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GANG POLICING: THE POST STOP-AND-FRISK
JUSTIFICATION FOR PROFILE-BASED POLICING
K. Babe Howell*
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INTRODUCTION

The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is about to follow a number of
other urban police departments down the well-worn path of gang policing. It does not take
this path because New York City has a significant gang problem. Gangs ranked last and
second-to-last among the causes of murder in the two years since the NYPD added the
category of "gangs" as a cause of murder to its annual reports.' Nor do gang-motivated
crimes account for even one percent of the crimes that take place in New York City each
year.2 Indeed, having recently transferred 300 new officers to the Gang Division,3 the
NYPD has more new police officers in the Gang Division than the 264 gang-motivated
crimes the NYPD identified in the 2013 fiscal year.5 With over six hundred police
officers dedicated to "Operation Crew Cut," announced in October 2012, the NYPD has
quadrupled its gang division at a time when shootings and homicides are lower than at any
time in the four decades since crime statistics have been maintained.6
Why would the NYPD commit more officers to gang policing than there are
gang-motivated crimes in New York City? Why would it quadruple its gang division in
two years during which violent crimes have reached the lowest level in recorded history?
The answer to these questions is that the class action challenging the NYPD's use
of stop-and-frisk7 threatened to foreclose the NYPD's ability to monitor youth of color in
the absence of crime based on appearance and geography. After years of stopping
suspicious people in high-crime areas, the NYPD is addicted to profile-based policing.
Since 2001, the NYPD has adopted a surveillance-based policing model in which the
millions of fruitless stops were a concern only because of the political and legal pressure
they created, not because of the violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. For the NYPD to relinquish the intensive policing of these
suspect populations is unthinkable. The NYPD is driven by crime statistics and believes
that aggressively policing a particular suspect class, which happens to be defined by race
and class, is the reason for crime decline. It does not matter that the crime decline began
before stop-and-frisk became the pervasive tactic it is today.8 Nor is this belief
undermined by the fact that crime has declined in cities across the country and around the
' NYPD, Murder in New York City, NYC.GOV, 3 (2011) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Murders 2011],
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysisand planning/201 1murder in nyc.pdf; NYPD, Murder
in
New
York
City,
NYC.GOV,
3
(2012)
[hereinafter
N.Y.C.
Murders
2012],
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysisand planning/murder in nyc_2012.pdf.
The
other
categories are Dispute/Revenge, Drug, Domestic, Robbery/Burglary, Unknown and Other.
2 NYPD, GangStat Reports (2005-12) [hereinafter GangStat Reports] (on file with the author). The GangStat
reports were provided to the author in response to a Freedom of Information Law request by NYPD Legal after
three years and a law suit.
3 Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Frisking Tactic Yields to Focus on Youth Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2013, at Al.
4 See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text for NYPD definitions of gang motivated and gang related
incidents.
N.Y.C.,
MAYOR'S
MANAGEMENT
REPORT
4
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/2013_mmr.pdf
6 N.Y.C, Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Kelly Announce 2013 Saw the Fewest Murders and
Fewest Shootings in Recorded City History at NYPD Graduation Ceremony, OFF. MAYOR: NEWS (Dec. 27,
2013),
http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/436-13/mayor-bloomberg-police-commissioner-kelly2013-saw-fewest-murders-fewest/#/0.
Floydv. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
8 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK'S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS
CONTROL 7-14 (2012)(showing New York City crime drops beginning in 1990); Eric P. Baumer & Kevin T.
Wolff, Evaluating Contemporary Crime Drop(s) in America, New York City andMany Other Places, 2012 Just.
Quarterly 1, 4-7 (2012)(demonstrating that for some crimes that the crime drop began prior to 1990).

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

10

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
2015]

GANG POLICING

3

world regardless of policing strategies.9
Like any organization that enjoys success utilizing a particular strategy, the
NYPD has enjoyed success in the form of declining crime during the last two decades
while policing minor crimes and makings millions of stops. To change strategies is
unthinkable. Thus, the NYPD's challenge in the face of loss of legal and political support
for stop-and-frisk policing is to create a new avenue for intensive surveillance of young
men of color in a manner that avoids legal review or political opposition.
This explains the NYPD's "new" focus on gang policing despite the fact that
gang crime in New York is low. As it became clear that the NYPD was losing the battle to
defend stop-and-frisk in the courtroom, the media, and the political arena, the NYPD
issued dire warnings about the dangers of gangs and began trumpeting the success of
"Operation Crew Cut."
Who is not afraid of gangs? Or of gang violence? Who could object to policing
focused on gang members? To date, no one has objected and the most important critics of
the misuse of stop-and-frisk policing - Mayor de Blasio, Police Commissioner Bratton,
and key city politicians such as Councilmember Jumaane Williams, have praised the shift
from overuse of stop-and-frisk to gang policing.10
The gang narrative, however, is essentially the same as the narrative used to
justify both the overuse of stop-and-frisk itself and the racial disparities that flowed from
stop-and-frisk. Rather than requiring actual criminality, each narrative turns on two core
concepts - place and person. Stop-and-frisk, according to the NYPD, was not directed at
youth of color but at high-crime places and suspicious people." Indeed, according to the
NYPD it protected the innocent people in these high-crime areas from the criminal
suspect. However, during the Floyd trial (a class action challenging the use of stop-andfrisk on Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection grounds), the empirical analysis of
crime-rates by census track showed that the NYPD carried out more stops in black and
Latino neighborhoods, whether crime levels were high or low. 12 Within these "highcrime" areas the NYPD focused on persons engaged in what they deemed to be suspicious
conduct even though 94% of these suspicious people were not arrested after being
stopped. 13 The interplay of cognitive biases about place and appearance provided profiles
that, to the police at least, obscured the lack of individualized suspicion and the racial
disparities. 14

9 ZIMRING supra note 8 at 15-18 (comparing New York City to other major U.S. cities); Baumer & Wolff supra

note 8 at19-25 (placing New York City crime drop in national and global context)..
0 Stephon Johnson, Stop-and-FriskMakes Way for Operation Crew Cut, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS (Sept. 26,
2013, 11:32 AM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2013/sep/26/stop-and-frisk-makes-way-operation-crew-cut/.
"Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
12 Id. at 560.
13 Id. at 660. Moreover, the New York State Attorney General's review of arrests resulting from stop-and-frisk
revealed that nearly half of these arrests did not result in conviction. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S
STOP-AND-FRISK
PRACTICES
3
(2013),
available
at

http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAGREPORTONSQF_-PRACTICES NOV 2013.pdf Further, about one in six
of these arrests were never even arraigned after being either voided by the NYPD itself or declined by the
prosecution. Id.
14 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Policing Character, and the FourthAmendment, 44 ARIZ. ST.

L.J. 267 (2012); James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race, FBI.GOV (Feb. 12,
2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race (noting that unconscious bias
and mental shortcuts drive different behavior and relationships between law enforcement and communities).
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The gang narrative, like the stop-and-frisk narrative, turns on the same core
concepts - place and person. Instead of characterizing neighborhoods as "high-crime," the
NYPD now indicate that an area has a "gang problem." Instead of stating that an
individual is suspicious, the NYPD now state that he or she is a suspected gang or crew
member. The gang narrative will be used, and has already been used, to justify an even
more aggressive regime of stops, summonses, arrests, and surveillance than the pre-Floyd
regime.1 5 The central concepts, however, like those underpinning the stop-and-frisk
narrative, are defined so broadly that they can capture any neighborhood or individual the
police deem suspicious. No criminal conduct whatsoever is required to be identified as a
gang member. The gang allegation provides a facially race-neutral means for policing the
usual suspects in the usual way. However, because gang databases and intelligence are
secret, this policing avoids both public and judicial scrutiny
This article takes on the task of challenging the NYPD's new gang narrative
before it takes root as a fully accepted justification for profile-based policing. The project
is imperative because studies of gang formation suggest that gang policing encourages
gang formation, hardens gang identity, and increases gang delinquency. 16 It is not
harmless to mistakenly identify and police individuals as gang members. Like the
narrative that justifies stop-and-frisk, the gang narrative can obscure reality. Labeling
individuals as gang members, trumpeting gang policing in the media, attributing crime
decline to gang policing, and highlighting the relatively rare gang-motivated offenses to
gain support for intensive policing exacerbates the adversarial, suspicion, and fear-based
relationship between the police and youth of color. Further, gang policing affects
communities as well as suspected gang members.
Part I of this article examines the NYPD's crime statistics for New York City,
demonstrating that claims of increasing gang crime are inconsistent with policemaintained data. Part II examines the relation of Floyd to Operation Crew Cut, and links
the Operation Crew Cut narrative to the creation of "moral panics" based on alleged gang
crime in other jurisdictions in the United States. Part III provides background relating to
the challenge of defining gangs and identifying gang members, as well as the definitions
used by the NYPD to certify gang membership for inclusion in their databases. Part IV
explores the harms that flow from using the gang category to justify police intrusions.
Among these harms are violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment such as those
found in the Floyd case. Additionally, the gang narrative is even more damaging to fabric
of vulnerable communities because the narrative creates fear and condemnation that can
encourage and reinforce gang ties and potentially increase gang violence. Finally, in Part
V, I will examine existing alternatives to address gangs and gang violence.
The Floyd decision and the acceptance of its findings by the Mayor and the
Police Commissioner and the joint remedial process all provide an opportunity for the
NYPD to break its addiction to profile-based policing. The addiction will only be
overcome, however, if the NYPD does not adopt malleable "suspected gang member" or
"crew member" profiles to continue race, place, and appearance based profiling. If the
NYPD successfully advances an exaggerated narrative relating to gang and crew violence
in New York City, suppression of informal youth groupings may give rise to a more
See infra Part IV.A below for description of gang policing.
FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 10 (2000 ed., originally
published in 1927) (noting that the transformation from informal peer group to gang is often precipitated by
oppositional encounters, whether with other groups or with the police); Stephanie A. Wiley & Finn-Aage
Esbensen, The Effect of Police Contact: Does Official Intervention Result in Deviance Amplification?, CRIME
DELINQ., July 12, 2013, at 1, available at http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/05/23/0011128713492496.
'

&

1
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pervasive and persistent gang problem and will certainly perpetuate profile-based rather
than offense-based policing.
Although this article addresses the particular example of the NYPD's reliance on
the gang narrative, the issue is one of national significance. Police departments across the
United States have developed gang units and committed their forces to gang policing. Law
enforcement and prosecutors have pushed for civil injunctions and enhanced criminal
penalties, even as researchers demonstrate that youth typically mature out of gangs and
delinquent groups and that negative police contact increases rather than decreases
delinquency and gang ties. In an era of declining crime, the rise of intensive and secret
surveillance of youth based on profiles, the intensive policing of these youth for minor
offenses, and the imposition of extensive sentences based on theories of conspiracy and
accomplice liability threaten to extend racial disparities in mass-incarceration into the
indefinite future. At a moment when the overuse of stop-and-frisk and intensive Broken
Windows policing of minor offenses have come to the fore as issues of racial justice, the
expansion of gang policing initiatives extends the use of these very same techniques
against the same suspect populations, while avoiding oversight and transparency. When
police-community relations are strained by instances of excessive force against youth of
color, the propagation of narratives about gang-involved youth of color as the source of
most violent crime can only heighten the stressful and explosive nature of police contacts
with youth of color. Thus, every jurisdiction can benefit from an objective examination of
the data supporting the need for gang policing, and an evidence-based evaluation of the
actual outcomes of broad police-led suppression efforts, narrowly tailored anti-violence
efforts, and non-law-enforcement alternatives to addressing youth violence.
I. GANG CRIME As PRETEXT
The dramatic nature of youth crime and the quasi-mythical construction of gang
crime gives rise to a belief that gang crime is far more common than it actually is and that
young vulnerable children are recruited into gangs where they engage in violent crime.
More importantly, the conflation of gangs and gang membership with violent crime
creates the misimpression that gang membership alone is a proxy for violent criminality.
To assess the narrative that attributes large proportions of violent crime to gangs, it is
necessary to attempt to disentangle myth from reality.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to make clear that I do not claim that
there is no gang-related crime or problems with youth violence and conflicts in New York
City. New York City has always had gangs and will likely always have gangs."
18
Nonetheless, New York City has a far smaller gang problem than other large cities.
Moreover, a convincing case has been made that New York City's lack of organized gangs
and its minimal gang violence is because New York used non-law enforcement
approaches to address gangs and gang violence in the past. 19 In jurisdictions where gang
violence has been used to justify additional resources for broad law enforcement-based
" ERIC C. SCHNEIDER, VAMPIRES, DRAGONS, AND EGYPTIANS KINGS: YouTH GANGS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK

(1999).
" See infra Part I.B for New York City data on gang offenses. See also NAT'L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL
GANG

THREAT

ASSESSMENT:

EMERGING

TRENDS

47

(2011),

available

at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-

services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/201 1-national-gang-threat-assessment-emergingtrends (reporting that New York State is in the lowest category for gang violence in the range of zero to two gang
crimes per 1,000 people).
19 Judith Greene & Kevin Pranis, Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective
Public Safety Strategies, JUST. POL'Y INST., July 2007, at 33-39, http://wwwjusticepolicy.org/images/upload/0707_REPGangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf.
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suppression strategies, gang membership and gang violence have increased. 2 0 Therefore,
before arming the NYPD to engage in aggressive surveillance of and crackdowns on
loosely organized "crews" of young people, it is necessary to examine the evidence that
such "crews" are a major source of violence in New York City.21
A. NationalCrime Trends Versus Reported Gang Threat
To put it mildly, law enforcement reports of a growing gang menace in the
United States are in significant tension with the dramatic decline of violent crime across
the United States. Between 1993 and 2010, the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) has documented a decline in serious violent crime victimization of 77%.22 The
Federal Bureau of Investigations' Uniform Crime Reports provide law enforcement
figures that similarly document a decline in the rate of violent crime of 51% between 1993
and 2012.23 According to the NCVS, only 6% of victims of violent felonies between 1998
24
and 2003 perceived the perpetrator to be a gang member. This perception is consistent
with FBI homicide reports, which classify about 5-7% of homicides as gang-related
between 1993-2003. 25 Despite claims that gangs are corrupting ever more and ever
younger youth, the rates of violence crime among youth under 18 appears to have declined
26
more dramatically than rates for adults during the last decade. This is the case even in a
27
state like California, which reports high numbers of gangs and gang members. In
California, juvenile violent offense rates are lower than at any time during the sixty years
281
that statistics have been kept. Indeed, the juvenile crime rates in the 1950s were 2.5
in
times higher than they were 2011.29
The perception that gang violence is an ever-growing problem is fed by official
law enforcement pronouncements. For example, according to the 2011 National Gang
Threat Assessment published by the FBI, gangs and gang violence are a growing problem.
In fact, the FBI's National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) estimates a 40% increase in
id.
As discussed below at note 53 a "crew" would certainly fit the NYPD's definition of
a gang. Furthermore,
Operation Crew Cut officers are in the Gang Division. It is therefore assumed that crew violence should be
captured in reports of gang violence in New York City.
20
21

22

JANET

L. LAURISTEN & MARBETH L. REZEY, BJS, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY 5 (2013),

available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpcncvs.pdf ("The rate of serious violent victimization-rape
and sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault-declined 77%, from 29.1 per 1,000 in 1993 to 6.6 per 1,000
in 2010."). All violent victimization fell by 76%. Id. at 1.
23 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, tbl. 1 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_inthe_unitedstates by volumeandrateper 100000 inhabitants_1993-2012.xls (reporting NCVS statistics reflecting both reported and
unreported crime while the UCR provides statistics based on reported crime only).
24

ERIKA

HARRELL,

BJS,

VIOLENCE

BY

GANG

MEMBERS

1993-2003

(2005),

available

at

http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=695 (providing estimates of the number and rate of violent
crimes committed by offenders that victims perceived to be members of gangs based on the National Crime
Victimization Survey data from 1998-2003: 55% of victims reported that perpetrators were not gang members,
37% did not know).
25id
26

Id. at tbl. 32, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-

2012/tables/32tabledatadecoverviewpdf.
27 NAT'L GANG INTEL. CTR., supra note 18, at 47 (placing California among the five states with the highest
prevalence of gang membership in the country).
28 David Pimental, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and PunishingJuveniles as Adults in an Era ofExtended
Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 92 (2013); Mike Males, California Youth Crime Plunges to All-Time
Low,

CENTER

ON

Juv.

&

CRIM.

JUST.,

Oct.

http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/CA-_YouthCrime_2011.pdf
consistently since 1954).
29 Males, supra note
28, at 1.
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active gang members-from one million to approximately 1.4 million-between between
2009 and 2011.30 According to the law enforcement sources that provide information to
the NGIC, these gang members were responsible for an average of 48% of violent crime
in most jurisdictions and as much as 98% of violent crimes in some jurisdictions. 31
The notion that gangs are growing exponentially in number and membership and
are responsible for the majority of violent crime is nearly impossible to reconcile with the
fact that violent crime, and indeed all crime, is down throughout the country. 3 2 Some
aspect or aspects of the law enforcement gang and crime narrative is awry. Either the gang
problem is exaggerated or crime declines reported to the UCR are illusory. While there are
certainly some sources that suggest that, in the age of computerized crime statistics, there
is some pressure to downgrade and underreport serious crimes, 33 the sharp decline in
homicide numbers (which are not easily susceptible to manipulation) and the substantial
decline in reports of victimization recorded by the NCVS confirm that crime has
decreased by nearly 80% in the past two decades. 34
Before attempting to explain the impetus for exaggerating the extent and danger
posed by gangs in the United States, we will turn to the specific case of New York City
crime trends and gang offenses.
B. New York City Crime and Gang Trends

New York City, like the entire country, has experienced declining crime in the
past two decades. New York has been at the forefront of this trend, boasting crime
declines of nearly 80% for violent crime between 1990 and 2014.35

Despite the overall drop in violent crime and drops in youth crime, the NYPD has
recently taken to the media and attributed 40% of recent shootings to loosely organized
"crews" of "dozens of 12- to 20-year- olds with names such as Very Crispy Gangsters,
True Money Gang and Cash Bama Bullies." 36
These attributions are at odds with the NYPD's statistics for crime, shootings,
and homicides in New York City.
First, according to the NYPD's GangStat Reports which were obtained pursuant
to a FOIL request, less than 1% of all crime in New York City is "gang-related" and only

NAT'L GANG INTEL. CTR., supra note 18, at 11 (attributing the increase in gang membership to both improved
reporting and "more aggressive recruitment efforts by gangs").
31 Id. at 9.
32 FBI, supra note 23.
30

3 JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT BY MANPULATION 170

(2012); Dean Scoville, What's Really Going on With Crime Rates, POLICE: L. ENFORCEMENT MAG. (Oct. 09,
2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2013/10/what-s-really-going-on-with-crime-rates.aspx
("[C]reat[ing] an illusion of vulnerability, or strength, depending on one's agenda") (discussing history of
manipulating statistics to either undercount or overcount offenses).
34 LAURISTEN & REZEY, supra note 22, at 1.

See NYPD, CompStat Report Covering the Week 1/19/2015 Through 1/25/2015, NYC.GOV,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crimestatistics/cscity.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015) [hereinafter
CompStat Report] (recording a 79.76% drop between 1990 and 2014 in crime categories used by the FBI
Uniform Crime Reporting Program).
3
Associated Press, Teen Crews Linked to 40 Percent of NYC Shootings, TOWNHALL (May 1, 2014),
http://townhall.com/news/us/2014/05/01/teen-crews-linked-to--40-percent-of-nyc-shootings-nl831975. See also
Goldstein & Goodman, supra note 3 (attributing 30% of all shootings in recent years to crews based on
Commissioner Kelly's announcement of Operation Crew Cut in 2012).
3
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a small fraction of that crime is "gang motivated" .37 A gang-related crime is a crime
committed by any gang member or any suspected gang member whether or not the crime
has anything to do with the gang. 38 A gang-motivated crime is one that is done to benefit a
gang or because of gang rivalries within or among gangs. 3 9 Table 1 provides the number
of gang-related and gang motivated crimes as reported in NYPD GangStats reports from
2005 - 2012. The statistics demonstrate that NYPD attributed less than 1% of major
categories of felony crimes 40 in New York City to gang members through 2012.
Table 1: NYPD GangStats 2005-2012
Year

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Gang Related Crime
Total
(percentage
of
all
crime)

41

Gang Motivated Crime
Total
(percentage
of all
crime

907 (0.68%)
1111 (0.87%)
1009 (0.84%)
943 (0.82%)
1006 (0.99%)
1001 (0.99%)
990 (0.98%)
1014 (0.95%)

235 (0.17%)
321 (0.25%)
280 (0.23%)
189 (0.16%)
134 (0.13%)
157 (0.16%)
143 (0.14%)
99 (0.09%)

All Crimes

133,774
127,478
119,841
114,487
102,054
101,127
101,220
106,866

The rarity of gang crime in New York City is confirmed by the NYPD's
contribution to the annual Mayor's Management Report. For each of the past five years,
the NYPD has provided statistics for "Gang Motivated Incidents" which have been
published in the Mayor's Management Report.4 3 Table 2, below reproduces these numbers
for fiscal years 2009 - 2013.
Table 2: NYPD's "Gang Motivated Incidents" 44
FY09
335

FY10
228

FY11
303

FY12
310

FY13
264

Gang-related and gang-motivated crimes account for a greater percentage of
shootings and homicides than of all felony crime, however, the contribution to these

GangStat Reports, supra note 2. Given the NYPD's broad definition of "gangs" a crew engaged in violent
crime or shooting should be captured in these statistics. See infra text accompanying note 53.
3

38

NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212-13: REPORTING GANG RELATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 1 (2000)

("Gang Related Incident[:] Any incident of unlawful conduct by a gang member or suspected gang member."
(emphasis added)).
Id ("Gang Motivated Incident[:] Any gang related incident that is done primarily:
a. To benefit or further the interests of the gang, or
b. As part of an initiation, membership rite, or act of allegiance to or support for a gang, or
c. As a result of a conflict or fight between gang members of the same or different gangs.")
40 See infra note 42 for the major crimes included in "All Crimes" in the GangStat Reports.
4' GangStat Reports, supra note 2.
42 "All Crimes" include: homicides, non-fatal shootings, rape, robbery, felony assaults, burglary, grand larceny,
grand larceny auto. GangStats are provided on a weekly basis, thus the numbers for each year are based on the
last full reporting week of the year. Id.
43 N.Y.C., supra note 5, at 4.
44id
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categories of crimes is nowhere near the 40% that the NYPD has recently been attributing
to "crews." Regarding homicides, the NYPD published annual reports on Murder in New
York City until 2012. Like the published statistics for "Gang Motivated Incidents," the
murder statistics contradict the assertion that gang-like groups are responsible for a
significant portion of homicides. Gangs were not even included as a potential cause of
homicides until 2011, and in that year only 5% of the 515 homicides In New York City
were attributed to gangs.45 (Except for the category "Other," this was the lowest of all
categories of homicides in that year). In 2012, 9% of a total of 419 homicides were
attributed to gangs.46
The NYPD's GangStat figures attribute an even smaller percentage - between
2.6 to 5.8%- of shootings and homicides to "gang-motivated" incidents. Table 3 provides
this data for the years from 2005 through 2012.

Table 3: "Gang Motivated" Shootings and Homicides
Year

Gang
Motivated
Shootings
(percentage
of
all
shootings)

Gang
Motivated
Homicide
(percentage
of
all
homicides)

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

36 (2.3%)
49 (3.1%)
31 (2.2%)
43 (2.9%)
41 (2.9%)
57 (3.9%)
62(4.2%)
38 (2.8%)

27 (5.0%)
18 (3.1%)
13 (2.6%)
15 (2.9%)
27 (5.8%)
21 (4.0%)
14(2.8%)
12 (2.9%)

Shootings

1533
1567
1441
1497
1407
1452
1482
1372

Homicides

540
590
492
512
460
520
497
415

As would be expected, the NYPD categorizes a higher percentage of shootings
and homicides as "gang related." A gang-related shooting or homicide would capture all
incidents involving actual or suspected gang members even if the shooting/homicide
clearly is attributable to a non-gang motive such as domestic violence. Even using this
broader category, 80 to 85% of shootings and homicides are not gang-related.
Table 4: "Gang Related" Shootings and Homicides
Year

Gang Related
Shootings
(percentage
of
all
shootings)

Gang Related
Homicide
(percentage
of
all
homicides)

2005
2006
2007

186 (12.1%)
198 (12.6%)
201 (13.9%)

82 (15.2%)
90 (15.3%)
76 (15.4%)

48

Shootings

1533
1567
1441

Homicides

540
590
492

N.Y.C. Murders 2011, supra note 1, at 3.
N.Y.C. Murders 2012, supra note 1, at 3.
47 GangStat Reports, supra note 2.
48 id.
4
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2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

220(14.7%)
254(18.1%)
300 (18.8%)
286(19.3%)
283 (17.6%)

81 (15.8%)
80(17.4%)
98 (20.7%)
96 (19.3%)
73 (20.6%)

1497
1407
1452
1482
1372
1100 49

512
460
520
497
415
335
33350

Like gang-related crime, the NYPD estimates of new gang members do not
appear to suggest a new gang menace. Each year from 2000 through 2012, the NYPD
added from 850 to 1600 new alleged gang members to its database. Indeed, in 2011, the
year before Operation Crew Cut was announced, the NYPD certified nearly 30% fewer
new gang members than it had earlier in the decade. 2012 had even fewer additions to the
gang database, and if the last four months of 2013 were consistent with the first eight
months, the number of gang members added in that year would have been only about 700,
a 30% drop from the 2012 low.
Table 5: Individuals added to NYPD Gang Database 2005-2013

Year

52

Individuals added to
Gang Database

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 (through August 30, 2013)

1419
1542
1419
1381
1555
1614
1144
1104
470

The NYPD might assert that it has not historically categorized crime by crews as
gang crimes or included "crew" members in gang statistics. However, under the NYPD
definitions of gangs, there can be no doubt that loosely organized "crews" that commit 40
percent of violent crimes, would fall into the category of gangs. It would be immaterial
that such a group had no defined hierarchy or leadership. Furthermore, individual criminal
behavior is enough to qualify such a group as a gang; collective criminal action is not
required. The NYPD Patrol Guide, 212-13, provides the following definition:
GANG - Any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary
activities, the commission of one or more criminal acts, having a
Edgar Sandoval & Tina Moore, New York City Murders Drop 200% but Not All Denizens Feel Safe, N.Y.
DALY NEWS (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nyc-murders-drop-20-2013not-feels-safe-article-1.1561930 (noting that there were 333 homicides and only 1100 shootings, nearly a 20
percent drop in both categories between 2012 and 2013, and quoting the NYPD as attributing this decline in part
to Operation Crew Cut).
5o CompStatReport,supra note 30. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Murders in New York Drop to a Record Law
But OfficersAren't Celebrating,N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2014, at Al (noting there were 328 homicides in 2014).
" Gang Members Entered by Month, NYPD statistics January 2001 - August 2013, provided by NYPD Legal in
response
to FOIL request.
52
id.
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common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a
pattern of criminal gang activity.5 3
Any "crew" of youths committing violent crimes with a name like "Very Crispy
Gangsters" would certainly be considered a gang within this definition.
Operation Crew Cut has resulted in the quadrupling of the Gang Division from
150 officers to 600 in just four years. The narrative attached to it is that of an emerging
form of criminality - a "shifted paradigm," as Deputy Harrington phrased it when
addressing the City Council in hearings on Operation Crew Cut. 5 4 Shootings have
remained remarkably consistent during the past decade and dropped precipitously in 2013
to 1093 shootings for the year. 5 If crews have emerged as a new threat committing 40%
of shootings, all other offenders in New York City must have very abruptly reformed
substantially. Alternatively, the NYPD has simply chosen to re-label or exaggerate the
threat of violence by crews. 5 6
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION CREW CUT AND THE STOP AND FRISK
LITIGATION

The narrative that "crews" of young people are responsible for a large percentage
of shootings in New York City was first advanced by Police Commissioner Raymond
Kelly in October of 2012, when he announced Operation Crew Cut.5 7 This announcement
came just months after an order in Floyd v. City of New York granting class certification
to:
All persons who since January 31, 2005 have been, or in the future will
be subjected to the New York Police Department's policies and/or
widespread customs or practices of stopping, or stopping and frisking
persons . . . in violation of the Fourth Amendment, including persons
stopped or stopped and frisked on the basis of being Black or Latino in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause....
The decision accompanying the order was twenty pages long, included extensive
references to the discovery materials, and laid out the basis for concluding that the class of
individuals described by the plaintiffs in Floyd represented hundreds of thousands of New

5 NYPD PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212-13, supra note 38, at 1.

N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Pub. Safety, Oversight: The NYPD 's Operation Crew Cut and Crime Reduction
Strategies
for
NYCHA,
N.Y.C.
COUNCIL
(Apr.
28,
2014,
1:00
PM),
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/MeetingDetail.-aspx?ID=304831&GUID=66D6AF49-65A7-4AA8-851EDA8755D55FED&Options=infol&Search=. Deputy Harrington's comment occurs at 1:15:16 in the hearing
video.
Sandoval & Moore, supra note 49.
See Mercer L. Sullivan, Maybe We Shouldn't Study "Gangs": Does Reification Obscure Youth Violence?, 21
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 170 (2005) for a discussion of how labeling can increase the perception of gang
problems in the absence of increased criminality. Mercer explains why the supposed proliferation of national
gangs in New York in the 1990s did not increase serious youth crime but merely relabeled existing beefs. Id.
" Richard Esposito, New York's Kelly Plans "Crew Cut" for Gang Members, WORLD NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/nypd-plans-crew-cut-gang-members/story?id=17370903&singlePage=true;
Daniel
5

Beekman, Bronx Community Leaders Praise New NYPD Anti-gang Initiative, Argue More Youth ProgramsAre
Also Needed: NYPD Gang Division to Double in Size in Intensive Effort to Stem Shootings, N.Y. DALY NEWS

(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/city-top-raymond-kelly-announces-operationcrew-cut-article-1. 1173045.
5 Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification, May 16, 2012).
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Yorkers of color, who faced a heightened risk of being stopped, frisked, and subjected to
use of force in violation of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 9 A trial date
was also set, but with the certification of the class, the NYPD's stop and frisk activity
declined for the first time in decades. While the NYPD were on track in the first quarter of
2012 to exceed the 685,000 stops they made in 2011, by the end of the year only 533,000

stops were reported (a 22% drop).60 In 2013, the number of reported stops plunged to
about 190,000.61

Furthermore, in contrast to dire predictions that crime would increase if the
NYPD were not permitted to continue the regime of stop and frisks, homicides dropped
nearly 20% between 2011 and 2012 (from 515 to 419), and another 20% between 2012

and 2013 (from 419 to 335).62 As the weekly CompStat data came through in the fall of
2012, a thinking person might have concluded that the intensive policing of innocent
young men of color really was not responsible for the drop in crime.
There can be no doubt that in October 2012, when Commissioner Kelly
announced that "crews" were responsible for at least 30% of shootings in New York City
and that the NYPD was doubling the number of officers in the Gang Division to police
63
these youth, he was aware that homicides would likely drop to a historic low in 2012.
The NYPD also faced an upcoming trial based on assertions of racial profiling and
unconstitutional stops.64 The announcement of a new menace to society, however,
together with frightening rhetoric about kids who would hurt you for invading their turf,65
served both to give the NYPD a new justification for intensively policing young men of
color and to overshadow any argument that stop and frisk was not a deterrent to crime.
In his announcement of Operation Crew Cut, Commissioner Kelly defined the
problem as "not . .

large, established gangs such as the Bloods and Crips, but .

.

. the

looser associations of younger men who identify themselves by the block they live on, or
,,66
on which side of a housing development they reside".
Although, feuding crews did exist
and do cause problems, the NYPD was already collaborating with the District Attorneys
and federal prosecutors and its Gang Division was already collecting evidence on crews
that were in active conflict. The new resources poured into the Gang Division via
Operation Crew Cut allowed an expansion of intensive policing of individuals based on
the block or housing development where they reside beyond the investigation of these
67
existing conflicts. No increase in crime accounted for the massive increase of resources
into Operation Crew Cut.
The use of the gang menace to create a moral panic
59

68

and increase support for

Id. at 158-78.

Racial Justice: Stop-and-Frisk Data, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data
May 1, 2015).
6o

(last visited

"'Id
62 Historical New York City Crime Data: Citywide Seven Major Felony Offenses 2000 2014, NYPD

http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/excel/analysisand planning/seven major felonyoffenses_2000_20
14.xls (last visited May 1, 2015).
6 Beekman, supra note 57.
64
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. 153.
6' Esposito, supra note 57 (quoting Commissioner Kelly as reporting that crews' "rivalries are based not on
narcotics trafficking or some other entrepreneurial interest, but simply on local turf.")
66 Rocco Parascandola, NYPD to Double Gang Division to Combat Street Violence: Commissioner Kelly, N.Y.
DALY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-double-gang-division-article1.1172347.
67

id.

6' See generally STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (3d ed. 2002) (updating the seminal 1972
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intensive profile-based policing is a well-established policing tactic.6 9 In studies across the
country, law enforcement has been able to push through legislation and obtain resources
and support by providing the media with stories recounting increased gang crime
violence.70 The media is not necessarily a victim in the creation of moral panic but may
benefit commercially from sensational and disproportionate coverage of youth and gang
violence, which in turn reshapes public opinion and criminal justice policy as well.7 1
While moral panics may involve any type of deviant behavior, they have been used
extensively to highlight the risk of youth gang violence even in an era when youth gang is
declining.72
In a moral panic, the public, the media, and politicians reinforce
each other in an escalating pattern of intense and disproportionate
concern in response to a perceived social threat posed by a particular
group of individuals. . . . Although sometimes the targeted enemy poses
an imaginary threat (the Salem "witches," for example), more often a
moral panic focuses on individuals who do real harm, such as sexual
abusers or members of criminal street gangs. . . . But what distinguishes
a moral panic from an effort to deal with a pressing social problem is
the gap between the perception of the problem and the reality. In a
moral panic, the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders
are greatly exaggerated.7 3
While the predominant narrative throughout the Bloomberg/Kelly era was that
the NYPD had made New York the safest city in the world, by the fall of 2012 the press
started publishing more and more stories about local crews, suggesting that New York
was, in fact, a city facing new dangers.74 These stories had always existed, but the threat
book on the moral panic generated around conflicts between the Mods and Rockers in 1960s England); CHARLES
KRINSKY ET AL., THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MORAL PANICS, (Charles Krinksy ed., 2013)

(providing an overview by various authors of types of moral panics, the role of media, and the impact on
governance).
6 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 108-12 (2008) (discussing

the passage of Proposition 21 in California based on a moral panic about juvenile crime); John M. Hagedorn,
Gang Violence in the PostindustrialEra, 24 CRIME & JUST. 365, 376 (1998) (noting the tendency to construct
male gangs as deviant during moral panics); Maijorie Zatz, Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of a
Moral Panic, 11 CONTEMP. CRISES 129 (1987); Maijorie Zatz, Los Cholos: Legal Processing of Chicano Gang
Members, 33 SOC. PROBS. 13 (1985).
70 See Richard C. McCorkle & Terance D. Miethe, The Political and OrganizationalResponse to Gangs: An
Examination of a "Moral Panic" in Nevada, 15 JUST. Q. 41 (1998); Carol A. Archbold & Michael Meyer,
Anatomy of a Gang Suppression Unit: The Social Construction of an Organizational Response to Gang

Problems, 2 POLICE Q. 184, 189-98 (1999) (recounting a particularly dramatic response to a moral panic caused
by a single homicide in a town 80 miles away in response to which police in a midsized Midwestern town
redefined all crime committed by anyone under 18 as "gang related" and thereby "document" a gang problem
that required resources to establish a gang suppression unit).
" Sara Sun Beale, The News Media'sInfluence on CriminalJustice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes

Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 397-98 (2006).
72 David Pimental, supra note 28, at 92 (discussing how fear of juvenile violence has driven us to punish
American youth as adults, even in the face of historic lows in juvenile crime); Jodi Lane, Fear ofGang Crime: A
Qualitative Examination of the Four Perspectives, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 437 (2002) (presenting several
theoretical models that might explain why fear of gang violence in parts of Southern California exceeds the
actual danger of gang violence).
7
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 69, at 109-10 (linking moral panic over youth crime to the adoption of
Proposition 21 which required many juveniles to be tried as adults, barred sealing of juvenile records, and
extended prison terms for gang-related crimes. Concluding that "Proposition 21 was adopted by a "public who
inaccurately thought that youths were responsible for most crime and that juvenile crime was on the rise.").
7 For a cluster of articles in mainstream liberal media focusing on the threat of a new type of youth violence and
the NYPD's response that came out within weeks of the gang raid in June 2014 see, for example, Mosi Secret,
On
the
Brink
in
Brownsville,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.,
May
1,
2014,
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and the number of offenses were exaggerated. In the fall of 2013, Commissioner Kelly
expressly linked the shift from stop-and-frisk policing to policing of crews, when he
announced a second doubling of the size of the NYPD's Gang Division. By highlighting
a new threat,76 he was able to garner support for a form of policing that differs more in
form than in substance from the prior regime of profile-based stop-and-frisk. Even the
biggest critics of stop-and-frisk policing expressed approval for focusing police resources
on "crews" who were responsible for forty percent of shootings, despite the fact that only
isolated stories support this narrative. Under the new police commissioner and the de
Blasio administration the commitment to Operation Crew Cut has continued unabated.78
The larger concern raised by this paper, however, is the fact that there is no
definition for "crews," no transparency about who will be considered a possible crew or
gang member. Examined closely, policing kids because of associations based on where
they live, is not fundamentally different from the stop and frisk regime. Indeed, policing of
gangs and crews is more worrisome. First, stop-and-frisk policing is subject to Fourth
Amendment requirements and gives rise to occasional review in either criminal or civil
cases. Second, gang policing relies on police-developed secret lists, secret surveillance,
secret criteria, and is not governed by either constitutional or statutory requirements.
Finally, the crew/gang label can be used to justify even harsher treatment than a stop-andfrisk, both for those who are labeled as crew members and for those who associate with
alleged crew members either in public or in private.
In the following section the lack of meaningful definitions for gangs, the lack of
process, and the vague criteria for certifying gang membership will be reviewed.
III. THE NYPD's GANG DEFINITIONS AND DATABASE
In May of 2010, the NYCLU filed a lawsuit, Lino v. City of New York,

challenging the NYPD's practice of maintaining an electronic database containing
information relating to every individual that the NYPD stopped or stopped and frisked,
even when the stop did not result in a summons or arrest.7 9 The public outrage that the
NYPD was keeping an electronic database with identifying information on innocent New
Yorkers was widespread.so On July 16, 2010, less than two months after the database was
challenged, the criminal procedure law was amended to prohibit the maintenance of an
electronic database containing identifying information for individuals stopped and
"released without further legal action." 1 Lino was settled in August 2013, when the City
agreed to remove information from the database relating to people whose cases were

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/on-the-brink-in-brownsville.html; Eric Konigsberg, Woo Cho
Bang Bang, NYMAG.COM (June 19, 2014), http://nymag.com/news/features/brownsville-2014-6/; Matthew
McKnight,
De
Blasio's
Violent-Crime
Challenges,
NEW
YORKER
(July
9,
2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/de-blasios-violent-crime-challenges
(interviewing Jeffrey Fagan
about the alleged increase in violent crime to 2014).
" Goldstein & Goodman, supra note 3.
* See Esposito supra note 57.
n Johnson, supra note 10 (indicating that Operation Crew Cut had the backing of stop-and-frisk critics, Bill de
Blasio and Jumaane Williams).
7 J. David Goodman & Joseph Goldstein, Bratton Takes Helm of Police Force He Pledged to Change, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 2, 2014, A14.
79
Lino v. City of New York, 958 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (App. Div. 2012).
o Rocco Parascandola, Gov. PatersonSigns Law ForcingNYPD to Delete Stop and FriskDatabase,N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (July 16, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/gov-paterson-signs-law-forcing-nypd-deletestop-frisk-database-article-1.46791 1.
" N.Y. CPL §140.50(4) (McKinney 2010).
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subsequently dismissed or resolved with no criminal conviction.8

2

Where the legislation closes a door, however, gang policing opens a window
(albeit, a pre-existing window). Although it is not a crime to be in a gang,8 3 law
enforcement agencies across the country have started to maintain extensive databases of
gang members or associates and suspected gang members and associates. 8 4 There is no
right to notice or procedure for challenging inclusion in gang databases." The challenge
of defining gangs has been one that has long plagued researchers, law enforcement, courts,
and scholars. Thus, there are no generally accepted definitions for gangs and no
universally applicable method for determining gang membership.86 Nonetheless, there are
commonalities in the definitions used by law enforcement in the United States for defining
gangs and, more importantly, for "certifying" gang membership or association for the
purpose of collecting intelligence on suspected gang members. 7
The most important commonality is that there is no jurisdiction that requires
proof (or even reasonable suspicion) of any criminality on the part of an individual in
order to certify him as a gang member or associate." Instead, individuals can be certified
as gang members or associates, based on appearance, association, location, law
enforcement "intelligence," or informants. There is no notification of inclusion in gang
databases and no right to challenge inclusion.
Thus, although the NYPD cannot maintain electronic data on those stopped-andfrisked but not arrested or given a summons, the NYPD gang database allows the NYPD
to maintain identifying data, including name, address, and social security number on
individuals without even a pretense of reasonable suspicion.90 Indeed, the NYPD gang
database does not require any information regarding criminality whatsoever. The criteria
used by the NYPD to "qualify" an individual as an "Identified Gang Member" were
provided to the author January 7, 2014, in response to a FOIL request filed on September
2, 2011.91 The criteria are listed on the Intelligence Division (I.D.S.) Gang Entry Sheet,
and an individual can be certified in any of the following three ways:

82

NYCLU Settlement Ends NYPD Practice ofKeeping New Yorkers in Stop-and-FriskDatabase, NYCLU (Aug.

7, 2013), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nyclu-settlement-ends-nypd-practice-of-keeping-new-yorkers-stop-andfrisk-database.
83 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1939).
84 For examples of typical criteria for inclusion in gang databases
see NAT'L GANG CTR., BRIEF REVIEW OF
FEDERAL AND STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS "GANG," "GANG CRIME," AND "GANG MEMBER" (2012),

available at https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Definitions.pdf.
8 Joshua D. White, The ConstitutionalFailureofGang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 115, 118 (2005). One
recent exception to this general rule is California which passed legislation granting notice and an opportunity to
challenge gang designation to parents or guardians and minors under the age of 18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34
(West 2014).
8 K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself The Impact ofAllegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-TrialDetention, 23 ST.
THoMAS L. REv. 620, 643-47 (2011).
NAT'L GANG CTR., supra note 84, at 2-3.
Id. at 3-8. Of the seven states that have legislative criteria for identifying gang members and associates, none
requires any criminal conviction or arrest. Instead, each requires that two or more criteria of a list be met. The list
typically includes such items as, self-admission, dress, tattoos, correspondence with gang members, and the
rather circular "identified as criminal street gang members by law enforcement." Id. As discussed below,
Minnesota has a database that requires a gross misdemeanor conviction but it also has second database that does
not require criminality. See text infra at note 104-110.
89 See sources cited supranote 85.
90 The NYPD does not share its database with the federal government or others. E-mail Response from N.Y.C.
Police Dep't Legal Bureau to author, (March 24, 2014) (on file with author). Therefore it is not bound by 28
C.F.R. § 23.20 which requires reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct or activity and compliance reviews every
five years for shared intelligence databases. 28 C.F.R. § 23.20 (2015).
9 NYPD, I.D.S. GANG ENTRY SHEET (obtained by FOIL from NYPD, on file with the author).
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An individual will be entered if he/she admits to membership
during debriefing OR
Through the course of an investigation an individual is reasonably
believed to belong to a gang and is identified as such by two
independent sources. (Ex. Pct. Personnel, Intell, School Safety,
Dept. of Correction, or Outside Agency) . . OR
Meets any Two below mentioned criteria
o
Known gang Location
o
Scars/Tattoos Associated w/ Gangs
o
Gang Related Documents
o
Colors Associated w/ Gangs
o
Association w/ Known Gang members
Hand Signs Associated with Gangs 9 2
o

-

None of the three methods for certifying gang members and adding them to the NYPD's
database requires any arrest or criminal conduct.93 Nor is there any requirement or
provision for notifying individuals that they are included in gang databases or for purging
names from gang databases. 9 4 For the period covered by the FOIL request (January 2001
August 2013), the NYPD Legal Bureau responded that they could locate no documents
related to maintenance or guidelines regarding purging of the database.
As of August 30, 2013, the NYPD's Gang Database included over 20,000
individuals. 96 Of the 21,537 who were added between January 2001 and August 30, 2013,
just one percent (212 individuals) of those entered into the gang database were categorized
as Caucasian or white. Approximately 48% of the individuals added to the database
between 2003 and 2013 were identified by the NYPD as black, another 42% Hispanic,
nearly 8% "unidentified" and less than 4% were female.9 " About 30% were under 18 years
of age when they were added to database.99 Because of widely accepted narratives
regarding gang membership, these percentages may not strike the reader as underrepresentative of white or female gang membership or over-inclusive of black and Latinos.
However, criminologist and youth gang researchers find that gang membership is rare
among all races but substantially more common among white youth than law enforcement
statistics estimates, with white gang members accounting for 25% or more of all gang
members.100
92

d.

93 This is typical of gang databases across the country. There are no generally accepted definitions for gangs and

no universally applicable method for determining gang membership. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 86, at 643-47.
One commonality, however, is that criminal conduct is not necessary for inclusion in gang databases. Id.
94 E-mail Response from NYPD Legal Bureau to author, supra note 90.
95

d.
96 See NYPD Gang Members by Age, (obtained by FOL from NYPD, on file with author); Joseph Goldstein,

Weekly PoliceBriefing Offers Snapshot ofDepartment and Its Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2013, at A15.
97
98
99

d..
d.
d.

"0 See, e.g. Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, supra note 19, at 37 (noting that white youth accounted for 40% of
adolescent gang members according to National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and GREAT surveys); David
Pyrooz and Gary Sweeten, Gang Membership Between Ages 5 and 17 Years in the United States, J. of

Adolescent Health 1, 3 (2015)(noting that the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth establish that while gang
participation is more common among black and Latino, the majority of self-reported gang members were white);
Finn-Aage Esbensen & L. Thomas Winfree, Race and Gender Differences Between Gang and Nongang Youths:
Results from a Multistate Survey, 15 Just. Q. 505, 510 (1998); Adrienne Freng & Finn-Aage Esbensen, Race and
Gang Affiliation: An Examination of Multiple Marginality, 24 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 600, 609 (December

2007)(approximately 30% of gang youth in this study were white). See also, Jordan Blair Woods, Systemic
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Because criteria for the database do not require any criminality and there is no
notice or right to appeal, there is a potential for the database to be or to become both vastly
over-inclusive and demographically skewed. The track record for gang databases in other
cities and states demonstrate this risk.101 A particularly good example of the potential
impact that lack of criteria has on the racial makeup of databases can be seen in
Minnesota. 10 2 Minnesota maintained two databases, one of which, the Gang Pointer File,
requires at least one conviction for a gross misdemeanor or felony, a minimum age of 14
for inclusion, and three criteria from a 10-point list. 103 A second database, GangNet, like
the NYPD database, did not require any conviction or a minimum age for inclusion. 1 0 4 In
2009, the more demanding Gang Pointer database included about 2500 individuals, 36%
of whom were white.10 5 The GangNet database was nearly seven times larger and included
17,000 individuals, of whom only 18% were white.10 6 As this example illustrates, broad
criteria for inclusion can lead to over-representation of youth of color and underrepresentation of whites.10 7 Indeed, the community groups that held hearings on the
Minnesota databases asked whether the criteria used to designate gang members were
"synonymous with the urban youth culture." 108
With the increased number of officers assigned to gang division intelligence
gathering, we must consider what criteria should be in place before individuals can be
added to the database. Further, we cannot be confident that the gang database represents
the entirety of the intelligence gathered relating to suspected gang members. The database
appears to be just one aspect of the intelligence-gathering machine. In fact, despite the
doubling of the gang intelligence division under Operation Crew Cut in the fall of 2012,
the number of gang members added to the database in first eight months 2013 was lower
than in prior years. The intelligence collected by these officers may be going into other
databases, may be broader than that kept in the gang databases, and may be disseminated
and used in other ways. While the NYPD's reply to a FOIL requesting what information is
kept in the database was non-responsive, the databases maintained relating to the NYPD's
surveillance of Muslims since 9/11 may be instructive.109 As part of an intelligencegathering program, the NYPD debriefed Muslim individuals who were arrested for even
minor offenses and maintained a detailed database. As the New York Times reports:
After each interview, the detectives filed detailed reports about the
Racial Bias and RICO'sApplication to CriminalStreet andPrison Gangs, 17 Mich. J. of Race & Law 303, 30709 (2012)(for a discussion of how "racial stereotype can shape the way government constructs gangs.").
10' See Howell, supra note 86, at 650-54 (gathering information on database demographics in which over 90% of
individuals in gang databases were black or Latino but half had never been arrested).
CMTY. JUSTICE PROJECT, UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS, EVALUATION OF GANG DATABASES IN MINNESOTA
RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR
CHANGE
2-4
(2011),
available
at
&

102

https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/bca/Documents/Evaluation%/`20of%`2OGang%/`2ODatabases%/`20in%/`2OMinnesota%/`2
Oand%/o2oRecommendations%/`20for%/2OChange.pdf
103 Id. at 4. The 10-point criteria are as follows: (1) Subject admits to being a gang member;(2) Is observed to
associate on regular basis with known gang members; (3) Has tattoos indicating gang membership; (4) Wears
gang symbols to identify with a specific gang; (5) Is in a photograph with known gang members and/or using
gang-related hand signs; (6) Name is on gang document, hit list, or gang-related graffiti; (7) Is identified as a
gang member by a reliable source; (8) Arrested in the company of identified gang members or associates; (9)
Corresponds with known gang members or writes and/or receives correspondence about gang activity; (10)
Writes about gang (graffiti) on walls, books and paper. Id. See also Howell, supra note 86, at 650-53.
104 CMTY. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 102, at 2-4; Howell, supra note 86, at 652.
105

CMTY. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 102, at 22.

Id. at 10.
107 Id. at 10, 22.
.os Id. at 19.
109 See generally Joseph Goldstein, PoliceRecruit Muslims to be Informers, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2014, at Al.
10.
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prisoner that were entered into a database. In many instances, they
included the names of relatives, including children: "Subject daughter
is 'Myriam', age 6 and youngest child is 'Omar' age 2 years," stated
part of a six-page report filed about a furniture salesman, who had been
arrested for driving without a license and making an improper left
turn. 110

Whether similar detailed statements are being assembled for those in gang
databases and for others targeted by Operation Crew Cut, we cannot be sure. However, the
NYPD Patrol Guide suggests that this may well be the case. The Patrol Guide identifies
Gang Division Intelligence Officers who are availableto debriefsuspected gang members
2417."' It further designates local Field Intelligence Officers and charges them to
disseminate lists of gang members on a monthly basis. 1 12 Other than the very broad noncriminal criteria that relate to certification for the gang database, there are no established
criteria for the additional intelligence gathering that the NYPD engages in as part of
Operation Crew Cut and its Gang Intelligence Division. There is nothing in the criteria for
certifying gang members that would prevent collection of detailed information even for
individuals who have never been arrested or charged with any crime based on where they
live, what they look like and who they are seen with.
The existence of parallel databases stemming from collaboration with the NYPD
is evident in recent statements by New York County District Attorney's Office. After
tapping the NYPD to designate the 25 worst offenders in each of the 22 precincts in
Manhattan, the DA's Office went on to develop a list of about 9000 individuals of high
interest that its Crime Strategies Unit considers the worst of the worst. 1 1 3 The fact that the
District Attorney averages over 400 persons of interest per precinct, rather than 25, likely
reflects the broad collection of data from the surveillance and petty arrests of individuals
consistent with Operation Crew Cut. It is worth noting that the number of people on this
list is twice as high as the number of all violent felony arrests for 2014.114 Like the
surveillance of Muslim drivers and food vendors arrested for minor offenses who are then
debriefed, alleged gang members are also detained and questioned for very minor
offenses.1 15 Based on this list, the prosecutors
decide whom we should try to pull out for a debriefing. We don't
debrief people arrested for felonies because we don't want to
compromise a case. We pull people arrested on low-level misdemeanor
charges, maybe two or three a week. We read them their Miranda
rights. About 80 percent of them will talk. If you speak to a 16-yearold, they might tell you, 'This kid is running things, this kid is a
hanger-on.' That's how we find out information like whether a gang
has changed their name. We took down the Flow Boyz gang at the
Robert F. Wagner housing project in 2012. But a lot of those gang
members have aged out, and now there's a new group of 14- and 15o Id.
NYPD, supra note 33, at 1.

111

NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212-103: CRIME INFORMATION CENTERS 3 (2010) (requiring field
intelligence officers to post lists of "active gang members" who reside within the command by the 5th of each
month).
113 Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance Jr. 's "Moneyball" Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 7, 2014),
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-approach-to-crime.html.
114 See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ADULT ARRESTS: 2005-2014 (2015),
available at
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/NewYork.pdf
" Brown, supra note 113.
112
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year-olds who want their own set name. Through debriefings, we
116
learned they call themselves Only the Wagner.
When suspect individuals go through the system, even for a minor offense, they may be
pulled aside and subjected to interrogation based on this secret list. If we could be assured
that the list was developed to actually target repeat violent offenders, we might (or might
not) applaud such an effort, but the debriefing of 16 year-olds to get names of 14 and 15
year-olds goes well beyond targeted enforcement, and is certainly not what a parent would
expect prosecuting attorneys to do to an unrepresented teenager in a minor case.
IV. THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF GANG SUPPRESSION TACTICS

Although the narrative used to justify gang policing rests on the same two
concepts - place and suspicion - as the justification for stop-and-frisk, the narrative can
lead to even greater harms than the stop-and-frisk regime. First, the gang label permits and
encourages even more aggressive and broader police intrusion than the stop-and-frisk
narrative. The label affects police perception and behavior, prosecutorial behavior,
suspected gang and crew members, and the broader community. Second, gang suppression
policing may be counterproductive, leading to increased formation, cohesion, and
longevity of gangs, and contributing to individual criminality and delinquency among
youth.
A. The Impact of the Gang Narrative on Police, Suspects, and the Community
1.

Police Perceptions of Gang Problems.

Although the narratives justifying the use of excessive stop-and-frisk and
justifying gang policing are very similar, they differ in ways that make gang policing
deeply troubling. Unlike a Terry stop, there are no legal pre-requisites for categorizing an
individual as a gang member. Unlike a Terry stop, no criminal conduct must be suspected
or established. Unlike Terry, there are no official rules or limits for whether a frisk is
permissible or how a search might be conducted. And, unlike a Terry stop, there are no
systems of review. Moreover, the central premise of the gang narrative-that gangs are
responsible for most violent crime and engage in violence heedlessly and irrationallycreates circumstances in which an officer approaching a suspected gang member is likely
to view him not just with suspicion but with some level of fear and antagonism.
The gang narrative has the power to distort police perception of the prevalence
and violence of gangs and to trigger biases 1 7 that affect policing. In a careful study of
gang units in four western cities (Inglewood, CA, Albuquerque, NM, Las Vegas, NV, and
Phoenix, AZ), Charles Katz and Vincent Webb outline some worrisome aspects of gang
policing."" After following and interviewing police officers from four gang units and their
colleagues, these researchers observed a number of disturbing attitudes and trends.
[T]he majority of the officers perceived the magnitude of their local
gang problem to be greater than indicated by the official gang crime

Jessica J. Sim, Joshua Correll, & Melody Sadler, Understanding Police and Expert Performance: When
Training Attenuates (vs. Exacerbates) Stereotypic Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 39 Personality & Soc. Psych.
117

Bull. 291, 299 (2013)(finding that special unit officers in gang units demonstrate racial bias in the first-personshooter task (FPST) similar to untrained novices and unlike trained patrol officers).
" CHARLES M. KATZ & VINCENT J. WEBB, POLICING GANGS IN AMERICA (2006).
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data recorded by their department. Except in Las Vegas, the vast
majority of officers in each [gang] unit perceived that their city had a
major gang problem, that gang members engaged in a wide variety of
criminal behaviors, and that roughly 30 to 70% of all local crimes were
probably attributable to gang members.119
Gang units across the country similarly attribute 48 to 98% of violent crime to gangs
even though victim reports attribute only about 6% of violent crimes to gangs.121
This misperception translated into action, as gang unit officers came to perceive
their role as a duty to fight "evil perpetrators" and engaged in aggressive directed patrols
and sweeps that focus on minor offenses in an attempt to deter gang membership. 1 2 2 "All
of the police departments reacted with zero-tolerance law enforcement for gang members,
and by initiating gang sweeps and saturating gang neighborhoods."l23 The sweeps
contributed to community complaints of over-policing and excessive force, even while
community members continued to seek law enforcement assistance to address gang
problems. 124
The use of the gang narrative enhances the sense of danger and dehumanizes the
targets of enforcement. The fight against "evil perpetrators" can lead the police to engage
in unlawful conduct. Such attitudes were at the root of the Rampart Scandal, in Los
Angeles in which gang unit officers engaged in widespread misconduct and corruption.125
In Phoenix, thirteen police officers shot at a gang member 89 times, striking him 30
times.126 In Las Vegas an FBI investigation led to the arrest of two gang unit officers for
engaging in a drive-by shooting.127 The attitudes that could lead to such an outcome were
expressed by an officer in an anonymous statement to the press:
As for the poor, stupid, innocent gang member, that has spread hatred,
vandalism, crime, and murderous-intent-through-profit-motive -legacy
of his organization, all that I can say is what goes around comes around
... and THE only good gang member is a dead gang member.128
2.

Gang Policing Justifies Intensive Policing and Surveillance

In west coast jurisdictions, where gang policing has long been practiced, the
policing is often associated with very broad and intrusive practices. Suspected gang
members may be included in civil injunctions that criminalize their presence in public
places.129 These injunctions can prevent named individuals from participating in sports
Id at 122. In Las Vegas, officers stated that they did not know the proportion of crime that was committed by
gang members. Id at 122 n.6.
120 NAT'L GANG INTEL. CTR., supra note 18, at 11, 15 (attributing the increase in gang membership to both
improved reporting and "more aggressive recruiting efforts by gangs").
121 See HARRELL, supra note 24 (reporting that 6 percent of victims of violent crime identify perpetrator as
perceived gang member).
122 KATZ & WEBB, supra note 118, at 71.
123 Id. at 88.
124 Id.
125 See Floyd v. City of New York, 302 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) ("LAPD [CRASH] officers had
'subject[ed] individuals to uses of excessive force, false arrest, and improper searches."' (quoting Complaint at 2,
United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 00 Civ. 11769 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2000))).
126 KATZ & WEBB, supra
note 118, at 83.
127 Id at 74-75. The shooter was convicted, but contrary to normal
practice the driver was not charged as an
accomplice. Id.
128 Id. at
75.
129 See, e.g., Matthew M. Werdegar, Note, Enjoining the Constitution:
The Use ofPublic Nuisance Abatement
119
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teams, after school activities, taking public transportation, and going to job centers.130
Some gang units engage in aggressive Broken-Windows style enforcement, ticketing
suspected gang members forjaywalking and other minor traffic infractions. 1 31 The NYPD
has indicated that a similar strategy would be adopted as part of Operation Crew Cut, with
officers focusing on picking kids up for truancy or ticketing them for bikes on sidewalks if
they were suspected crew members. 13 2 These minor arrests can lead to debriefing of
minors who have never been arrested or accused of a violent offense, based on dress or
association with other suspected gang or crew members.
The intensive surveillance extends to following twitter feeds, monitoring
Facebook (often by creating fake profiles of attractive young women), and monitoring
YouTube videos. 13 3 Whether the police should be engaged in this level of surveillance of
youth for intelligence collection purposes, without any prior showing or justification, is an
important question that merits serious consideration and is not one that should be
answered in a kneejerk manner based on our fear of gangs. Police lists may be shared with
immigrationl34 or potential employers 13 5 and cause substantial collateral damages even in
the absence of criminal convictions or arrests.
The potential impact of gang intelligence was demonstrated quite dramatically in
a case decided by the New York State Court of Appeals in 2014.136 In People v. Johnson,
the defendant was standing on the sidewalk of 140th Street at 7th Avenue near three other
men. At least two of them were allegedly members of the local gang, the 40 Wolves. 137
There was no information that the defendant was alleged to be a member of the 40
Wolves. 13 There was no testimony that any of the men had done anything other than stand
on the block (where they lived) but the NYPD, nevertheless ordered them to disperse.
When one of the men asked why they were being ordered to disperse, all four were
arrested for disorderly conduct for failing to obey an order to disperse.139 In a searchincident-to arrest, drugs were found on the defendant. 1 4 0 At the suppression hearing the

InjunctionsAgainst Urban Street Gangs, 51 STAN. L. REV. 409, 411 (1999).

Youth Justice Coal., Getting Off a Gang Injunction, YOUTH FOR
http://www.youth4justice.org/self-defense-legal-rights/getting-off-a-gang-injunction.
131 KATZ & WEBB, supra note 118, at 274.
132 Goldstein & Goodman, supra note 3.
133 id
130

134

JUST.

(Apr.

2011),

Jennifer Chacon, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal ofthe "CriminalStreet Gang Member",

2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 348 (noting that a substantial portion of alleged gang members swept up by ICE had
not been accused of any violent crime); SEC'Y JEH JOHNSON, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICIES FOR THE
APPREHENSION,

DETENTION

AND

REMOVAL

OF

UNDOCUMENTED

IMMIGRANTS

(2014),

available at

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 1120_memo_prosecutorialdiscretion.pdf
(categorizing
aliens "not younger than 16 years of age who intentionally participated in an organized gang" along with
terrorists and convicted felons as Priority 1 for civil enforcement of immigration laws). Suspected gang
membership is also being used to deny relief for DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival) eligible
individuals. Defendants' Sur-Reply In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion of Preliminary Injunction at 32-33,
Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-CV-254 (S. D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015).
135 CMTY. JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 102, at 20-21 (discussing witnesses who reported being denied
employment by law enforcement, probation, and the national guard); see also, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF INVESTIGATION,
DOI REPORT

REVEALS

BROKEN RECRUITMENT

SYSTEM

AND

APPLICATION

PROCESS

10-11

(2015),

www.nyc.gov/html/doi/downloads/pdf/2015/janl5/prOlrikers_aiu_011515.pdf
(critiquing the Department of
Corrections for failure to screen for prior gang association and indicating that DOC is now rejecting candidates
based on tattoos that suggest gang membership).
136People v. Johnson, 22 N.Y.3d 1162 (2014)
137 Brief Amicus Curiae for Defendant-Appellant on behalf of the New York Bar Ass'n at 3-4, People v.
Johnson, 22 N.Y.3d 1162 (2014) (No. APL-2013-00034).
138 Johnson, 22 N.Y.3d at 1164.
139 id
140 id
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officer testified that 40 Wolves members only associated with 40 Wolves members, and
therefore, the defendant was a gang member. 14 1 The prosecution elicited testimony that
two of the men were 40 Wolves members based on "gang intelligence," but objected to
questioning by defense counsel to probe the basis for this intelligence.14 2
The trial court denied suppression, and the intermediate appeals court issued a
sweeping ruling that police who had information "about gang problems . .. at that location
in the past and the gang background of several of the men" could order dispersal and
arrest the men if they disobeyed. 143 The Appellate Division's decision, if upheld, would
have allowed police to order anyone that they claimed was a member of a local crew or
gang off their own block and arrest them for disobeying. 144
In a per curiam decision, the New York Court of Appeals stepped in to protect
the right to stand peaceably in a public place. As the Court wrote, "It is understandable
that police officers become concerned when people they believe to be gang members and
their associates gather in public. It is not disorderly conduct, however, for a small group of
people, even people of bad reputation, to stand peaceably on a street corner."l45 Although,
this decision forecloses arrest based on the theory of disorderly conduct advanced in the
Johnson case, there are many ways to achieve similar results by asserting gang allegations.
In many jurisdictions, moral panics about the dangers of gang violence have led to civil
gang injunctions and curfews that have left alleged gang members and other youth without
the right to stand in their own neighborhoods and without a basis to challenge gang
classifications.146
Under a stop-and-frisk regime, the police are required to articulate reasonable
suspicion that the individual had engaged or was about to engage in a crime.147 If the
Court of Appeals had upheld the Appellate Division's decision, reputation alone, and not
criminality, would be enough to compromise both an alleged gang member's right to stand
on the street and the right of anyone standing with him, whether that person was aware of
the alleged gang affiliation or not. The surveillance and intelligence gathering of
Operation Crew Cut create databases for those who have never been arrested or accused of
any crime, where the Criminal Procedure Law would not permit the retention of such data
after a stop.
3.

The Gang Narrative Harms Community Relations

Gang or crew allegations affect not only those who voluntarily associate with
gang members, but can render entire communities vulnerable to militaristic anti-gang
tactics.
At six a.m. on June 3, 2014, hundreds of police officers in riot gear descended on
the Grant and Manhattanville housing projects as helicopters roared overhead.148 The
Brief Amicus Curiae for Defendant-Appellant on behalf of the New York Bar Ass'n, supra note 137, at 4.
Hearing Transcript at A53, People v. Johnson, 99 A.D.3d 472, 473 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). (No. 8050
5822/10).
14 Johnson, 99 A.D.3d at 473.
144 See id. It is not clear how this decision could have been reconciled with City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41 (1999), which struck down a city ordinance that provided for dispersal orders and arrests of suspected gang
members and those standing with them as void for vagueness.
145 Johnson, 22 N.Y.3d at 1164.
146 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
147 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
148 J. David Goodman, Dozens of Gang Suspects Held in Raids in Manhattan,
N.Y. TIEs, June 4, 2014, at A25;
141
142
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police broke down doors and ordered residents, including children, to the floor at
gunpoint. 14 9 This raid was New York City's "largest ever gang bust" according to
150

Reuters.

The purported goal was to arrest 64 individuals who were charged with crimes
related to feuds between crews in the two projects that have simmered for at least three
years.15 1 But when the dust settled, one in three of the wanted individuals remained at
large. 152
These 64 were among 103 individuals charged in two conspiracy indictments.
The most serious of the substantive crimes charged in the conspiracy were 2 homicides
and approximately 50 shootings (causing 19 injuries).153 For at least one of the homicides,
that of Tayshana Murphy in 2009, two individuals had already been convicted and
imprisoned. 1 5 4 The 103 charged were charged based on theories of accessorial liability
(primarily conspiracy). 155 A major form of evidence supporting these charges are the
communications relating to the on-going rivalry between the Grant Houses-based 3 Staccs
gang and the Manhattanville-based Make it Happen Boys and Money Avenue. During the
years between the killing of Tayshana Murphy and the conspiracy arrests, the NYPD
listened to telephone calls from Rikers, followed social media postings of the kids in the 3
Staccs, Make it Happen Boys, and Money Avenue gangs/crews, and collaborated with the
Manhattan District Attorneys office to assemble evidence to charge these 103 individuals
with conspiracy to commit homicide, to possess weapons, and to commit various
assaults. 156
Although most of those indicted for conspiracy in the first degree and other
charges that carry potential life sentences engaged in some form of non-communicative
conduct, 9 of the 103 were not characterized as committing substantial criminal
conduct.1 57 Others were present for one or two street encounters over the course of
15
years.s
Yet others had pleaded guilty years earlier, had already served part or all of their
sentences, and were indicted and faced prosecution based on the same predicate acts in the
Daryl Kahn, Harlem Residents: We Asked the Cityfor Help, We Got a Raid Instead, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE

(June 5, 2014), http://jjie.org/harlem-residents-we-asked-city-for-help-we-got-a-raid-instead/10703 1/.
149 The Brian Lehrer Show: We Asked the City for Help and We Got a Raid, (WNYC radio broadcast June 10,
2014), available at http://www.wnyc.org/story/we-asked-city-help-and-we-got-raid/ (according to callers who
were residents of Grant and Manhattanville Houses, homes were "trashed" furniture "broken" and children were
traumatized by the unprofessional heavy handed raids); Abigail Kramer, Busts, but Not a Solution, from NYPD
Tracking of Housing Feuds, CAPITAL (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/cityhall/2015/03/8563012/busts-not-solution-nypd-tracking-housing-feuds#
15o Victoria Cavaliere, More than 100 Arrested in Harlem in Largest-EverNYC Gang Bust, REUTERS (June 4,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/20 14/06/04/us-usa-crime-gangsidUSKBN0EF IDQ20 140604. (Indicating that 40 of the 64 individuals were arrested.)
151 Id. 103 individuals were charged in two indictments but 39 of them were already incarcerated. Khan, supra
note 138.
152 Cavaliere, supra note 15240; Khan, supra note 148. The show of force and the militaristic tactics are common
to gang units and have led to serious abuses and scandals. See, e.g., supra Part IV(A)(1).
153 See Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Att'y's Office, District Attorney Vance and Police Commissioner Bratton
Announce Largest Indicted Gang Case in NYC History (June 4, 2014), available at http://manhattanda.org/pressrelease/district-attorney-vance-and-police-commissioner-bratton-announce-largest-indicted-gang.
See
also
Goodman, supra note 148.
154 Goodman, supra note
148.

Press Release, supra note 153.
155

id

Assistant Dist. Att'y Christopher Ryan, Comment at N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Panel on Gang Intervention Panel (Jan.
14, 2015) (stating that 94 of the 103 indicted committed "substantive criminal conduct").
151 See, for example, defendants Johnny Green and Andre Guzman described in paragraphs
102, 105, and 258 of
the MA & MHB indictment. Press Release, supra note 153.
15'
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Manhattan District Attorney's new conspiracy charges.159
Moreover, while the NYPD and the District Attorney amassed evidence in the
form of gang member communications to charge these 103 individuals, the residents of
Grant Houses and Manhattanville sought assistance at the precinct level to diffuse tensions
and provide alternatives for the warring factions. 16 0 How much violence could have been
prevented if the NYPD and District Attorney had worked with community members to
intervene and mediate conflicts rather than secretly recording, watching and amassing
information?
The raid on Grant and Manhattanville Houses is deeply troublesome in two
respects. First, one may question the wisdom of watching, listening, spying, waiting and
then using conspiracy charges to link dozens of young people to offenses committed by
others instead of intervening to defuse the rivalry. Second, one may wonder how a
military-style raid to accomplish regular law enforcement goals affects police-community
relations. Having obtained the indictment and surveilled the individuals for years, why
enter their homes wearing bulletproof vests, with firearms drawn, pointing weapons at
family members, while helicopters whir overhead? While some members of the
community may applaud such tactics, at least one former gang member reported that for
youth in those neighborhoods, the tactics elevated the arrested individuals to "rock star"
status and glorified the reputation and standing of crews in the eyes of some vulnerable
youth. 161
B. Gang Suppression as a Catalyst to Gang Formation andIndividual Criminality

Even if one accepts that an intelligence and suppression strategy such as
Operation Crew Cut extends to non-gang members, former gang members, and gang
members who are not actively involved in any collective crime or violent conduct, one
may question whether anti-gang policing does any harm. If an individual is not engaged in
gang activity, then surely he or she has nothing to worry about? Surely the overarching
message that gangs and crews will be watched and dealt with harshly will be a balm to atrisk communities and a deterrence to those who would become gang members.
Unfortunately, like the overbroad use of stop-and-frisk, the impact of gang-suppression
tactics reaches far beyond the alleged gang or crew member. Gang suppression units often
resort to stops and minor arrests to garner information about suspected gang members and
to communicate that police, and not gangs, control neighborhoods. Moreover, even when
gang suppression tactics are used against actual gang members, law enforcement
opposition can serve to increase individual criminality, entrench gang affiliation, increase
gang membership, and prolong gang ties.
Jeff Mays, DistrictAttorney Cast Too Wide a Net in Harlem Gang Crackdown, CriticsSay, DNAINFO (Oct. 6,
2014, 7:31 AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20141006/west-harleni/vance-cast-too-wide-net-harlemgang-crackdown-families-say (recounting how Darrell Rhett, plead guilty to an assault and was serving a fiveyear sentence for shooting a 3 Staccs member and was rearrested in prison for conspiracy for the same shooting
on June 4 in connection with Grant House and Manhattanville raids; similarly, Ralphie Garcia who was arrested
at the age of 15 for gun possession was completing an intensive supervision program and completing his GED
when the NYPD and the Manhattan DA's office had him rearrested); Ben Popper, How the NYPD Is Using
159

Social Media to Put Harlem Teens Behind Bars: The Untold Story of Jelani Henry, Who Says FacebookLikes

Landed
Him
Behind
Bars,
THE
VERGE
(Dec.
10,
2014,
01:15
PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/12/10/7341077/nypd-harlem-crews-social-media-rikers-prison (recounting how
Asheem pleaded guilty to possessing a fireann, served a probation sentence, completed high school and was
starting college when he was indicted for conspiracy for possessing the same gun and appearing in photos on
social media dating back to when he was 14 and 15).
16o Kahn, supra note 148.
16 Kramer, supra note 149.
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Gang Formation

From the earliest studies of street gangs, the transition from informal youth peer
group to true gang status has been attributed to oppositional forces. 162 The informal peer
group tends to form in neighborhoods with limited resources and to be based on
geographic proximity.163 In many ways, the "crews" described by the NYPD fit this
model. These groups form for protection and to ensure access to limited recreational
space.16 4 Often opposition comes in the form of other informal peer groups. The police,
however, can contribute to the transition from informal group to gang status by treating
groups as if they are gangs.
After an exhaustive study of informal youth groupings and gangs in the early
twentieth century in Chicago, Frederic Thrasher identified the catalyst that turns typical
youth groupings and delinquent groups into gangs. That catalyst is opposition. The
opposition can come either from other gangs or from the police. As Thrasher outlines the
move from informal groupings based on neighborhood and age group to gang:
[A] play-group may acquire a real organization. Natural leaders emerge,
a relative standing is assigned to various members and traditions
develop. It does not become a gang, however, until it begins to excite
disapproval and opposition, and thus acquires a more definite groupconsciousness. It discovers a rival or an enemy in the gang in the next
block; its baseball or football team is pitted against some other team;
parents or neighbors look upon it with suspicion or hostility; "the old
man around the corner," the storekeepers, or the "cops" begin to give it
"shags" (chase it); or some representative of the community steps in and
tries to break it up. This is the real beginning of the gang, for now it
starts to draw itself more closely together. It becomes a conflict
165
group.
Police recognition and suppression efforts confirm and consolidate gang structure, gang
identity, and gang duration. Suppression of gangs, like trimming back certain shrubs, is
one means of encouraging gang growth.
The contrast between New York City's experience and that of cities which
adopted aggressive gang suppression strategies in the past fifty years supports the
conclusion that gang suppression may increase gang cohesion and membership. 16 6 The
Justice Policy Institute study Gang Wars traces the divergent approaches to gang problems
in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago from World War II to present.167 In New York
the Youth Board was established in the mid-fifties and street gang workers were
dispatched to troubled neighborhoods throughout the city. The street gang workers, who
were not law enforcement officers, gave advice, took kids on trips, helped them find jobs,
and intervened to attempt to negotiate truces or even alert law enforcement of fights and
weapons. 1611n addition to street workers, the social work model based on the Chicago

162

THRASHER, supra note 16, at 10.

163id
164id

'6
6
6

Greene & Pranis, supra note 19, at 68.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15-16.
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Area Project "used local residents as family counselors and organizers in their
neighborhoods to engage . . . youth and adults in projects designed to improve and
strengthen social control in the community." 1 6 9 Truces were negotiated, and gang violence
largely abated by the mid 1960s.1 70 This is not to claim that there are no gangs in New
York, but as discussed in part IB above, the number of offenses attributed to gang violence
has been consistently low in New York. The "gangs" that do exist are little more than the
informal peer groups as observed by Frederic Thrasher and are not organized criminal
associations. Not even the NYPD claims that the "crews" they are now targeting are
anything like organized crime groups or hierarchical established gangs.17 1
This is not the case in cities where gangs have been vigorously repressed and
suppressed by law enforcement. In cities like Chicago and Los Angeles, gangs have
become institutionalized, and persist across generations.
In Chicago, the police have engaged in round after round of gang suppression.
The result of these efforts has not been elimination of gangs. The strength and level of
organization of gangs has been linked to these suppression efforts. In a move that sounds
much like the expansion of the NYPD's gang unit, in the late sixties "the gang intelligence
unit was increased from 38 to 200 officers" for political reasons rather than because of
violent crime. 1 7 2 In the years that followed, the Unit engaged in an intensive campaign of
harassment that led to greater incarceration and greater resistance of those incarcerated to
prison authority.173 Prisons became gang-dominated institutions, and imprisonment served
to cement gang bonds and gang power rather than deter gangs or undermine their power.
Successive attempts at gang suppression, such as the city ordinance that was overturned in
Chicago v. Morales,174 have done little to improve matters. Prosecution and imprisonment
of the leadership of the largest gang, the Gangster Disciples, has contributed to more gang
factions and more violence.1 75
Similarly, in Los Angeles, the police have attempted to suppress gangs through
force, arrests, and injunctions. The STEP Act has provided prosecutors with tools to
obtain lengthy sentence enhancements. 17 6 yet,
[d]espite massive, militarized police actions, strict civil injunctions,
draconian sentencing enhancements, and a gang database that appears
to criminalize upwards of half of its young African American residents,
gang violence is worsening, according to media reports. With a
reported 729 active gangs and 39,488 gang members Los Angeles
remains the dubious honor of being the gang capital of the world. 177
The observation that opposition spurs gang development along with the

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
171 N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Pub. Safety, supra note 48 ("[Despite] their lack of defined structure . .
[crews]
remain at least as dangerous as their more structured counterparts."). Deputy Chief Harrington begins speaking
on the topic at 1:13:22 of the video.
172 Greene & Pranis, supra note 19, at 22.
173 JAMES B. JACOBS, STATEVWLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY 141-63 (1977).
174 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
175 Jeremy Gorner & Jason Meisner, More than 2 Dozen Gang Members Arrested in Drug Investigation, CHI.
TRIB. (June 12, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-06-12/news/ci-more-than-2-dozen-gangmembers-arrested-in-drug-investigation-20140612_1_drug-investigation-dozen-gang-traveling-vice-lords.
.. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West 2014).
177 Greene & Pranis, supra note 19, at 29.
169

17o
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dominance of gangs in cities that have adopted aggressive anti-gang suppression tactics
suggests that pursuing anti-gang tactics in the absence of serious gang problems is unwise.
Indeed, even where gang problems are serious, the periods of relative calm in Los Angeles
and Chicago have coincided with negotiated truces and community engagement, not with
law enforcement crackdowns. 17 It is not surprising that policing and prosecution of
peripheral or non-gang members followed by incarceration of these individuals with core
members will create or cement gang ties leading to more cohesion over time.
2.

Individual Criminality

Aggressive policing does not simply encourage gang cohesion; it can also
contribute to individual delinquency and criminality. Negative contact with law
enforcement and contact that is perceived of as unfair can contribute to unwillingness to
conform to the law in several ways. First, procedural justice research establishes that
people are much more willing to conform to the law when they are treated fairly and with
respect.179 For those who experience police surveillance as harassment, are treated harshly
during arrests, and are prejudged as alleged gang members if arrested for even a minor
offense, the perceived unfairness of the treatment may reduce willingness to comply with
the law and the perception that law enforcement is legitimate. 8 o Additionally, labeling
theory posits that when one is labeled as delinquent, one is more likely to associate with
delinquent peers and behave in delinquent ways. 8 The raids, high bail requests, doublejeopardy defying reindictments, 18 2 and fake Facebook friend requests all undermine the
legitimacy of law enforcement and respect for the criminal justice system. Labeling and
segregation, particularly in jails and prisons, may encourage rather than deter delinquent
conduct.
Whether or not these theories correctly explain the impact of negative contact
with police and the criminal justice system, there can be no doubt that these factors are
causally connected to increased delinquency, criminality and violence. There is strong
proof that negative police contact in fact contributes to criminality. Ironically, one of the
best sources of proof for this is the research done in connection with a gang intervention
program that targets at risk youth at the middle school age.
The GREAT program is a gang intervention program that has been carefully
evaluated by researchers. The program brings law enforcement representatives to schools
to talk to young people about the dangers of gangs. The program covers 31 schools in 7
Id. at 21, 26.
179 TOM R. TYLER & E. ALLEN LIND, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); TOM R.
178

TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Tom R. Tyler & Jason Sunshine, The Role ofProceduralJustice
andLegitimacy in Shaping PublicSupportfor Policing, 37 LAW & Soc. REV. 513 (2003).
18o

Raymond Paternoster et al., Do FairProceduresMatter? The Effect of ProceduralJustice on Spouse Assault,

31 LAW & SOCY REV.163 (1997) (analyzing a randomized study of domestic violence arrests, showing
defendants who were treated politely and given an opportunity to speak were less likely to re-offend than those
that were treated less politely). See also, Jeffrey Fagan et al., Neighborhood, Crime, and Incarceration in New
York City, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 97 (2005) (concluding that drug enforcement appears to have an
adverse effect on crime rates); Robert White, CurtailingYouth: A Critique of Coercive Crime Prevention, 9 CIV.
REMEDIES & CRIME PREVENTION 117, 124 (1998) (observing one consequence of street policing as crime
prevention is the "creation of 'criminals"'); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A
Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 426 (1993) (noting that defiance to unfair
sanctions may explain reoffending); Daniel S. Nagin, CriminalDeterrenceResearch at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 22-23 (1998) (noting that stigma-erosion may decrease deterrence effect of
sanctions).
181 Wiley & Esbensen, supra note 16, at 17 (controlling for original levels of delinquency police stops increase
future delinquency and arrests increase delinquency even further).
182 See supra note 159.
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citiesl83 and the final sample includes 2614 youth. 18 4 The program has success in that the
GREAT program substantially reduced gang membership by 39%.15 However, the
decrease in gang membership is not matched by a decrease in violent crime or general
delinquency. 18 6 The first lesson of the GREAT program should be that deterring gang
membership and deterring violent crime are two different things. Each may be valuable,
but decreasing gang membership does not automatically reduce crime or violence.
A second and equally important lesson of the GREAT research and related social
science research is that police and criminal justice intervention increase delinquency and
violence independent of any other factor.18 7 Controlling for initial rates of delinquency, the
study follows youth over time, and thus can compare individuals with negative police
contact to similar individuals without negative police contact (stops or arrests) and
determine if the negative police contact independently predicts a reduction in delinquent
acts (as deterrence theory would predict) or an increase in delinquency (as procedural
justice and labeling theories would predict). 88
The lesson of the GREAT research is not only clear but it is quite dramatic.
Controlling for initial levels of delinquency, those who are stopped by police engage in
nearly 60% more delinquent acts than those who have no contact with police. 18 Those
who are arrested engage in 230% more delinquent acts than those with no contact. 190 And
those who are arrested engage in nearly twice as many delinquent acts as those who are
merely stopped. 191 In responding to questions about their attitudes toward delinquent
behaviors and delinquent peers:
[Y]outh who have been stopped or arrested report significantly less
anticipated guilt, greater agreement with neutralization techniques,
greater commitment to delinquent peers, and higher levels of
delinquency than youth with no police contact. In addition, our findings
show that the negative consequences of police contact are compounded
for arrested youth; subsequent to arrest they report less anticipated guilt
and more delinquency compared with stopped youth. 192
The rich data from the GREAT research provides affirmative lessons about the

Albuquerque, NM, Chicago, IL, Dallas-Fort Worth, TX, Greeley, CO, Nashville, TN, Philadelphia, PA, and
Portland, OR. Id. at 7.
184 Id. at 7-8. The original sample was 3820 students but the 2614 reflects
those for whom all data was available
at Wave 4 (about 3 years after the initial participation in GREAT). Id.
185 Finn-Age Esbensen et al., Results from Multi-Site Evaluation of the G.R.EA.T Program, 29 JUST. Q. 125,
139-41 (2012).
183

186 Id.
187 Wiley & Esbensen, supra note 16, at 17 (controlling for original levels of delinquency police stops increase
future delinquency and arrests increase delinquency even further); Jon Gunnar Bernburg et al., Official Labeling,

Criminal Embeddedness, and Subsequent Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test of Labeling Theory, 43 J. RES.

CRIME & DELINQ. 67, 80 (2006) ("[J]uvenile justice intervention increases the odds of involvement in serious
delinquency . . . by a factor of 5.5, net of all controls.") Although this effect is greater for non-gang members, it
is also observed for gang members. Thus police intervention and gang membership reinforce each other creating
more, rather than less risk of subsequent delinquency. Id.
188 Wiley & Esbensen, supra note 16, at 9-10 (controlling for original levels of delinquency police stops increase
future delinquency and arrests increase delinquency even further).
189 Id. at 15. In the researchers' words "The use of propensity score matching reduces the likelihood that our
results are being driven by preexisting differences, a problem that may plague much existing labeling research."
Id. at 17.
190 Id. at 14.
191 Id. at 16.
192 Id. at 17.
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relationship between policing, delinquency, and violent crime. The GREAT researchers
had extensive data from the program participants about their backgrounds, risk factors,
and delinquent behavior. The researchers also followed the GREAT participants over
time. There can be little doubt that negative suppression tactics such as those proposed in
connection with Operation Crew Cut are likely to increase individual delinquency and
commitment to delinquent peers.
In similar research analyzing 1,000 youth from the Rochester Youth
Development Study of seventh and eighth graders, the effect of juvenile justice
intervention was to increase the odds of serious delinquency by a factor of 5.5 by Wave
4.193 As in the GREAT experiments, the researchers control for initial levels of
delinquency and substance abuse. Whether these results stem from the label "juvenile
delinquent" or the fact that juvenile justice intervention increases contact with delinquent
peers, it is evident that suppression efforts are far more likely to increase delinquency than
to reduce it.
This research is not intended to suggest that stops, arrests, or juvenile justice
interventions are never appropriate. Rather the lesson is that these should be avoided
where delinquency is not severe. The broad net of anti-gang policing tends to catch the
suspected, the marginal, the former, or the wannabe gang members together with the core
members. Databases, surveillance and mass-prosecutions encourage these trends. These
interventions are likely to significantly increase delinquent behavior for those who are
targeted. If the goal is actually to reduce violence, then expanding policing to those who
live on gang blocks and associate with any other gang member, which is virtually
unavoidable in some circumstances, will undermine this goal in the long term.
V. ALTERNATIVES APPROACHES TO REDUCING GANG CRIME

As discussed above, intensive gang suppression policing is damaging to police,
community, and at-risk youth. This is particularly so where the underlying gang problem
is exaggerated and is a pretext for intensive surveillance. The research and history of gang
suppression tactics by law enforcement instructs that suppression tactics are often
ineffective and counterproductive. The oppositional nature of gang formation and the
effect of labeling theory means that the greater the gang suppression effort, the larger the
gang problem will likely become.
Fortunately, New York City has a history of successfully using non-law
enforcement interventions to reduce gang violence. In the 1960s, New York relied on nonlaw enforcement street workers and community social work models to connect at-risk
youth with services, to mediate conflicts, and to notify law enforcement when serious
violent confrontation was anticipated. While these programs were disbanded in the 1970s,
the collaboration with street workers and community groups who were not law
enforcement provides a model for working with the crew or gang-involved youth today.
The Chicago Ceasefire/SNUG (guns spelled backward) model takes the non-law
enforcement street worker model a step further by mobilizing former gang members and
convicts as outreach workers and violence interrupters. 194 New York State has funded

Bernburg et al., supra note 187, at 80.
Nat'i Inst. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Program Profile: Cure Violence (Chicago, Illinois),
CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=205
(last visited May 13,
2015). The SNUG model is now called: Cure Violence.
193
194
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SNUG initiatives with significant reductions of shootings in Albany and Rochester. 195
Building on New York's history with non-law enforcement outreach workers and
the Chicago model, several community-based organizations have developed in New York
and have been credited with substantial reductions in gang related violence. In East New
York, Brooklyn, the neighborhood development organization Man Up! has used former
gang members as mentors and mediators and violence interrupters. 19 6 Similarly, in Crown
Heights, Save Our Streets replicated the Cure Violence Model, reducing shootings in the
target area by 6% at a time when adjacent comparable neighborhoods experienced an
increase in gun violence of 18 and 28%t.197 These are examples of community-based
groups that engage directly to defuse violent conflicts and protect communities and gang
members.
Successful programming need not be based on or targeted at gang or crew
members to be effective. Recognizing that gang membership and violence are independent
of each other (GREAT, for example, decreases gang membership but does not affect
violence), it is important that the goal of preventing violence be the focus. Programs that
reach all youth and keep them in school or get them jobs can prevent violence as
effectively as those targeted at gang members. Tutoring in algebra and other subjects in
Chicago has reduced drop-out rate and violence in at-risk youth.198 Job and employment
programs have long been associated with reduced gang membership, leaving gangs, and
reduced violence. 199
The Boston Ceasefire Program does instruct that law enforcement and even law
enforcement intelligence can play an important role in reducing gang violence when it is
properly targeted. 2 0 0 The Boston Ceasefire Program identified the most violent offenders
and brought them in to meet with law enforcement and community leaders. Rather than
collecting data secretly as the NYPD Operation Crew Cut does and bringing massive
indictments seeking decades-long sentences based on conspiracy charges, the Boston
Ceasefire surveillance data was used to accomplish specific deterrence. Individuals
identified as most likely to commit violent crime were brought to public meetings, told
they were being observed and offered assistance.2 01
Another alternative to the current NYPD suppression strategy that is well
supported by research relating to gang formation and violence would be to do nothing at
all. Gang researchers concur that the vast majority of gang members age out of gangs and

Cure Violence New York, CUREVIOLENCE.ORG, http://cureviolence.org/partners/us-partners/snug/ (last visited
May 13, 2015).
16 Jim Dwyer, No Shootings or Killings for 363 Days, but the Fight Is Farfrom Over, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2013, at Al.
195

197 SARAH PICARD-FRITSCHE & LENORE CERNIGLIA, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, TESTING A PUBLIC HEALTH
APPROACH TO GUN VIOLENCE: AN EVALUATION OF CROWN HEIGHTS SAVE OUR STREETS, A REPLICATION OF
THE
CURE
VIOLENCE
MODEL
18
(2012),
available
at

http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/ SOSEvaluation.pdf.
198
Jann Ingmire, Crime Lab Makes Impact for Chicago Youth, U.
http://www.ucicago.edu/features/crimelab makesimpact for chicago_youth/.
199

CHI.

(Feb.

20,

2014),

Justin Dickerson, 'Nothing Stops a Bullet Like a Job': Homeboy Industries andRestorative Justice (May 14,

2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract_id=1827983
(providing a history of Homeboy Industries, and the philosophy of its founder, Father Greg Boyle).
200 David M. Kennedy et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Developing and Implementing Operation Ceasefire, in
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE BOSTON GUN PROJECT'S OPERATION CEASEFIRE 1, 27-28, 30, 48 (2001),

availableat https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/188741.pdf
201 Id. at 3, 35-41.
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with no intervention.2 02 While neglect is not preferable to employment,
counseling, violence prevention, and educational improvements, these strategies should
ideally be carried out by community-based groups, not law enforcement. Because police
contact, stops, arrests, prosecution, imprisonment, and juvenile justice involvement are all
factors that tend to increase delinquency, gang membership, and violence, it would be far
better to do nothing than to engage in the intensive policing of vulnerable youth.20 3 New
York has had little in the way of gang policing during the past three decades and has fared
far better than localities that use aggressive gang suppression tactics. These different
experiences provide some of the most compelling proof that gang suppression is a catalyst
for, not a solution, to gang violence.

In addition to using a social work model of intervention for general crime
deterrence, and a limited and targeted law enforcement model for working with violent
criminals, narrow and enforceable criteria must be developed to maintain databases that
are not overbroad. While the details of appropriate inclusion criteria, oversight, notice and
appeal provisions, maintenance, and security measures for such database are beyond the
scope of this paper, the databases must, at a minimum, be narrowly tailored with
requirements of actual criminality, notice to those included and to parents of minors, and
regular purging of non-gang and non-active gang members.
CONCLUSION

By all accounts, New York City has enjoyed a tremendous drop in all crime and
particularly in violent crime during the past 25 years. This drop has been accomplished
without intensive gang policing or prosecutions. During this time, the NYPD has always
recorded a low number of gang crimes. Nonetheless, during the death-throws of the
NYPD's stop-and-frisk regime in New York City the NYPD announced a new threat in
the form of "crews," and, despite continuing crime declines, quadrupled the number of
Gang Division officers dedicated to watching and policing these youth of color. This
announcement manipulates and exaggerates an existing phenomenon to increase support
for a new profile-based policing. The NYPD's gang division and databases permit
extensive surveillance of suspect populations, and essentially recreate and expand the
scope of the blanket stop-and-frisk regime without the potential for court supervision. Like
the stop-and-frisk regime before it, the strategy will exacerbate tensions with communities
of color and sweep up innocent and guilty alike. Unlike stop-and-frisk, there is currently
no effective oversight to limit the extent of surveillance or information collected relating
to vulnerable youth. Most importantly, these strategies are unsuited to actually reducing
problems of gang and youth violence and have historically increased rather than decreased
gang violence and the costs associated with it. Rather than following west-coast
forerunners into a cycle of gang suppression, long sentences, and community disruption,
New York should build on its history of non-law enforcement outreach to provide
productive alternatives to gang involvement. This article should also prompt other
jurisdictions to examine the empirical need for and efficacy of aggressive gang
suppression strategies.

202

See TERENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., GANGS AND DELINQUENCY IN DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 38, 41

(2003) (discussing a study of 1000 Rochester youth from the age of 13 to 17.5, about 31% reported belonging to
a gang at some point but only 1.6% of the sample remained in gangs at the age of 18 and this number did not
increase through the rest of the study to age 22). See also, IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YOUTH GANG PROBLEM 104
(1995) ("Most studies suggest that gang members simply 'mature-out"').
203 See text at notes 189-93 for research demonstrating the adverse impact of negative police contact on youth.
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INTRODUCTION

Following up on a previous piece describing the limiting effect of confining
federal habeas relief to violations of "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court," this brief essay focuses on a particular set of cases to examine further
the constraints the Court has placed on the grant of relief to state prisoners. Over the past
seven terms (October, 2009 to June, 2015), the Court has issued summary, per curiam

reversal of grants of federal habeas corpus relief by circuit courts of appeals at the behest
of wardens, without briefing or oral argument, in eighteen cases, including seven
involving death sentences. 2 By contrast, in only five cases did the Court reverse denials of
habeas relief per curiam, and those cases presented highly unusual circumstances. 3
Shining a bright light on cases in which the Court saw fit to undo a determination by a
federal court of appeals that a state prisoner had been deprived of his constitutional rights
reveals the extent to which the Great Writ has been diminished by the Court's restrictive
reading of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). State
prisoners are entitled to relief from federal courts, it appears, only for the most blatant
violations of their rights - they must be content with Constitution lite.4
The summary reversals of cases in which a panel of one of the circuit courts of
appeal, the courts directly below the Supreme Court, found merit in petitioners' claims
continue the trend of interpreting AEDPA in a way that makes it virtually impossible to
overcome the deference now due to state court rejections of constitutional claims. To
understand the dramatic changes wrought by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
AEDPA, it is useful to recall the position of state prisoners seeking redress of their
constitutional rights before that statute was enacted. Petitioners who had followed the
proper procedures (giving state courts opportunity to rule on their federal claims, not
procedurally defaulting them, and overcoming any harmless error argument) had the right
to have a federal court decide, viewing the question de novo, whether their constitutional
rights were violated in the state court proceedings. Now, state prisoners have only two
ways of securing de novo federal court review of federal constitutional claims alleged to
have been wrongly decided by the state court: through a grant of certiorari on direct
review (with the Court hearing about 75 cases per year of more than 7,000 petitions filed)
or by overcoming a finding of procedural default.6

' See Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings ofSupreme Court Precedents, 14
LEWIS & CLARKL. REV. 741, 743-44 (2010).
2See infra Appendix A (listing cases reversing grants of habeas relief).
See infra Appendix B (listing cases reversing denials of relief); see also infra notes 159-64.
4 While this essay does not directly engage with the ongoing debate about the role of federal habeas review
prompted by Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann's book HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES,
ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011), the reader will correctly infer that the author's
sympathies lie with those who, unlike King and Hoffmann, still see a significant role for federal courts in
ensuring the protection of constitutional rights in state courts. See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas ProcessRather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 198-99 (2012).
See, e.g., Brownv. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 462-64 (1953).
6 When a state court relies on an independent and adequate state ground, such as failure to raise appropriate
objections, to deny relief on a constitutional claim, rather than addressing the merits, federal courts that find
either "cause and prejudice" for the default or a showing of actual innocence may address the issue of whether
the petitioner's rights were violated de novo. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); see also Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 495-96 (1986). One scholar views that potential avenue for relief as showing that the
Court has a logical approach to the habeas remedy consistent with notions of fault comparable to those applied to
constitutional torts. See Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 523, 585 (2014).
On the other hand, it could be seen as perverse to provide a benefit to petitioners who failed to adhere to state
procedural rules.
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In all other cases, federal courts, rather than granting relief to defendants who
suffered a constitutional violation that prejudiced them, instead are limited to deciding
whether the state courts' refusal to acknowledge the constitutional violation represented
such an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law that no rational
jurist would agree with the state court.7 The extent to which Congress actually intended,
when it enacted AEDPA, to cause such a dramatic shift in habeas jurisprudence is subject
to debate." Even assuming the legitimacy of the new regime, the way the Supreme Court
has handled cases in which circuit courts granted relief to state prisoners should raise
concerns about the diminished protection of constitutional rights.
The cases examined for this essay demonstrate the Court's continuing substantive
restrictions on the federal habeas remedy for state prisoners, as well as displaying its low
regard for that remedy by the use of summary procedure and a highly dismissive tone.
First, the Court's definition of what law it has "clearly established" is disconcertingly
narrow, requiring that the Supreme Court confronted on a prior occasion, in which it had
granted its notoriously parsimonious certiorari review on direct appeal, essentially the
same set of facts presented by the habeas petitioner. Second, building on its increasing
deference to any determinations by state courts on the merits of the constitutional claims,
the Court appears to require such a determination to be basically irrational to warrant
federal relief - if any "fairminded jurist"9 could arrive at the same conclusion, habeas is
precluded.
In terms of process, the Court issues these reversals without so much as hearing
the respondent - the habeas petitioner who prevailed in the Court of Appeals - on the
merits of why the grant of relief should be affirmed. On petitions by wardens, to which
prisoners respond only to urge the Court not to grant review, the Court is summarily
reversing decisions on the basis that those decisions were so clearly in error as to occasion
no debate, even when dissenting justices disagree. In addition, the per curiam opinions are
written in a tone more appropriate to scold a naughty child than to address an institution
one step below the Supreme Court. The language in the opinions in some of these cases
reflects a disdain not only of the petitioners, but of the courts of appeals that granted their
petitions, hardly in keeping with the significant constitutional rights at stake. Finally, the
few cases in which the Court uses summary reversal when habeas relief was denied
display a quite different pattern.
II.

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW

The Supreme Court has continued its pattern, first announced in Carey v.
Musladin, of narrowly defining what law has been so "clearly established" as to warrant

See, e.g., Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-02 (2011).
See Judith L. Ritter, The Voice of Reason Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act's Restrictions on Habeas Corpus are Wrong, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 55, 55-56

(2013); see also Elizabeth J. Barnett, Comment,A Great Writ Reduced: Why the Tenth Circuit'sInterpretationof
Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Precedent Portends Defeat for State Prisoners Seeking Federal

Habeas Corpus Relief 58 OKLA. L. REv. 469, 475-78 (2005); see also Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, A Decade of
Reversal: The Ninth Circuit'sRecord in the Supreme Court through October Term 2010, 87 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 2165, 2175 (2012); see also Daniel J. O'Brien, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Heeding
Congress's Message: The United States Supreme Court Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief
Against All but IrrationalState Court Decisions, and Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 320 (2012).

The authors of the latter two articles, a judge and assistant attorney general respectively, assume, without
explanation, that it was Congress, rather than the Court, that intended the new meaning of "unreasonable."
9 See Harrington,562 U.S. at 101-02.
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habeas relief after a state court has denied the federal constitutional claim on the merits.10
Two consequences, both harmful to the protection of constitutional rights, flow from this
approach. First, interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution designed to ensure the
fairness of criminal convictions and sentences is placed entirely in the hands of the
Supreme Court, with the lower federal courts playing virtually no role. Given the Court's
limited review of cases on certiorari review of direct appeals, the opportunity to clarify or
expand constitutional protections is vanishingly small. Second, failure to apply the
constitutional principles developed in the context of appellate review to defendants, who
may well have raised those challenges on direct appeal, but whose petitions for writ of
certiorari were (as most are) denied, results in a stark differentiation, sometimes literally
involving life or death, between prisoners whose cases are identical except for the timing
of the Supreme Court's recognition of the constitutional violation. True, that difference
has long been accepted as the price to pay in postconviction proceedings out of concern
for finality and comity, 1 but when the petitioner unsuccessfully raised the claim on direct
review, the result seems particularly unfair. Moreover, using the mechanism of summary
reversal, without briefing or oral argument, for making that critical decision suggests that
the cost is disproportionate to any possible benefit achieved.
One of the Court's most recent cases emphasizing the requirement that habeas
relief is precluded in the absence of its own clearly established law illustrates the problem.
In White v. Woodall, 12 over three dissents, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's grant of
habeas relief to a Kentucky petitioner who had pled guilty to capital murder, kidnapping,
and rape and been sentenced to death. 13 The court of appeals had concluded that the trial
judge's failure, upon request, to give the jury a no-adverse-inference instruction from the
defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase (here, the only phase) of his trial violated
law that had been clearly established in a series of Supreme Court precedents. 1 4 When the
defendant had raised this federal constitutional issue on direct appeal, the Kentucky
Supreme Court rejected it,15 and the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. 1 6
That denial, one of almost 2,000 issued that day, 17 turned out to have sealed the
defendant's fate under the Court's current regime governing habeas review. Had the Court
granted certiorari, it might well have determined that the trial court did indeed violate the
defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment by refusing to issue a no-adverse-inference
instruction. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court denying relief to Mr. Woodall
acknowledged as much: "Perhaps the logical next step from [the Supreme Court
precedents] would be to hold that the Fifth Amendment requires a penalty-phase noadverse-inference instruction in a case like this one; perhaps not... . The appropriate time

.

See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 72, 74, 76-77 (2006).
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-09 (1989).
12 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014).
13 Id. at 1701,
1707 (containing a dissent written by Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor).
14 Woodall v. Simpson, 685 F.3d 574, 579 (6th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Kentucky Supreme Court had unreasonably rejected the defendant's Fifth
Amendment claim based on clearly established law set forth in three Supreme Court cases. Id. In Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981), the Court held that a defendant is entitled to a "no adverse inference"
instruction during the guilt phase of a trial. This Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination was
extended from the guilt phase to the penalty phase of a capital trial in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63
(1981). Finally, the Court determined that the "rule against negative inferences at a criminal trial appl[ies] with
equal force at sentencing[,]" even where a defendant pled guilty. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 317,
329 (1999).
" Woodallv. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 104, 115 (Ky. 2001) (distinguishing each of the Supreme Court cases
on its facts).
Woodall v. Kentucky, 537 U.S. 835 (2002).
1 See 537 U.S. 812-945 (2002) (listing the cert. petitions denied on October 7, 2002).
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to consider the question as a matter of first impression would be on direct review, not in a
habeas case governed by Sec. 2254(d)(1)." 8
The Court in no way acknowledged that at the "appropriate time," the Court had
denied review,19 as it does in all but a minuscule number of cases in which certiorari is
sought on direct appeal. The Court thereby summarily relegated the defendant to
"Constitution lite," the watered-down version of constitutional protections available to
state prisoners on federal habeas review. As long as the specific facts of a petitioner's case
are, in the eyes of a majority of the Supreme Court, sufficiently different from the
precedent cases so that the "clearly established law" does not encompass them, no habeas
relief is permitted. Even if some of the justices on the Court (three, in Woodall's case)
agree with the circuit court that Supreme Court precedents had clearly established the
constitutional principle on which the petitioner relies, the state prisoner is without a
remedy for its violation, and his execution can be carried out.20
In addition to characterizing the holdings of Supreme Court cases quite narrowly,
the Court in Woodall foreclosed a basis for federal habeas relief that had been assumed to
be available since Section 2254 was first interpreted in Williams v. Taylor.21 Justice
O'Connor had included among possible "unreasonable application" scenarios one in
which "the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to
a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to
a new context where it should apply."2 2 The Court now rejected that possibility, asserting
that the "unreasonable-refusal-to-extend rule" had never been endorsed by a majority of
23
the Court. The Court acknowledged that it is not always clear whether one is applying a
rule or extending it, and that § 2254 does not require an identical fact pattern for a rule to
be applied, rather than extended. Yet for relief to be available under the unreasonable
application clause, a clearly established rule must so obviously apply to the given set of
facts "that there could be no fairminded disagreement on the question." 24
Finally, the Court noted in this case, as it has in several of the recent per curiam
reversals, that habeas relief can never be justified by reference to a circuit court's own
precedents. Use of lower court cases as part of what law has been "clearly established" is,
of course, expressly prohibited by the language of § 2254(d)(1) ("clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"). Yet even if
circuit courts may not extend the reach of Supreme Court precedents in the habeas
context, are they precluded from looking to their own opinions, or the decisions of sister
circuits, in determining what law the Supreme Court has clearly established? The Sixth
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1707.
See Woodall, 537 U.S. at 835.
20 Three dissenting justices in another recent case, in which the Sixth Circuit had granted habeas on the ground
that the defendant prisoner was "in custody" when he was taken to a prison conference room, noted the stark
difference between direct review and review of a decision on federal habeas:
Given this Court's controlling decisions on what counts as "custody" for Miranda
purposes, I agree that the law is not "clearly established" in respondent Fields's favor. See,
e.g., Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 105, 106 (2010); Thompsonv. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
112 (1995). But I disagree with the Court's further determination that Fields was not in
custody under Miranda. Were the case here on direct review, I would vote to hold that
Mirandaprecludes the State's introduction of Fields's confession as evidence against him.
Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1185-87, 1194 (2012) (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
21 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
22 Id. at 407.
23 White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1705-06.
24
Id. at 1706-07 (quoting Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
1
19
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Circuit in Woodall referred to a prior case in which the court had analyzed the Supreme
Court's cases involving an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to testify, noting
that although the high court had not "directly" addressed the specific circumstance at
issue, the principles set forth in its opinions suggested that the instruction requested was
constitutionally required.2 5 In fact, in the circuit court's view, the question the Supreme
Court had not "directly" addressed was application of the principle to non-capital cases;26
given Woodall's death sentence, that concern was irrelevant. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court chastised the circuit for basing its conclusion on one of its own cases, broadly
proclaiming that a lower court may not "consult" its own precedents in assessing a habeas
claim governed by § 2254.27
A number of the per curiam opinions that are the subject of this essay, in which
the Court has reversed circuit courts' grant of habeas relief summarily, without briefing or
oral argument, assert that habeas was not warranted because the applicable law had not
been "clearly established" - there simply was no explicit prior holding by the Supreme
Court on the facts presented. Of course, as any law student knows after a few weeks in
school, the "holding" of a case can be stated in rather general or very specific terms. In the
extreme case, so many facts are incorporated in the holding that virtually any deviation
from those particular facts prevents the case from being binding precedent. 28 That appears
to be the route taken by the Supreme Court in the habeas context when determining that
the law based on which relief was granted was not in fact "clearly established." Reliance
on general principles of constitutional law drawn from Supreme Court precedents, or,
even worse, on interpretation of those precedents by the circuits themselves, is condemned
as departing from the highly deferential standard of review required by AEDPA.
In eight of the summary reversals in recent terms, three involving death sentences
and three sentences of life imprisonment, the per curiam opinions focused primarily on the
lack of clearly established law to support the grant of habeas relief. In its brief opinion
Id. at 1703. In the prior case, Finney v. Rothgerber, the court had analyzed the issue as follows:
In Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 67 L. Ed. 2d 241, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981),
the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the right, upon
request, to a jury instruction that his failure to testify may not be the basis of an inference
of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way. The Court had earlier held that a federal
statute required that a no adverse inference instruction be given upon request of a criminal
defendant. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 84 L. Ed. 257, 60 S. Ct. 198 (1939).
Following Carter, in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 101 S. Ct. 1866
(1981), the Court held a defendant is entitled to the Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination in the punishment phase of a bifurcated trial of a capital case, declaring,
"We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phase of
respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
is concerned." Id. at 462-63 (footnoted omitted).
The Supreme Court has not held directly that a no adverse inference instruction
is required in the enhancement phase of a bifurcated persistent felony offender proceeding.
It can be argued that Estelle v. Smith should be applied only to the punishment phase of
capital cases, in view of the emphasis the Court placed on that feature of the case: "Given
the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the
obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees." 451 U.S. at 463 (citations
omitted). We do not believe this emphasis is significant.
751 F.2d 858, 863 (6th Cir. 1985).
26
Finney, 751 F.2d at 863.
27 White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 n.2.
28 Judges working within the common law tradition of stare decisis are well versed in how to characterize prior
cases from which they want to deviate. A common formulation is to describe the pesky precedent as "best
understood in the context of its facts." See Ursula Bentele, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, The Eighth Amendment, and
The Role of Precedent, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 267, 290 (1991). Rehnquist was referring to Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), which had announced a strict rule about when jurors could be excluded from
capital trials based on their death penalty views. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418 (1985).
25
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reversing the grant of relief to a petitioner serving life imprisonment for rape, the Court
reiterated three separate times that "no prior decision of this Court" clearly established the
principle on which the Ninth Circuit had relied. 2 9 At issue was the Nevada trial court's
refusal to allow the defense to introduce evidence that the victim, defendant's former
girlfriend, had made several previous reports claiming that defendant raped or assaulted
her, claims the police were unable to corroborate, thereby depriving him of his federal
constitutional right to present a complete defense. 3 0 According to the Supreme Court, the
circuit court had made the mistake of describing its precedents establishing the right to
present a defense too generally: "By framing our precedents at such a high level of
generality, a lower federal court could transform even the most imaginative extension of
existing case law into 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court.' 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)." 31
The Nevada courts had asserted that the defendant could not rely on a Nevada
statute that explicitly granted defendants in sexual abuse cases the right to present
extrinsic evidence of false allegations because he had not filed the written notice required
by the statute. The Supreme Court declared: "No decision of this Court clearly establishes
that this notice requirement is unconstitutional." 3 2 In response to the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that such a notice requirement is subject to examination as to whether it serves
legitimate state interests, the Court proclaimed: "Nor ... do our cases clearly establish that
the Constitution requires a case-by-case balancing of interests before such a rule can be
enforced." 3 3 The Court concluded: "No decision of this Court clearly establishes that the
exclusion of such evidence for such reasons in a particular case violates the
Constitution." 3 4 Of course, if that kind of specificity regarding the holding of precedents is
required, habeas petitioners will virtually never be entitled to relief.
Similarly confining habeas relief to cases in which the Supreme Court had faced
essentially identical facts, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding that the
prosecutor's closing argument in a capital case deprived the defendant of due process. 35
Conceding that part of the summation did appear improperly to allege collusion between
the defendant and counsel, the Court was not persuaded that his suggestion that the
defendant tailored his testimony justified the grant of relief: "The Sixth Circuit cited no
precedent of this Court in support of its conclusion that due process prohibits a prosecutor
36
from emphasizing a criminal defendant's motive to exaggerate exculpatory facts."
Again, habeas relief seems to be authorized only when the Supreme Court has decided a
case on all fours with the petitioner's.
In addition to granting relief without the requisite Supreme Court precedent, the
Sixth Circuit also committed error in consulting its own precedents, rather than those of
the Supreme Court.3 7 Rejecting the argument that the circuit court was simply considering
those cases to shed light on what law had been clearly established by the Supreme Court,
the Court noted that the general standard regarding prosecutorial misconduct set forth in

Nevada v.

Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1991, 1993-94 (2013) (per curiam).
Id at 1990-91.
31 Id. at 1994.
32
Id. at 1993.
3 Id
The Court described the decision on which the Ninth Circuit relied, Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145
(1991), as "very far afield." Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1993. Again, any intelligent second-semester law student
could make a cogent argument to the contrary.
34 Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1994.
35
Parkerv. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2154-55 (2012).
36
Id. at 2154.
37
Id. at 2155-56.
29

30
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its key precedent, Darden v. Wainwright,38 did not support the more specific tests
suggested by the circuit court cases cited. 3 9 Accordingly, the Court granted the warden's
petition for writ of certiorari and reversed the circuit court's decision granting habeas
relief.

40

A third summary reversal illustrates the same pattern. At the first trial of Irving
Cross, the complaining witness had described a forcible assault, while the defendant
claimed a consensual sexual encounter in exchange for money and drugs. 4 1 The jury found
the defendant not guilty of kidnapping, but when it was unable to reach a verdict on the
sexual assault count, the court declared a mistrial.42 At the retrial, the complainant could
not be located and, over defense objection, her prior testimony was read by a legal intern
from the State's attorney's office upon a finding that the prosecution had made sufficient
efforts to secure her presence.43 The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault, but
found him guilty of criminal sexual assault, and the Illinois appellate courts affirmed.44
The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief (reversing the district court), on the basis that
the Illinois courts were unreasonable in finding the State's efforts to secure the
complainant's testimony to be sufficient.4 5 In finding that the efforts did not meet
constitutional standards, given the importance of the witness's testimony, the court relied
in part on the fact that the trial judge had described the witness's testimony at the first trial
as halting, while the intern read the testimony without the pauses. 46 Regarding her
unavailability, in addition to suggesting various avenues the State might have pursued to
find the witness, the court noted that the prosecution failed to serve her with a subpoena
after she had expressed concern about testifying at the retrial. The Supreme Court
responded to that assertion as follows: "We have never held that the prosecution must
have issued a subpoena if it wishes to prove that a witness who goes into hiding is
unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes . . . ."4 If that kind of specificity is

required in the prior holdings of Supreme Court cases, habeas relief will indeed be limited
to cases that duplicate the facts in those precedents.
Two other summary reversals in which circuit courts had granted relief to death
row inmates also relied on the absence of "clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court." The Sixth Circuit had found a Fifth Amendment violation when
the police persuaded the defendant to cut a deal before his accomplice did so. The
Supreme Court responded: "Because no holding of this Court suggests, much less clearly
establishes, that police may not urge a suspect to confess before another suspect does so,
the Sixth Circuit had no authority to issue the writ on this ground." 48 Articulating a
similarly narrow description of what previous high court precedents must hold, the Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit's grant of relief on a Batson claim:

U.S. 168, 189-90 (1986).
Parkerv. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. at 2155.
Id. at 2156. The case was remanded for further proceedings, but as of this writing, no additional decision has
been forthcoming.
41
Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 491 (2011) (per curiam).
42
38477
3
40

id.
43

44
45

Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 493.
id.

Id. at 491, 493. See Cross v. Hardy, 632 F.3d 356, 362 (7th Cir. 2011) ("A.S.'s testimony at the first trial was
pause-filled and evasive, which may have adversely affected the jury's impression of her, as is perhaps
demonstrated by the verdict of not guilty on the kidnapping count and the lack of a verdict on the sexual assault
counts.").
47 Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. at 494.
48 Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct.
26, 30 (2011).
46

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

48

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
41

THE NOT So GREAT WRIT

2015]

In holding that respondent is entitled to a new trial, the Court of
Appeals cited two decisions of this Court, Batson and Snyder, but
neither of these cases held that a demeanor-based explanation for a
peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally
observed and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror's
demeanor.4 9

Again, requiring such a fact-specific holding in a Supreme Court case before habeas relief
is warranted limits state prisoners to swiss-cheese-like constitutional protections with
major holes wherever the Court has not yet confronted the fact pattern presented by the
petitioner.
Finally, the pattern continues in the current term. On the first day, the Court
summarily reversed, in a per curiam opinion, the grant of habeas to a defendant convicted
of murdering his wife when the prosecution asserted throughout the trial that he had
committed the killing himself, but after all the evidence was in, requested an aiding and
abetting charge.5 0 The jury, instructed on both theories, found the defendant guilty without
specifying which theory it found to have been proven. The Court justified its reversal both
on the ground that the California courts' affirmance of the conviction did not contravene
clearly established Supreme Court law and that the circuit court had committed error in
relying on its own precedents.
On the issue of how "clearly" the law must be established, the Court defined the
principle at issue in the narrowest possible terms:

-

[T]he Ninth Circuit's grant of habeas relief may be affirmed only if this
Court's cases clearly establish that a defendant, once adequately
apprised of such a possibility, can nevertheless be deprived of adequate
notice by a prosecutorial decision to focus on another theory of liability
at trial. The Ninth Circuit pointed to no case of ours holding as much.
Instead, the Court of Appeals cited three older cases that stand for
nothing more than the general proposition that a defendant must have
adequate notice of the charges against him. This proposition is far too
abstract to establish clearly the specific rule respondent needs. We have
before cautioned the lower courts - and the Ninth Circuit in particular
against "framing our precedents at such a high level of generality."
Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U. S. __, _

(2013) (per curiam) (slip op., at

7). None of our decisions that the Ninth Circuit cited addresses, even
52
remotely, the specific question presented by this case.
As in the cases discussed above, the Court seems to require a precedent with a fact pattern
virtually on all fours to warrant federal habeas relief.
Similarly, the Court found fault with the circuit's citation to its own precedent,
refusing to accept the lower court's assertion that the previous case had simply applied
principles that had been established by the Supreme Court:

49
5o
'
52

Thalerv. Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010).
Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 5-6 (2014), rev'gper curiam 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1-2.

Id. at 3-4 (citation omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit did not purport to identify any case in which we have
found notice constitutionally inadequate because, although the defendant
was initially adequately apprised of the offense against him, the
prosecutor focused at trial on one potential theory of liability at the
expense of another. Rather, it found the instant case to be
"indistinguishable from" the Ninth Circuit's own decision in Sheppard
v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234 (1989), which the court thought "faithfully

applied the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court."

53

Apparently disagreeing with the circuit court's assessment that it was in fact
applying clearly established Supreme Court law, the Court summarily reversed the
decision granting habeas relief.
Another recent case, again from the Ninth Circuit, continued in the same vein.
Habeas relief had been denied by the district court and a panel of the circuit, but the en
banc court reversed in a decision that was, in turn, reversed summarily by the Supreme
Court.54 At trial, the defendant, charged with participating in robberies with two
associates, had relied on a defense of duress. Before summation, his attorney asked to be
able to argue both that the state had not proven that his client was an accomplice and, in
the alternative, that he had acted under duress. The trial court ruled that, under state law, a
defendant was prohibited from simultaneously contesting an element of the crime and
raising an affirmative defense. 5 The state appellate court agreed that the trial court's
decision was in error, but ruled the error harmless. On federal habeas, the en banc court
deemed the mistake to constitute structural error, the kind of error that is not subject to
harmless error analysis. The Supreme Court declared this ruling not to have been clearly
established, noting that most constitutional errors call for reversal only if the government
fails to show harmlessness, with only a rare type of error requiring automatic reversal:
"None of our cases clearly requires placing improper restriction of closing argument in
this narrow category." 56

In addition to interpreting the relevant Supreme Court precedent too broadly, the
circuit had also cited to precedents from its own circuit. Again declining to accept that the
court referred to these decisions simply to shed light on what law had been clearly
established by the Supreme Court, 7 the Court reminded the circuit that, as "we have
repeatedly emphasized," circuit court precedent does not satisfy AEDPA's clearly
established law requirement.
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit was the subject of the Court's tongue-lashing for
its grant of habeas relief to a Michigan defendant serving a life sentence.5 9 During the
trial, the defendant's attorney was absent from the courtroom when testimony was given
by a prosecution witness concerning telephone calls among the codefendants.6 0 Chiding
the lower court for finding counsel's absence during a critical stage to amount to a Sixth
Amendment violation under United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court noted that "We

have never addressed whether the rule announced in Cronic applies to testimony regarding
5

Id. at 3.
See Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430-31 (2014), revg Frost v. Van Boening, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 430.
6
Id. at 430-3 1.
Id. at 431. The Court seemed to find it determinative that the precedents did not arise under AEDPA; it did not
explain why that fact should be conclusive on the issue of what law the Supreme Court had "clearly established".
Id. at. 431-32.
5 Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372 (2015).
6Id.
at 1375.
54
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codefendants' actions." 6 1 Reprising its theme that to be "contrary to" Supreme Court law,
one of its own precedents must have confronted the specific question presented, the Court
saw no case in which testimony relevant to a codefendant was deemed to amount to a
critical stage of the proceeding.6 2
These per curiam, summary decisions by the Supreme Court send a strong
message to lower federal courts considering granting habeas relief to a state prisoner.63
That message is obviously most explicit when the Court directly orders habeas relief to be
denied.6 4 In most cases, however, the Court remands to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with the per curiam opinion. 65 Such remands generally, but not
always, result in denial of habeas relief.66 In addition, the Court with some frequency
issues orders granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding (gvr) for reconsideration in light
67
of decisions that have some bearing on the opinion below. In those cases, too, the lower
courts most often "get the hint" and issue an opinion in keeping with the Court's
restrictive view of the availability of habeas relief under AEDPA.68 Finally, even without
an order from the Court, some circuits, presumably gleaning an implicit threat of summary
reversal, have sua sponte changed outcomes in cases previously granting relief, citing to
recent Supreme Court opinions. 6 9 The pronounced ripple effect of the Court's admonition
that circuit courts are prohibited from playing any role in developing principles of
constitutional law in the context of assessing state court decisions under AEDPA means
that state prisoners throughout the country must be satisfied with Constitution lite.

"6 Id. at 1377.
62 Id.

63 To further complicate matters, the message may be strong, but not entirely clear. As one scholar has pointed
out, use of the summary reversal has the potential of muddying up "clearly established law." See Richard M. Re,
Did the Martinez Sum Rev Apply or Change the Law?, RE'S JUDICATA (June 6, 2014),
https://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/2014/06/06/did-the-martinez-sum-rev-apply-or-change-the-law/.
64 Indeed, in one recent case, the Court at first stated that habeas relief should be denied despite an open issue on
which the circuit had not yet ruled. See Johnsonv. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1092 (2013). Then, alerted by two
circuit judges pointing out the error, the Court issued a per curiam decision remanding for consideration of that
claim under the proper standard. See Johnson v. Williams, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), vacating 720 F.3d 1212 (9th
Cir. 2013). Judges Reinhardt and Kozinski concurred in denial of the habeas petition but expressed concern
about the Court's previous opinion. See 720 F.3d at 1212, 1214.
6' See, e.g., Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) ("The petition for a writ of certiorari and
respondent's motion to proceed in fonna pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
6 See discussion infra notes 81-96.
67 See, for example, two cases remanded for reconsideration in light of White v. Woodall: Washington v. Sec'y
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 726 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. Wetzelv. Washington, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014)
(granting habeas for confrontation clause violation when codefendant's confession implicated the defendant);
Drummond v. Houk, 728 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2013) cert granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Robinson v.
Drummond, 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014) (granting habeas for violation of right to a public trial by closure of the
courtroom without demonstration of an overriding interest). According to one observer, some remands are not
easily explained. See James J. Duane, Sherlock Holmes and the Mystery of the PointlessRemand, 18 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 154, 169-70 (2013).
68 See, e.g., infra note 114.
69 See, e.g., Moore v. Helling, 763 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). The original opinion granting habeas was
withdrawn (Warden had petitioned for rehearing) in light of the intervening decision in White v. Wfoodall, which
made clear that relief may not be based on a state court's unreasonable refusal to extend a rule set forth by
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1015. The court explained that when petitioner's conviction became final,
fairminded jurists could conclude that the Supreme Court had not yet clearly established that an ameliorative
change in state law must be applied retroactively to cases pending on appeal. Id. at 1020. See also Rivera v.
Cuomo, 664 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2011) (panel decision granting habeas on ground of insufficiency of the evidence
reversed on rehearing based on summary reversal in Cavazos v. Smith, which reasserted the "double deference"
due to state court decisions raising such a claim).
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The Supreme Court's insistence that, before any federal court, including the
Court itself, is authorized to grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the law governing the
claim must have been clearly established by the high court in the factual context in which
the petitioner presents it poses a significant constraint. That limitation has been magnified
exponentially by the Court's recent redefinition of the meaning of the term "unreasonable
application." In cases where the state court adjudicated the federal constitutional claim on
the merits, comprising the vast majority of federal habeas petitions,70 the federal court is
precluded from granting the writ unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .,,71 Particularly given that even so-called
postcard denials of relief, that is those in which the state court provides no reasons
whatever, are deemed to be on the merits,7 2 it is not surprising that state decisions will
rarely be challengeable as "contrary to" clearly established law. Most cases, therefore, will
fall under the "unreasonable application" clause.
That clause was first interpreted in Williams v. Taylor,73 where, with Justice
O'Connor writing the controlling opinion, the Court emphasized that the petitioner must
show something more than that the state court's decision was erroneous; rather, the
decision must have been "objectively unreasonable."7 The Court firmly rejected,
however, the position taken by some circuits that, to be unreasonable, the challenged state
court decision had to be one that no reasonable jurist could make. 5 Yet eleven years later,
in Harrington v. Richter,76 without so much as acknowledging its about-face, the Court
adopted just that interpretation. State prisoners whose claims were adjudicated on the
merits by state courts are now barred from federal relief unless there is "no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's
precedents."7 " A number of the summary per curiam opinions have explicitly relied on this
standard in reversing the circuit courts' grants of habeas relief, at times placing an
additional gloss on the meaning of "unreasonable application." Quoting the Richter
standard in the first paragraph of its opinion reinstating a death sentence, for example, the
Court asserted: "Because it is not clear that the Ohio Supreme Court erred at all, much less
70 The most common scenario where a state court does not reach the merits involves reliance on the defendant's
failure to follow a state procedural rule, thereby defaulting the claim. Under such circumstances, the habeas
petitioner is not entitled to federal review at all without demonstrating either "cause and prejudice" or actual
innocence. Fortunate petitioners who can overcome that high bar may then be granted de novo review. See cases
cited supra note 6 and accompanying text.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (West 1996).
See Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011).
7 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
74 Id. at 409.
72

75
7

id.
562 U.S. 86.

7 Justice Kennedy's opinion cites to Wiliams only generally as distinguishing between an unreasonable
application and an incorrect application. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 100-01. Without explanation, the
opinion goes on to assert that federal habeas relief is precluded so long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on
the correctness of the state court's decision. Id. at 88 (citing Yarboroughv. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
In that 5 to 4 decision, again without any reference to the discussion in Wl/ams, the majority introduced the idea
of the fairminded jurist as the appropriate standard for determining whether a state court decision was
unreasonable. Yarborough, 541 U.S. 663-64. Scholarship supporting the Court's restrictive interpretation of
AEDPA similarly ignores the initial interpretation of the AEDPA language in tillams v. Taylor. See, e.g.,
O'Scannlain, supra note 8; see also O'Brien, supra note 8. Neither article so much as mentions the opinion in

Williams v. Taylor.
7'

Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

52

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
2015]

THE NOT So GREAT WRIT

45

erred so transparently that no fairminded jurist could agree with that court's decision, the
Sixth Circuit's judgment must be reversed." 7 9 The notion that an error must be
"transparent" appears to be a new, and exacting, requirement.
Application of the "no fairminded jurist" standard has led to some puzzling
results. In two cases in which the Supreme Court had summarily reversed the grant of
habeas but sent the case back to the circuit for further consideration, habeas relief was
again affirmed, each time over the dissent of a member of the panel. Despite what
appeared to be the opinion of a presumptively fairminded judge, the Supreme Court this
time denied certiorari review to the wardens. Examination of these opinions reveals the
extent to which the writ has been both marginalized and made dependent on the subjective
views of the particular judges who happen to sit on the panel reviewing the case. These
results are particularly ironic given that the standard was originally touted as suggesting
that relief would be based on "objective" unreasonableness.
In one of the cases in which the Supreme Court summarily reversed the grant of
habeas to a death row inmate by the Third Circuit, the Court remanded for exploration of
an issue on which the state court might have relied.o According to the Court, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have concluded, when denying petitioner's Brady
claim, that a report that had been withheld was "ambiguous." Having been chided for
failing to acknowledge and address the state courts' possible reliance on the ambiguous
nature of the withheld report, the Third Circuit on remand explicitly addressed that
purported conclusion. 1 Even granting AEDPA deference, the majority found the state
court's characterization of the police report as ambiguous to be an unreasonable
determination of the facts, as well as an unreasonable application of clearly established
law.8 2 Accordingly, this Pennsylvania death row inmate's life was spared.
Dissenting Judge Hardiman, on the other hand, conceding that finding ambiguity
was not the most natural reading of the report, asserted that the state court's decision had
enough support to preclude federal habeas relief: "If we exercised de novo review of the
state court decision, it would seem that the best reading of the activity sheet is that it
relates to the . .. robbery [with which petitioner was charged]. But under AEDPA's highly
deferential standard of review, 'even a strong case for relief does not mean the state
court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable. '83 The dissenting judge further cited to the
earlier Supreme Court case of Yarborough v. Alvarado84 for the proposition that habeas
relief is precluded as long as the state court decision was "within the matrix" of the
custody test for Miranda purposes as articulated by the Court. 5 Finally, the judge stressed
the reach of the standard set forth in Harrington v. Richter, supplying emphasis to the
word "possibility": "The Court has repeatedly reminded the lower federal courts that
AEDPA precludes relief unless the state court's ruling was error 'beyond any possibility
of fairminded disagreement. '86 In a footnote to this interpretation of the standard, Judge

Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011).
o Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (2012) ("[The] Third Circuit overlooked the determination of the
state courts that the notations were . . . 'entirely ambiguous."').
8See Lambert v. Beard, 537 F. App'x. 78, 84-86 (3d Cir. 2013).
82 Id at 84.
83 Id at 89 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (quoting Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. at 88).
84 Id (quoting Yarboroughv. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 665 (2004)).
Id (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 103).
8Id (quoting Harringtonv. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added).
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Hardiman cited to a previous dissent in which he had collected all the cases in which the
Supreme Court had reversed lower courts for failure to heed this admonition. 7
Another case illustrates the same point. Habeas relief that had been granted by
the Sixth Circuit was vacated and remanded"" in light of Parkerv. Matthews," one of the
summary reversals being considered here. Unlike in most cases, when such a remand
results in the court toeing the line articulated by the Supreme Court, the lower court again
found relief warranted, with one judge dissenting. 90 The circuit court acknowledged that
its first decision had relied, improperly as the Supreme Court made clear in Parker v.
Matthews, on its own precedent in evaluating the prejudice suffered by the defendant by
his attorney's deficient performance.91 On remand, the court reexamined the case using
only the Strickland standard itself and concluded that the Michigan court both failed to
apply the correct rule and, even if it stated the rule correctly, the result was an
unreasonable application of federal law.9 2 By contrast, the dissenting judge did not find
the Michigan court's decision to be "objectively unreasonable; fairminded jurists could
(and did) disagree on this point." 9 3
The same pattern is reflected in another recent case, in which the Supreme Court
has recently allowed the Eleventh Circuit's grant of habeas relief to vacate an Alabama
death sentence to stand.9 4 Here, too, a dissenting judge, praised by one of the judges ruling
in the petitioner's favor as a "nationally known and admired judge,"95 criticizes his
colleagues as failing to heed the requirement that the state court's application of Strickland
be "objectively unreasonable." 96 It is difficult to square the disagreement of a jurist
acknowledged to be fairminded with the grant of habeas relief applying the "fairminded
jurist" standard.
The new fairminded jurist standard poses a particular analytical challenge in the
context of claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Such claims
require a defendant to demonstrate that "no rational trier of fact" could have agreed with
the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.9 7 To secure habeas relief on that
basis, in addition to making that showing, a petitioner must now show that a state court's
decision rejecting the sufficiency of the evidence claim was such that "no fairminded
jurist" could agree with it. As the Supreme Court noted in one of its per curiam summary
reversals, over the objection of three dissenting justices, "[b]ecause rational people can
sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will
sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must

Id. at n.2 (citing Garrus v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 694 F.3d 394, 412-15 nn.1-3 (3d Cir. 2012)). Judge
Raggi of the Second Circuit provided a similar list in an opinion dissenting from a grant of habeas relief. Young
v. Conway, 715. F.3d 79, 87 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (Raggi, J., dissenting).
8 Howes v. Walker, 132 S. Ct. 2741, 2741 (2012), vacating Walker v. McQuiggan, 656 F.3d 311 (6th Cir.
2011).
8

89
90

Id.

Walkerv. Hoffner, 534 F. App'x. 406, 416-18 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1025 (2014).

9' Id. at 411 ("[A] defendant suffers prejudice when he is deprived of a 'substantial defense' by the deficient

performance of his counsel.") (citing Walkerv. McQuiggan, 656 F.3d at 321); see Parkerv. Matthews, 132 S. Ct.
2148, 2155 (2012).
92 Walkerv. Hoffner, 534 F. App'x at 412-13.
9Id
at 418 (Cook, J., dissenting).
94 See DeBruce v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 758 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2014), cert denied sub nom Dunn v.
DeBruce, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4015 (June. 15, 2015).
9 Id at 1279-80 (Martin, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 1280 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97 Jacksonv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 319 (1979).
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nonetheless uphold." 9 " Yet in this context, several presumably fairminded jurists
(including three justices of the Supreme Court) found the evidence so lacking that no
rational factfinder could arrive at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The case that prompted the Court's admonition that mistaken convictions must
sometimes be upheld involved Shirley Rhee Smith, a grandmother convicted of killing her
seven-week-old grandchild based on questionable evidence that he had died of "shaken
baby syndrome."99 The case had a long and complicated history in the state and federal
courts, including three trips to the United States Supreme Court. When the Ninth Circuit
first granted habeas relieft100 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of the
recently decided Carey v. Musladin, which, as described above, had narrowed the
meaning of "clearly established law" in § 2254(d)(1).o The Court of Appeals reinstated
its grant of relief on the grounds that, unlike the situation in Musladin, here, the federal
law had been clearly established by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia.102 The court
acknowledged that the high court had not confronted the same factual scenario presented
by the petitioner, but refused to accept that AEDPA could be interpreted to limit habeas
relief to cases in which the Court had decided an identical case.103 When the Warden
sought rehearing en banc in light of another Supreme Court case applying the Musladin
principle, 104 the Ninth Circuit denied the petition, again finding that the intervening
opinion did not affect the grant of relief.10 5 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, 106
Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam).
Id. at 4-5.
.00 Smithy. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We agree with Smith that no rational trier of fact could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith caused the child's death. We further conclude that the state
court's affirmance of Smith's conviction constituted an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), which established the standard for constitutional sufficiency
98

99

of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We accordingly reverse and remand with instructions to grant the
writ.").
Patrick v. Smith, 550 U.S. 915 (2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74, 76 (2006). See 28 U.S.C.
2254(d)(1) (2014); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
102 Smithy. Patrick, 508 F.3d 1256, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2007).
103 The circuit court's decision stated as follows:
101

§

It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court has never had a case where the issue was
whether the evidence, expert and otherwise, was constitutionally sufficient to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had shaken an infant to death. But there are an
infinite number of potential factual scenarios in which the evidence may be insufficient to
meet constitutional standards. Each scenario theoretically could be construed artfully to
constitute a class of one. If there is to be any federal habeas review of constitutional
sufficiency of the evidence as required by Jackson, however, section 2254(d)(1) cannot be
interpreted to require a Supreme Court decision to be factually identical to the case in
issue before habeas can be granted on the ground of unreasonable application of Supreme
Court precedent.
Id. at 1259.
104 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S.
120, 126 (2008).
105

The court's decision stated:

For the same reason that we determined that Musladin did not affect our decision in Smith,
we conclude that Van Patten does not, either. Van Patten addresses an entire class of cases
under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence applying the standards set by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674(1984), for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Whether appearance of counsel by telephone is structural error is an
issue "for another day" that the Supreme Court may address to establish a rule for
innumerable cases in the future. See 128 S. Ct. at 747.
Smith v. Patrick, 519 F.3d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 2008).
10' Patrick v. Smith, 558 U.S. 1143 (2010).
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107
in which it had granted
citing yet another intervening opinion, McDaniel v. Brown,

certiorari to consider the insufficiency standard in the habeas context. And yet again, the
Ninth Circuit reinstated its prior opinion.1os Finally, the Supreme Court summarily
reversed the grant of habeas relief, per curiam, over the dissents of three justices.109
The per curiam opinion begins by stressing that, under Jackson v. Virginia, it is

the responsibility of the jury, not the court, to decide what conclusions should be drawn
from evidence. 1 o A reviewing court may set aside the jury verdict only if no rational trier
of fact could have agreed with the jury's assessment that the evidence demonstrated the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Added to this significant hurdle, on habeas
review, the federal court may not grant relief simply because it disagrees with the state
court's rejection of the sufficiency claim; rather, the state court decision must be
"objectively unreasonable" such that "no fairminded jurist" would agree with it."' It is
almost impossible even to imagine that no fairminded jurist could agree with a conclusion
of twelve jurors that the state court, by hypothesis, refused to reverse as one that "no
rational factfinder" would have reached. 112
In another per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court also summarily reversed a
habeas grant on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, chiding the Third Circuit for
failing to afford the respect that the jury and Pennsylvania state courts were due.11 The
federal court had found insufficient evidence that the defendant was an accomplice of the
shooter to a deliberate murder; according to the Supreme Court, under the doubly
deferential standard, that conclusion could not stand. Accordingly, on remand habeas
relief was denied. 114
Analysis of claims under these multiple layers of abstract standards, most
involving some notion of what is "reasonable," not only requires mind-numbing logical
gymnastics, but fails to achieve results that can in any meaningful way be termed
"objective." First, the Jackson standard itself suggests that presumably reasonable jurors
may arrive, unanimously, at a verdict that "no rational factfinder" could support. To
further complicate matters, that conclusion necessarily incorporates the constitutionally
mandated burden that guilt must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 15 Second, trial
courts routinely deny defense counsel's motion before the case is submitted to the jury
asking for dismissal on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. Overturning a jury's
verdict pursuant to the Jackson standard therefore inherently involves disagreement
among fairminded jurists. Accordingly, applying the "fairminded jurist" standard would
appear always to preclude the grant of federal habeas relief.

Id. (citing McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010)).
.o. Smith v. Mitchell, 624 F.3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2010) ("We have now examined Brown along with
supplemental briefs from the parties addressing its potential effect on Smith's case. We conclude that nothing in
Brown is inconsistent with our prior decision or our method of reaching it. We accordingly reinstate our former
decision....").
109 Cavazosv. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 8 (2011).
110 Id. at 3-4.
..
" Id. at 4; Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011) (per curiam).
112 Although she did not secure relief through the courts, Shirley Rhee Smith was ultimately granted a
commutation by Governor Jerry Brown. A.C. Thompson, California Governor Commutes Sentence in Shaken
Baby Case, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/califoria-governor-commutessentence-in-shaken-baby-case.
113 Colemanv. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012).
114 Id. at 2064; Johnsonv. Mechling, 518 F. App'x. 106, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2013).
115 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
1o'

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

56

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
THE NOT So GREAT WRIT

2015]

49

The fairminded jurist standard raises a further issue for courts of appeals
considering whether to grant a certificate of appealability to a petitioner who has been
denied habeas relief by a district court. Long before Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme
Court had set the bar for issuance of such a certificate at a relatively low level. 1 16 Courts
were admonished that they should make only a threshold inquiry into the claim, assessing
whether the petitioner has made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right."1 17 Such a showing is made when "jurists of reason could disagree with the district
court's resolution" or conclude the issues presented are worthy of further exploration."" In
establishing this standard for appellate review, the Court noted specifically that "a claim
can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been
granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail."119
Once the fairminded jurist test is in place, however, if the issue is debatable among such
jurists, no habeas relief will ever be warranted for claims adjudicated on the merits in state
courts.
IV.

SUMMARY TREATMENT

The Supreme Court's practice of issuing summary per curiam opinions resolving
cases on petitions for certiorari review has long come under strong criticism both within
the Court and from academics and practitioners. While the earlier practice of reversing
summarily without providing reasons1 20 has largely been abandoned, questions have been
raised about the lack of transparency and procedural regularity governing summary
dispositions. 121 In addition, skeptics wonder whether such reversals are being limited to
cases of clear error, and whether there is a substantive bias in the selection of cases to
subject to this treatment. 122 Moreover, concern that respondents may be unfairly
prejudiced when the merits of claims are adjudicated on petitions for writ of certiorari
continues to be voiced.
Several of the opinions being considered here illustrate the problems of such
summary reversals. In her dissent from the summary reversal in Cavazos v. Smith, joined
by two other members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg specifically chastised the Court for
its failure to allow for full briefing and argument.123 "The fact-intensive character of the
case calls for attentive review of the record, including a trial transcript that runs over 1,500
pages. Careful inspection of the record would be aided by the adversarial presentation that
full briefing and argument afford."1 24

". Indeed, in Cavazos v. Smith, the Magistrate Judge noted that this was not the typical shaken baby case, raising
many questions, but found that the evidence was sufficient to a support conviction. 132 S. Ct. at 6, 8. The district
court adopted this recommendation, but granted a COA on ground that question was debatable. Id
117 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2014)).
"1 Id
119 Id. at 338.
120 Failure to give any rationale for summary reversal prompted the initial protests against the practice. See, e.g.,
Ernest J. Brown, Foreword:ProcessofLaw, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 82, 90 (1958).
121 See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court's Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LiBERTY 1 (2015).
Professor Baude looked at all the Roberts Court's summary reversals so far, and studied in depth those issued in
the 2013-14 term. He describes the reversals as falling into two general categories: those designed to enforce the
Supreme Court's supremacy over recalcitrant circuit courts and those essentially serving an ad hoc function. Id.
at 1-2.
22
1 See Jonathan Kirshbaum, Accelerating Pace of Supreme Court's Summary Reversals of Habeas Relief
Suggests Impatience with CircuitCourts'Failureto Defer to State Tribunals, CRIM. L. REP., June 27, 2012, at 13; see also Baude, supra note 121, at 4.
123 132 S. Ct. 2, 12 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
124 Id
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Justice Ginsburg cited to two highly respected treatises in support of her
objection to the summary treatment of the case. The classic treatise on Supreme Court
practice1 2 5 characterizes per curiam opinions such as those discussed in this article, in
which the Court grants certiorari and, at the same time, disposes of the merits, addressing
both facts and issues in detail, as the "most controversial form of summary disposition."1 26
The authors note that the justices themselves characterized summary reversals as "rare and
exceptional," appropriate only when "law is well settled and stable, facts are not in
dispute, and the decision below is clearly wrong." 1 2 7 According to Justice Brennan,
summary dispositions should be limited to situations where the decision below flatly
rejected the Court's controlling authority. If even one justice disagreed, the case should be
set for briefing and argument. 1 28 In addition, the authors describe the problems posed for
counsel, particularly for respondents, by the use of summary reversals, in light of the fact
that lawyers are told not to focus on briefing the merits of the issue when seeking or
opposing certiorari review. 1 29
Summary reversal seems particularly questionable when, as in Shirley Rhee
Smith's case and the capital case involving James Lambert described above, 1 3 0 several
justices of the Supreme Court dissent from the disposition. If indeed the practice is meant
for cases in which the law and facts are undisputed and the decision below is clearly
wrong, even one dissenting opinion, much less three, would suggest that, at the very least,
full briefing and argument is in order. Moreover, the lack of any written dissent does not,
in and of itself, demonstrate that summary treatment is proper. Several of the unanimous
summary reversals presented both factual and legal issues that seemed worthy of full
consideration by the Court. In Felkner v. Jackson, for example, the Ninth Circuit had
granted relief on a Batson claim, finding that the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral bases
were not sufficient to counter evidence of purposeful discrimination, given that two of
three black jurors were stricken and the record reflected different treatment of comparably
situated white jurors. 13 1 Such claims are by their nature fact-sensitive, and adherence to
the prohibition against use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race has by no means
been universally accepted. 13 2 Yet the Supreme Court summarily reversed the circuit
court's determination: "That decision is as inexplicable as it is unexplained. It is
reversed." 1 3 3 Noting the deference due to the trial judge's assessment of a prosecutor's
credibility, to which AEDPA adds another level of deference, the Court announced: "The
state appellate court's decision was plainly not unreasonable. There was simply no basis
for the Ninth Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive
manner."l34

125

Id.; GRESSMAN, ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (10th ed. 2013) is "regarded

as a sufficiently

authoritative resource on all things related to the Court that it is cited not only by lawyers who argue there but
also by the Justices themselves." Tom Goldstein and Amy Howe, Book review: New editionfor a classic treatise,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 28, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/book-review-new-edition-for-aclassic-treatise/.
126

GRESSMAN, ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 349 (9th ed. 2007).

Id. at 350-51 (quoting Justice Marshall). The other treatise cited by Justice Ginsburg, FALLON, ET. AL., THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009), also cites to justices in its critique of summary
reversals, adding that some justices complained that they were more likely to be granted in favor of the
government than an individual claiming violation of constitutional rights. Id. at 1479-80.
127

128
129

Justice Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 232 (1983).
GRESSMAN, AT AL., supra note 126, at 417 n.46.

See supratext accompanying notes 80-87.
131 562 U.S. 594, 597 (2011).
32
1 See, e.g., Miller-Ely. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003).
133 Felkner, 562 U.S. at 598.
130

134

Id.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

58

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
THE NOT So GREAT WRIT

2015]

51

The panel of the Ninth Circuit that did reach this conclusion surely will consider
the Supreme Court's summary reversal of its decision to have been reached in a similarly
"dismissive manner." As will the Sixth Circuit, whose decision that a defendant facing a
death sentence did not receive effective assistance at sentencing phase was summarily
reversed, with the conclusory statement: "Because we think it clear that Van Hook's
attorneys met the constitutional minimum of competence under the correct standard, we
grant the petition and reverse." 3 5 The circuit court was deemed particularly at fault for
relying on the 2003 ABA guidelines for the defense of capital cases, a point that prompted
Justice Alito to write a separate concurrence to make clear that the opinion in no way
136
suggests that those guidelines have special relevance1.
Admonishing the circuit court for
relying on the well-established guidelines for the representation of defendants in capital
cases seems particularly unseemly without allowing full briefing or oral argument on the
issue.
V.

TONE

As the previous sections have shown, these per curiam summary reversals reveal
a pattern of limiting the federal habeas petitioner's opportunity to secure relief based on
constitutional violations in state court. The petitioner must be able to point to "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," which
has been limited to narrowly defined holdings of the Court; no reference should be made
to any circuit court rulings; then it must be demonstrated that "no fairminded jurist" would
agree with the state court's determination that his constitutional rights were not violated.
Moreover, all this must be accomplished in the context of responding to a petition for
certiorari by the warden, without the opportunity for full briefing and argument. One
additional characteristic of these opinions is noteworthy: their tone. The Court strikes an
attitude of lecturing and dismissiveness, suggesting that the circuit courts need to be
taught a lesson, that they should know better. Indeed, as one commentator has noted, the
Court's summary reversals can be seen as a non-too-subtle threat to any federal court
considering granting habeas relief.137 Even if not designed to send such warnings, the
language used by the Court in describing opinions granting relief certainly conveys a
message any objective reader would find insulting.
The Supreme Court's attitude is well illustrated by the first paragraph of one of
the summary reversals in a case in which the defendant had been sentenced to death:
In this habeas case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder convictions based on the
flimsiest of rationales. The court's decision is a textbook example of

what the . . AEDPA proscribes: "using federal habeas corpus review as
a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts."
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. _

(2010) (slip op., at 12). We therefore grant

the petition for certiorari and reverse.138
The Supreme Court's derogatory assessment of the Sixth Circuit's opinion is particularly
striking in light of the Court's own curious evaluation of the evidence regarding extreme
emotional disturbance, the issue on which the circuit had found the Kentucky courts to

135
136
137
138

Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 5 (2009).
Id. at 13-14 (Alito, J., concurring).
See Kirshbaum, supra note 122, at 4.
Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2149 (2012) (emphasis added).
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have improperly shifted the burden to the defense. Noting that the defense expert admitted
that many people suffer from adjustment disorders, the Court commented: "But of course
very few people commit murders.l39 The Court thereby suggested that it is the murder for
which there must be a reasonable explanation or excuse, while any competent first year
criminal law student would understand that the requirement of a reasonable explanation
applies to the emotional disturbance, not to the killing.
In the same opinion, the Court chastised the circuit court for relying on its own
precedents, rather than limiting consideration to Supreme Court case law. Beginning with
a phrase that appears regularly in these summary reversals:
To make matters worse, the Sixth Circuit decided [the prior case] under
pre-AEDPA law, . . . so that case did not even purportto reflect clearly
established law as set out in this Court's holdings. It was plain and
repetitive error for the Sixth Circuit to rely on its own precedents in
granting Matthews habeas relief.14 0
Why reliance on a pre-AEDPA case would "make matters worse" is by no means clear;
surely a circuit court could render an opinion stating well-established principles of
constitutional law rooted in Supreme Court precedents at any time.14 1
The Court's reversal of habeas relief granted to a death row inmate by the Sixth
Circuit contained similarly querulous language: "Because it is not clear that the Ohio
Supreme Court erred at all, much less erred so transparently that no fairminded jurist
could agree with that court's decision, the Sixth Circuit's judgment must be reversed."1 4 2
Regarding the circuit court's rationale for concluding that the state courts had failed to
acknowledge a Miranda violation, the Court announced dismissively: "That is plainly
wrong."l43

The Court used the same phraseology in rejecting the Ninth Circuit's evaluation
of the evidence in Shirley Rhee Smith's case as insufficient to demonstrate the cause of
the child's death beyond a reasonable doubt: "That conclusion was plainly wrong."1 4 4
Reminding the circuit that a state appellate court can reverse for insufficiency only if no
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime; that the
reviewing court must presume that jury resolved conflicts in favor of prosecution, and
must defer to that resolution; and that AEDPA adds another layer of deference to state
court decisions, the Court announced: "[T]here can be no doubt of the Ninth Circuit's
error below."l45 The Court continued with its tone of absolute certainty, despite the
disagreement of three dissenting justices: "In light of the evidence presented at trial, the
Ninth Circuit plainly erred in concluding that the jury's verdict was irrational, let alone
that it was unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to think otherwise."1 46 The
final substantive paragraph of the Court's opinion went beyond finding the circuit to have

39

Id. at 2153.
Id. at 2155-56.
141 See supra note 57 (describing another case in which the Court made the same point in reversing the Ninth
Circuit).
142 Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 27 (2011), habeas denied, 737 F.3d 1003 (6th Cir. 2013), reh g denied, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 1890 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 63 (2014).
143 Id. at 29.
144 Cavazosv. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 6 (2011).
1

140

145

Id.

146

Id. at 7.
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been mistaken and accused the court of essentially ignoring the Supreme Court's
directives:
The decision below cannot be allowed to stand. This Court vacated and
remanded this judgment twice before, calling the panel's attention to
this Court's opinions highlighting the necessity of deference to state
courts in §2254(d) habeas cases. Each time the panel persisted in its
course, reinstating its judgment without seriously confronting the
significance of the cases called to its attention. Its refusal to do so

necessitates this Court's action today. 1 4 7
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting with two other justices, viewed the case as intensely factbound and not worthy of certiorari review, and characterized the per curiam opinion as
follows: "[T]he Court is bent on rebuking the Ninth Circuit for what it conceives to be
defiance of our prior remands. I would not ignore Smith's plight and choose her case as a
fit opportunity to teach the Ninth Circuit a lesson."1 4 8
Criticizing the Ninth Circuit in another case, the Supreme Court, as noted
above, 1 4 9 focused on the conclusory and dismissive manner in which the circuit treated the
state court's rejection of the petitioner's Batson claim: "The state appellate court's
decision was plainly not unreasonable. There was simply no basis for the Ninth Circuit to
reach the opposite conclusion, particularly in such a dismissive manner."150 Yet some of
the per curiam opinions in which the high court rejected the determinations of circuit court
panels appear equally "dismissive," or at least might be taken that way by the judges who
had found violations of state prisoners' constitutional rights.
In summarily reversing the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas to a death row inmate
even in the absence of AEDPA deference, when the petitioner had filed for relief before
that statute was enacted, the Court, without the benefit of full briefing and argument, was
able to reject an ineffective assistance of counsel claim: "Because we think it clear that
Van Hook's attorneys met the constitutional minimum of competence under the correct
standard, we grant the petition and reverse."15 1 After describing the gruesome crime in
considerable detail, the Court noted that a panel of the circuit had been reversed by the en
banc court twice, and then went on to criticize the most recent panel opinion for its
reliance on the 2003 ABA guidelines for defense of capital cases, according to the Court,
"without even pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing professional
practice at the time of the trial." 1 5 2 The Court continued: "To make matters worse," the
circuit treated the guidelines as inexorable commands, rather than as guides for what is
reasonable, as required by Strickland.153 To the petitioner's assertion that his counsel was
ineffective even under professional standards of the time, the Court responded curtly. "He
is wrong."l54

Justice Alito took the opportunity in his concurrence to stress that the Court's
opinion in no way suggests that ABA guidelines have special relevance.
147
148
149
15o

Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
Felknerv. Jackson, 562 U.S. at 598.

.Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 4-5 (2009).
id. at 8.

152

153

id.

154

Id. at 9.
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It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work
that a defense attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the
obligations imposed by the Constitution, and I see no reason why the
ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged position in making that
determination.15 5

Particularly when a defendant's life is at stake, one might question whether it is
appropriate for the Supreme Court to reach out to scold a court of appeals for relying on
well-respected guidelines for the defense of capital cases without even permitting counsel
to brief and argue their possible relevance.
One of the Court's summary reversals of the current term contains the same kind
of sharp rebuke. Asserting that the "second rationale for the Court of Appeals' decision is
no more sound than the first," the Court summarizes the key points in the circuit court's
opinion leading it to the determination that the trial court's error was structural. 156 The
15
next paragraph begins with a single word: "No."s
The Court then goes on to find fault
with each aspect of the circuit's analysis, stressing that "reasonable minds could disagree"
with all of the lower court's conclusions.1 5 8
VI.

SUMMARY REVERSALS WHEN RELIEF WAS DENIED

The five per curiam summary reversals of decisions in which the circuit court had
denied federal habeas corpus relief during this period15 9 convey strikingly different
characteristics, both in terms of substance and tone. Four of these cases are essentially
reversals based on procedural irregularities, in which the courts had in some way
misinterpreted their task in assessing the petitioner's right to relief. 1 6 0 The fifth case,
Porterv. McCollum, 1 6 1 was unanimous in reversing a death sentence imposed on a Korean
War veteran on the basis that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance at the
penalty phase of trial by not informing the jury about the defendant's post-traumatic stress
disorder. 162 As Linda Greenhouse pointed out at the time, the case formed a stark contrast
with that of Bobby Van Hook, whose lawyer similarly failed to present extensive

Id. at 14 (Alito, J., concurring).
.. Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014).
155

...Id. at 431.
158 Id.
159

See cases listed in Appendix B.

'6, In the most recent such case, Tiliams v. Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014), the Court corrected an error in its

previous opinion when it declared that the petitioner was not entitled to relief despite the fact that it had not ruled
on the merits of one of the issues. See supra note 64.
In Jefferson v. Upton, the Court remanded to the circuit for consideration of all the applicable exceptions to the
requirement that a federal court must accept state factual findings when the circuit had considered only one of
those exceptions. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. 560 U.S. 284, 294-95 (2010). In Wellons v. Hall, the
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's denial of habeas relief to a petitioner under sentence of death because the
circuit had erroneously relied on a procedural bar that may have affected its decision to deny an evidentiary
hearing. 558 U.S. 220, 226 (2010). Fourjustices dissented on the ground that the circuit had also denied relief on
the merits, making remand inappropriate. Id. at 226-28 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. at 228-32 (Alito,
J., and Roberts, C.J., dissenting). And in Corcoran v. Levenhagen, the Court remanded to the circuit which had
reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief on one bases without addressing other claims challenging the
petitioner's death sentence. 558 U.S. 1, 2-3 (2009). When the circuit later granted habeas relief, the Court again
reversed summarily, on the ground that the circuit had relied on a violation of state law, rather than denial of a
federal constitutional right. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 7 (2010). On remand, the district court denied the
writ. Corcoranv. Buss, No. 3:05-CV-389, 2013 WL 140378, at *17 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2013).
16 558 U.S. 30 (2009).
162 Id. at 30-31, 40.
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mitigating evidence on behalf of that veteran.16 Because the state court had not decided
whether counsel's performance was deficient, Porter's claim could be reviewed de novo
by the federal court, without the deference due under AEDPA. Bobby Van Hook was not
so fortunate: habeas relief granted to that petitioner was summarily reversed. 164
VII.

CONCLUSION

The picture that emerges from examination of these summary reversals is one of
a Supreme Court arrogating to itself, through its tiny direct review docket, guardianship of
the Constitution as it applies to defendants in state courts, leaving no role for the lower
federal courts. From this vantage point, the Court interprets constitutional protections in
the narrowest possible terms, using the mechanism of summary reversals to send
unmistakable messages to the circuit courts that granting relief based on generous reading
of Supreme Court precedents, much less on lower court characterizations of what those
precedents might have held, will be set aside without so much as a call for briefing or oral
argument. Moreover, to be deemed "generous," an opinion in a petitioner's favor simply
needs to be one with which any fairminded jurist could disagree. And the Supreme Court's
per curiam opinions are written in a way that signals utter lack of respect for both the
petitioners and the courts that found their constitutional claims to be valid. The Great
Writ's protections extend only to Constitution lite.

See Linda
Greenhouse,
Selective Empathy, N.Y.TIMES
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/selective-empathy.
164 Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 13 (2009).
163
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APPENDIX A

Summary reversals ofgrants ofhabeas corpus relief October, 2009 to June, 2015
Nov. 9, 2009

Bobby v. Van Hook, No. 09-144
558 U.S. 4 (2009)

6th Cir. (death sentence)

Nov. 16, 2009

Wong v. Belmontes, No. 08-1263
558 U.S. 15 (2009)

9 th

Cir. (death sentence)

Jan. 11, 2010

McDaniel v. Brown, No. 08-559
558 U.S. 120 (2010)

9th

Cir.

Feb. 22, 2010

Thaler v. Haynes, No. 09-273
559 U.S. 43 (2010)

5th Cir. (death sentence)

Nov. 8, 2010

Wilsonv. Corcoran, No. 10-91
562 U.S. 1 (2010)

7th Cir. (death sentence)

Mar. 21, 2011

Felkner v. Jackson, No. 10-797
562 U.S. 594 (2011)

9 th

May 2, 2011

Bobby v. Mitts, No. 10-1000
131 S. Ct. 1762 (2011)

6th Cir. (death sentence)

Oct. 31, 2011

Cavazos v. Smith, No. 10-1115
132 S. Ct. 2 (2011)

9th Cir.

Nov. 7, 2011

Bobby v. Dixon, No. 10-1540
132 S. Ct. 26 (2011)

6th

Dec. 12, 2011

Hardy v. Cross, No. 11-74
132 S. Ct. 490 (2011)

7th Cir.

Feb. 21, 2012

Wetzelv. Lambert, No. 11-38
132 S. Ct. 1195 (2012)

3d Cir.

May 29, 2012

Colemanv. Johnson, No. 11-1053
132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012)

June 11, 2012

Parker v. Matthews, No. 11-845
132 S. Ct. 2148 (2012)

6th Cir. (death sentence)

April 1, 2013

Marshallv. Rodgers, No. 12-382
133 S. Ct. 1446 (2013)

9 th

Cir.

June 3, 2013

Nevada v. Jackson, No. 12-694
133 S. Ct. 1990 (2013)

9th

Cir.

3

Cir.

Cir.

(death sentence)

rd Cir.

This case was briefed and scheduled for oral argument, but shortly before the argument date, it was removed
from the calendar without explanation.
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Lopez v. Smith

No. 13-946

9 th

Cir.

9 th

Cir.
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135 S. Ct. 1 (2014)
Nov. 17, 2014

Glebe v. Frost

No. 14-95

135 S. Ct. 429 (2014)
Mar. 30, 2015

Woods v. Donald No. 14-618

6th Cir.

135 S. Ct. 1372 (2015)
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APPENDIX B

Summary reversals of denials of habeas corpus relief October, 2009 to June, 2015
Corcoranv. Levenhagen, No. 08-10495
558 U.S. 1 (2009)

7th Cir. (death sentence)

Nov. 30, 2009

Porterv. McCollum, No. 08-10537
558 U.S. 30 (2009)

1 1 th

Cir. (death sentence

Jan. 19, 2010

Wellons v. Hall, No. 09-5731
558 U.S. 220 (2010)

1 1 th

Cir. (death sentence

May 24, 2010

Jeffersonv. Upton, No. 09-8852
560 U.S. 284 (2010)

1 1 th

Cir. (death sentence

July 1, 2014

Johnson v. Williams, No. 13-9085
134 S. Ct. 2659 (2014)

9 th
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INTRODUCTION

The original purposes of eavesdropping statutes were to protect the citizen
against government intrusion into the citizen's privacy and to authorize law enforcement
interception to fight organized crime.' Yet, in certain instances, the statutes have been
used offensively by the government to avoid citizen oversight of policing and even to
intimidate citizens. These uses are far different from the original legislative intent behind
the statutes, doing nothing to thwart organized crime activities and significantly
interfering in the lives of otherwise law-abiding citizens. The prohibition against taping
police activity ultimately hurts society more than it benefits society, given overenforcement of eavesdropping statutes and under-enforcement of discipline or penalties
for officers lying or falsifying evidence. The over-enforcement of eavesdropping statutes
must be viewed against the backdrop of officer falsification of evidence and the police
code of silence.
Citizens who audio record or videotape conversations run the risk of being
arrested for violating eavesdropping statutes, especially in the eleven states that require
all-party consent prior to taping. Even in a one-party consent state, there may be grounds
to arrest the citizen if the citizen is a bystander rather than a party to the conversation. The
risk is greater where the person being recorded is a police officer because the police
officer may feel challenged by a civilian recording the police officer's actions; this is so
although several federal circuit courts have found that the First Amendment protects
gathering such information. The civilian fear of arrest for taping an encounter involving a
police officer has a chilling effect on the civilian's gathering of information concerning
law enforcement, as the eavesdropping statutes in most jurisdictions carry a hefty prison
term, or fine, or both for their violation.
Two federal courts of appeals have found that the First Amendment protects
civilian taping of encounters with police officers.2 Those decisions and the Department of
Justice's statement of interest in Garcia v. Montgomery County, Maryland3 may signal a

trend in the law. In effect, the scales may be tipping in favor of sanctioning civilian
recording of encounters with police officers.
The facts of Garcia are discussed in Section I. Section II provides information on
eavesdropping statutes of various jurisdictions, as does Appendix A, and Section III
reviews federal court decisions considering whether there is First Amendment protection
for civilian taping. Section IV discusses officer falsification of evidence and the police
code of silence. Section V analyzes the role civilian taping plays in society and Section VI
proposes an exemption to eavesdropping statutes that would safeguard a civilian's right to
tape an encounter with a police officer.

' See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153, 2157, for the Senate report
that accompanied the passage of the federal eavesdropping statutes in 1968. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 630
(West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.01(3), (4) (West 2001); and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 272, § 99(A)
(West 2014) for the state statutes of three all-party consent states.
2ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012), on remand, No.
10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012) (granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and a permanent injunction); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78,82 (1st Cir. 2011).
3
See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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THE CASE OF MANNIE GARCIA

The following case is illustrative of what can happen when police officers take
offense at a civilian recording a police encounter.
Mannie Garcia is a well-known freelance photojournalist whose photos have
appeared in national publications, such as The New York Times and Newsweek and
international publications such as Der Spiegel.4 He was leaving a restaurant with his wife
and a friend on June 16, 2011 when he spotted several Montgomery County, Maryland
police officers arresting two male Hispanics at a nearby intersection. Believing that the
officers were using excessive force in making the arrest, Garcia began to photograph the
incident from a distance of some thirty feet. When Officer Baxter shone a spotlight on
him, Garcia retreated to a distance of almost 100 feet. As Officer Malouf approached
Garcia, Garcia identified himself as a member of the press. Officer Malouf announced that
Garcia was under arrest, restrained Garcia in a choke hold, dragged him to the patrol car,
placed handcuffs on Garcia, and confiscated Garcia's camera.5 While Garcia was in
handcuffs, Officer Malouf kicked one of Garcia's feet out from under him, resulting in
Garcia's head hitting the patrol car. When Garcia's wife asked Officer Baxter what was
happening, Officer Baxter threatened to arrest her also. Officer Malouf placed Garcia in
the patrol car and drove Garcia to the police station. Outside the police station, Garcia
6
observed Officer Malouf remove the video card and battery from Garcia's camera.
Garcia was charged with disorderly conduct under Maryland Criminal Code §
10-201.7 On December 16, 2011 following trial, the judge declared Garcia not guilty." A
police department investigation reached the finding on April 12, 2012 that there had been
no administrative violation.9 Garcia filed a title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on December 7,
2012 against Montgomery County, Maryland and several officers, including Officer
Malouf and Officer Baxter, claiming, among other things, that they had deprived him of
his First and Fourth Amendment rights.10
On March 4, 2013, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) took the rare
step of filing a Statement of Interest in Garcia's § 1983 action asking the court to find that
"both the First and Fourth Amendments protect an individual who peacefully photographs
police activity on a public street, if officers arrest the individual and seize the camera of
that individual for that activity."" The DOJ then proceeded to make two other points, the
first of which was to recognize that a police department often uses certain "discretionary"
charges of general applicability such as "disorderly conduct, loitering, disturbing the
peace, and resisting arrest" to dissuade citizens from exercising their First Amendment
right and to urge a court encountering these types of charges to examine them critically as

Complaint at 2-3, Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., No. JFM-12-cv-03592, 2013 WL 4539394 (D. Md. Aug.
23, 2013).
'Id. at 5.
at 6.
6Id.
'Id. at 7.
'Id. at 8.
9Id.
at 9.
'0 Id. at 12-14.
" Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., Md., No. 8:12-cv-03592-JFM (D.
Md. Mar. 4, 2013). The United States filed a similar Statement of Interest in a second Maryland case. Statement
of Interest of the United States, Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep't., No. 1:11-cv-02888 (D. Md. Jan. 10,
2012), 2012 WL 9512053.
4
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a subterfuge for curtailing constitutionally protected conduct. 12 "Core First Amendment
conduct, such as recording a police officer performing duties on a public street, cannot be
the sole basis for such charges."1 3 The second point was that it is not just the media, but
individuals also, who enjoy the First Amendment right to tape police activities.14 "The
derogation of these rights erodes public confidence in our police departments, decreases
the accountability of our governmental officers, and conflicts with the liberties that the
Constitution was designed to uphold." 1 5
In addition to eavesdropping charges, discretionary charges are often used against
a civilian recording an encounter with a police officer. However, use of these charges
against a civilian recording this type of encounter flies in the face of the First Amendment.
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Houston ordinance as overbroad
because it criminalized civilian speech that "in any manner . . . interrupt[s]" a police
officer. 16 Similar to other discretionary charges used in civilian taping cases, the Houston
ordinance "accord[ed] the police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement." 17 "The
freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation
from a police state." 8
According to Garcia's version of the facts, he was well out of the way of the
police officers effecting the arrest of the two Hispanic males and did nothing to interfere
with the arrest. 19 Garcia was at a location open to the public, as he was on a public
thoroughfare. To him, the encounter was newsworthy, as the police officers seemed to be
using excessive force.2 0 Perhaps the officers' perception that they might have been
photographed engaging in police misconduct was what caused them to arrest Garcia. In a
number of respects, the public nature of the location, the photographer's concern for the
person being arrested, the subsequent arrest of the photographer on a discretionary charge,
the failure to convict on the discretionary charge, and the ensuing civil rights lawsuit
against the police officer, Garcia's case is factually similar to Glik v. Cunniffe, 2 1 one of the
First Amendment cases reviewed in Section III.
The circumstances of bystander Garcia photographing police officers arresting
individuals and Garcia's subsequent arrest happened in Maryland, an all-party consent
jurisdiction.22 Had Garcia been videotaping the encounter rather than photographing it, he
might have been charged with eavesdropping under the Maryland eavesdropping statutes,
in addition to being arrested for disorderly conduct. The eavesdropping statutes of the
various jurisdictions are discussed in the following section.
II.

EAVESDROPPING STATUTES

Federal statutes prohibit eavesdropping and all states but one protect certain types
of conversation from being taped; the highest court of the single state without a statutory
12
13

Statement of Interest of the United States at 1-2, Garcia, No. 8:12-cv-03592-JFM.
Id. at 2.

14id
'Id

'6 City of Hous., Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987).
1 Id at 466.
8
' Id at 462-63.
19 Complaint, supra note 4, at 5.
20 id
21 655 F.3d 78, 79-80 (1st Cir. 2011). See infra notes
223-36 and accompanying text.
22 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1),
(c)(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
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prohibition against taping interpreted the state constitution to provide some protection
against eavesdropping.23
Although all states but one protect certain types of conversation against being
recorded, three states, Indiana, New Mexico, and Mississippi, appear not to make
surreptitious taping of a face-to-face conversation a crime. The statutes of Indiana and
New Mexico appear to prohibit taping of telephone conversations but not face-to-face
conversations.2 4 Although the Mississippi statutes contain procedures for obtaining a court
order to intercept an oral communication,2 5 research has failed to locate any statute or case
law interpretation of any statute affirmatively prohibiting such taping.
Eavesdropping statutes of the various jurisdictions vary widely in the manner in
which they protect face-to-face conversations from being recorded; however, two factors
to consider are the consent required to tape a conversation and the type of conversation
protected. Eavesdropping statutes generally require a police officer not a party to the
conversation to obtain a court order prior to secretly taping a face-to-face conversation.26
Other than obtaining a court order, a conversation may be taped with the consent of at
least one party to the conversation.2 7 A major distinction among the jurisdictions is the
consent required to permit legal recording without a court order; until very recently,
eleven states required all-party consent28 and the federal statutes and the eavesdropping
29
statutes from the balance of the states required only one-party consent.
The other factor is the type of conversation that receives statutory protection.
Katz v. United States was the landmark 1967 case that found Fourth Amendment
protection for a telephone conversation.3 0 The case is remembered for Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in which he announced a two-pronged test to determine whether a
conversation would receive constitutional protection against secretly being taped. 3 1 The
focus of the test is on the speaker's privacy rather than the substance of the conversation
or the possibility that the conversation may be divulged later. The first prong is that there
must be an expectation of privacy and the second prong is that the expectation of privacy
must be reasonable. 32

See infra app. A (Vermont).
See infra app. A (Indiana & New Mexico).
25 See infra app. A (Mississippi).
26 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2516-2519 (West 2000 & Supp. 2014). The federal eavesdropping statute includes an
exemption allowing a police officer who is a party to the conversation to secretly tape the conversation. Id. §
2511(2)(c). The statute provides: "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of
law to intercept a[n] . . oral .. . communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." Id.
27 See, e.g., Id. § 2511(2)(d). The statute provides:
23
24

It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a[n] . . . oral . . . communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
Id. The eavesdropping statutes of a number of states contain a similar exemption. See infra app. A.
28 See infra notes 34-187 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
30 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 id
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The federal statutes protect face-to-face conversations against recording under
this two-pronged test. Thus, a face-to-face conversation qualifies for protection as an oral
communication against being taped where the speaker had an expectation of privacy that
society would consider reasonable. 3 3 Many of the state statutes incorporate the term "oral
communication" and define that term similar to the definition contained in the federal
statutes. The next portion of this paper contains a discussion of all-party consent states,
followed by a discussion of one-party consent jurisdictions.
A.

All-Party Consent States

A starting point is to examine the nature of the face-to-face conversation
protected under the eavesdropping statutes of the eleven all-party consent states. The
statutes from the eleven all-party consent states are discussed in this section, as they are
the most problematic for a civilian who desires to tape an encounter with a police officer.
The pertinent provisions of the federal statutes and the statutes of the other states are
reviewed in Appendix A.
Florida, 3 4 New Hampshire, 3 5 and Pennsylvania 3 6 are all-party consent states that
protect a face-to-face conversation as long as there is an expectation of privacy that is
reasonable; thus, other than requiring all-party consent to taping, the way in which they
define the term "oral communication" is similar to the way in which it is defined in the
federal statutes. However, as more fully discussed below, what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy has been interpreted differently by Florida and Pennsylvania.
The Massachusetts eavesdropping statute protects "oral communication" but does
not tie this to whether the speaker has a reasonable expectation of privacy.3 7 What is
important in determining whether the face-to-face conversation is protected is whether the
conversation was secretly taped and whether the taping was done with all-party consent.
Until two recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois
eavesdropping statutes were the most rigid and unforgiving of any of the all-party consent
statutes. Although the statutes protected "oral communication" they did so in such a way
as to specifically negate any exemption for a conversation made with a reasonable
expectation of privacy.3 8
The eavesdropping statutes of Maryland, 3 9 Michigan, 4 0 and Washington 4 1 protect
"private conversation," California eavesdropping statutes 4 2 protect "confidential
communication," and the eavesdropping statutes of Montana 4 3 and Oregon 4 4 protect
"conversation" against being recorded without all party consent. In those states and as
more fully explained below, case law provides some guidance in determining the nature of
the face-to-face conversation protected against eavesdropping.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014). See infra app. A (United States).
See infra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 84-101 and accompanying text
3 See infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text
38 See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text
3 See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text
40 See infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
3

34
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A Conversation Made with a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
a.

Florida

Florida defines "oral communication" as "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation." 45 Under Florida law, it is illegal to
deliberately tape a private conversation without all-party consent.4 6 One who illegally
tapes a conversation is subject to up to five years imprisonment,4 7 or a fine of up to five
thousand dollars, or both.48
The Florida Supreme Court had occasion to determine whether there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a private home, State v. Walls,49 in a business office
50
open to the public, State v. Inciarrano,
and in a police car, State v. Smith.51 While the
Walls and Smith decisions presented little difficulty, Inciarrano highlighted the difficulty
faced by the courts in other states of interpreting the terms "oral communication" and
"intercept."
In Walls, two individuals were allegedly extorting Antel in his home when Antel
secretly taped the conversation.5 2 The Florida Supreme Court found that the conversation
was an oral communication and no statutory exception would allow the taped conversation
to be used as evidence.5 3
In Inciarrano, the victim was in his business office secretly taping the
conversation between the victim and Inciarrano when Inciarrano shot and killed the
victim. Because the taped information was the only evidence against Inciarrano, the
Florida courts faced a tough situation.54 The trial court did not suppress the taped
information, considering "the quasi-public nature of the premises within which the
conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to
bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to
record the conversations."55 Inciarrano pled nolo contendere but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The intermediate appellate court reversed,
feeling duty-bound to follow Walls. However, even in reversing, the intermediate court
expressed its uneasiness with the decision it felt it needed to make. 56 The court suggested
that the Florida Supreme Court could take one of three avenues of interpretation that
would allow the information secretly taped by the victim to be used against Inciarrano.

§ 934.02(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 255 (End) of the 2014 Sp. "A" Sess. of the TwentyThird Legislature).
4 Id.
934.03(1), (2)(d).
47 Id.
775.082(3)(e).
48 Id.
775.083(1).
49 State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294, 295 (Fla. 1978).
o State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 1985).
' State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1994).
52 356 So. 2d at 295.
5 Id
at 296. Although the court did not state its reasoning, presumably the parties had an expectation of privacy
because there were only three people talking in a confined space and the expectation of privacy was reasonable
because they were in a private home. The court explained that Antel, had he wished, could have obtained
authorization to secretly tape the conversation. Even though Antel had not received the required authorization,
the prosecution could use Antel's testimony as evidence. Id. at 297.
54 Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (Fla.
1985).
* State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1274.
* Inciarranov. State, 447 So. 2d at 387, 390.
4 FLA. STAT. ANN.
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One route would have been to interpret the term "intercept" to allow a conversant to
secretly tape a conversation but preclude a third party not a party to the conversation from
taping. 7 Another route would have been to read the legislative history to protect the
privacy of an "innocent" individual.5 ' The final route would be to limit application of the
exclusionary rule to secret government taping of a conversation.
When Inciarrano reached the Florida Supreme Court, the four-member court
majority stated that Inciarrano's expectation of privacy was not reasonable and quashed
the lower court's decision.6 0 Without offering more of an explanation why Inciarrano's
expectation of privacy was not reasonable, the court quoted from the intermediate
appellate court decision:
One who enters the business premises of another for a lawful purpose is
an invitee. At the moment that his intention changes, that is, if he suddenly
decides to steal or pillage, or murder, or rape, then at that moment he becomes a
trespasser and has no further right upon the premises.61
Perhaps in indication of the difficulty in reaching a decision in Inciarrano,there
were two concurring opinions, the first authored by one justice and the second, concurring
in result only, joined in by two justices. 6 2 The reasoning of the first concurring opinion is
that Inciarrano did not have an expectation of privacy, as he went into the victim's
business. "[W]hen an individual enters someone else's home or business, he has no
expectation of privacy in what he says or does there, and chapter 934 does not apply." 63
The second concurring opinion characterized the majority opinion as a "tortuous
,,64
misconstruction of the plain language of the statute.
The concurring opinion criticized
the reasoning that the majority borrowed from the intermediate appellate court. "To hold,
as the majority does, that the commission of a criminal act waives a privacy right requires
an entirely new legal definition of privacy rights which would, in turn, shake the
foundation of fourth amendment analysis." 6 5 The concurring opinion added, "If criminal
" Id at 388-89.
55 9 Id at 390.
id

60 State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1276. In 2000, the intermediate appellate court relied on Inciarrano in
deciding a case in which a part business owner of Balgres Distributing Company, Inc., Lamaletto, secretly taped
a conversation in his office with Jatar who was allegedly attempting to extort Lamaletto. Jatar v. Lamaletto, 758
So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Jatar sued Lamaletto and Balgres civilly, asking for damages for
the taping. The trial court granted Lamaletto and Balgres' motion for summary judgment, and the appellate court
affirmed. Id at 1168-69. The intermediate appellate court certified the following question to the Florida Supreme
Court as one of great public importance:
DOES STATE v. WALLS, 356 So.2d 294 (Fla.1978), HAVE CONTINUED VALIDITY
AND BAR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE VICTIM'S FAVOR, WHERE AN
EXTORTION THREAT WAS DELIVERED IN THE VICTIM'S OFFICE AND
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED BY THE VICTIM BECAUSE HE FEARED THAT
SUCH AN EXTORTION THREAT WAS IMMINENT, IN VIEW OF THE HOLDING
INSTATE v. INCIARRANO, 473 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1985)?
Id at 1169-70. The Florida Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Jatar v. Lamaletto, 786 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
2001) (mem.).
6' State v. Inciarrano,473 So. 2d at 1275-76.
62
Id. at 1276.
63 Id. (Overton, J., concurring). Justice Overton also recommended that the Florida legislature consider amending
chapter 934. Id
64 Id at 1277 (Ehrlich, J.,
concurring).
65
Id
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acts waive privacy rights, as the majority implies, police have the right and duty to intrude
without a warrant into a bedroom where the owner/resident is smoking marijuana,
reasoning that the fourth amendment protection has 'gone up in smoke."' 6 6 The author of
the concurring opinion would have adopted one of the suggestions of the intermediate
appellate court and would have interpreted the term "intercept" to allow a conversant to
secretly tape a conversation but preclude a third party not a party to the conversation from
secretly taping a conversation.6 7 In addition, the opinion recognized the special status of
being in one's own home, which gave Inciarrano's victim a "higher degree of privacy. ,,68
In contrast, any expectation of privacy that Inciarrano claimed was not reasonable.69
State v. Smith 70 was a typical traffic stop case in which the driver consented to the
officer's request to search the car in which Smith was a passenger. At the officer's
suggestion, the driver and Smith sat in the back seat of the patrol car while their car was
being searched. Unbeknownst to them, the officer secretly taped their conversation, which
contained incriminating information. The suspects were not under arrest while their
conversation was taped but were arrested after the officer found illegal drugs in the car.
The suspects did seem to have a subjective expectation of privacy while in the patrol car,
72
as evidenced by their disclosure of incriminating information. Even though this was a
case of first impression for the Florida Supreme Court, the court had several cases of
persuasive authority to rely on and, thus, the decision was a fairly easy one.73 "We agree
with the Eleventh Circuit Court's reasoning and hold that a person does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car and that any statements intercepted
therein may be admissible as evidence." 74 That means that the suspects' conversation did
not fall within the definition of an oral communication and, therefore, the conversation
was not protected against being secretly recorded.
b.

New Hampshire

The New Hampshire statutory prohibition against eavesdropping is similar to that
of Florida in a number of respects. New Hampshire defines "oral communication" as "any
verbal communication uttered by a person who has a reasonable expectation that the
communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such
expectation."76 Under New Hampshire law, it is a class B felony if "without the consent of
all parties to the communication, the person . . . [w]ilfully intercepts . . . any . . . oral
communication" ;77 however, it is "a misdemeanor if, . . . without consent of all parties to
the communication, the person knowingly intercepts a[n] . . . oral communication when
the person is a party to the communication or with the prior consent of one of the parties
to the communication. 78

66

Id

6' Id. at 1276.
68 Id
69 Id at 1276-77.
7o

641 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. 1994).

72

id

73 Id.
74id

at 852.

7 Id. The court reasoned: "Because we find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car,
section 934.03 does not apply to conversations that take place in those vehicles. Consequently, the section 934.06
prohibition against the use of intercepted oral communications as evidence is inapplicable as well." Id.
76 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:1.II (2012).
Id. 570-A:2.I.
78 Id.
570-A:2.I-a.
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The New Hampshire statute provides two exceptions allowing a police officer to
record a conversation when performing the officer's duties. The first exception makes the
eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to a police officer recording a traffic stop, in other
words allowing:
A uniformed law enforcement officer to make an audio recording in
conjunction with a video recording of a routine stop performed in the ordinary
course of patrol duties on any way as defined by RSA 259:125 [street or other
thoroughfare], provided that the officer shall first give notification of such
recording to the party to the communication.
The second exception allows an officer to record an incident involving the use of
a taser, in other words making the eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to:
A law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of the officer's duties
using any device capable of making an audio or video recording, or both, and
which is attached to and used in conjunction with a TASER or other similar
electroshock device. Any person who is the subject of such recording shall be
informed of the existence of the audio or video recording, or both, and shall be
provided with a copy of such recording at his or her request. 0
One who illegally tapes a conversation without the consent of at least one party
to the conversation has committed a class B felony, making the individual subject to more
than one year and a maximum of seven years imprisonment, or a maximum fine of $4,000,
or both. 1 One who illegally tapes a conversation with the consent of only one party to the
conversation has committed a misdemeanor, punishable as a class B misdemeanor,
making the individual subject to "conditional or unconditional discharge, a [maximum]
fine [of $1,200], or other sanctions"; "[a] fine may be imposed in addition to any sentence
... conditional discharge." 82
In contrast to Florida and Pennsylvania, research showed no case law interpreting
the New Hampshire statutory term "oral communication." 8 3
c.

Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania statutory prohibition against eavesdropping is similar to that of
Florida in a number of respects. Pennsylvania defines "oral communication" as "[a]ny oral
communication uttered by a person possessing an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 8 4 Similar to
the New Hampshire eavesdropping statute, an exception to the Pennsylvania statute makes
the eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to a police officer recording a traffic stop.
79

Id. § 570-A:2.II.j).
soId. § 570-A:2.II.().
81
Id. § 625:9.III.(a)(2), 651:2.11, IV.
8
2 Id. § 625:9.IV.(c), 651:2.111, IV.
83 A New Hampshire statute provides an exemption making it lawful for a "law enforcement officer . . . to
intercept a telecommunication or oral communication, when . . . one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception." Id. § 570-A:2.II(d). The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has
interpreted the consent requirement under that statute in the context of a face-to-face conversation, State v.
Locke, 761 A.2d 376, 381 (N.H. 1999), and instant messaging, State v. Moscone, 13 A.3d 137, 145 (N.H. 2011);
State v. Lott, 879 A.2d 1167, 1172 (N.H. 2005).
84 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5702 (West 2013).
Id. § 5704(16). The statute provides:
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Under Pennsylvania law, it is a third degree felony if one "intentionally intercepts
... any . . . oral communication;" 8 6 however, it is not illegal for "[a] person, to intercept
a[n] . . . oral communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior
consent to such interception."8 7 One convicted of a third degree felony is subject to a
maximum of seven years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $15,000.8

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's case law interpretation of the term oral
communication tracks the statutory definition in part, but with a layered approach. The
statutory language directs the court to determine if the conversant had a reasonable
expectation that the conversation would not be intercepted, which interception, in most
instances, means that the conversation would not be recorded; however, according to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Agnew v. Dupler, the non-interception determination is

dependent on a determination that the conversant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy. This approach asks a court to first consider whether there was a reasonable

A law enforcement officer, whether or not certified under section 5724 (relating to
training), acting in the performance of his official duties to intercept and record an oral
communication between individuals in accordance with the following:
(i) At the time of the interception, the oral communication does not occur inside the
residence of any of the individuals.
(ii) At the time of the interception, the law enforcement officer:
(A) is in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as a law enforcement officer;
(B) is in close proximity to the individuals' oral communication;
(C) is using an electronic, mechanical or other device which has been approved under
section 5706(b)(4) (relating to exceptions to prohibitions in possession, sale, distribution,
manufacture or advertisement of electronic, mechanical or other devices) to intercept the
oral communication; and
(D) informs, as soon as reasonably practicable, the individuals identifiably present that he
has intercepted and recorded the oral communication.
Id.
Id.
Id.
89

5703.
5704(4).

Id. §§ 106(b)(4), 1101, 1103.
Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. 1998). As the court explained:
[I]n determining what constitutes an "oral communication" under the Wiretap Act, the
proper inquiries are whether the speaker had a specific expectation that the contents of the
discussion would not be intercepted, and whether that expectation was justifiable under the
existing circumstances. In determining whether the expectation of non-interception was
justified under the circumstances of a particular case, it is necessary for a reviewing court
to examine the expectation in accordance with the principles surrounding the right to
privacy, for one cannot have an expectation of non-interception absent a finding of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. To determine the existence of an expectation of privacy
in one's activities, a reviewing court must first examine whether the person exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable.

Id.

A 1996 case involved a police officer who secretly taped traffic stops. Commonwealthv. McIvor, 670 A.2d 697,
698 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). In contrast to the analysis of Agnew, the McIvor court found no linkage between a
reasonable expectation of non-interception and a reasonable expectation of privacy. "Under the circumstances of
this case, while the stopped motorists had no expectation of privacy, they had a very real expectation of non-
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expectation of privacy prior to considering whether the expectation that the conversation
would not be recorded was reasonable. This two-step approach, unique to the state, may
well be because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized an implicit right to
privacy under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the state's version of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 0
This interpretation asks a court to make two determinations, one about privacy
and the other about non-interception, both of which have a subjective and an objective
component. Case law focus is often on the reasonableness of the speaker's expectation of
privacy because the reasonable expectation of non-interception finding is necessarily
dependent on a reasonable expectation of privacy finding.91 As for the subjective
component, the conversant naturally claims an expectation of privacy and an expectation
that the conversation was not being recorded. Thus, the key to the court's decision is the
objective component of whether society would view the speaker's expectation of privacy
as reasonable.9 2
The reasonableness objective component is often based on the location of the
conversation and the identities or positions of the parties to the conversation. In 1998 in
Agnew v. Dupler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a police officer did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a squadroom in the police department where the
police officer was talking to two other police officers and the chief of police was
eavesdropping on the conversation via intercom. 9 3 The squadroom was large and the door
was open, allowing others outside the room to overhear conversations in the room without
amplification, and the intercom on the room's four telephones, which could be activated at
any time, permitted conversations in the room to be heard in other locations within the
building. 9 4
In the 1994 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Commonwealth v. Brion, a
confidential informant with a body wire entered Brion's home to make an illegal drug
interception. They legitimately could expect that their words would not be electronically seized and carried away
by the officer." Id. at 704. The court then found that the secretly taped conversations were oral communication.
Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review of the case on appeal. Commonwealth v. McIvor, 692 A.2d
564 (Pa. 1997) (mem.).
The continued viability of McIvor seems doubtful, given Agnew. In addition, a police officer can easily tape a
traffic stop in compliance with § 5704(16) quoted above, which was adopted in 2002.
90 Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81, 87 (Pa. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 494 U.S. 299 (1990)
("Article I, § 8 creates an implicit right to privacy in this Commonwealth.... To determine whether one's
activities fall within the right of privacy, we must examine: first, whether appellant has exhibited an expectation
of privacy; and second, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable").
Another reason for making the non-interception dependent on a determination of a reasonable expectation of
privacy may be to refute the reasoning of McIvor. The concurring opinion of Agnew would have separated the
finding of interception from the finding of privacy. "Contrary to the Majority's position, I believe that the
expectation of non-interception and the expectation of privacy involve two distinct inquiries. Thus, a speaker,
under certain circumstances, may possess a reasonable expectation of non-interception even in the absence of a
reasonable expectation of privacy." Agnew, 717 A.2d at 525 (Nigro, J., concurring).
91 In determinig whether the speaker has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the subjective component is
whether the speaker expects privacy, and the objective component is whether society would consider this
expectation reasonable. In determinig whether there is a reasonable expectation of non-interception, the
subjective component is whether the speaker expects that the conversation will not be recorded, and the objective
component is whether society would consider this expectation reasonable. Agnew, 717 A.2d at 523.
92 Id. "Since the standard for such expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable, the standard is necessarily an objective standard and not a subjective standard . . . ." Id. The
determination of the reasonableness of the conversant's expectation of privacy is like a house of cards; with this
objective component of reasonableness missing, the house of cards collapses.
93
94

Id. at 521, 524.
Id. at 524.
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purchase and the informant taped the conversation.9 5 The court found that the recording
violated Brion's right to privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution and held that "an
individual can reasonably expect that his right to privacy will not be violated in his home
through the use of any electronic surveillance." 9 6
In a 1989 case, Commonwealth v. Henlen, a Pennsylvania state trooper was
questioning a prison guard regarding the theft of an inmate's personal property.97
Unbeknownst to the trooper, the guard was secretly taping the conversation, which
conversation was being conducted at the county jail.9 " The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
found that "the circumstances do not establish that Trooper Dibler possessed a justifiable
expectation that his words would not be subject to interception."99 Questioning of suspects
is usually recorded, the trooper took notes of the questioning, which were to be made part
of a report, and there was a third person present during part of the questioning. 00
Thus, although the definition of "oral communication" in the statutes of the three
states, Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania, is almost identical in wording, the
interpretation of that term by two states is differs significantly. New Hampshire has not
had occasion to interpret the meaning of oral communication. Florida and Pennsylvania
have each decided a number of cases interpreting the meaning of the term.
Under Florida case law, a court would first consider the threshold issue of
whether the subject conversation qualifies as an oral communication. Florida has
interpreted the two prongs of the definition as being given equal weight. Thus, if either the
speaker did not have an expectation of privacy or if the expectation of privacy was not
reasonable, then Florida would find no protected oral communication. In Walls, the
Florida Supreme Court easily found that the conversation qualified as an oral
communication because the conversation took place in a private home. In both Inciarrano
and Smith, the Florida Supreme Court found that the objective prong of the two-prong test
lacking and, therefore, tape recording did not violate the Florida eavesdropping statute.
Once it has been determined that the taped conversation qualifies as an oral
communication, the court would move on to consider whether there was an eavesdropping
violation because all parties to the conversation failed to consent.
In examining whether the taped conversation was private, Pennsylvania case law
emphasizes the objective prong of the two-pronged test and assumes that the subjective
prong of the test was met. Thus, it was reasonable for Brion to have an expectation of
privacy in his home but it was not reasonable for there to be an expectation of privacy in a
squadroom, as in Agnew, or during an interview that took place in a county jail, as in
Henlen.

2.

A Conversation that is Secretly Taped - Massachusetts

After reviewing the eavesdropping statutes of Florida, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania, one should not necessarily expect the same two-pronged approach to apply
to a state statute that protects a face-to-face conversation under the term "oral

9
9

98

652 A.2d 287, 287 (Pa. 1994).
Id at 289.
564 A.2d 905, 905 (Pa. 1989).
Id

Id at 907.
.00 Id at 906.
99
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communication." As more fully explained below, the key to the Massachusetts
eavesdropping statute is whether the person who recorded the conversation did so secretly.
In Massachusetts,
. . any person who--willfully commits an interception .. . of any . .. oral
communication shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or
imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five years, or
imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for not more than two and
one half years, or both so fined and given one such imprisonment.101
Pursuant to the statute, "'interception' means to . . . secretly record . . . the
contents of any . . . oral communication through the use of any intercepting device by any
person other than a person given prior authority by all parties to such communication." 102
The statute further defines "oral communication" as "speech, except such speech as is
transmitted over the public air waves by radio or other similar device."1 03
In a 2001

case, Commonwealth v. Hyde, the Supreme

Judicial Court of

Massachusetts held that the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute "strictly prohibits the
secret electronic recording by a private individual of any oral communication, and makes
no exception for a motorist who, having been stopped by police officers, surreptitiously
tape records the encounter." 104 The four police officers involved did not discover that
Hyde, the driver, had secretly taped the fifteen to twenty minute stop, which was
"confrontational" until Hyde went to the police department to file a complaint.10 5 The
police department requested that Hyde be charged with four counts of eavesdropping and
Hyde was convicted of the charges. 106
On appeal, Hyde argued that he could not be convicted because the officers did
not have an expectation of privacy, reasoning that the term "oral communication" should
be interpreted to require an expectation of privacy. 107 The four-member majority of the
court declined to so interpret the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute in light of the
statute's "plain language and legislative history," explaining that Hyde could have
recorded the encounter had he "simply informed the police of his intention to tape record
the encounter, or even held the tape recorder in plain sight."108
The two justices joining in the vigorous dissent would have read the
Massachusetts statute to prohibit recording only of a conversation made with "a legitimate
expectation of privacy."109 The dissent emphasized the vital role that the public has in
monitoring police activity. "To hold that the Legislature intended to allow police officers
to conceal possible misconduct behind a cloak of privacy requires a more affirmative
showing than this statute allows." 110 Finally, the dissent noted the flawed nature of the
§ 99 C.L (West 2014)

10

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
Id. 99 B.4.
Id. 99 B.2.

104

750 N.E.2d 963, 964 (Mass. 2001).

101
102

Id. at 964-65.
.'Id. at 965.
107 Id. at 965-66.
.os Id. at 971.
109 Id. at 975 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 976. "It is the recognition of the potential for abuse of power that has caused our society, and law
enforcement leadership, to insist that citizens have the right to demand the most of those who hold such awesome
powers." Id. at 977.
105
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statute because it does not distinguish between a private individual and a reporter
exercising the reporter's right under the First Amendment to Freedom of the Press and
would subject both individuals to criminal liability."
The dissenting opinion in Hyde makes it clear that not only face-to-face
conversations made with a reasonable expectation of privacy are protected against being
recorded. The Massachusetts interpretation of the state's eavesdropping statute focused on
the autonomy of the individual in consenting or not consenting to being recorded. Still, a
determination whether the taping was done secretly may be fact specific to a particular
case and may be dependent on whether the speaker recognizes that a device in plain view
has the capability of taping.
3.

Taping a Conversation Where There is no Claim of a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy - Illinois

Until two 2014 Illinois Supreme Court decisions, Illinois law protected "any oral
communication between 2 or more persons regardless of whether one or more of the
parties intended their communication to be of a private nature under circumstances
justifying that expectation." 1 2 An individual eavesdropped when the individual
"[k]nowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device for the purpose of hearing or
recording all or any part of any conversation . .. unless he does so .

.

. with the consent of

all of the parties to such conversation or electronic communication."ll3 The statutory
language specifically negated limiting conversations protected against recording to those
made with a reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, it would have been an offense to tape
a conversation even in a public place or in the midst of a crowd of people. 1 14 Among a
lengthy string of exemptions, were two that allowed an officer to tape a conversation
relating to a traffic stop while suspects were in a patrol car.1
Eavesdropping was a class 4 felony11 6 unless the person recorded was a law
enforcement officer or other official, in which event eavesdropping was a class 1
felony.1 17 One convicted of a class 4 felony was subject to imprisonment of not less than
one to not more than three years and a fine of a maximum of $25,000.11" One convicted of
a class 1 felony was subject to imprisonment of not less than four to not more than fifteen
years and a fine of a maximum of $25,000.119
In 2014 in People v. Clark1 20 and People v. Melongo, 12 1 two cases decided on the

same day, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the unforgiving nature of the Illinois
statute that protected face-to-face conversations even if there was no reasonable
"1 Id.
112 720 ILL. COW. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1(d) (West 2003).
113

Id. 5/14-2(a)(1).

114id

Id 5/14-3(h), (h-5).
...
Id. 5/14-4(a). "Eavesdropping, for a first offense, is a Class 4 felony and, for a second or subsequent offense,
is a Class 3 felony." Id.
".Id 5/14-4(b).
118 730 ILL. COW. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-45(a), 5/5-4.5-50(b) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-756 of the 2014
Reg. Sess.).
115

119

Id. 5/5-4.5-30(a), 5/5-4.5-50(b).

People v. Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154 (Ill. 2014). Clark was charged with secretly taping a conversation with an
attorney and secretly taping a conversation with a judge and an attorney. Id. at 156.
121 People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120 (Ill. 2014). Melongo was charged with secretly taping three telephone
conversations with the Assistant Administrator of the Cook County Court Reporter's Office, Criminal Division,
and illegally posting the recordings and a transcript of the recordings on her website. Id. at 122-23.
120
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expectation of privacy and held the recording statute to be unconstitutional on its face. 1 2 2
The court found the statute problematic for several reasons. First of all, the
statute "criminalize[d] a wide range of innocent conduct."l23 The court explained, "[t]he
statute criminalizes the recording of conversations that cannot be deemed private: a loud
argument on the street, a political debate on a college quad, yelling fans at an athletic
event, or any conversation loud enough that the speakers should expect to be heard by
others."1 2 4 A second reason for concern is that one who openly tapes a conversation with
the recording device in plain view might have been charged under the statute unless the
person taping had the express consent of all parties to the conversation. "[T]he individual
must risk being charged with a violation of the statute and hope that the trier of fact will
find implied consent." 1 2 5 In addition, the court recognized the value of an eavesdropping
statute in protecting conversations that are truly private from being surreptitiously taped;
otherwise, the possibility of an intimate conversation being taped might have a chilling
effect. 126
Thus, with two Illinois Supreme Court decisions, Illinois has moved from rigidly
protecting conversations against being taped to presently providing no protection. The
Illinois legislature will have the task of fashioning a new eavesdropping statute.
4.

Taping a Private Conversation

Maryland, Michigan, and Washington prohibit taping a "private conversation"
without all-party consent.
a.

Maryland

Maryland makes it illegal to tape "any person in private conversation" unless
"the person is a party to the communication and where all of the parties to the
communication have given prior consent." 1 2 7 One who illegally tapes a conversation is
subject to up to five years imprisonment, or up to ten thousand dollars in fine, or both.128
An exception to a Maryland statute allows a police officer to record a traffic stop subject
to certain conditions. 129
122 Clark, 6 N.E.3d at 162 ("[S]ection [5/14-2](a)(1)(A) of the eavesdropping statute is unconstitutional as
violative of the overbreadth doctrine under the first amendment to the United States Constitution."); Melongo, 6
N.E.3d at 127 ("[T]he recording provision is unconstitutional on its face because a substantial number of its
applications violate the first amendment.").
123 Melongo, 6 N.E.3d at 126.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Clark, 6 N.E.3d
at 160-61.
127 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401(13)(i), (3), 10-402(a)(1),
(c)(3) (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
128 Id. § 10-402(b).
129 Id. § 10-402(c)(4). The statute
provides:

(i) It is lawful under this subtitle for a law enforcement officer in the course of the officer's
regular duty to intercept an oral communication if:
1. The law enforcement officer initially lawfully detained a vehicle during a criminal
investigation or for a traffic violation;
2. The law enforcement officer is a party to the oral communication;
3. The law enforcement officer has been identified as a law enforcement officer to the
other parties to the oral communication prior to any interception;
4. The law enforcement officer informs all other parties to the communication of the
interception at the beginning of the communication; and
5. The oral interception is being made as part of a video tape recording.
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The Maryland term "private conversation" is not defined by statute. In 1997, a
Maryland court analyzed whether a conversation qualified as an oral communication by
determining whether the conversation was made with a reasonable expectation of
privacy.130 In so doing, the court employed the two-pronged Katz test of "whether Craigie
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with regard to his statements. If we
answer that question in the affirmative, we then ask whether that expectation is 'one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"'l31
b.

Michigan

Michigan statutes define "eavesdropping" as "to overhear, record, amplify or
transmit" the "private discourse of others without the permission of all persons engaged in
the discourse."1 32 It is illegal for "[a]ny person who is present or who is not present" to
eavesdrop on a "private conversation," with one who illegally eavesdrops subject to up to
two years imprisonment, or a fine of up to two thousand dollars, or both. 133 In contrast to
the eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes in most other states, the Michigan statutes do
not distinguish between eavesdropping on a face-to-face conversation and wiretapping a
telephone conversation, with the terms "private discourse of others" and "private
conversation" applying to both types of conversations.
In 2001 in People v. Stone, the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted a private

conversation to be "a conversation that a person reasonably expects to be free from casual
or hostile intrusion or surveillance". ,,134 Although Stone involved a cordless telephone
conversation, the court's interpretation in Stone coincides with its decision in Dickerson v.
Raphael,135 which involved the recording of a face-to-face conversation.136
In Dickerson, the Michigan Court of Appeals had held that, where one of the
participants in the conversation was wearing a concealed microphone, a non-participant
who was taping the conversation could be liable for eavesdropping.137 In reversing in part,
the Michigan Supreme Court found that the intermediate appellate court had improperly
granted a directed verdict in favor of the participant whose conversation had been secretly
broadcast because the lower court had not first determined whether the conversation was
private. 138 The Michigan Supreme Court stated, "the question whether plaintiffs
conversation was private depends on whether she intended and reasonably expected it to

(ii) If all of the requirements of subparagraph (i) of this paragraph are met, an interception
is lawful even if a person becomes a party to the communication following:
1. The identification required under subparagraph (i)3 of this paragraph; or
2. The informing of the parties required under subparagraph (i)4 of this paragraph.
Id
Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The court found that
Craigie did not have an expectation of privacy because, on his side of the telephone conversation, he was yelling
loud enough to be heard in the next apartment. Id at 591, 595.
132 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539a(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2014, No. 280, of the 2014 Reg. Sess.,
97th Legislature).
133 Id § 750.539c.
134 People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Mich. 2001).
135 Dickersonv. Raphael, 601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1999).
13' Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd in part, 601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich.
1999).
130
131

137

Id

138

601 N.W.2d at 108.

at 88.
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be private at the time and under the circumstances involved."1 39 The trial court had
mistakenly focused on the substance of the conversation rather than the speaker's
reasonable expectation of privacy. "The proper question is whether plaintiff intended and
reasonably expected that the conversation was private, not whether the subject matter was
intended to be private." 4 0
In 2011 in Bowens v. Ary, Inc.,141 the Michigan Supreme Court applied language

from Stone when finding that the plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy based on the following facts:
(1) the general locale of the meeting was the backstage of the Joe Louis
arena during the hectic hours preceding a high-profile concert, where over 400
people, including national and local media, had backstage passes; (2) the concertpromoter defendants were not receptive to the public-official plaintiffs' requests
and, by all accounts, the parties' relationship was antagonistic; (3) the room in
which plaintiffs chose to converse served as defendants' operational headquarters
with security personnel connected to defendants controlling the open doors; (4)
there were at least nine identified people in the room, plus unidentified others
who were free to come and go from the room, and listen to the conversation, as
they pleased; (5) plaintiffs were aware that there were multiple camera crews in
the vicinity, including a crew from MTV and a crew specifically hired by
defendants to record backstage matters of interest; (6) and video evidence shows
one person visibly filming in the room where the conversation took place while
plaintiffs were present, thereby establishing that at least one cameraman was
openly and obviously filming during the course of what plaintiffs have
characterized as a "private conversation. 142
An interesting question in Michigan is whether a participant can tape a
conversation without running afoul of the prohibition against eavesdropping even though
the all-party consent requirement would be applicable if a bystander were to tape the
conversation. In 1982 in Sullivan v. Gray, the Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted that
statute to allow taping by one of the parties to a telephone conversation. 143 "The statute
contemplates that a potential eavesdropper must be a third party not otherwise involved in
the conversation being eavesdropped on." 1 44 The Michigan Supreme Court did not weigh
in on this interpretation, denying review in Sullivan,145 nor in Dickerson did the Michigan

Supreme Court comment on whether there was an exception for a participant recording the
conversation. 146

c.

Washington

Washington makes it illegal to tape "any . .

[p]rivate conversation .

.

. without

first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the conversation." 1 47 One who
139

Id.

140

Id.
794 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 2011).

141
142
143

Id. at 843-44.
324 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).

Id.
Sullivanv. Gray, 335 N.W.2d 473 (Mich. 1983) (mem.).
14' Dickersonv. Raphael, 601 N.W.2d 108, 108 (Mich. 1999).
147 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation). The statute specifies how
144
145

all party consent may be demonstrated:
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illegally tapes a private conversation has committed a gross misdemeanor1 48 and is subject
to up to three hundred sixty four days imprisonment, or up to five thousand dollars in fine,
or both.1 4 9 Under the state eavesdropping statutes, a police officer who uses the patrol car
video to tape a conversation must specifically inform civilians that the conversation is
being recorded. 150
The term "private conversation" has no statutory definition; however, the term
has been subject to case law interpretation. The Washington Supreme Court found that a
traffic stop conversation is not private.151 The court also found that "conversations with
police officers are not private." 52
In other circumstances, the court has interpreted the term to first require that the
parties to the conversation have a subjective expectation of privacy and that the court
consider three other factors in determining whether the taped conversation is a private
conversation within the meaning of the statute.153 In a 2006 case, Lewis v. State, Dept. of
Licensing, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the three factors are: "(1) duration
and subject matter of the conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or

Where consent by all parties is needed pursuant to this chapter, consent shall be
considered obtained whenever one party has announced to all other parties engaged in the
communication or conversation, in any reasonably effective manner, that such
communication or conversation is about to be recorded or transmitted: PROVIDED, That
if the conversation is to be recorded that said announcement shall also be recorded.
Id § 9.73.030(3).
148 Id.
9.73.080(1).
149 Id. 9.92.020.
15o Id
9.73.090(1)(c). The statute exempts "[s]ound recordings that correspond to video images recorded by
video cameras mounted in law enforcement vehicles" from the reach of the eavesdropping prohibition. Id.
However, there are several conditions that a police officer must abide by when making the recording. The statute
provides:
All law enforcement officers wearing a sound recording device that makes recordings
corresponding to videos recorded by video cameras mounted in law enforcement vehicles
must be in uniform. A sound recording device that makes a recording pursuant to this
subsection (1)(c) must be operated simultaneously with the video camera when the
operating system has been activated for an event. No sound recording device may be
intentionally turned off by the law enforcement officer during the recording of an event.
Once the event has been captured, the officer may turn off the audio recording and place
the system back into "pre-event" mode.

A law enforcement officer shall inform any person being recorded by sound under this
subsection (1)(c) that a sound recording is being made and the statement so informing the
person shall be included in the sound recording, except that the law enforcement officer is
not required to inform the person being recorded if the person is being recorded under
exigent circumstances. A law enforcement officer is not required to inform a person being
recorded by video under this subsection (1)(c) that the person is being recorded by video.
Id
I Lewis v. State, Dep't of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1086 (Wash. 2006). In Lewis, the Washington Supreme
Court held that "traffic stop conversations are not private." Id. the court further held that "the language of RCW
9.73.090(1)(c) directs officers to inform all traffic stop detainees that they are being recorded, not just those
having private conversations. Therefore, we conclude that police officers must strictly comply with RCW
9.73.090(1)(c), even though recording those traffic stop conversations does not also violate RCW 9.73.030." Id.
152 Id at 1084.
153 Id. at 1083.
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potential presence of a third party, and (3) role of the nonconsenting party and his or her
relationship to the consenting party." 54
In Lewis, the court considered four consolidated cases in which police officers
had stopped drivers for alleged DUI offenses and the officers had taped the
conversations.15 5 In considering the three factors, the court easily concluded that the
conversations were not private; 1 5 6 however, the court excluded the use of the taped
conversation in each of the three cases in which the police officer failed to inform the
driver that the conversation was being taped.15 7
In the 2014 case State v. Kipp, the Washington Supreme Court considered the
15
three factors in deciding that the conversation was private.s
Kipp engaged in a tenminute conversation with his brother-in-law about a sensitive subject when they were
alone in a private home. 159
Thus, although Maryland, Michigan, and Washington all protect face-to-face
conversations under the term "private conversation," the case law interpretation of the
term differs from state to state. In addition, Michigan may allow participant taping as an
exception to all-party consent.
5.

Taping a Confidential Communication - California

In California, it is illegal to tape a "confidential communication ... without the
consent of all parties."l60 A "confidential communication" is defined as:
[A]ny communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably
indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the
parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in
any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the
public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication
1
may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. 16

Id. The court first identified the three factors in 1996. State v. Clark, 916 P.2d 384, 392-93 (Wash. 1996). In
that case, the court provides analysis, perhaps instructive, of whether the three factors apply in a number of
situations. Id.
. 139 P.3d at 1079.
.Id. at 1084.
154

Under the first factor, the recorded conversations in these cases were essentially brief
business conversations with uniformed police officers. Under the second factor, the
conversations between the police officers and the detainees occurred in public, in several
cases along busy roads. Additionally, in the case of Lewis and Kelly, third parties were
present for part or all of the conversations because the police officers called back-up, and
in the case of Kelly, a passenger was in his car. Finally, under the third factor, it is not
persuasive that the nonconsenting parties to these conversations, the drivers, would expect
the officers to keep their conversations secret, when the drivers would reasonably expect
that the officers would file reports and potentially would testify at hearings about the
incidents.
Id. at 1083.
. Id. at 1090.
158 317 P.3d 1029, 103 5-36 (Wash. 2014).
159 Id. at 1034-35.
1.o CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 187 of 2014 Reg. Sess.,
Res. Ch. 1 of 2013-2014 2nd Ex. Sess., and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot).
..Id. § 632(c).
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The California Supreme Court found that "a conversation is confidential under
section 632 if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that
the conversation is not being overheard or recorded."l62 One who illegally tapes a
conversation is subject to up to one year imprisonment, or a fine of up to two thousand
five hundred dollars, or both. 163
Thus, California employs the Katz two-pronged test to determine if a face-to-face
conversation qualifies for protection as a "confidential communication."
6.

Protection Against Taping a Conversation
a.

Montana

.

Montana makes it illegal to secretly record a conversation without all party
consent. 164 Under the Montana statute, one "commits the offense of violating privacy in
communications if the person knowingly or purposely . . . records . . . a conversation by
use of a hidden electronic or mechanical device that reproduces a human conversation
without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation." 1 6 5 The statute exempts from
criminal sanction "elected or appointed public officials or ... public employees when the
recording is done in the performance of official duty. ,,166 This exception would allow a
uniformed police officer to secretly record a conversation with a suspect.167 One who
illegally tapes a conversation is subject to up to six months imprisonment, or up to five
hundred dollars in fine, or both. 168

162 Flanagan v. Flanagan, 41 P.3d 575, 582 (Cal. 2002). Flanagan involved the secret taping of telephone
conversations; however, pursuant to statutory language the term "confidential communication" is not limited to
face-to-face conversation. Section 632(a) provides:

Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential
communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops
upon or records the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on
among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or
other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five
hundred dollars ($2,500), or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in
the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

§ 632(a). As evidence of the inclusive nature of the term, in Flanaganthe California Supreme Court cited with
approval to a case involving a face-to-face conversation. 41 P.3d at 581 (citing Shulmanv. Grp. W Prods., Inc.,
955 P.2d 469, 492 (Cal. 1998) (finding that the recording is illegal if one has "an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy" in the conversation)).
163
164

§ 632(a).

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1) (West 2009), invalidatedon other grounds by State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755
(Mont. 2013).
16' Id. Secret recording is not illegal in circumstances in which either "persons [are] speaking at public meetings"
or "persons [are] given warning of the . . . recording, and if one person provides the warning, either party may
record." Id. § 45-8-213(1)(c).
166 Id.

However, the Montana Constitution may prohibit secret taping by a police infonnant. The Montana
Constitution contains a right to privacy and a right against unreasonable search and seizure. See MONT. CONST.
art. I, §§ 10, 11. In a 2008 decision, the Montana Supreme Court held that "recording of the Defendants'
conversations with the confidential informants, notwithstanding the consent of the confidential informants,
constituted searches subject to the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution."
State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 504 (Mont. 2008). The court further found that "recording of those conversations
without a warrant or the existence of an established exception to the warrant requirement violated the
Defendants' rights under Article II, Sections 10 and 11." Id.
' § 45-8-213(3)(a).
1'6
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In addition to the eavesdropping statute, Article 2, § 10 of the Montana
Constitution guarantees Montana citizens a right to privacy: "The right of individual
privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without
the showing of a compelling state interest." 1 6 9
The eavesdropping statute does not define the term "conversation" and research
fails to show that the term has been interpreted by the Montana state courts. However, two
Supreme Court of Montana cases have interpreted the Montana Constitution privacy
provision to protect certain conversations against being secretly taped.
In 2008 in State v. Goetz, the court considered two consolidated cases in which
police confidential informants had been fitted with body wires and secretly taped
conversations with the two suspects, with two of the conversations taking place in the
suspects' residences and one conversation taking place in the informant's vehicle located
in a parking lot.170 In determining if the suspect had a right to privacy, the court
considered "1) whether the person challenging the state's action has an actual subjective
expectation of privacy; [and] 2) whether society is willing to recognize that subjective
expectation as objectively reasonable." 17 1 The court found that the suspects did have
"actual subjective expectations of privacy" because of the "private settings"1 7 2 and that
"society is willing to recognize as reasonable the expectation that conversations held in a
private setting are not surreptitiously being electronically monitored and recorded by
government agents." 1 73
In 2010 in State v. Meredith, police officers secretly taped Meredith's allegedly
incriminating statements while he sat alone in a police station interrogation room. 17 4 The
Supreme Court of Montana used the two-pronged test from Goetz and concluded that
"while Meredith may have an expectation of privacy in his statements, it is not one that
society would recognize as objectively reasonable." 7 The court reasoned that "[h]ad
[Meredith] wanted to preserve his privacy, he would not have voiced his thoughts." 1 7 6
b.

Oregon

The Oregon statute provides that one "may not . .. [o]btain ... the whole or any
part of a conversation by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether
electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, if not all participants in the conversation are
169 MONT. CONST. art. II,

§ 10.

17o

Goetz, 191 P.3d at 492-93.

171

Id. at 497.

Id. at 499. "The [suspects] did not conduct their conversations where other individuals were present or
physically within range to overhear the conversations." Id. at 498.
173 Id. at 500. An open question is whether the court would have reached the same two conclusions if the person
secretly taping had been a private individual. The court stated:
172

[W]hile we recognize that Montanans are willing to risk that a person with whom they are
conversing in their home or other private setting may repeat that conversation to a third
person, we are firmly persuaded that they are unwilling to accept as reasonable that the
same conversation is being electronically monitored and recorded by government agents
without their knowledge.
Id
174 226 P.3d 571, 575, 580 (Mont. 2010).

Id. at 580.
Id. "Police interrogation rooms are traditionally areas where people are watched and monitored in some form
or fashion whether it be by two-way glass, video taping or audio recording. In addition, there was no reason for
Meredith to make the incriminating statements out loud unless he wanted to be overheard." Id.
1

17
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specifically informed that their conversation is being obtained.""' The term
"conversation" is defined as "the transmission between two or more persons of an oral
communication which is not a telecommunication or a radio communication."" The
Oregon eavesdropping statutes are in some respects similar to those of Illinois in that
Oregon requires all party consent and does not limit protected conversations to those made
with an expectation of privacy considered to be reasonable.
Research of Oregon case
law reveals no case that read a reasonable expectation of privacy requirement into a
protected conversation. Illegal eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor,1 0 carrying a
maximum one year prison term" and a maximum fine of six thousand two hundred fifty
dollars. 182
Surprisingly enough, the words "specifically informed" were the focus of two
Oregon Court of Appeals cases, one from 1990 and the second from 2011, decided en
banc. 18 3 In the 1990 case, Bichsel's conviction for recording her in-person conversation
with at least two officers and her companion was affirmed because she failed to tell the
officers that she was recording the conversation. 18 4 In the 2011 case, a police officer
pulled over Neff for a traffic stop and told Neff that the officer was recording the
conversation; the officer did not know that Neff was also recording the conversation from
his driver's position with a recorder not in view of the officer. 1 The court held that
officer "Ou's own act of informing defendant that their conversation was being recorded
was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of ORS 165.540(l)(c) that all participants to the
conversation be 'specifically informed' that the conversation was being obtained."1 8 6
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.540(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. legislation effective through July
1, 2014).
178 Id. § 165.535(1).
177

The statute does except from the reach of the prohibition against recording, face-to-face conversations made
in certain specified settings so long as the tape recorder is not hidden. Id. § 165.540(6). The statute provides:
179

The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not apply to persons who intercept
or attempt to intercept with an unconcealed recording device the oral communications that
are part of any of the following proceedings:
(a) Public or semipublic meetings such as hearings before governmental or quasigovernmental bodies, trials, press conferences, public speeches, rallies and sporting or
other events;
(b) Regularly scheduled classes or similar educational activities in public or private
institutions; or
(c) Private meetings or conferences if all others involved knew or reasonably should have
known that the recording was being made.
Id.
18o Id

165.540(8).

...
Id. 161.615.
182 Id
161.635(1).
183 See State v. Bichsel, 790 P.2d 1142 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (en banc); State v. Neff, 265 P.3d 62 (Or. Ct. App.
2011) (en banc).
184

Bichsel, 790 P.2d at 1143. Bichsel had been counseling young people at a local mall and was carrying a tape

recorder that continued to record when she and a companion met up with at least two police officers in an alley
of downtown Eugene. One of the officers arrested Bichsel when the officer discovered that their conversation
had been recorded. Id. The court opined that, even if the recorder was in plain sight, as Bichsel claimed, the
statute required her to tell the officers that she was taping the conversation. Id. at 1144-45.
185

Neff 265 P.3d at 63.

Id. at 68. The court found that "the primary concern underlying ORS 165.540(1)(c) was the protection of
participants in conversations from being recorded without their knowledge." Id. at 66. The court reasoned that
"[w]here, as here, all participants in a conversation know that the conversation is being recorded, the legislature's
primary concern has been satisfied." Id.
18.
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Similar to the New Hampshire eavesdropping statute, the Oregon statute provides two
exceptions allowing a police officer to record a conversation when performing the
officer's duties. 1s7
Although the eavesdropping statutes of Montana and Oregon protect face-to-face
conversations, the focus of the two states is quite different. Montana uses the Katz twopronged test to gauge the speaker's privacy. Oregon is more akin to Massachusetts in
Oregon's focus on the autonomy of the speaker in consenting or not consenting to being
taped.
7.

One-Party Consent States

The federal eavesdropping statutes prohibit taping a conversation that qualifies as
an oral communication.88 In defining the term oral communication, the federal statutes
incorporate the Katz two-pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test. Thus, an oral
communication is a conversation in which the speaker has an expectation of privacy that
society would consider to be reasonable. The first prong is the subjective component of
the test and the second prong is the objective component of the test.1"9 One of the
exemptions from liability under the federal statutes allows a private individual to tape a
conversation if the person is a party to the conversation or one of the parties to the
conversation consents to the taping unless the taping is for a criminal or tortious
purpose. 190 This exemption makes the federal eavesdropping statutes one-party consent
statutes.
Although the federal statutes allow a conversation to be taped upon one-party
consent, it would be illegal for someone who is not a party to the conversation to tape the
conversation so long as the participants expect privacy in the conversation and society
would consider that expectation of privacy to be reasonable. 191 Typically, people
discussing confidential, sensitive, or intimate information expect privacy; therefore, the
subjective component of the test is usually satisfied. The second prong of the test, the
objective component, is usually fact specific and is often tied to location and the
possibility that the conversation might be overheard. A reasonable expectation of privacy
is often recognized in a private home, but not in a public park or on a public street.
However, there may not be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a private home if the
doors or windows were open or the parties to the conversation were speaking loud enough
to be heard outside the home1 9 2 and there might be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
The first exception allows a police officer to record a traffic stop, in other words making the eavesdropping
prohibition inapplicable to:
187

A law enforcement officer who is in uniform and displaying a badge and who is operating
a vehicle-mounted video camera that records the scene in front of, within or surrounding a
police vehicle, unless the officer has reasonable opportunity to inform participants in the
conversation that the conversation is being obtained.

§ 165.540(5)(c). The second exception allows an officer to record an incident involving the use of a taser, in
other words making the eavesdropping prohibition inapplicable to: "A law enforcement officer who, acting in the
officer's official capacity, deploys an Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology device that contains a built-in
monitoring system capable of recording audio or video, for the duration of that deployment." Id. § 165.540(5)(d).
188 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (West 2000 & Supp. 2014).
189 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g. Malpas v. State, 695 A.2d 588, 595 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); People v. Kirsh, 575 N.Y.S.2d 306,
307 (App. Div. 1991). The Malpas court found that Craigie did not have an expectation of privacy because, on
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park if the conversation is being conducted in a low tone of voice and the parties to the
conversation are far removed from others in the park.193
The federal eavesdropping statutes have been quite influential and serve as a
model for many states adopting their own eavesdropping statutes. The eavesdropping
statutes of a number of states track the above provisions of the federal eavesdropping
statutes. The states that track the federal eavesdropping statutes fairly closely are:
Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, 1 9 4 Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.1 95 Other states that are one-party
consent states and use a two-pronged definition of oral communication but do not track
the federal statutes include: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, 1 9 6 North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. 197
Other states protect a face-to-face conversation using a term other than "oral
communication" but define the term using subjective and objective components. The
Alaska eavesdropping statutes protect "private communication" and define the term using
the two-pronged Katz test. 198 The eavesdropping statutes of Georgia' 99 and Kansas2 0 0
protect "private conversation" made in a "private place" and define private place as a
location where one can be "reasonably safe" from "surveillance." The Maine
eavesdropping statutes protect the privacy of sounds made in a "private place" and define
private place as a location where one can be "reasonably safe" from "surveillance." 2 0 1 The
New York eavesdropping statutes protect "conversation" but the statutes do not define
conversation; 202 New York case law indicates that a conversation made with a reasonable
expectation of privacy is protected against recording. 203
Other states protect a face-to-face conversation against being secretly taped but
do not provide a definition for the type of conversation protected.20 4 These states are:
Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Nevada. The Alabama
205
eavesdropping statutes protect "private communication"; the eavesdropping statutes of

his side of the telephone conversation, he was yelling loud enough to be heard in the next apartment. 695 A.2d at
591, 595. The Kirsh court found that "absent a reasonable expectation of privacy, the recording of conversations,
per se, is not illegal" and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in "conversations . .
heard
through a hole in the floor, and tape recorded." 575 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
193 See, e.g., Dickersonv. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd in part, 601 N.W.2d 108
(Mich. 1999). The conversation took place in a public park with one of the parties wearing a microphone that
simultaneously broadcast the conversation to a TV van. On appeal the Michigan Supreme Court stated "the
question whether plaintiffs conversation was private depends on whether she intended and reasonably expected
it to be private at the time and under the circumstances involved." Dickerson v. Raphael, 601 N.W.2d 108, 108
(Mich. 1999).
194 In Rhode Island, the term "oral communication" is defined in a criminal procedure statute, rather than in the
eavesdropping statute. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-5.1-1(10) (West 2006).
195 See infra app A (Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
196 Missouri eavesdropping statutes protect "oral communication" where the conversation is intercepted using a
microphone transmitting the conversation elsewhere and define the term using the two-pronged Katz test. See
app A (Missouri).
197 See infra app. A (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming).
198 See infra app. A (Alaska).
199 See infra app. A (Georgia).
200 See infra app. A (Kansas).
201 See infra app. A (Maine).
202 See infra app. A (New York).
203 People v. Kirsh, 575 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307-08 (App. Div. 1991).
204 See infra app. A (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Nevada).
205 See infra app. A (Alabama).
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communication";

the

20 9

Connecticut eavesdropping statutes
protect "conversation"; and the Nevada
eavesdropping statutes210 protect "private conversation." In these states, lack of a
definition for the type of conversation being protected is problematic for a bystander
taping an encounter with a police officer. The police officer could claim that the taping
was illegal even if the taping were done in a location traditionally open to the public, such
as a street or a park.
As one might imagine, arresting someone who is videotaping an encounter with a
police officer has been challenged under the theory that the First Amendment protects the
videotaping. The following section discusses First Amendment protection for videotaping
a police officer.
III.

FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION

There is a circuit split as to whether there is a First Amendment right to record a
police officer and the United States Supreme Court has yet to clarify whether such a First
Amendment right exists. However, two federal courts of appeals, the first and the seventh
circuits, found that the First Amendment protects civilian taping of encounters with police
officers.211 These cases are discussed in subsections A and B below.
As one might expect, a much higher percentage of cases advocating a First
Amendment right to gather information are from all-party consent states than from oneparty consent states because it is easier for a police officer in an all-party consent state to
allege that the civilian taping an encounter with a police officer has violated the state
eavesdropping statute. Although just over one-fifth of the states have all-party consent
eavesdropping statutes, just over sixty percent of the cases discussed in this section are
from all-party consent states.
A.

The Seventh Circuit

The impetus behind the seventh circuit's 2012 decision in American Civil
Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez212 was the ACLU's planned "police accountability
program" pursuant to which individuals would videotape and audiotape public police
officer activity where the police officer's conversation could be heard by a bystander.
Fearful that the individuals taping would be charged under the Illinois eavesdropping
statutes, the ACLU filed the lawsuit against the Cook County State Attorney requesting
that the judge enter an injunction preventing enforcement of the eavesdropping statutes
against individuals participating in the planned program.2 13 The Illinois eavesdropping
statutes make recording a conversation illegal except with the consent of all parties to the

See infra app. A (Arkansas).
See infra app. A (Kentucky).
208 See infra app. A (Tennessee).
209 See infra app. A (Connecticut).
210 See infra app. A (Nevada).
211 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012), on remand,
No. 10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012) (granting the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and a permanent injunction); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2014); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011).
212 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 586.
206

207

213

Id.
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conversation and do not limit protection to those conversations made with an expectation
of privacy.

214

In considering "whether the First Amendment prevents Illinois prosecutors from
enforcing the eavesdropping statute against people who openly record police officers
performing their official duties in public," 2 15 the court emphasized the all-inclusive nature
of the Illinois statutes. 216 The court found that "[t]he act of making an audio or audiovisual
recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and
press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording." 21 7 The court
reasoned that the Illinois statute "restricts . . . an integral step in the speech process" as it
"interferes with the gathering and dissemination of information about government officials
performing their duties in public." 218 The court noted that recorders are devices generally
available and used by the public, with the characteristics of being "uniquely reliable and
powerful methods of preserving and disseminating news and information about events that
occur in public" and "self-authenticating" making "it highly unlikely that other methods
could be considered reasonably adequate substitutes." 2 19
The court remanded the case to the federal district court to enjoin the "State's
Attorney from applying the Illinois eavesdropping statute against the ACLU and its
employees or agents who openly audio record the audible communications of lawenforcement officers (or others whose communications are incidentally captured) when
the officers are engaged in their official duties in public places."220 After the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari,22 1 the federal district court granted the ACLU's motion
for summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction barring the State's Attorney
from enforcing the Illinois statute against those participating in the ACLU accountability
222
program.
B.

The First Circuit

Glik v. Cunniffe was a 2011 case from the first circuit in which Glik was walking
past the Boston Common when he began using his cell phone to videotape three officers
ten feet away, allegedly using excessive force, arresting a young male.223 Following the
Id. at 587. The Alvarez court described the history of the eavesdropping statutes, including an interesting
interplay between the judicial and legislative branches. Id. A 1986 Illinois Supreme Court case involved an
arrestee with a tape recorder seated in the back seat of a patrol car who taped a conversation between two officers
in the front seat. People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 347-48 (Ill. 1986). The Beardsley court read into the
eavesdropping statute a requirement that there be a reasonable expectation of privacy for the conversation to be
protected. "Because there was no surreptitious interception of a communication intended by the declarants to be
private, secret, or confidential, under circumstances justifying such expectation, there was no violation of the
eavesdropping statute." Id. at 350. Eight years later, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the same path in
deciding that "the Illinois eavesdropping statute . . allows the recording of a conversation by a party to that
conversation." People v. Herrington, 645 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ill. 1994).
In response to Beardsley and Herrington, the Illinois legislature amended the Illinois statute to include
participant recording without the consent of all parties as eavesdropping and to expand protected conversations
beyond those made with an expectation of privacy. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 587.
214

215

Id. at 586.

Id. at 595. "Unlike the federal wiretapping statute and the eavesdropping laws of most other states, . . . the
[Illinois] statute sweeps much more broadly, banning all audio recording of any oral communication absent
consent of the parties regardless of whether the communication is or was intended to be private." Id.
216

217
218

id.
Id at 600.

Id at 596, 607.
Id at 608.
221 Alvarez v. ACLU of Ill., 133
S. Ct. 651 (2012).
222 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012).
223 Glikv. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d
78 (1st Cir. 2011).
219
220
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completion of the arrest, one of the officers asked Glik whether Glik was taping the audio
portion of the encounter. The officer arrested Glik under the Massachusetts eavesdropping
statute after Glik admitted that he was taping sound.22 4 After the eavesdropping charge
was dismissed, Glik filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the police officers and the City
of Boston.225
The court found that "the First Amendment protects the filming of government
officials in public spaces [and] accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and district
courts. ,,226 The court stated that there was no reason to distinguish this case from a prior
case in which the court had noted that a journalist was exercising his First Amendment
right to film officials.227 "[C]hanges in technology and society have made the lines
between private citizen and journalist exceedingly difficult to draw." 2 2 8 However, "the
right to film ... may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions."229 Glik
did not run afoul of any of these limitations as he was in a public park at a safe distance
from the arrest and did not interfere with the arrest in any way.230 The court held that,
"though not unqualified, a citizen's right to film government officials, including law
enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and
well-established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment."231 The court concluded that
"the district court did not err in denying qualified immunity to the appellants on Glik's
First Amendment claim."

23 2

Glik's Fourth Amendment claim was that the officer lacked probable cause to
arrest Glik because his taping was not done secretly and taping secretly was a prerequisite
233
to violating the Massachusetts eavesdropping statute.
After reviewing Massachusetts
cases interpreting the statute, the court determined that the cases "indicate that the use of a
recording device in 'plain sight,' as here, constitutes adequate objective evidence of actual
knowledge of the recording" and, on top of that, "here the police officers made clear
through their conduct that they knew Glik was recording them."234 The court concluded
that "Glik's recording was not 'secret' within the meaning of Massachusetts's wiretap
statute, and therefore the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him." 2 3 5 Therefore, the
court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for the police officers. 236
Almost three years after Glik, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit had occasion to determine in Gericke v. Begin whether Glik applied to a bystander
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
226 Id. at 83.
224
225

227

Id. "[T]he news-gathering protections of the First Amendment cannot turn on professional credentials or

status." Id. at 84.
228 Id. The court explained:
The proliferation of electronic devices with video-recording capability means that many of

our images of current events come from bystanders with a ready cell phone or digital
camera rather than a traditional film crew, and news stories are now just as likely to be
broken by a blogger at her computer as a reporter at a major newspaper.
Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id. at
85.
232 Id.
233 Id. at
86.
234 Id. at
87.
235 Id. at
88.
236 Id. at
89.
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appearing to videotape a traffic stop "where there was no police order [for Gericke] to stop
filming or leave the area.,,237
Late in the evening of March 24, 2010 in Weare, New Hampshire, Carla Gericke,
part of a two-car caravan, was following Tyler Hanslin's car when a police car behind
them activated its emergency lights. Both Gericke and Hanslin pulled over and the police
car parked between them. When the police officer told Gericke that Hanslin's car was the
one being pulled over and asked Gericke to move her car, Gericke told the officer that she
would pull into an adjacent school parking lot at least thirty feet away. After moving her
car to the parking lot, Gericke exited her car, announced that she would videotape the
stop, and attempted to do so. 23 8 Although Gericke's camera malfunctioned and failed to
record, Gericke continued to act as if she were taping the incident even after the officer
ordered her to return to her car.239 According to Gericke, the officer did not order her to
stop taping nor did the officer order her to move her car.2 40
After other officers arrived, Gericke was arrested for failing to produce her
license and registration. At the police station, Gericke was charged with disobeying a
police officer, obstructing a government official, and illegally taping a conversation under
New Hampshire law. 24 1 After neither the town prosecutor nor the county attorney pressed
the charges, Gericke filed a civil rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against the police
officers, the Weare police department, and the town of Weare for violating her First
Amendment right by charging her with illegally taping a conversation. 242 The officers
filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to find that they had qualified
immunity, as there was no clearly established right to videotape a traffic stop.243
At the trial level, the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire denied the motion for summary judgment, largely because the facts were
unclear as to whether Gericke was disruptive. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal of
their motion for summary judgment, accepting Gericke's version of the facts solely for
purposes of the appeal. The issue before the First Circuit was "whether it was clearly
established that Gericke was exercising a First Amendment right when she attempted to
film Sergeant Kelley during the traffic stop." 24 4
According to the court, Glik and Gericke were similar in that someone was
245
attempting to gather information on a police officer performing a duty in public.
Although an officer may place reasonable restrictions on taping a traffic stop, "a police
order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right to film police performing
their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasonably
6
conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with his duties." 24
Because in Glik the court found that a First Amendment right to tape a police officer
performing a duty in public was clearly established and the Glik incident occurred more
than two years prior to the Gericke incident, Gericke's First Amendment right to

Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 3, 10 (1st Cir. 2014).
Id. at 3.
239 id.
240 id
241 Id.
at 4.
242 id
243 id
244 Id. at
5.
237
238

245
246

Id. at 7.
id. at 8
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videotape was clearly established.2 4 7
Thus, the court found Glik controlling as to Gericke's First Amendment right to
videotape. "It was clearly established at the time of the stop that the First Amendment
right to film police carrying out their duties in public, including a traffic stop, remains
unfettered if no reasonable restriction is imposed or in place."2 48 The court held "that the
district court properly denied qualified immunity to the officers on Gericke's § 1983 claim
that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First
Amendment."

249

Although the court affirmed the denial of the officers' motion for summary
judgment on Gericke's version of the facts, it left open the possibility that the fact-finder
could reach a different conclusion at trial. "Of course, a trial might leave a fact-finder with
a different view of whether Sergeant Kelley ordered Gericke to leave the area or stop
filming. That view, in tum, might affect the court's analysis of the availability of qualified
immunity to the officers."
C.

250

The Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits

Three federal courts found that a First Amendment right to tape a government
official was not clearly established under the circumstances, entitling the official to
qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim.251 However, the courts did not state
that a First Amendment right to gather information does not exist.
In Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, a third circuit case from Pennsylvania, Brian

Kelly was riding with his friend in his friend's truck when a police officer stopped the
252
truck for alleged traffic violations2.
Kelly was accustomed to carrying his video camera
with him, which he used to tape various encounters. During the traffic stop, Kelly held the
camera in his lap and proceeded to tape the incident. It is unclear whether the camera was
in plain view of the officer. Later in the traffic stop, the officer told Kelly and the driver
that the officer was taping the stop and, according to the officer, it was then that the officer
realized that Kelly was taping. After confiscating Kelly's camera, the officer telephoned
Assistant District Attorney Birbeck to inquire whether the officer could arrest Kelly for
violating the Pennsylvania eavesdropping statute because Kelly had failed to inform the
officer that Kelly was taping the traffic stop.253 The officer arrested Kelly based on
Birbeck telling the officer it was appropriate to do so, but the charge was later dropped.
Believing that the officer and the Borough of Carlisle had violated his First and Fourth
254
Amendment rights, Kelly filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them.
The court first considered Kelly's Fourth Amendment claim in light of the
officer's conversation with Birbeck. The court held "that a police officer who relies in
good faith on a prosecutor's legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is
presumptively entitled to qualified immunity from Fourth Amendment claims premised on
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.

Id. at 10 n.13.

Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010); Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App'x 852, 852
(4th Cir. 2009); Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 312881, at *57 (D. N.M.
Jan. 14, 2013) (deciding a case within 10th circuit jurisdiction).
252 Kelly, 622 F.3d
at 251.
253 Id.
254 Id. at
252.
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a lack of probable cause."2 5 5 The court ordered that, on remand, the district court
investigate the facts to make findings as to whether the officer knew he was being
recorded at the beginning of the traffic stop and whether the officer asked Birbeck for
legal advice or for an arrest number.2 56 The appellate court found that the lower court had
erred in reviewing case law interpreting the Pennsylvania eavesdropping statute, as the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had twice held that recording a police officer did not violate
the statute where the police officer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 257 and
"it was also clearly established that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when recording conversations with suspects." 2 5 8
In considering Kelly's First Amendment claim, the court held "that the right to
videotape police officers during traffic stops was not clearly established and Officer
Rogers was entitled to qualified immunity on Kelly's First Amendment claim."259 The
court characterized traffic stops as "inherently dangerous situations" and pointed out that
courts within the third circuit that had recognized a First Amendment right to tape a police
260
officer had not dealt with the traffic stop environment.
Szymecki v. Houck, a case from Virginia, was a brief, unpublished decision of the
261
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In the decision, the court agreed
with the lower court's conclusion "that Szymecki's asserted First Amendment right to
record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit at the
time of the alleged conduct."262
InAlocek v. City ofAlbuquerque, a case from New Mexico, Mocek had a practice
of refusing to show identification when passing through a Transportation Security
Administration airport checkpoint. 263 In 2009, Mocek was passing through the checkpoint
at the Albuquerque airport when he refused to show identification and began videotaping
the incident. One of the Transportation Security Administration officers (TSOs) ordered
Mocek to stop filming and called in officers from the Albuquerque Aviation Police

Id at 255-56. The court noted that "a plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing that, under all the
factual and legal circumstances surrounding the arrest, a reasonable officer would not have relied on the
prosecutor's advice." Id. at 256.
256 Id. at 256.
257 Id
at 257. The two cases are Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523 (Pa. 1998) and Commonwealthv. Henlen,
564 A.2d 905, 906 (Pa. 1989).
258 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 258.
259
Id. at 263.
260 Id. at 262. "Moreover, even insofar as it is clearly established, the right to record matters of public concern is
not absolute; it is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions .... "Id. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378
F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005) was one of the cases discussed in Kelly. Robinson was worried about safety
concerns regarding Pennsylvania state troopers conducting truck inspections on Route 41. After obtaining
permission from an adjoining landowner, Robinson began videotaping the inspections while positioned twenty to
thirty feet from the highway. In 2000, officers arrested him for harassment and he was convicted but did not
appeal the conviction. A similar incident and arrest occurred late in 2002; Robinson was found guilty, but on
appeal the judge dismissed the charge. Believing that the three officers had violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights, Robinson filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them. Id at 538. The court concluded that
"there can be no doubt that the free speech clause of the Constitution protected Robinson as he videotaped the
defendants on October 23, 2002." Id. at 541. The court reasoned that "[v]ideotaping is a legitimate means of
gathering information for public dissemination and can often provide cogent evidence, as it did in this case." Id.
The court found each of the three officers liable to Robinson, awarding Robinson $35,000 in compensatory
damages against the three officers, jointly and severally, and $2,000 in punitive damages against each of the
three officers. Id. at 545-46.
261 Szymecki v. Houck, 353 F. App'x 852, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id at 853.
263 Mocekv. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 11-1009 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 312881, at *1 (D. N.M. Jan. 14, 2013).
255
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Department (AAPD) when Mocek did not stop. 264 The AAPD officers escorted Mocek
away from the checkpoint and placed him in a holding cell. Mocek had four criminal
charges filed against him but a jury acquitted him. 265 Believing that the TSOs and the
AAPD officers had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights, Mocek filed a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them. 266
The location of the filming incident, the checkpoint of an airport terminal,
weighed heavily in the court's decision to grant the TSOs qualified immunity.
"[R]ecording TSA employees at a screening checkpoint raises safety concerns, because, if
Mocek had ill intentions and was able to record information regarding the TSA's screening
procedures which would allow someone to evade the procedures, the safety of passengers
at commercial airports would be jeopardized." 2 67 The court found that Mocek's right to
videotape under the circumstances was not clearly established. "Just as the Court finds
that the TSOs did not violate Mocek's right to gather news, which entails some First
Amendment protection, neither the Tenth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has found that
Mocek's right to gather news in this context is clearly established." 268 The court noted that
the United States Supreme Court had approved reasonable limitations on the exercise of
Constitutional rights in airports. "[T]he Supreme Court has upheld reasonable limitations
on First Amendment conduct in airport terminals, and thus a reasonable TSA agent in the
TSOs' shoes would not likely understand that telling Mocek to stop recording and
subsequently summoning the police when he refused to comply violated his rights." 26 9
D.

The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits

In 2000, one federal court of appeals found that civilians had a First Amendment
right to tape police officers and, in 1995, another federal court of appeals recognized in
271
passing a First Amendment right to videotape police officers.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Smith v. City of Cumming,
a case out of Georgia, in 2000.272 Aside from the allegation that police officers had
prevented Mr. Smith from videotaping police activities and that police officers had
harassed the Smiths, the facts in the Smiths' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit are non-existent in
273
the decision.
The court held that, 'a]s to the First Amendment claim under § 1983, we
agree with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time,
manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct."274 The court
reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public
interest."275 The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants because,
"[a]lthough the Smiths have a right to videotape police activities, they have not shown that
276
the Defendants' actions violated that right."
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
266 Id. at *5.
267 Id. at *57.
268 Id. at *56.
269 Id.
270 Smithy. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332,
1333 (lthCir. 2000).
271 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436,
439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995).
272 Smith, 212 F.3d
at 1332.
273 Id.
274 Id. at
1333.
275 Id.
276 Id.
264
265
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Fordyce v. City of Seattle in
1995.277 Fordyce was videotaping a protest march, including police officers on duty, and
later tried to videotape some bystanders.278 Fordyce alleged that in the earlier incident an
officer smashed the camera into Fordyce's face.2 79 In the later incident, a different officer
arrested Fordyce under the Washington eavesdropping statute when the bystanders
indicated that they did not want to be videoed.2 80 Several months later, a court dismissed
the charges. 28 1 Believing that the city and eight officers had violated his First and Fourth
Amendment rights, Fordyce filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against them. The court
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.282 Of its
own accord and without a request from Fordyce, the lower court granted him declaratory
relief, "declaring that [the Washington eavesdropping statute] 'does not prohibit the
videotaping or sound-recording of conversations held in a public street, within the hearing
of persons283 not participating in the conversation, by means of a readily apparent recording
device."'
On appeal, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the officer who
allegedly attempted to stop Fordyce from videotaping the march. "[A] genuine issue of
material fact does exist regarding whether Fordyce was assaulted and battered by a Seattle
police officer in an attempt to prevent or dissuade him from exercising his First
Amendment right to film matters of public interest."284 Thus, the court assumed in passing
that Fordyce did have a First Amendment right to videotape the march and the court
repeated the existence of that right in the conclusion paragraph. "[A] genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning whether he interfered with Fordyce's First Amendment
right to gather news."285

Other information necessary to understand the tension behind a civilian taping an
encounter with a police officer are two common characteristics of police culture. These
characteristics are explained in the following section.
IV.

"TESTILYING" AND THE CODE OF SILENCE

The job of the police officer is not an easy one, to say the least, with the officer
forced to make difficult decisions in the face of looming violence. "Patrol officers and
detectives deal with the public without direct oversight by administrative superiors, and so
they must be trusted to behave in an ethical way on their own."286 Often there is an outcry
from television viewers that suspects be apprehended almost immediately following a
newsworthy and violent televised incident. "When a terrible crime has occurred, the

277

55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).

Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 id.
282 id
283 Id
278

at 438.
at 439.
at 438.

at 439 (quoting Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 840 F. Supp. 784, 794 (W.D. Wash. 1993), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995)). On appeal, the court vacated the declaratory
judgment because the lower court had not provided Washington State a chance to be heard on the issue of the
constitutionality of the eavesdropping statute. Id at 442.
284 Id. at
439.
285 Id. at
442.
286
James Q. Wilson,
Police Ethics, EJOURNAL USA,
Apr.
2011, at 7, available at
http://photos.state.gov/1ibraries/korea/397355/April 2011/Ethical-Policing-041311.pdf
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public may demand that the police solve it 'no matter what they have to do,' and so there
is pressure to use unnecessary force." 28 7
The police officer wields immense power and this immense power should justify
allowing law enforcement activity to be scrutinized. Generally, a uniformed police officer
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while conducting official business
because the officer is performing a service to the public.288 One Maryland judge opined,
"Those of us who are public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state are
ultimately accountable to the public. When we exercise that power in public fora, we
should not expect our actions to be shielded from public observation."289 In addition, it is
routine for an officer to videotape a traffic stop, with certain statutes specifically
sanctioning this activity, 2 9 0 and an officer may tape other interactions with the public via a
body-mounted video camera. 291 It would be anomalous for one who is deliberately taping
a conversation to claim that the conversation is private.
Society's general trust of police activity combined with police bravado means
that, without a citizen recording, the officer's testimony would be believable even if the
officer is falsifying information. In fact, officer falsification is so commonplace that the
Mollen Commission, charged with investigating the New York City Police Department,
referred to officer falsification of evidence as "testilying."292 If falsification of evidence
were to occur, a huge gulf may exist between the sights and sounds captured on videotape
and a witness recounting what transpired.
A police studies professor explained, "Many police departments attempt to
impose ethical standards and effective policing through policy, proscription, and
punishment."293 However, many incidents of police and minority encounters remain
uninvestigated, perhaps because there is no visual recordation of what happened. "A major
shortcoming of this approach is that most police actions will never be reviewed and, as a
practical matter, are unreviewable."2 94

287

Id.

See, e.g., State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *19 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 2010)
("[O]n a public highway in full view of the public[,] . . the Troopers had [no] reasonable expectation of privacy
in their conversation with the Defendant which society would be prepared to recognize as reasonable."); Lewis v.
v. State, Dep't of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1084, 1086 (Wash. 2006) ("[C]onversations with police officers are
not private. . . . [T]raffic stop conversations are not private[.]"); Burton v. York County Sheriffs Dep't, 594
S.E.2d 888, 895 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he manner in which the employees of the Sheriffs Department
prosecute their duties to be a large and vital public interest that outweighs their desire to remain out of the public
eye."); Hornberger v. Am. Broad. Cos., 799 A.2d 566, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) ("[P]laintiffs, as
police officers on duty, searching a vehicle on a public street, cannot expect the same level of privacy as a private
citizen in a private place."). See also supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
289 Graber,2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS
7, at *35.
290 See supra notes 79, 85, 115, 129, 150, 187
and accompanying text.
288

291

Andrea Noble, Police Now Armed with Video: Recording Can ProtectOfficer, Citizen Through Visual
Proof

WASH. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/25/police-now-armed-withvideo/?page=all.
292

THE CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI[hereinafter MOLLEN

CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMMISSION REPORT 36 (1994)

COMMISSION REPORT] (" [P]olice falsifications . . [are] probably the most common form of police corruption ...
so common in some precincts that it has spawned its own word: 'testilying."'), available at
http://www.parc.info/client files/Special%/`20Reports/4%/`20-%/`2OMollen%/`2OCommission%/`20-%/`20NYPD.pdf.
293 Eugene O'Donnell, FosteringEthical and Humane Policing, EJOURNAL USA, Apr. 2011, at 9, available at
http://photos.state.gov/1ibraries/korea/397355/April_201 1/Ethical-Policing-0413 ll.pdf.
294

Id.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

102

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
2015]

TIPPING THE SCALES IN FAVOR OF CIVILIAN TAPING

95

Citizen taping can balance the deference, sometimes undue, given the police
officer by the court and jury and provide an accurate portrayal of the incident. There may
be a significant discrepancy between citizen recording and a police officer's recount of an
incident. The Christopher Commission, which was charged with investigating the Rodney
King incident, found the arrest report to be inconsistent with the videotape.29 5 Jurors are
likely to believe police officer testimony and are not likely to have experienced police
corruption first-hand. Taping allows weighing the power of the police against the
corrective power of the citizenry. Courts and oversight boards are inadequate to prevent
police-inflicted harm, either intended or unintended.
The Mollen Commission description of officer falsification of evidence,
testilying, is frightening because it weakens the foundations of the criminal justice system.
The Mollen Commission found:
Police perjury and falsification of official records is a serious problem
facing the Department and the criminal justice system - largely because it is
often a "tangled web" that officers weave to cover for other underlying acts of
corruption or wrongdoing. One form of corruption thus breeds another that taints
arrests on the streets and undermines the credibility of police in the courtroom.2 96
The Mollen Commission found that falsification was widespread, "widely
tolerated by corrupt and honest officers alike, as well as their supervisors."2 9 7 The
justification for the falsification is that it is "'doing God's work' - doing whatever it takes
to get a suspected criminal off the streets." 2 98
One of the root causes of police corruption is what is sometimes referred to as the
code of silence. This is "the silence of honest officers who fear the consequences of
'ratting' on another cop no matter how grave the crime."299 The Christopher Commission
found that "the greatest single barrier to the effective investigation and adjudication of
complaints is the officers' unwritten 'code of silence:' . . . an officer does not provide
adverse information against a fellow officer." 3 0 0 The Mollen Commission found the New
York City Police Department code of silence had not weakened since the Knapp
Commission, the prior police investigative commission of more than twenty years earlier.
"[T]he dishonest officers in the New York City Police Department still do not fear their
honest colleagues. . . . The vast majority of honest officers still protect the minority of
corrupt officers through a code of silence few dare to break." 3 01 The honest officer may be
secretly relieved when a civilian taping exposes lying by a corrupt officer. "[A]1though
patrol officers openly expressed disgust over corruption and hoped corrupt officers would
INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los
ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 9 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT], available at
295

http://www.parc.info/client files/Special%/`20Reports/1%"o20-%/`2OChistopher%/2OCommision.pdf.
The
arrest
"report of the incident is inconsistent with the scenes captured on the Holliday videotape in terms of the number
and location of baton blows, as well as the description of King's 'resistance."' Id.
296 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 292, at 36. Falsification "typically occurs as a means to conceal
other underlying acts of corruption or to conceal illegal steps taken for what officers often perceive as
'legitimate' law enforcement ends." Id. at 37.
297 Id. at 40.
298 Id. at 41.
299
id. at 1.

300

CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 295, at 168.

MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 292, at 51. "[I]t often appears to be strongest where corruption is
most frequent." Id. at 53. The Mollen Commission explained: "this is because the loyalty ethic is particularly
powerful in crime-ridden precincts where officers most depend upon each other for their safety each day - and
where fear and alienation from the community are the most rampant." Id.
301
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be fired, they nonetheless are highly reluctant to report corruption . . . .302 The code of
silence is part of the culture of a police department and is enforced by retaliation against
an officer who does provide negative information about a fellow officer. An officer who
fails to abide by the code is subject to being "ostracized and harassed" and may "become
the target of [police] complaints." 3 0 3
The police culture is very much a product of the manner in which most police
departments are managed. "Changing police attitudes can be especially challenging given
that police departments are run on a military model that demands obedience to authority,
the surrender of officers' individuality, and the willingness to wield coercive power
against others." 304
One must consider the pernicious intersection of testilying and the code of
silence as the backdrop against which increased civilian taping of encounters with police
officers occurs. For the officer, "[1]earning about the cultures of the communities police
serve is not enough. Police departments also have cultures that need to be examined-and
sometimes changed." 3 0 5 Without the civilian tape, an officer might be tempted to falsify
information concerning the encounter to make sure that what the officer perceives to be
the right result is reached. Thus, a police officer charged with upholding the law would
feel free to act outside the constraints of the law. The code of silence would make sure that
the falsification remains undisclosed by fellow officers. However, audio recording is a
powerful counterbalance to testilying and the code of silence. But for the prevalence of
civilian recording, the police culture would dictate that the ends justify the means.
The following section analyzes civilian taping of encounters with police officers
in light of eavesdropping statutes, First Amendment protection for taping, and police
culture.
V.

ANALYSIS

A more recent version of the Rodney King incident is that involving Oscar Grant
at the Fruitvale Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) station in Oakland, California.3 06 Early
on January 1, 2009, transit police officers were reacting to reports of a fight aboard a train
arriving at the Fruitvale station when they pulled a number of passengers, including Grant,
from the train. As the incident unfolded, a number of passengers videotaped the encounter
and captured an officer, Johannes Mehserle, fatally shooting Grant in the back.3 07 At least
one of those videos was posted online and Mehserle served less than a year after being
convicted of involuntary manslaughter.308 The online video spurred an aspiring filmmaker,

302 Id. at 56. "It is not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off the job. The consequences of
corruption for honest cops are grave: it taints their reputation, destroys their morale, and, most important,
jeopardizes their very safety." Id. at 57.
303 CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 295, at 170. "When an officer finally gets fed up and comes
forward to speak the truth, that will mark the end of his or her police career." Id.
304 O'Donnell, supra note 293, at 10.
305 Joseph D. McNamara, Policing Diverse Communities, EJOURNAL USA, Apr. 2011, at 5, available at
http://photos.state.gov/ibraries/korea/397355/April_201 1/Ethical-Policing-0413 11.pdf.
306 "Fruitvale Station": Recreating a Tragic Loss of a
Life, CBSNEWS.COM (July 21, 2013, 10:51 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3445_162-57594533/fruitvale-station-recreating-a-tragic-loss-of-a-life/.
307 Id.
308 Id.
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Ryan Coogler, to make the movie, Fruitvale Station, which was released to the public in
July 2013 after winning awards at the Cannes and Sundance film festivals.3 09
Surprisingly enough, the new BART police chief, Kenton Rainey, gave his full
cooperation to Coogler's filming, allowing the murder scene to be filmed on the Fruitvale
station platform where Grant was shot. Rainey commented, "When Ryan came to us, we
really wanted to help in the making of this film, to help with the healing process" and
added, "The story's going to be told." 310 After the movie was complete, Rainey viewed it
with individuals from his command staff as a preventative measure. "It's important for us
to understand what we're doing, so that another incident like this never happens again."3 11
The movie has resonated with black males near the age of Grant, shot at twentytwo years old.312 At twenty-four, Hamza Farrah identifies with Grant: "it's frightening to
think that the people who are sworn to protect and serve can also cause such great harm.
Growing up he said he was taught by his elders to just listen and obey police officers and
to not act 'black' around them." 3 13 Farrah sees Fruitvale Station as "very important to

show. ,,314 He reasons, "It gives you a conscience of what's happening across the nation;
from Trayvon Martin to the Oscar Grant story. It shows you that race still matters and that
people are treated differently because of the color of their skin." 3 15
The typical police officer's focus is to protect society, sometimes by arresting
those accused of criminal activity. The police officer's interests while participating in the
encounter are to gather evidence, promote the safety of all persons involved, conduct an
efficient investigation, and gather evidence. The typical reader of this paper is from a
fairly affluent community, relying on the police force to enforce the law against
undesirable elements; however, someone not from an affluent community may hold a
radically different view of police activity. Insight may be gained by viewing police
activity from the extremes of a prosperous community, in which the police officer is
trusted, and a high-crime community, where police are not trusted. Typical jurors may
view a convicted criminal, or a person lacking formal education, or one from a low socioeconomic background as less credible than a police officer and are used to the official
framing of a civilian encounter with a police officer as recounted by the officer.
Citizen oversight is generally helpful, rarely harmful, and community policing
has been implemented within the last few decades. The benefits of recording interactions
with police officers are to encourage police accountability, promote use of justifiable
police tactics, serve as the basis of deserved discipline against an officer engaging in
misconduct, reduce harm to the individual, promote the free flow of discussion concerning
police activities, educate the public, and prevent and deter police misconduct. Some 400
316
persons annually die as the result of police officer shootings, yet many in non-minority
Id. The movie received the Prize of the Future award during the Cannes Film Festival and the Grand Jury
Prize and the Audience Award at the Sundance Film Festival. Ja'Nel Johnson, Fruitvale Station Shines Light on
Race, Police Accountability, KVNONEWS.COM (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.kvnonews.com/2013/08/fruitvalestation/. The Oscar Grant incident took place in California, an all-party consent state; however, the passengers
who videotaped the incident did not run afoul of the California eavesdropping statutes because they were on a
BART platform open to the public where an expectation of privacy, especially considering the many train
passengers, would not have been objectively reasonable. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
309

310 "FruitvaleStation": Recreating a Tragic Loss ofa Life, supra note 306.
311

id.

Johnson, supra note 309.
id
314 id
315 id
316 id
312

313
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communities remain unaware of incidents involving minorities and police officers, such as
the Oscar Grant incident, without a videotape of such an incident. "[T]he cell phone
footage of Oscar Grant's killing, much like the video footage captured of Rodney King's
beating in 1991, has transformed police accountability. ,,317 A criminal justice professor
noted, "The important thing is that there are tens of millions of people, white Americans,
who just don't believe these things happen. To see it happen made it real for them. It
transformed the public reaction to it." 3 18
Most citizens have video capability on their phones, which they carry with them,
and many phones allow recorded videos to be posted online. It would be natural for a
citizen to record an event in progress, such as one that involves a confrontation between
another citizen and someone in authority, followed by the common practice of posting the
video online. The video reinforces one's memory of the event and provides evidence of
events as they transpired. The video can furnish proof of the even where two individuals'
versions of the event differ. The video can exculpate a defendant. A video can provide
graphic images and audio of police brutality, misconduct, and corruption.
The cell phone is not a new technology but its use as a recording device with
access to the internet is fairly new. Technology, including the recording capabilities of cell
phones, has blurred the distinction between an official member of the press and a publicminded citizen. Citizen-taping can capture newsworthy events when no professional
journalist is present and the press often requests use of citizen-taped material to
supplement news stories. Incidents videotaped by citizens, such as the Rodney King and
Oscar Grant incidents, may be picked up by the press and covered in great detail. Without
the videotapes of the Rodney King and Oscar Grant incidents, most would not have
believed the violence of the confrontations and the incidents would not have made
news. 319
Taping is unique in that it memorializes the tension of the moment, capturing
what was said, with the tone of voice and context intact. The self-authenticating character
of taped information can corroborate one person's version of events or perhaps shed light
on an aspect of the incident not recalled by any participant or bystander. Without taping, it
would be the civilian's word against the officer's, neither of which might be entirely
accurate. Inaccuracy in recounting the event as it transpired may be due to the bias of the
viewer, faulty memory, or deliberate falsification. In fact, in some instances a recording
may show that there was no misconduct on the part of the police officer, who was
innocently performing a law enforcement duty, and the officer can use the recording to
show that there was no misconduct. 3 2 0 An attorney who hears a recording of the encounter
317
318

Id.

319

CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 295, at 12.

Id.

A videotape was the key in a United States Supreme Court case. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). In
Scott, Scott was the police officer pursuing Harris in a vehicle chase. The chase ended when Scott rear-ended
Harris' vehicle to stop it. Harris was seriously injured and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his
constitutional rights. Id. at 375. The federal district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment and the
federal court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 376. The Court reversed based on a videotape of the chase that
corroborated Scott's version of the facts. Id. at 376, 378. Harris' version of the facts was quite different in that
"rather than fleeing from police, [Harris] was attempting to pass his driving test." Id. at 378-79. In stark contrast,
the videotape showed:
320

[Harris'] vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that
are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the
double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders
to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red lights and travel for considerable periods of
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between the police officer and the potential client may be dissuaded from filing what the
attorney gauges to be a frivolous lawsuit. A recording may serve other police officers by
being the subject of officer training.
What would police activity be like without accountability overseen by citizens?
One expert on police accountability opined, "It's people of color who are the victims, for
the most part, of police misconduct." 3 2 1 The expert continued, "Race is at the center of
policing. My view is that if we can fix police problems we can go a long way toward
fixing our race problem in this country." 32 2 Mistrust between a minority citizen and a
police officer stifles effective policing. "Mistrust is created between citizens and the police
when officers are not held accountable for wrongdoings." 3 23 The effect of this mistrust is
significant. "[P]olice depend on the public for their cooperation in dealing with crime and
disorder, but when people don't trust the police they don't report crime and that hampers
effective crime fighting." 324
For example, the Christopher Commission report recommended that an
independent group monitor the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, resulting in the Special
Counsel's office. 32 5 The office "consists of a team of experts that has full authority to audit
and monitor any aspect of the sheriff's department operations."326 The Special Counsel
follows the "auditor model" of citizen oversight, with a permanent, full-time staff, rather
than the other model, with "a part-time, volunteer citizen review board focusing on
specific complaints."327 The Special Counsel's office has had a positive effect on the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Department: "The Special Counsel's regular monitoring and reporting
on civil suits against the sheriff's office has reduced the number of lawsuits against the
department and amounts of monetary settlements paid to complainants." 328
Taping would allow a check on the discretionary and often arbitrary power of a
police officer, an example of which is the almost unbridled power of a police officer to
pull over a vehicle for any traffic violation under Whren v. United States.329 Whren allows

a police officer to stop based on immutable and otherwise protected categories such as
race. 330 Taping can limit the objectionable activities of an officer who used the alleged
traffic violation as a pretext and made the stop for an improper motive.
time in the occasional center left-tum-only lane, chased by numerous police cars forced to
engage in the same hazardous maneuvers just to keep up. Far from being the cautious and
controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles
a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and
innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.
Id at 379-80 (footnote omitted).
321 Johnson, supra note 309.
322 id
323 id
324 id
325

Samuel Walker & Andrea Lorenz, Policing the Police: Citizens Encourage EthicalPolicing,
EJOURNAL USA,

Apr. 2011, at 23, available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/3973 55/April 201 1/Ethical-Policing0413 11.pdf
326 Id "The Special Counsel, which continues today, has issued 29 semi-annual public reports that address the
most critical issues related to police accountability: use of force, lawsuits against the department, personnel
issues, the management of district stations and innumerable other issues." Id.
327 id
328 id
329 Whrenv. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (holding that "probable
cause to believe that petitioners had
violated the traffic code . . rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment").
330 Id. at 813. "[T]he constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops [does
not] depend[] on the actual motivations
of the individual officers involved." Id. The Court added "that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of
the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
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The advances in technology have brought with them ready availability of
videotaping to civilians who have used this technology, among other uses, to record police
officer activity. This videotaping is often followed by the video being posted online. News
programs clamor for viewers to upload videos they have taken. This has spurred a tension
between technological capability to make a record and a police officer's perception that
the taping wrongfully interferes with law enforcement or challenges the officer's
authority. Technology has far outpaced the law, in effect tempting a civilian to tape
activity occurring in a location open to the public, with the civilian least suspecting that
taping could be illegal, and subjecting the civilian to imprisonment and fine. The civilian
may further increase the chance of having criminal charges filed for the allegedly illegal
taping by posting the video online and thus providing the prosecutor with evidence. With
further advances in technology and without amendment to the eavesdropping statutes, the
potential liability for a civilian taping a police officer engaged in official duties will only
increase.
Citizens who audio record or videotape conversations run the risk of being
arrested for violating eavesdropping statutes, even more so in the eleven states that require
all party consent prior to taping. The risk is greater where the person being recorded is a
police officer. This is so although several courts have found that the First Amendment
protects gathering such information. The civilian fear of arrest for taping an encounter
involving a police officer has a chilling effect on the civilian's gathering of information
concerning law enforcement. The eavesdropping statutes in most jurisdictions carry a
hefty prison term, or fine or both for their violation.
The person taping may be a participant in the conversation or a bystander. If the
person is a participant, the legality of the taping typically turns on whether the taping is
performed in a one-party or all-party consent jurisdiction. The action of taping provides
the requisite consent in a one-party consent jurisdiction but not in an all-party consent
jurisdiction. In an all-party consent jurisdiction, the participant taping may be able to
escape liability if the eavesdropping statute only protects private or confidential
conversations or those made with a reasonable expectation of privacy, especially where
the conversation takes place in a location open to the public. If the person taping is a
bystander, the requisite consent, from one party to the conversation in a one-party consent
jurisdiction or all-party consent in an all-party consent jurisdiction, may be lacking. If the
requisite consent is lacking, the bystander taping may be able to escape liability if the
eavesdropping statute only protects private or confidential conversations or those made
with a reasonable expectation of privacy, especially where the conversation takes place in
a location open to the public.
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Oregon eavesdropping statutes afford the most
expansive protection against a conversation being taped as they do not require a
reasonable expectation of privacy as a threshold for the conversation being protected and
require all-party consent. The Illinois statute necessarily views citizen recording at odds
with effective policing and carries an enhanced prison term of more than double the prison
term in other states for taping a police officer. Many other jurisdictions limit protection to
those having a reasonable expectation of privacy.

discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
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A citizen may be limited in taping a conversation with a police officer in all-party
consent states; however, the police officer does not usually have to abide by the same
constraints. In addition, the police have ready access to being able to record their
encounters with citizens and several states have an explicit statutory exemption from
eavesdropping liability for a police officer taping such an encounter. The limitation of
citizen taping obscures transparency in law enforcement and civilian oversight. This
disparity in the legal right to tape an encounter between a citizen and a police officer
creates a double standard, with the balance tipped in favor of the police officer.
Police officers may not be educated as to whether a citizen is permitted to tape a
conversation involving a police officer and sometimes limits on police conduct are
unclear. By the same token, a civilian may not understand whether the state eavesdropping
statute applies to an encounter with a police officer, allowing the police officer to
intimidate the civilian into stopping taping. Eavesdropping statutes differ from state to
state and differ from the federal eavesdropping statutes, possibly leading to more
confusion. Also, as discussed earlier in this paper, eavesdropping statutes of several states
lack clarity and some have rarely been subject to court interpretation.
Given this inherent tension, it might be well to consider the players involved, the
civilian, the police officer, and society, as viewed against a backdrop of fairness and
justice. One could view the civilian as law-abiding, generally cooperative with police
involvement, and willing to assist in apprehending someone who is breaking the law. The
civilian's interests in taping an encounter with a police officer are to gather evidence, deter
police misconduct, and participate in community policing efforts. This civilian views the
lawbreaker as someone other than the civilian himself and might be shocked by the reach
of criminal statutes on the books, especially where a criminal statute, such as an
eavesdropping statute, is enforced against the civilian. Society has an interest in seeing
criminal statutes enforced by police officers and is understandably dismayed when police
misconduct is uncovered.331 The associate producer of the movie Fruitvale Station
explained that "people living in homogeneous environments may not interact with people
of different backgrounds, which can instigate fear when all they see are negative stories in
33 2
the news about people unlike them."
VI.

AN

EXEMPTION AUTHORIZING TAPING AN

ENCOUNTER WITH A POLICE

OFFICER

As discussed above, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and
Seventh Circuits recently found that the First Amendment protects civilian taping of
encounters with police officers.3 33 This may signal a trend of recognizing that the First
Amendment protects civilian taping of their encounters with police officers. However, this
movement in constitutional law may amount to little real protection for a civilian, such as
Mannie Garcia, faced with a discretionary criminal charge of general applicability.

331

See generally MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 292; and CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 295.
332 Johnson, supra note 309. "[The movie Fruitvale Station] gives [Grant] back his sense of humanity. That's the
whole point- to see it as a real three dimensional person instead of a statistic." Id.
333 Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012),
cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012), on remand, No. 10 C 5235, 2012 WL 6680341 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (granting the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction).
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There should be an exemption in the eavesdropping statutes that guarantees the
right of a civilian to audiotape a police officer. The following is suggested statutory
language :334
It is lawful for a person not acting under color of law to record the
conversation of a law enforcement officer who is performing a public duty in a
public place and any other person who is having a conversation with that law
enforcement officer if the conversation is at a volume audible to the unassisted
ear of the person who is making the recording. For purposes of this subsection,
"public place" means any place to which the public has access and includes, but
is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, and highways (including inside motor
vehicles), and the common areas of public and private facilities and buildings.
Any person whose right to record under this section has been violated
shall have a civil cause of action against the law enforcement officer who
stopped, prevented, or resulted in the destruction of such recording and shall have
the right to collect no less than $1,000 nor more than $2,500, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred,
personally from the law enforcement officer. In addition, the police officer shall
be suspended from official duties for not less than seven nor more than twentyone days without pay. An affirmative defense is that the law enforcement officer
exhibited an expectation of privacy in the conversation that was reasonable under
the circumstances or that the officer's actions prevented immediate and serious
injury to the officer or bystanders.
Such an exemption clearly places a police officer on notice that a civilian does
have the right to tape an encounter with a police officer. The exemption allows a civilian,
whether a bystander or a party to the conversation, to tape the conversation of a uniformed
police officer performing official duties in a location open to the public. In addition, the
proposed legislation gives the civilian a private right of action against a police officer who
fails to abide by the exemption. This penalty reinforces the civilian's right to tape and
should be sufficiently onerous to dissuade a police officer from interfering with civilian
taping. The right of action makes the police officer personally liable to pay the civilian a
stipulated damages award and results in the officer's suspension from official duties
without pay for a reasonable amount of time. Police officer liability automatically attaches
should the police officer's actions result in destruction of the audiotape. Police officer
liability under the private right of action is a presumption that can be rebutted by the
police officer upon a showing that the officer did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, perhaps when discussing confidential information or dealing with a confidential
informant or an undercover police officer, or the officer's actions prevented substantial
injury to the police officer or bystanders.
CONCLUSION

Given the reality of police culture and the civilian's easy access to recording,
civilian recording is needed now more than ever. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions have been
ineffective in checking police intimidation of civilian taping of encounters with police
officers. Perhaps this is because the videos of such encounters have not been as dramatic
as the Rodney King or the Oscar Grant incidents. Except for the individuals personally
The proposed statutory language borrows from the text of Illinois Senate Bill 1575 (SB 1575) introduced in
2013. S.B. 1575, 98 h Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
334
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intimidated by police while taping, this police harassment has not struck a chord with the
public. The difficulty of being successful in a § 1983 action may mean that protection for
gathering newsworthy information should come from legislation designed specifically to
protect newsgathering.
The prior section of this paper included a proposed exemption from civilian
liability under the eavesdropping statutes; in addition, the proposed legislation would
provide the civilian who is wrongly arrested a private right of action against the arresting
police officer.
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APPENDIX A

United States
One who "intentionally intercepts . . . any . . . oral . . . communication" is subject
to five years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(1), (4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014).

It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a[n] ...

oral . . . communication where such

person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State.
Id. § 2511(2)(d). Oral communication is defined as "any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id. § 2510(2).
Alabama
The state defines eavesdrop as "[tlo overhear, record, amplify or transmit any
part of the private communication of others without the consent of at least one of the
persons engaged in the communication, except as otherwise provided by law." ALA. CODE
§ 13A-1 1-30(1) (2006). Eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor. Id. § 13A-1 1-31. It may
be punished by not more than a year imprisonment or a fine of not more than $6,000, or
both. Id. §§ 13A-5-2(c), 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1). A defense is that "[h]e was a
peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." Id. § 13A-1 1-36. Research
failed to locate case law interpreting "private communication."
Alaska
The state eavesdropping statute states that "[a] person may not . . . use an
eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of an oral conversation without the
consent of a party to the conversation." ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.310(a) (West,
Westlaw through legislation effective April 24, 2014, passed during the 2014 2nd Reg.
Sess. of the 28th Legislature). There are several definitions that help understand what is
prohibited. "'[O]ral communication' means human speech used to communicate
information from one party to another." "' [I]ntercept' means the aural or other acquisition
of the contents of an oral . . . communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device, including the acquisition of the contents by simultaneous
transmission or by recording." "' [C]ontents' includes information obtained from a private
communication concerning the existence, substance, purport, or meaning of the
communication, or the identity of a party of the communication." "' [P]rivate
communication' means an oral . . . communication uttered or transmitted by a person who
has a reasonable expectation that the communication is not subject to interception." Id. §
42.20.390(2), (7), (9), (11). Eavesdropping is a class A misdemeanor punishable by up to
one year imprisonment, or up to a $10,000 fine, orboth. Id. §§ 12.55.015(a), 12.55.035(b),
12.55.135(a), 42.20.330.

Article 1, Section 22 of the Alaska Constitution provides: "The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22.
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In State v. Glass, 583 P2d 872, 879 (Alaska 1978), the Alaska Supreme Court held "that
Alaska's privacy amendment prohibits the secret electronic monitoring of conversations
upon the mere consent of a participant" where the informant was sent into the suspect's
home wearing a body bug, which allowed officers located outside to record the
conversation. Id. at 874. However, in later opinions, the Alaska Supreme Court found that
a drunk driving suspect's expectation of privacy was not reasonable and, thus, the
suspect's conversation was not protected under the Alaska Constitution from being
secretly taped. City and Borough of Juneau v. Quinto, 684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984)
(finding that drunk driving suspect's expectation of privacy was not reasonable where
uniformed officer was performing official duties and, therefore, taped information was not
inadmissible); Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 1979) (finding that drunk
driving suspect's expectation of privacy was not reasonable where the suspect was under
arrest and in police headquarters undergoing breathalyzer and sobriety tests when he was
secretly taped and, therefore, his right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution was not
violated).
Arizona
.

The state statute provides: "a person is guilty of a class 5 felony who . .
[i]ntentionally intercepts a conversation or discussion at which he is not present, or aids,
authorizes, employs, procures or permits another to so do, without the consent of a party
to such conversation or discussion." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2010). "'Oral
communication' means a spoken communication that is uttered by a person who exhibits
an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying the expectation." Id. § 13-3001.8. The statutes exempt "[t]he interception of any
... oral communication by any person, if the interception is effected with the consent of a
party to the communication or a person who is present during the communication." Id §
13-3012.9. The penalty for a class 5 felony is from six months to two and one half years
imprisonment, "an amount fixed by the court not more than one hundred fifty thousand
dollars," orboth. Id §§ 13-702.D., 13-801.
Arkansas
.

The state statute provides: "It is unlawful for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral.
communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the
person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception and recording." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120(a)
(West, Westlaw through end of 2014 Second Extraordinary Session). The same statute
classifies a violation as a Class A misdemeanor. Id § 5-60-120(b). One guilty of a Class A
misdemeanor may be fined a maximum of $2,500, or sentenced to a maximum of one year
imprisonment, or both. Id §§ 5-4-201(b), 5-4-104(d), 5-4-401(b). Research failed to locate
case law interpreting "oral communication."
Colorado
The state statute provides: "Any person not visibly present during a conversation
or discussion commits eavesdropping if he . . . [k]nowingly overhears or records such
conversation or discussion without the consent of at least one of the principal parties
thereto." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-304(1) (West, Westlaw current through the
Second Regular Session of the Sixty-Ninth General Assembly (2014)). See People v.
Lesslie, 24 P.3d 22, 28 (Colo. App. 2000) ("recognize[ing] that this criminal statute
requires a case-by-case analysis as to whether the participants in the intercepted
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conversations have a justifiable expectation of privacy and, in turn, whether they believe
that their conversation is subject to interception"). The same statute classifies
eavesdropping as a Class 1 misdemeanor. Id. § 18-9-304(2). "'Oral communication'
means any oral communication uttered by any person believing that such communication
is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such belief ..... Id. § 18-9301(8).

See People v. Lesslie,

939 P.2d 443, 446

(Colo.

App.

1996)

(finding

"conversation" or "discussion" synonymous with "oral communication"). One guilty of a
Class 1 misdemeanor may be sentenced to a minimum of six months and a maximum of
eighteen months, or a minimum fine of $500 and a maximum fine of $5,000, or both. §
18-1.3-501(l)(a).

Connecticut
In Connecticut, eavesdropping, the "mechanical overhearing of a conversation,"
is a class D felony. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West, Westlaw through
enactments of Public Acts of the 2014 February Regular Session of the Connecticut
General Assembly effective on or before July 1, 2014). The Connecticut statutes define
"[m]echanical overhearing of a conversation" as "the intentional overhearing or recording
of a conversation or discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a
person not present thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment." Id § 53a187(a)(2). The prison term for a class D felony is not more than five years (effective
October 1, 2013) and the fine is not more than $5,000; the court may impose

imprisonment, or a fine, or both. Id. §§ 53a-28, 53a-35a(8), 53a-41(4). Research failed to
locate case law interpreting "conversation."
Delaware

The state statute provides that "no person shall ... [i]ntentionally intercept ...
any . . . oral . . . communication" and specifies that someone who eavesdrops has

committed a class E felony and is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014, ch. 388). Pursuant to
that statute:
.

It is lawful . . . [flor a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral . .

communication where the person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
constitutions or laws of the United States, this State or any other state or
any political subdivision of the United States or this or any other state.
Id § 2402(c)(4). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered
by a person made while exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject
to interception and under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id § 2401(13).

Georgia
The state statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for . . . [a]ny person in a
clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record or attempt to overhear,
transmit, or record the private conversation of another which shall originate in any private
place." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West, Westlaw through Acts 343 to 346, 348 to 631,
and 633 to 669 of the 2014 Regular Session). "'Private place' means a place where one is
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entitled reasonably to expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance."
Id. § 16-11-60(3). The eavesdropping statute "does not prohibit one party to a
conversation from secretly recording or transmitting it without the knowledge or consent
of the other party." State v. Birge, 241 S.E.2d 213, 213 (Ga. 1978). "[A]ny person

violating any of the provisions of this part shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years
or a fine not to exceed $10,000.00, or both." § 16-11-69.
Hawaii
The state statute provides that "any person who . . . [i]ntentionally intercepts ...
any .

.

. oral .

.

. communication . .. shall be guilty of a class C felony." HAW. REV. STAT.

§ 803-42(a) (West, Westlaw through Act 235 [End] of the 2014 Regular Session of the
Hawaii Legislature). Pursuant to that statute:

It shall not be unlawful under this part for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral . . . communication when the

person is a party to the communication or when one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to the interception unless the
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of this State.
Id. § 803-42(b)(3)(A). "'Oral communication' means any utterance by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the utterance is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying that expectation ..... Id § 803-41. The prison term for a class C
felony is not less than one year and not more than five years and the fine is not more than
$10,000; the court may impose imprisonment, or a fine, or both. Id §§ 706-605, 706-640,
706-660.

Idaho
The state statute provides:
any person shall be guilty of a felony and is punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison for a term not to exceed five (5) years or by a fine not
to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both fine and
imprisonment if that person .

.

. [w]illfully intercepts .

.

. any .

.

. oral

communication.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Second
Regular Session of the 62nd Idaho Legislature). Pursuant to that statute, "[i]t is lawful
under this chapter for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral communication when one (1) of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." Id § 186702(2)(d). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person

exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 18-6701(2).
Indiana
The state statute provides:

Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2015

115

University of Denver Criminal Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 8
108

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

(a) This section does not apply to a person who makes an
interception authorized under federal law.
(b) A person who knowingly or intentionally intercepts, a
communication in violation of this article commits unlawful
interception, a Level 5 felony.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-5-5 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014). See State v.
Lombardo, 738 N.E.2d 653, 660 (Ind. 2000) ("[O]ur legislature did not intend to directly

incorporate the Federal Wiretap Act statutory or case law into Indiana's Act but instead
meant to exempt from its provisions federal law enforcement surveillance activities within
Indiana's borders."). Research failed to locate case law interpreting "communication."
Arguably, communication refers only to communication via the telephone or telegraph
and not to face-to-face conversation. The title of article 33.5 is "Interception of Telephonic
or Telegraphic Communications" and an Indiana statute, § 35-33.5-1-5 repealed effective
July 1, 2012, contained the following definition:
"Interception" means the intentional:
(1) recording of; or
(2) acquisition of the contents of;
a telephonic or telegraphic communication by a person other than a
sender or receiver of that communication, without the consent of the
sender or receiver, by means of any instrument, device, or
equipment under this article.
Id. § § 35-33.5-1-5 (repealed 2012).
Iowa

The state statute provides:
Any person, having no right or authority to do so, . . . who by any

electronic or mechanical means listens to, records, or otherwise intercepts a
conversation or communication of any kind, commits a serious misdemeanor;
provided, . . . one who is openly present and participating in or listening to a
communication shall not be prohibited hereby from recording such message or
communication ....
IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2014). Another state statute provides: "a person
who does any of the following commits a class 'D' felony: . . . [w]illfully intercepts ...
a[n] . . oral . . communication." Id. § 808B.2.1. Pursuant to the statute:

It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color
of law to intercept a[n] .

.

. oral .

.

. communication if the person is a

party to the communication or if one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state
or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Id § 808B.2.2.c. "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to
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interception, under circumstances justifying that expectation." Id. § 808B.1.8. "A class 'D'
felon, not an habitual offender, shall be confined for no more than five years, and in
addition shall be sentenced to a fine of at least seven hundred fifty dollars but not more
than seven thousand five hundred dollars." Id. § 902.9.1.
Kansas
The state statute provides:
Breach of privacy is knowingly and without lawful authority:
(3)

entering

with intent to

listen

surreptitiously

to private

conversations in a private place or to observe the personal conduct
of any other person or persons entitled to privacy therein; [or]
(4) installing or using outside or inside a private place any device
for hearing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds
originating in such place, which sounds would not ordinarily be
audible or comprehensible without the use of such device, without
the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy therein.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(a) (West, Westlaw through laws effective July 1,
2014, including Chapters 1 through 152 (End) of the 2014 Regular Session of the Kansas
Legislature). That statute provides that breach of privacy is a class A nonperson
misdemeanor. Id. § 21-6101(b). In addition, it defines "private place" as "a place where
one may reasonably expect to be safe from uninvited intrusion or surveillance." Id. § 216101. The statute has been interpreted to allow taping upon consent of one party to the
conversation. In a 1984 case, the Kansas Supreme Court found that "any party to a private
conversation may waive the right of privacy and the non-consenting party has no Fourth
Amendment or statutory right to challenge that waiver." State v. Roudybush, 686 P.2d
100, 108 (Kan. 1984). Further, the court held "that a face-to-face 'private conversation'

between a police informer and a suspect is not an 'oral communication' as defined by
K.S.A. 22-2514 and, thus, it is not necessary to obtain an ex parte court order to intercept
such conversation if the informer knowingly consents to the interception." Id. A class A
nonperson misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year, or a
fine of $2,500, orboth. §§ 21-6602(a),(b), 21-6611(b).
For the purpose of obtaining a court order to intercept a conversation, "'oral
communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation." § 22-2514(2).
Kentucky

Pursuant to the state statute, "[a] person is guilty of eavesdropping when he
intentionally uses any device to eavesdrop, whether or not he is present at the time." KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 legislation).
That statute makes eavesdropping a Class D felony. Id. § 526.020(2). "'[E]avesdrop'
means to overhear, record, amplify or transmit any part of a[n] . . . oral communication of
others without the consent of at least one (1) party thereto by means of any electronic,
mechanical or other device." Id. § 526.010. Research failed to locate case law interpreting
"oral communication."
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Louisiana
.

The state statute provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to . .
[w]illfully intercept .

.

. any .

.

. oral communication." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

15:1303.A

(Westlaw through the 2014 Regular Session with Acts effective on or before December
31, 2014). That statute provides: "Any person who violates the provisions of this Section
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned for not less than two
years nor more than ten years at hard labor." Id. § 15:1303.B. That statute further
provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this Chapter for a person not acting under
color of law to intercept a[n] .

.

. oral communication where such person

is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception, unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States or of the state or for the purpose of committing any other
injurious act.
Id. § 15:1303.C.(4). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 15:1302.(14).

Maine
The state statute provides:
A person is guilty of violation of privacy if, except in the execution of a
public duty or as authorized by law, that person intentionally:
B. Installs or uses in a private place without the consent of the person or
persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing,
photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events
in that place; [or]
C. Installs or uses outside a private place without the consent of the
person or persons entitled to privacy therein, any device for hearing,
recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds originating in that place
that would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible outside that
place.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511.1 (Westlaw through legislation through the
2013 Second Regular Session of the 126th Legislature). That statute provides: "'private
place' means a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance,
including, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms, bathrooms and similar places."
Id. § 511.2. The statute further provides: "Violation of privacy is a Class D crime." Id. §
511.3. A class D crime is punishable by of imprisonment of less than one year, a fine of
not more than $2,000, orboth. Id. §§ 1152.2, 1252.2, 1301.1-A.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine interpreted "private place" to require that
a person's desire to keep private what transpires within that place must be a justifiable
expectation, and, therefore, objectively reasonable." State v. Strong, 60 A.3d 1286, 1291
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(Me. 2013). The court found that "it is objectively unreasonable for a person who
knowingly enters a place of prostitution for the purpose of engaging a prostitute to expect
that society recognizes a right to be safe from surveillance while inside." Id. Research
failed to locate case law determining whether the statute has been interpreted to allow
taping upon consent of one party to the conversation.
Minnesota
The state statute provides that "any person who ... intentionally intercepts ...
any . . . oral communication . . . shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both." MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 626A.02.1 to 626A.02.4 (West,

Westlaw through legislation of the 2014 Regular Session effective through July 31, 2014).
That statute provides:
It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color
of law to intercept a[n] .

.

. oral communication where such person is a

party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such
communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States or of any state.
Id. § 626A.02.2.(d). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id § 626A.01.4.

Mississippi
Mississippi statute sections 41-29-501 to 41-29-535 appear to prohibit taping of a
private conversation. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-501 to 41-29-535 (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Regular (End) and First and Second Extraordinary (End) Sessions).

Although the statutes provide exceptions from liability, research has not found any statute
or case law interpretation of any statute affirmatively prohibiting such taping. In addition,
it is unclear the activity to which the penalty provisions apply. The state statute provides:
(1) Any person who knowingly and intentionally possesses, installs,
operates or monitors an electronic, mechanical or other device in
violation of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to not more than one (1) year in
the county jail or fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000.00), or both.

(2) Any person who violates the provisions of Section 41-29-5 11 shall
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to
not more than five (5) years in the State Penitentiary and fined not more
than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00).

Id § 41-29-533. The state statute allows a private individual to disclose an
intercepted oral communication if the interception was authorized:
A person who receives, by any means authorized by this article,
information concerning a[n] .. . oral .. . communication .. . intercepted
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in accordance with the provisions of this article may disclose the
contents of such communication . . . while giving testimony under oath
in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States, of this
state, or of a political subdivision of this state.
Id. § 41-29-511(3).
The state statute excepts from liability:
A person not acting under color of law who intercepts a[n] . . . oral ...
communication if the person is a party to the communication, or if one
(1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of this state, or for the purpose of
committing any other injurious act.
Id. § 41-29-53 1(e). "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation. Id. § 41-29-501(j).
Missouri
The focus of sections 542.400-542.422 appears to be the prohibition against
taping a telephone conversation, except as authorized pursuant to those statutes, or taping
a face-to-face conversation using a microphone transmitting the conversation elsewhere.
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 542.400-.422 (West, Westlaw through emergency legislation approved
through July 14, 2014, of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 97th General
Assembly). Thus, the statutes do not appear to prohibit a participant from taping a face-toface conversation using a handheld tape recorder. The statutes contain a definition of "oral
communication" and a few tangential references to oral communication; otherwise, most
of the references are to "wire communication." Oral communication means "any
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id. §
542.400(8). A state statute provides that:
1.
Except as otherwise specifically provided in sections 542.400
to 542.422, a person is guilty of a class D felony and upon conviction
shall be punished as provided by law, if such person:
(1) Knowingly intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire communication;
[or]
(2) Knowingly uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to
use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication when such device transmits
communications by radio or interferes with the transmission of such
communication; provided, however, that nothing in sections 542.400 to
542.422 shall be construed to prohibit the use by law enforcement
officers of body microphones and transmitters in undercover
investigations for the acquisition of evidence and the protection of law
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enforcement officers and others working under their direction in such
investigations.
2. It is not unlawful under the provisions of sections 542.400 to 542.422:

(2) For a person acting under law to intercept a wire or oral
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception.
(3) For a person not acting under law to intercept a wire communication
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act.
Id. § 542.402.

Any investigative officer or law enforcement officer who, by any means
authorized by sections 542.400 to 542.422, has lawfully obtained knowledge of
the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom,
may use such contents to the extent such use is necessary to the proper
performance of his official duties.
Id. § 542.406(2). Another statute contains a reference to oral communication in
the context of the requirement of taping an authorized interception. Id. § 542.4 10(1).

Arguably, with the few slight references to oral communication discussed above,
the criminal sanctions for taping in these statutes refer only to communication via the
telephone and to one not a party to the conversation taping a face-to-face conversation.
Research failed to discover other statutory or case law prohibitions against taping a faceto-face conversation.
Nebraska
The state statute provides that "it is unlawful to ... [i]ntentionally intercept ...
any .

.

. oral communication." NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-290(1) (Westlaw through End

of 2013 Regular Session). That statute provides that "any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a Class IV felony." Id. That statute further provides:
It is not unlawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a[n] . . . oral communication when such person is a party to the

communication or when one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
Id. § 86-290(2)(c). The penalty for a Class IV felony is not more than "five years
imprisonment, or ten thousand dollars fine, or both." Id. § 28-105(1).
"Oral
communication means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 86-283.
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Nevada
The state statute provides:
[A] person shall not intrude upon the privacy of other persons by
surreptitiously listening to, monitoring or recording ... by means of any
mechanical, electronic or other listening device, any private
conversation engaged in by the other persons, or disclose the existence,
content, substance, purport, effect or meaning of any conversation so
listened to, monitored or recorded, unless authorized to do so by one of
the persons engaging in the conversation.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 77th Regular
Session and the 27th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature and technical corrections
received from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2013)). One who "willfully and
knowingly" violates the statute commits a category D felony. Id. § 200.690(1).
A category D felony is a felony for which a court shall sentence a
convicted person to imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not
less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 4 years. In addition to any
other penalty, the court may impose a fine of not more than $5,000, unless a
greater fine is authorized or required by statute.
Id. § 193.130(2)(d). Research failed to locate case law interpreting "private
conversation."
Certain Nevada state statutes govern the procedure for obtaining a court order to
tape an oral communication. Id §§ 179.410-.515. Pursuant to those statutes, "'[o]ral
communication' means any verbal message uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation
that such communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying
such expectation." Id § 179.440.
New Jersey
.

The state statute provides: "[A]ny person who . . . [p]urposely intercepts . . . any
oral communication .. . shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:156A-3 (West, Westlaw through laws effective through L.2014, c. 22 and J.R. No.
3). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation .
Id. § 2A: 156A-2(b). Another state statute provides an
exception for:
A person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral
communication, where such person is a party to the communication or
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted or used for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of this State or for the
purpose of committing any other injurious act.
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Id. § 2A: 156A-4. A crime of the third degree is punishable by imprisonment of
between three and five years, a fine of not more than $15,000, or both. Id. §§ 2C:43-2, -3,
-6.

New Mexico
Section 30-12-1 makes interference with communications a misdemeanor. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (West, Westlaw through laws of the 2nd Regular Session of the 51st
Legislature (2014), effective May 21, 2014). That statute does not contain the term "oral

communication"

and has been interpreted to be inapplicable

to a face-to-face

conversation. State v. Hogervorst, 566 P.2d 828, 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) ("[The statute]

pertains to telephone conversations or telegraph messages[] . . . [not] a face-to-face
conversation transmitted to a listener by a device concealed on one of the participants in
the conversation."). Sections 30-12-2 to 30-12-10 contain the term "oral communication"

and set the basis for obtaining a court order allowing interception of an oral
communication. Section 30-12-11 provides a civil cause of action to someone whose oral
communication has been wrongly intercepted. None of these statutes define oral
communication.
Research failed to discover other statutory or case law prohibitions against taping
a face-to-face conversation. Arguably, the criminal sanction for interfering with
communications in section 30-12-1 refers only to communication via the telephone or
telegraph and not to face-to-face conversation.
New York

.

"A person is guilty of eavesdropping when he unlawfully engages in . .
mechanical overhearing of a conversation . . . ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (Westlaw

through L.2014, chapters I to 208, 210, 213, 214, 217 to 221, 227 to 231, 233, 235 to 247,
261, 267, 290, 294, 297, 302, 304, 306, 309, 316, 322, 324). The statute makes

eavesdropping a class E felony. Id. A class E felony is punishable by a minimum of one
year and a maximum of four years imprisonment, or not more than the greater of five
thousand dollars or "double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of
the crime," or both. Id. §§ 60.01(3), 70.00(2, 3), 80.00(1). "'Mechanical overhearing of a
conversation' means the intentional overhearing or recording of a conversation or
discussion, without the consent of at least one party thereto, by a person not present
thereat, by means of any instrument, device or equipment." Id. § 250.00(2). One court
found that "absent a reasonable expectation of privacy, the recording of conversations, per
se, is not illegal" and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
"conversations ... heard through a hole in the floor, and tape recorded." People v. Kirsh,
575 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307 (App. Div. 1991). Other than Kirsh, research failed to discover

statutory or case law interpretation of "conversation" or "discussion."
North Carolina
The state statute provides that "a person is guilty of a Class H felony if, without
the consent of at least one party to the communication, the person . .. [w]illfully intercepts
..

any .

.

. oral .

.

. communication." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§

15A-287(a) (West 2014).

"'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation . . . ." Id. § 15A-286(17). A Class H felony is punishable by
imprisonment, orfine orboth. Id. §§ 15A-1340.17, -1361, -1362.
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North Dakota

The state statute provides that "[a] person is guilty of a class C felony if he ...
[intentionally intercepts any . . . oral communication by use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device." N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02(1) (West, Westlaw
through the 2013 Regular Session of the 63rd Legislative Assembly). That statute makes it
a defense to criminal liability that "(1) The actor was a party to the communication or one
of the parties to the communication had given prior consent to such interception, and (2)
such communication was not intercepted for the purpose of committing a crime or other
unlawful harm." Id. § 12.1-15-02(3).
"'Oral communication' means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." Id. § 12.1-1504(5). A class C felony carries "a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment, a fine of
ten thousand dollars, or both." Id § 12.1-32-01(4).
Ohio
The state statute provides: "No person purposely shall . .
[i]ntercept . .
a[n] . .
oral . . . communication." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52(A) (West, Westlaw through
Files I to 140 and Statewide Issue 1 of the 130th GA (2013-2014)). That statute makes its

violation a felony of the fourth degree. Id § 2933.52(C). That statute excepts from its
application:
A person who is not a law enforcement officer and who intercepts a[n]
. . oral ... communication, if the person is a party to the communication
or if one of the parties to the communication has given the person prior
consent to the interception, and if the communication is not intercepted
for the purpose of committing a criminal offense or tortious act in
violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States or this state or
for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Id § 2933.52(B). "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation." Id. § 2933.5 1(B). A felony of the fourth
degree is punishable by imprisonment for six through eighteen months, or a maximum
fine of $5,000, orboth. Id. §§ 2929.13(A), 2929.14(A)(4), 2929.18(A).
Oklahoma

The state statute provides that:
any person is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished
by a fine of not less than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or by
imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, or by both who:
1.

Willfully intercepts ... any ... oral ... communication.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 176.3 (West, Westlaw through chapters of the
Second Regular Session of the 54th Legislature (2014) effective July 1, 2014).
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It is not unlawful pursuant to the Security of Communications Act for:
5. a person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] .

.

. oral . .

communication when such person is a party to the communication or
when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless the communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal act.
Id. § 176.4. "'Oral communication' means any communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstance justifying such expectation." Id. § 176.2(12).
Rhode Island
The state statute provides: "[a]ny person . .. who willfully intercepts .

.

. any . .

oral communication . . . shall be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years." R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 11-35-21(a) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 104 of the January 2014
session). That statute provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for:
(3) A person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . oral

communication, where the person is a party to the communication, or
one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in the violation of the
constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the
purpose of committing any other injurious act.
Id § 11-35-21(c). Although "oral communication" is not defined in that statute, a criminal
procedure statute defines "[o]ral communications" as "any oral communication uttered by
a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying that expectation ..... Id. § 12-5.1-1(10).
South Carolina
Under the state statute, one who "intentionally intercepts . .
any . . . oral . .
communication" commits a felony. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. § 17-30-20 (2014). "It is

lawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a[n] ...
oral . . . communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception." Id § 17-3030(C). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying the expectation ..... Id. § 17-30-15(2).
South Dakota

The state statute provides that it is a class 5 felony if one "[n]ot present during a
conversation or discussion, intentionally and by means of an eavesdropping device
overhears or records such conversation or discussion .. . without the consent of a party to
such conversation or discussion." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-35A-20 (Westlaw through
the 2014 Regular Session and Supreme Court Rule 14-10). "Eavesdropping device" means
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"any electronic, mechanical, or other apparatus which is intentionally used to intercept a
wire or oral communication. . . ." Id. § 23A-35A-1(6). "Oral communication" means "any
oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation." Id. § 23A-35A-1(10). A class 5 felony is punishable by imprisonment for a
maximum of five years; in addition, a maximum fine of $10,000 may be imposed. Id. §
22-6-1.

Tennessee
.

The state statute provides that "a person commits an offense who . .
any . . oral . . communication." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13601(a)(1) (West, Westlaw from laws from the 2014 Second Reg. Sess., eff. through June
[i]ntentionally intercepts . .

30, 2014). That statute provides:
It is lawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to intercept
a[n] . . . oral . . . communication, where the person is a party to the

communication or where one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception, unless the communication is
intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the constitution or laws of the state of Tennessee.
Id. § 39-13-601(b)(5). One who violates § 39-13-601(a)(1) commits a Class D felony. Id.

§ 39-13-602. Research failed to discover statutory or case law interpretation of "oral
communication."
Texas

The state statute provides that "[a] person commits an offense if the person ...
intentionally intercepts .

.

. a[n] .

.

. oral .

.

. communication." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§

16.02(b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd
Legislature). That statute excepts from criminal liability:
.

[A] person not acting under color of law [who] intercepts a[n] ... oral.
communication, if:
(A) the person is a party to the communication; or
(B) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to the interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing an unlawful act.

Id. § 16.02(c). That statute further makes violation of the statute a felony of the second
degree. Id. § 16.02(f). A violation is punishable as follows:
(a) An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the second degree shall
be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years.
(b) In addition to imprisonment, an individual adjudged guilty of a
felony of the second degree may be punished by a fine not to exceed
$10,000.
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Id. § 12.33. "'Oral communication' means an oral communication uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying that expectation." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.20(2)

(West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature).
Utah

The state statute provides that "[a] person commits a violation of this subsection
who . . . intentionally or knowingly intercepts . . . any . . . oral communication." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014 General Session). That statute

provides that:
A person not acting under color of law may intercept a[n] . . . oral

communication if that person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception, unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of state or federal
laws.
Id. § 77-23a-4(7)(b). A violation of the statute is a third degree felony. Id. § 77-23a4(10)(a). A third degree felony is punishable by not more than five years imprisonment, or
a fine of not more than $5,000, or both. Id. §§ 76-3-201(2), 76-3-203(3), 76-3-301(1).
"'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that the communication is not subject to interception, under circumstances
justifying that expectation. . . ." Id. § 77-23a-3(13).
Vermont

This state has no statute prohibiting eavesdropping. However, the Vermont
Supreme Court has interpreted the search and seizure provision of Chapter 1, Article 11 of
the Vermont Constitution to prohibit a police officer from secretly taping a suspect's
conversation where the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Geraw,
795 A.2d 1219, 1221-22 (Vt. 2002) (stating that a suspect had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the home but not in a parking lot).
Virginia

any .

.

The state statute provides that "any person who . . . [i]ntentionally intercepts . .
. oral communication . . . shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony." VA. CODE ANN.

§

19.2-62(A) (West, Westlaw through the End of the 2014 Reg. Sess. and the End of the
2014 Sp. Sess. I). That statute provides: "It shall not be a criminal offense under this
chapter for a person to intercept a[n] . . . oral communication, where such person is a party
to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent
to such interception." Id. § 19.2-62(B)(2). "'Oral communication' means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectations .
Id. §
19.2-61. A class 6 felony is punishable by:
[A] term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or in the discretion of the jury or the court trying the case without
ajury, confinement injail for not more than 12 months and a fine of not
more than $2,500, either or both.
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Id. § 18.2-10(f).

West Virginia
The state statute provides that "it is unlawful for any person to . . . [i]ntentionally
intercept .

.

. any .

.

. oral .

.

. communication." W. VA. CODE ANN.

§

62-lD-3(a) (West,

Westlaw through laws of the 2014 Second Extraordinary Session). That statute provides:
"Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section is guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not more than five years or
fined not more than ten thousand dollars or both fined and imprisoned." Id. § 62-lD-3(b).
That statute further provides:
It is lawful under this article for a person to intercept a[n] .

.

. oral . .

communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception
unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States or the constitution or laws of this state.
Id. § 62-lD-3(e). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. . . ." Id. § 62-lD-2(h).

Wisconsin
One who "[i]ntentionally intercepts . .
any . . . oral communication" commits a
Class H felony. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Act 380,
published 4/25/2014). That statute provides that:
It is not unlawful . . . [f]or a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a[n] . . . oral communication where the person is a party to the

communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution
or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any
other injurious act.
Id. § 968.31(2). "'Oral communication' means any oral communication uttered
by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying the expectation." Id. § 968.27(12). The punishment for a
Class H felony is "a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 years, or
both." Id. § 939.50(3).

Wyoming

any .

.

The state statute provides that "no person shall intentionally . .
[i]ntercept . ..
. oral . . . communication." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-702(a) (West, Westlaw through

the 2014 Budget Sess.). That statute does not prohibit "[a]ny person from intercepting an
oral . . . communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one
(1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception unless
the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious
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act." Id. § 7-3-702(b). "[A]ny person who violates this section is guilty of a felony
punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), imprisonment for
not more than five (5) years, or both. Id. § 7-3-702(f). "'Oral communication' means any
oral communication uttered by a person who reasonably expects and circumstances justify
the expectation that the communication is not subject to interception .
Id. § 7-3701 (a)(xi).
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INTRODUCTION

Over forty years ago, a renewed focus on crime victim rights began to emerge in
this country. During the following years, every state enacted legislative provisions
addressing crime victim rights and a majority of states adopted constitutional provisions
concerning victim rights. Congress enacted several laws addressing aspects of crime
victim rights, but efforts to initiate a federal constitutional amendment regarding crime
victim rights proved unsuccessful.' In 2004, following another unsuccessful constitutional
amendment effort, Congress enacted the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA") to
strengthen and expand crime victim rights in the federal criminal justice system and to
serve as a model for state criminal justice systems. Unlike past federal crime victimrelated statutory enactments, the CVRA was designed to bring together the "critical
components [of] rights, remedies, and resources."2
Included in the CVRA enforcement mechanisms is the authority for a crime
victim, or the prosecutor on the victim's behalf, to petition the applicable court of appeals
for a writ of mandamus if a trial judge denies relief to the victim pursuant to the CVRA.3
In the ten years since the enactment of the CVRA, petitioners have filed over 70
mandamus petitions pursuant to the statute. The appellate courts have denied or dismissed
the majority of these petitions.4 In resolving the mandamus petitions, the federal appellate
circuits have adopted a variety of review standards, resulting in a clear conflict among the
circuits in the interpretation of this aspect of the CVRA.
This Article examines the legislative history of the CVRA mandamus provision,
and the varied review standards that the federal appellate courts have adopted to resolve
CVRA mandamus petitions.6 It also analyzes the issues raised and outcomes in the CVRA
mandamus petitions reviewed thus far.7 Finally, the Article discusses the impact-or lack
thereof-that the differing review standards have had on the outcomes of the mandamus
petitions filed pursuant to the CVRA.8
'See generally PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 5-13 (2d ed. 2010).

See id. at 12; see also 150 CONG. REc. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein); 150 CONG. REC. S4,266 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl). The CVRA, formally
designated as the Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime
Victims' Rights Act, was included as Title I in the Justice for All Act of 2004. Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102(a),
118 Stat. 2260, 2261-63 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West Pamp. 2014)).
3See
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(1), (d)(3).
4 See infra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; infra notes 193-428 and accompanying text (discussing CVRA
petitions and outcomes).
See infra notes 46-192 and accompanying text (discussing the review standards).
See infra notes 9-32, 46-192 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 193-428 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 429-64 and accompanying text. It is not the purpose of this Article to assess which of the
appellate circuits has "correctly" interpreted the CVRA mandamus review provisions. Cf Crime Victims Rights
Act of2004: HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security ofthe H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 46-47, 49-50 (2009) (testimony and statement of Douglas E. Beloof, Professor of Law,
Lewis and Clark Law School); 157 CONG. REC. S7,359-60 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2011) (letter of Assistant Attorney
General Ronald Weich discussing, in part, the CVRA mandamus review standard); 157 CONG. REc. S3,607-09
(daily ed. June 8, 2011) (letter of Sen. Jon Kyl discussing, in part, the CVRA mandamus review standard); David
E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The FederalCrime Victims'Rights Act of2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623,
664-65, 668-72 (2008); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting Crime Victims in FederalAppellate Courts: The Need to
Broadly Construe the Crime Victims' RightsAct's Mandamus Provision, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 599 (2010); Paul
G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System ofPublic Prosecution:A Response
to the Critics ofthe Crime Victims Rights'Act, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2011); Jon Kyl et al., On the
Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn
Crime Victims Rights' Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 618-20 (2005); Steven Joffee, Note, Validating
Victims: Enforcing Victims'Rights through MandatoryMandamus, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 241; Julie Kaster, Note,
2
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CONGRESS ADOPTS THE CVRA MANDAMUS ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
More than twenty years before the enactment of the CVRA, Congress began

enacting significant crime victim-related legislation, including provisions addressing
victim restitution and compensation and aspects of victim participation in criminal justice
proceedings (e.g., inclusion of victim impact statements in presentencing information). 9
Included in this legislation is the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 in which
Congress codified a statutory list of rights for federal crime victims. 10 Pursuant to this
legislation, officers and employees of federal agencies and departments involved in the
"detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that
victims of crime are accorded" the seven rights identified in the statute: 1) to notice of
court proceedings; 2) to confer with the prosecutor; 3) to be present at public court
proceedings regarding the crime (subject to potential limitations); 4) to reasonable
protection from the accused; 5) to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's
dignity and privacy; 6) to restitution; and 7) to information about the offender's
conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and release." This statute required only "best
efforts" to provide the enumerated rights and contained no enforcement mechanism.12
When Congress repealed this victim rights provision and replaced it with the
CVRA provisions in 2004, it not only expanded the statutory list of federal crime victim
rights, but also added enforcement provisions designed to ensure the rights. 13 The federal
crime victim rights provided by the CVRA are:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public
court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or
of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding,
unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence,
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered
if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.

The Voices of Victims: Debating the Appropriate Role of Fraud Victim Allocution Under the Crime Victims'
Rights Act, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1682, 1690-1702 (2010); Danielle Levine, Note and Comment, Public Wrongs and
Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's Role in a System ofPublic Prosecution, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 335 (2010)
(discussing the CVRA mandamus review standard). Ultimately, either Congress or the United States Supreme
Court must resolve the conflict in interpretation that has developed. The focus of this Article is to identify the
nature of the conflict in the circuits that has developed, analyze the outcomes in CVRA mandamus cases
reviewed thus far, and discuss any impact that the interpretation conflict may have had on the outcomes of these
CVRA mandamus petitions.
9 See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 11-12. See generally U.S. GOvT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIME
VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT: INCREASING AwARENESS, MODIFYING THE COMPLAINT PROCESS, AND ENHANCING

COMPLIANCE MONITORING WILL IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACT 14-17, 113-16 (2008) (describing
federal victim-related legislation).
"0 See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 502, 104 Stat. 4789, 4820 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10606, repealedby Pub.
L. No. 108-405, § 102(c), 118 Stat. 2260, 2264 (2004)). This legislation also contained a provision identifying
required services to federal crime victims, including notification of specified prosecution proceedings and postconviction events and information regarding available assistance. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 503, 104 Stat.
4789, 4820-22 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10607 (West 2013)).
" 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004).
12 id.
1

Compare 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3771 (West Pamp. 2014), with 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004).
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(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the
district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government
in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy. 1 4
Unlike the predecessor victim rights statute, Congress also included a definition of the
"crime victim" eligible to assert the CVRA victim rights, i.e., a "person directly and
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the
District of Columbia." 15 Designated representatives can assert CVRA rights on behalf of
crime victims who are minors, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased. 1 6
When the CVRA was introduced in Congress, Senator Dianne Feinstein, one of
its primary co-sponsors, articulated the importance of the CVRA's enforcement
provisions:
We have written a bill that we believe is broad. We have written a
bill that provides an enforcement remedy: namely, the writ of
mandamus.
This part of the bill is what makes this legislation so important, and
different from earlier legislation: It provides mechanisms to enforce the
set of rights provided to victims of crime.
These mechanisms fall into four categories:
A direction to our courts that they "shall ensure that the crime
victim is afforded the rights described in the law."
A direction to the Attorney General of the United States to take
steps to ensure that our Federal prosecutors "make their best
efforts" to see that crime victims are aware of, and can exercise
these rights.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a); cf S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (reflecting articulation
of these rights in the underlying bills, as initially introduced in each chamber of Congress). By comparison, the
victim rights constitutional amendment that was under consideration at the time of the CVRA's enactment
provided the following rights:
14

the right to reasonable and timely notice of any public proceeding involving the crime and
of any release or escape of the accused; the rights not to be excluded from such public
proceeding and reasonably to be heard at public release, plea, sentencing, reprieve, and
pardon proceedings; and the right to adjudicative decisions that duly consider the victim's
safety, interest in avoiding unreasonable delay, and just and timely claims to restitution
from the offender.
S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 48, 108th Cong. (2003); see S. REP. No. 108-191, at 33-41 (2003).
" Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e), with 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (repealed 2004). Although there was no crime victim
definition in the previous victim rights statute, the accompanying victim services provision defined "victim" for
purposes of that section as a "person that has suffered direct physical, emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of
the commission of a crime." 42 U.S.C.A. § 10607(e). By comparison, the victim rights constitutional amendment
that was under consideration at the time of the CVRA's enactment was limited to victims of "violent crime." See
S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 48, 108th Cong. (2003); S. REP. No. 108-191, at 30-32 (2003).

" 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e);

cf 42 U.S.C.A. § 10607.
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A specific statement that the victim of a crime, or their
representative, may assert these rights; the result is that, for the first
time victims will have clear standing to ask our courts to enforce
their rights.
And a new use of a very old procedure, the writ of mandamus.
This provision will establish a procedure where a crime victim can,
in essence, immediately appeal a denial of their rights by a trial
court to the court of appeals, which must rule "forthwith." Simply
put, the mandamus procedure allows an appellate court to take
timely action to ensure that the trial court follows the rule of law set
out in this statute.

These procedures, taken together, will ensure that the rights defined
in the first section are not simply words on paper, but are meaningful
and functional.1 7
Senator Feinstein subsequently engaged in a colloquy on the Senate floor regarding the
mandamus provision with Senator Jon Kyl, the other primary co-sponsor of the
legislation:
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. ...

I now want to turn to another critical aspect of

enforcement of victims' rights, section 2, subsection (d)(3). This
subsection provides that a crime victim who is denied any of his or her
rights as a crime victim has standing to appellate review of that denial.
Specifically, the provision allows a crime victim to apply for a writ of
mandamus to the appropriate appellate court. The provision provides
that court shall take the writ and shall order the relief necessary to
protect the crime victim's right. This provision is critical for a couple of
reasons. First, it gives the victim standing to appear before the appellate
courts of this country and ask for review of a possible error below.
Second, while mandamus is generally discretionary, this provision
means that courts must review these cases. Appellate review of denials
of victims' rights is just as important as the initial assertion of a victim's
right. This provision ensures review and encourages courts to broadly
defend the victims' rights.
Mr. President, does Senator KYL agree?
Mr. KYL. Absolutely. Without the right to seek appellate review
and a guarantee that the appellate court will hear the appeal and order
relief, a victim is left to the mercy of the very trial court that may have
erred. This country's appellate courts are designed to remedy errors of
lower courts and this provision requires them to do so for victim's
rights. For a victim's right to truly be honored, a victim must be able to
assert the rights in trial courts, to then be able to have denials of those
rights reviewed at the appellate level, and to have the appellate court
take the appeal and order relief. By providing for all of this, this bill
ensures that victims' rights will have meaning.

150 CONG. REC. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see S. 2329, 108th
Cong. (2004); 150 CONG. REC. S4,279 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (text of bill).
" 150 CONG. REc. S4,270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Dianne Feinstein and Jon Kyl); see also
150 CONG. REc. S4,271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); 150 CONG. REC. S4,230
(daily ed. Apr. 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (referencing the inclusion of the mandamus
enforcement mechanism in the proposed legislation).
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The mandamus provision, as introduced in the Senate and as passed there with
almost no opposition, stated:
If a Federal court denies any right of a crime victim under this chapter or
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government or the
crime victim may apply for a writ of mandamus to the appropriate court
of appeals. The court of appeals shall take up and decide such
application forthwith and shall order such relief as may be necessary to
protect the crime victim's ability to exercise the rights.19
The proposed Senate legislation also authorized the Government, in any appeal in a case,
to assert as error the trial court's denial of any crime victim's right in the underlying
criminal proceeding.20
After passage in the Senate, the House of Representatives included the crime
victim rights provisions in a broader piece of legislation. 21 Without specifically
articulating their rationale, the chamber's sponsors made some slight revisions to the
mandamus provisions in their introduced version of the proposed legislation: 2 2
The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district
court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the
crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide such motion
forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may
petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. The court of
appeals may issue the writ on the order of a single judge pursuant to
circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court of
appeals shall take up and decide such application forthwith within 72
hours after the petition has been filed. In no event shall proceedings be
stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five day [sic], or affect
the defendant's right to a speedy trial, for purposes of enforcing this
chapter.23
In addition to the mandamus procedure, the House of Representatives retained the
additional option in the Senate bill for the Government to assert a trial court's denial of a
victim's right as error in a criminal appeal in the underlying case.2 4 On the other hand, the
House of Representatives version of the bill preserved or expanded some Senate
limitations on remedies regarding victim rights violations, including prohibition of a cause

S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004); see 150 CONG. REc. S4,279 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (reflecting text of the bill
and 96 favorable votes, 1 unfavorable vote, and 3 members not voting).
20 S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004); 150 CONG. REC. S4,279 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (text of bill).
21 See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-63 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771).
22 See H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 10 (2004); id. at 122-24 (statements of Rep.
James Sensenbrenner).
23
H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced on September 21, 2004); see 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill); see also 150 CONG. REc. H8,188 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. James
Sensenbrenner).
24 See H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced on September 21, 2004); see 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill).
19
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of action for damages or grounds for a new trial. 2 5 The House of Representatives bill also
stated that none of its provisions should be construed to impair prosecutorial discretion.2 6
Prior to passage in the House of Representatives, Representative James
Sensenbrenner, the bill's manager, offered some amendments to the mandamus provision:
The rights described in subsection (a) shall be asserted in the district
court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the
crime occurred. The district court shall take up and decide any motion
asserting a victim's right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief
sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order of a
single judge pursuant to circuit rule or the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and decide such
application forthwith within 72 hours after the petition has been filed. In
no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more
than five days for purposes of enforcing this chapter. If the court of
appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons for the denial shall be
27
clearly stated on the record in a written opinion.
In his remarks on the floor of the House of Representatives, and consistent with the
legislation's provision that both the crime victim and the prosecutor may assert the
specified victim rights, Representative Sensenbrenner stated that the crime victim or the
Government can pursue the writ of mandamus remedy to "ensure that the crime victim's
rights are protected." 28 In addition to the mandamus amendment, Representative
Sensenbrenner proposed an amendment that would permit a crime victim to move to reopen a plea or sentence if 1) the victim had asserted a right to be heard before or during
the plea or sentencing proceeding and this right was denied; 2) the victim petitioned the
appellate court for a writ of mandamus within ten days; and 3) the accused had not entered
a plea to the highest offense charged. 29
The CVRA, as amended in the House of Representatives, was overwhelmingly
passed in the House of Representatives 30 and subsequently passed in the Senate by
31
unanimous consent. President George Bush signed the CVRA into law on October 30,
2004.32
Compare H.R. 5107, 108th Cong. (2004) (as introduced on September 21, 2004), and 150 CONG. REC. H8,180
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill), with S. 2329, 108th Cong. (2004), and 150 CONG. REC. S4,279 (daily ed.
Apr. 22, 2004) (text of bill).
26 See 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill).
27 Compare 150 CONG. REC. H8,180 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill as introduced), with 150 CONG. REC.
H8,195 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (amendments offered by Rep. James Sensenbrenner).
28 150 CONG. REC. H8,188 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); see 150 CONG.
REC. H8,180 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (text of bill as introduced).
29 See 150 CONG. REC. H8,195 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (amendments offered by Rep. James Sensenbrenner).
After enactment of the CVRA, the time period in which the crime victim must seek mandamus relief was
amended and extended to 14 days. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 1(d)(5) (West Pamp. 2014).
30 See 150 CONG. REC. H8,204, H8,208-09 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2004) (reflecting 393 favorable votes,
14
unfavorable votes, and 25 members not voting). See generally All Actions: H.R. 5107 108th Congress (20032004),
CONGRESs.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/5107/all-actions-withamendments (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
31
See 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-17 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004). Senator JonKyl, one of the CVRA's primary Senate
co-sponsors, offered additional remarks about the CVRA provisions similar to those he and Senator Dianne
Feinstein made when the CVRA was introduced, including statements regarding the importance of the
mandamus and direct appeal by the Government provisions. See 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-13 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
25
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III.

THE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS

ADOPT CVRA

MANDAMUS

REVIEW

STANDARDS

A.

Writ of Mandamus GeneralPrinciples

The writ of mandamus is part of the common law heritage that shaped American
jurisprudence.3 3 In its landmark decision addressing the issuance of a writ of mandamus in
Marbury v.

Madison, 34 the United

States

Supreme

Court (the

"Court")

quoted

Blackstone's mandamus definition:
a command issued in the King's name from the court of King's Bench,
and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature
within the King's dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing
therein specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which
the court of King's Bench has previously determined, or at least
supposed, to be consonant to right and justice. 35
In considering its authority to issue the requested writ of mandamus, the Marbury Court
also noted that "to render the mandamus a proper remedy," the person to whom the writ is
directed must be a legally appropriate subject of the writ and the person seeking the writ
must be "without any other specific and legal remedy."3 6 Further, the propriety of the
issuance of the writ is determined by the "nature of the thing to be done. "3 For example,
the Court noted that mandamus would not be an appropriate remedy regarding acts
pursuant to executive discretion.38
Over one hundred years after Marbury, the Court reviewed its mandamus
jurisprudence in Roche v. EvaporatedMilk Association.39 In determining that the federal

appellate court had improperly issued a writ of mandamus, the Roche Court noted that the
"traditional use of the writ in aid of appellate jurisdiction both at common law and in the
federal courts has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." 40 The
Court further noted that the function of mandamus is to correct "an abuse of judicial
power, or refusal to exercise it." 41 Finally, because "common law writs, like equitable
remedies, may be granted or withheld in the sound discretion of the court," the Court's
review of the lower court's issuance of the writ focused not on its "power to grant the writ
but whether in the light of all the circumstances the case was an appropriate one for the
exercise of that power."42

2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, including described remarks); cf 150 CONG. REC. S4,261-70 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein).
32 See AllActions: H.R. 5107, supra note 30.
3 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New FederalCircuitMandamus,45 IND. L. REv. 343, 351-61 (2012).
34 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Id. at 168 (quoting 3 WWLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 110).
3 Id. at 169.
3 Id at 170.
38
Id. at 170-71.
39319
U.S. 21, 22 (1943).
40 Id. at 26.
41
Id. at 31.
42 Id. at 25-26.
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Over fifty years later, and during Congress's consideration of the CVRA, the
Court again reviewed its mandamus jurisprudence in Cheney v. United States District
Court.43 The Cheney Court quoted prior Court statements that the "extraordinary remedy"

of the mandamus writ is justified only in "exceptional circumstances amounting to a
judicial 'usurpation of power' or a "clear abuse of discretion." 44 The Cheney Court then
summarized the requirements, previously articulated by the Court, for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus:

As the writ is one of "the most potent weapons in the judicial
arsenal," three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. First,
"the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate
means to attain the relief he desires," - a condition designed to ensure
that the writ will not be used as a substitute for the regular appeals
process. Second, the petitioner must satisfy 'the burden of showing that
[his] right to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable."' Third,
even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the
exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate
under the circumstances. 45
B.

Federal Courts of Appeals Diverge in Their Adoption of CVRA Mandamus
Review Standards

It is in the context of the above-described long-standing Court mandamus
jurisprudence and the previously described articulation by its two primary Senate sponsors
of the goals of the CVRA mandamus remedy that the federal appellate courts have
announced their CVRA mandamus review standards.4 6 The initial appellate circuits that
adopted CVRA mandamus review standards departed, to varying degrees, from the
traditional mandamus review standards described above. However, the majority of
appellate circuits that have adopted CVRA mandamus review standards have adopted
some variation of the traditional mandamus standards in reviewing CVRA mandamus
542 U.S. 367 (2004).
Id at 380 (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346
U.S. 379, 383 (1953)). The Court noted that the common law mandamus writ "against a lower court" was
codified, as follows: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651(a) (West 2006)).
45 Id at 380-81 (quoting Kerrv. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); TVill, 389 U.S. at 107; Schlagenhauf
v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112 n.8 (1964); Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384; Exparte Fahey, 332 U.S.
258, 260 (1947)).
46 See supra notes 17-18, 33-45 and accompanying text. The legislative history concerning the goals and
purposes of the CVRA mandamus remedy primarily consists of the statements offered by Senators Feinstein and
Kyl on the Senate floor. In their remarks, Senator Leahy and Representative Sensenbrenner simply referenced
the mandamus remedy as a mechanism to assert or protect the statutory victim rights. See H.R. REP. No. 108711, at 122-24 (2004) (statements of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); 150 CONG. REC. H8,188 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
2004) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner); 150 CONG. REC. S4,271 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of
Sen. Patrick Leahy); 150 CONG. REC. S4,230 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). There
had been previous hearings and reports regarding the proposed crime victim rights constitutional amendments,
but these did not address the mandamus remedy. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 108-191 (2003). There were no hearings
on the CVRA in either the Senate or the House of Representatives and no Senate committee report. The House of
Representatives committee report simply stated that the crime victim or the Government could apply to the
appellate court for a writ of mandamus to enforce the statutory victim rights if a trial court had denied a request
for "appropriate relief" See H.R. REP. No. 108-711, at 5, 10 (2004); 150 CONG. REC. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr.
22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); 150 CONG. REC. S4,266 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of
Sen.
Jon Kyl);
All Actions: S
2329
108th
Congress (2003-2004), CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/senate-bill/2329/all-actions-with-amendments (last visited Sept.
43
44

23, 2014).
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petitions. A few appellate circuits have not yet articulated their CVRA mandamus review
standards.4 7
1.

Initial Circuit Courts Depart, to Varying Degrees, From the Traditional
Mandamus Review Standard

Less than a year after the CVRA was enacted, the Second Circuit was the first
appellate circuit to articulate its CVRA mandamus review standard in In re W.R. Huff
Asset Management Co. 48 The Huff petitioners asserted that their CVRA rights to notice,
confer with the prosecutor, fair treatment, and restitution had been violated in connection
with a fraud proceeding.4 9 In establishing its CVRA mandamus review standard, the Huff
court first reviewed circuit precedent that required mandamus petitioners to demonstrate a
"novel and significant" legal question, the inadequacy of alternative available remedies,
and a legal issue the resolution of which would "aid in the administration of justice."so
The Second Circuit court concluded, however, that under the "plain language" of the
CVRA regarding the mandamus remedy and re-opening of a plea or sentence procedure,
Congress had "chosen" the mandamus remedy "as a mechanism by which a crime victim
may appeal" a trial court's denial of relief under the CVRA.5 1 Thus, a CVRA mandamus
petitioner "need not overcome the hurdles" of a traditional mandamus proceeding.52
The Second Circuit court stated that because CVRA crime victims, as mandamus
petitioners, "have a right to appellate review," it must determine the appropriate review
standard for these CVRA appellate proceedings.53 In this connection, the appellate court
reviewed the three traditional appellate review standards: de novo review of questions of
law, clear error review of questions of fact, and abuse of discretion review of matters
entrusted to the lower court's discretion.54 The Huff court found instructive the Court's
selection of the abuse of discretion appellate review standard in a decision concerning a
trial court's award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act.5 5
Applying the rationale of the Court's attorneys' fees decision, the Second Circuit court
found that the CVRA entrusts the trial court with ensuring that crime victims are afforded
their CVRA rights.56 In addition, the trial court is in a better position than an appellate
court to determine whether CVRA relief is warranted in an individual case and to make
the determinations of "reasonableness" required regarding most of the CVRA rights.
Finally, the Huff court stated that, just as regarding the attorneys' fees case, there is not a
"clear statutory prescription" or a "historical tradition" to determine the appropriate
review standard.5 " Finding that the factors utilized by the Court in adopting the abuse of
discretion review standard in the attorneys' fees decision applied "with equal force" to the

See infra notes 48-192 and accompanying text (discussing the CVRA review standards).
409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005). Most of the appellate courts' CVRA mandamus decisions have been rendered
through published and unpublished per curiam opinions or orders. Because all of these decisions are presented in
this Article for illustrative purposes, the per curiam and "unpublished" designations will not be used in the
citations of these opinions.
49 See id. at 560-61.
5o See id. at 562.
47
48

51
52

Id

id

53id

See id (referencing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988)).
See id. at 562-63.
5 Id. at 562.
5
1Id. at 562-63.
58 Id. at 563.
54
5
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CVRA, the Second Circuit held that a trial court's CVRA determinations should be
reviewed for abuse of discretion and found no abuse of discretion in the instant case. 59
In In re Galvis, 60 the Second Circuit subsequently expanded its CVRA
mandamus review standards in reviewing a trial court's determination that the petitioner
was not an eligible "crime victim" under the CVRA. 61 The Galvis court retained the Huff
standard that a trial court's CVRA determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion in
the mandamus process.62 However, the Second Circuit court also determined that the
appellate court reviews for "clear error any factual findings made by the district court in
determining a putative victim's motion to enforce her [CVRA] rights." 63 In adding this
CVRA mandamus review standard, the Galvis court quoted a previous Court decision
regarding the interrelationship of the abuse of discretion and clear error review standards:
"When an appellate court reviews a district court's factual findings, the abuse-ofdiscretion and clearly erroneous standards are indistinguishable. A court of appeals would
be justified in concluding that a district court had abused its discretion in making a factual
finding only if the finding were clearly erroneous." 64 The Galvis court denied the
mandamus petition, concluding that there was no clear error in the trial court's
determination of the facts concerning the petitioner's CVRA victim status and therefore
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to assert CVRA rights. 65
The Ninth Circuit announced its CVRA mandamus review standard regarding a
petition alleging a denial of the crime victim's right to be orally heard at sentencing in
Kenna v. United States District Court,66 issued a few months after the Second Circuit's

Huff decision. The Kenna court noted the usual circuit application of "strict standards" in
mandamus review, granting the writ only in "truly extraordinary" cases, such as those
involving clear or frequently repeated legal error, absence of alternative review
67
mechanisms, or issues of first impression. The appellate court further stated that the
instant case may warrant review under the circuit's traditional mandamus standards.68
However, the Ninth Circuit court stated that the application of the circuit's
traditional mandamus factors was not required because the "CVRA contemplates active
review of orders denying victims' rights claims even in routine cases. . . The CVRA
[mandamus provisions create] a unique regime that does, in fact, contemplate routine
interlocutory review of district court decisions denying rights asserted under the statute." 69
In agreement with the Second Circuit's decision in Huff and in the absence of any contrary
appellate decisions, the Ninth Circuit court stated that "we must issue the writ [in CVRA
mandamus proceedings] whenever we find that the district court's order reflects an abuse
of discretion or legal error." 70 Finding that the trial court clearly erred in declining to
permit the petitioner to be orally heard at sentencing, the Kenna court granted the writ of

See id. at 562-64 (discussing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558-62); infra notes 254-60, 344-51 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition); see also In re Local #46 Metallic Lathers Union, 568 F.3d 81, 85-88 (2d Cir. 2009)
(utilizing the abuse of discretion standard to deny a CVRA mandamus petition).
6o 564 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2009).
6'Id at 174-76.
62
63 Id at 174 (citing WIR. HuffAssetMgmt Co., 409 F.3d at 563).
5

id

64

Id at 174-75 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990)).
6'Id at 175-76; see infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006).
7
Id. at 1017.
68 See id (citing Baumanv. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977)).
69
1
60

Id.
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mandamus to permit the petitioner to pursue a CVRA motion in the trial court to re-open
the sentencing proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit has maintained the Kenna CVRA mandamus review standard
in subsequent decisions, i.e., utilizing its abuse of discretion or legal error standard
regarding CVRA mandamus petitions rather than the circuit's traditional mandamus
balancing test. 7 2 However, in applying this review standard in In re Andrich,7 3 in which
the petitioners sought mandamus both pursuant to the CVRA and traditional mandamus,
the Ninth Circuit described the interrelationship between the Kenna CVRA mandamus
review standard and the circuit's traditional mandamus review standard.74 In establishing
its CVRA review standard, the Andrich court stated that the Kenna court (and subsequent
circuit decisions following Kenna) had focused on one of the several factors identified in
the circuit's traditional mandamus review standard, i.e., that a trial court's order is "clearly
erroneous as a matter of law," and that prior circuit precedent had determined that this
traditional factor is "dispositive" in the mandamus analysis. 75 Moreover, this circuit
precedent is consistent with the Court's mandamus jurisprudence that a petitioner's
entitlement to mandamus must be "clear and indisputable." 7 6 In the instant case, the Ninth
Circuit court found that the trial judge did not "clearly err as a matter of law, nor did he
abuse his discretion" in determining the petitioner's CVRA victim status. 77 The Andrich
court therefore denied the mandamus petition under "either the CVRA or our traditional
mandamus authority."
Slightly over a year after the Ninth Circuit announced its CVRA mandamus
review standard in Kenna, the Third Circuit, in In re Walsh,79 denied a mandamus petition
presented generally and pursuant to the CVRA.so In denying the mandamus petition
pursuant to the CVRA, the Walsh court, citing the Ninth Circuit's Kenna decision and the
Second Circuit's Huff decision, stated that "mandamus relief is available under a different,
and less demanding, standard under [the CVRA] in the appropriate circumstances." 1 The
Walsh court did not explicitly state what this "different" CVRA mandamus standard
was.82 Moreover, in reviewing a CVRA mandamus petition in In re Zackey,83 the Third
Circuit stated, "[W]e assume that Congress understood the implications of using a term of
art such as 'mandamus' when drafting the statute." 84 However, the Zackey court found it
unnecessary to decide whether to apply the traditional mandamus review standard or the
"more expansive abuse of discretion standard" to the petitioner's claim regarding the right
to be heard through his attorney. 5 The appellate court found that, even under the abuse of

' Id at 1017-18; see infra notes 364-75 and accompanying text (discussing this petition); see also 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3771(d)(5)

(West Pamp. 2014) (describing the motion to re-open sentencing procedure).
See, e.g., In re K.K., 756 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Morning Star Packing Co., 711 F.3d 1142, 1143 (9th
Cir. 2013).
7 668 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011).
74
Id. at 1051.
7 Id
See id (quoting Kerrv. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).
7 Id
78 Id.; see infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
79 229 F. App'x 58 (3d Cir. 2007).
so Id at 60.
72

8 Id

See id.; accordIn re Mujaddid, 563 F. App'x 874, 875 (3d Cir. 2014); In re El, 553 F. App'x 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2014).
83 No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010).
84
Id. at *3.
85 Id
82
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discretion standard, the petitioner was not entitled to CVRA mandamus relief.8 6 Thus,
there appears to be some ambiguity in the Third Circuit's articulation of its CVRA
mandamus review standard and the degree to which it has departed from the traditional
mandamus review standard.
2.

Subsequent Circuit Courts Adopt a Traditional Mandamus Review Standard

As described above, the initial appellate circuits that addressed the CVRA
mandamus review standard, i.e., the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, interpreted the
CVRA mandamus provisions-to varying degrees-to support a mandamus review
standard less stringent than their circuits' traditional mandamus review standard. 87
However, all of the appellate circuits that have subsequently adopted a CVRA mandamus
review standard, i.e., the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits, have adopted a traditional mandamus review standard for their review of CVRA
mandamus petitions." The First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have not yet adopted a
CVRA mandamus review standard.
The Tenth Circuit was the first appellate circuit to adopt a traditional mandamus
review standard in connection with its review of a trial court's determination of CVRA
crime victim status in In re Antrobus. 90 The Antrobus petitioners had asserted that, "even

though the CVRA provides for mandamus review, this court should apply those standards
that would apply on normal appellate review," citing the Huff and Kenna decisions.91
However, the Antrobus court "respectfully disagree[d]" with the decisions of the Second
and Ninth Circuits. 92 Applying the "plain language" of the CVRA, the Tenth Circuit court
stated that Congress "authorized and made use of the term 'mandamus' in the CVRA
rather than terms such as "immediate appellate review" or "interlocutory appellate review"
that Congress had previously used in statutes. 93 The Antrobus court cited Court
interpretive precedent regarding statutory use of terms of art:
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the
meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed.

94

Finding that "[m]andamus is the subject of longstanding judicial precedent," the
Tenth Circuit court applied the above-described Court interpretive precedent to the "plain
language" of the CVRA and reviewed the petition under "traditional" mandamus
standards.9 5 The Antrobus court cited Court mandamus precedent that reflected that
mandamus is a "drastic" remedy reserved for "extraordinary situations," such as to compel
Id; see infra notes 393-99 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
See supra notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 90-167 and accompanying text.
89 See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
90519 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008).
91
92 Id. at 1124.
8

id

93

Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1124 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).
9 Id at 1125; see id. at 1126 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (noting the "relaxed" CVRA mandamus review
standards adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits and stating that the Antrobus court had "part[ed] company"
with these circuits and applied the traditional mandamus review standard).
94
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a lower court to "exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so," and requiring a
petitioner to demonstrate a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ. 96 Although
characterizing the instant petition as a "difficult case," the Antrobus court denied the writ
because it was unable to conclude that the trial court was "clearly wrong" in its victim
status determination or that the petitioners' right to mandamus was "clear and
indisputable," as required under the traditional mandamus review standard.9 7
In a subsequent CVRA mandamus proceeding involving the Antrobus petitioners,
the Tenth Circuit maintained its use of traditional mandamus review standards." In
articulating these standards, the appellate court cited additional Court precedent requiring
that a mandamus petitioner have "no other adequate means" to attain the requested relief.99
The Tenth Circuit also cited its own mandamus precedent that a petitioner's "clear and
indisputable" right to mandamus can be demonstrated by a "judicial usurpation of power
or a clear abuse of discretion."oo The Tenth Circuit declined the Antrobus petitioners'
request to apply "ordinary appellate standards of review" to the instant petition regarding
the trial court's denial of their discovery request concerning their attempt to establish their
CVRA victim status. 101 However, the appellate court stated that the review standard would
make no difference in the instant matter because the trial court's action would be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard under either review standard. 10 2 Finding no "clear
abuse of discretion" by the trial court, the Tenth Circuit denied the Antrobus mandamus
petition.103

In their subsequent petition for rehearing regarding their initial mandamus
petition, the Antrobus petitioners re-asserted their position that "normal appellate" rather
than traditional mandamus review standards should apply to their CVRA mandamus
petition. 1 0 4 Once again, in rejecting the petitioners' position, the Tenth Circuit cited the
"plain language" of the CVRA that incorporated the mandamus remedy, a "well worn
term of art in our common law tradition," and Court interpretive precedent regarding
statutory use of terms of art.10 5 The Tenth Circuit also found nothing in the Huff and
Kenna decisions-departing from the traditional mandamus review standard-that
explained Congress's use of "mandamus" rather than "appeal" in the CVRA and it found
the Huff court's reliance on the Court's attorneys' fees review standard decision
misplaced. 106
In addition to the general interpretive concept that Congress, having authorized
interlocutory appeals in other legislation, should be presumed to have intentionally
selected the mandamus remedy for use in the CVRA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
CVRA's "structure and language" supported the incorporation of traditional mandamus in
the CVRA. In this connection, the Tenth Circuit referenced the CVRA's alternative option
for the Government to assert CVRA error in an ordinary appeal from the underlying
conviction and the 72 hour time frame for CVRA mandamus decision-making that was
96

Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980)).
Id. at 1125-26.
98 In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008).
99 Id. (quotingAllied Chem.Corp., 449 U.S. at 35).
Id at *3 (quoting In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2006)).
97

101

102

Id. at *3 n.1L

id

Id. at *12; see infra note 226 (discussing this petition).
In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2008).
105 Id
at 1127-28 (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 263 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170-71 (1803)).
' Id. at 1128 & n.3.
103

104
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inconsistent with typical appellate review of often complex legal issues. 107 Contrary to the
petitioners' alternative assertions, the Tenth Circuit explained that the "clear and
indisputable right" requirement that it imposed regarding CVRA mandamus petitions was
consistent with traditional mandamus circuit precedent. 1o Finally, the Tenth Circuit found
that the Antrobus petitioners had failed to "even suggest" how adopting their proposed
review standard would affect their petition's outcome.109 The Tenth Circuit denied the
Antrobus petition for rehearing, 11o and has subsequently maintained the traditional
mandamus review standard regarding CVRA mandamus petitions."
The Fifth Circuit was the next circuit to adopt traditional mandamus review
standards regarding the CVRA. In resolving the mandamus petition in In re Dean,1 12 the
appellate court stated that the parties disputed the applicable review standard.11 3 The
appellate court stated that despite the use of the term "mandamus" in the CVRA, the
petitioners asserted that "ordinary appeal standards" apply to CVRA mandamus
petitions. 114 The Dean court noted that two circuits agreed with the petitioners, citing the
Kenna and Huff decisions. However, citing the Antrobus rehearing petition decision
described above, the Dean court stated that the Tenth Circuit had recently held that
mandamus standards apply to CVRA petitions. The Fifth Circuit announced, "We are in
accord with the Tenth Circuit for the reasons stated in its opinion." 15
The Dean court then described the three-part Court mandamus standard that the
Fifth Circuit had adopted, requiring a mandamus petitioner 1) to have "no other adequate
means" to attain the requested relief and 2) to demonstrate a "clear and indisputable right"
to the writ, and 3) further requiring that the court, in exercising its discretion, concludes
the writ is "appropriate under the circumstances." 1 6 The Dean court found that the trial
court, "with the best of intentions, misapplied the law and failed to accord the victims the
rights conferred by the CVRA," i.e., the rights to notice and to confer with the
prosecutor.1 17 However, in determining whether to issue the mandamus writ, the Dean
court found that it did not need to decide whether the first two mandamus requirements
were met because "for prudential reasons, a writ of mandamus is not 'appropriate under
the circumstances' presented by the case."
The Fifth Circuit has continued to apply to CVRA mandamus petitions the
traditional three-part mandamus review standard announced in Dean.119 In an en banc

See id. at 1128-30. The Antrobus court stated that the petitioners' additional arguments regarding why they
should have greater appellate rights pursuant to the CVRA were "best directed to Congress. Our job is to apply
the CVRA as written, not to rewrite it as one might wish the law to be." Id. at 1129.
"o Id. at 1130 (stating that a multi-factor analysis sometimes used in the circuit is simply "one, non-exclusive
means of applying" the "clear and indisputable right" standard).
0 9
1 Id. at 1130-31.
"o Id. at 1131; see infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf United States v.
Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308, 1312-16 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding the CVRA did not authorize a non-party right to
appeal the underlying sentence and dismissing the Antrobus attempt to directly appeal from the defendant's
sentence).
...
See In re Olesen, 447 F. App'x 868, 869-70 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir.
2009).
112 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008).
3
11 Id. at 393.
114 Id. at 393-94.
1o7

115

Id.

..Id. at 394 (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004)).
117

Id.

118

Id.; see infra notes 3 52-63 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
See, e.g., In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012); In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 647-48 (5th Cir. 2011).

119
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however, the Fifth Circuit not only rejected the

petitioner's contention that the review standard governing direct criminal appeals applies
to CVRA mandamus petitions, but also more fully articulated its rationale for adopting the
traditional mandamus review standard for CVRA mandamus petitions. 121 After reviewing
the nature of the traditional mandamus writ as an "extraordinary remedy" and not a
substitute for an appeal or a mechanism to control trial court decision making in
discretionary matters, 122 the Fifth Circuit found that aspects of the CVRA supported its
conclusion that Congress intended to incorporate traditional mandamus when it adopted
the statutory "mandamus" remedy for crime victims.123

For example, the en banc court found that the CVRA's identification of an
exclusive list of crime victim rights and authorization of mandamus only when a trial
court denies a motion regarding one of these identified rights "suggests that in granting
relief, the district court retains discretion to select the appropriate means to ensure victims'
rights, and that victims may only properly seek appellate intervention where the district
court clearly fails to 'exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' 1 2 4 Moreover, the
CVRA's express limitation to the Government, in the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion, of the alternative right to appeal based on a claim of CVRA-related error
further supports Congress's intentional adoption of a traditional mandamus remedy for
crime victims. The CVRA's requirement that its mandamus petitions must be resolved by
the appellate court within 72 hours and its authorization for resolution by a single
appellate judge further support Congress's adoption of a traditional mandamus remedy,
i.e., reflecting that appellate courts must "grant relief quickly, but rarely" as consistent
with a remedy reserved for "extraordinary" cases.125 Acknowledging the petitioner's
contention that "it may be more difficult for a crime victim to enforce rights through
mandamus than appeal, [the Fifth Circuit en banc court concluded] this limitation reflects
the express language of the statute and honors the common law tradition in place when the
CVRA was drafted."1 26
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Simons,127 its initial CVRA mandamus petition, noted
the conflict in the appellate circuits regarding the CVRA mandamus review standard.128
The Simons court, however, found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of the "proper"
CVRA review standard in the case because it found the petitioner had established his
"clear and indisputable" right to relief, i.e., a prompt ruling on his motion to unseal case

701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Paroline v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (determining restitution).
121 See id. at 756-58. In its en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit also held that the CVRA does not grant crime
victims an independent right to appeal from the underlying criminal proceedings. See id. at 754-56; cf id. at
758-59 (finding it unnecessary to resolve whether the appellate court's supervisory mandamus power of review
applied to the petition).
122 Id. at 757.
123 Id. at 757-58.
124 Id. at 757 (quoting Kerrv. U. S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976)).
125 Id. at 757-58; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(3), (4) (West Pamp. 2014).
126
Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 757-58. Contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the en banc court found that the
CVRA requirements that the appellate court "take up and decide" a CVRA mandamus petition and "ensure"
crime victims are afforded their rights did not support an appellate rather than a mandamus review standard. Id.
The en banc court also did not find persuasive the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits in Huffand Kenna,
respectively, regarding a non-traditional review standard, and questioned other cited circuits' support for a nontraditional mandamus standard. See id. at 758 n.6; cf infra notes 284-96 and accompanying text (discussing this
petition).
127 567 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2009).
128 Id
at 801.
120
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records. 129 He was therefore entitled to relief under the "stricter" traditional mandamus
review standard.

130

The Sixth Circuit subsequently adopted the traditional mandamus standard in In
re Acker. 131 The Sixth Circuit found "persuasive" the Tenth Circuit's Antrobus decision
that concluded the CVRA's "plain language" compelled application of the "normal
mandamus standards." 1 32 Specifically, the Acker court cited the CVRA's use of the term
"mandamus" that is governed by "well-established standards" and the "truncated" review
period required for CVRA mandamus petitions as factors that "convince[d]" it that the
"usual" mandamus standards apply to CVRA petitions.133 The Acker court cited Court and
Sixth Circuit precedent regarding the requirements for the "extraordinary" remedy of
mandamus, including "exceptional circumstances amounting to a ... clear abuse of
discretion."l34 Finding no such abuse of discretion in the trial court's acceptance of a plea
agreement in the case, the appellate court denied the mandamus petition. 135 In the related
mandamus petition of In re McNulty,136 the Sixth Circuit added that, as a discretionary
remedy, mandamus can be denied if it is not "appropriate under the circumstances" even if
a petitioner has shown a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ. The McNulty court
found that the petitioner, who challenged the denial of his CVRA victim status and
restitution, had not established his "clear and indisputable" right to the writ and thus the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its determinations.137
As was the case in the Sixth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit found it
unnecessary to determine the appropriate review standard in resolving its initial CVRA
mandamus petition in In re Jacobsen.138 The Jacobsen court found that the petitioner had

not satisfied either a "clear and indisputable right" or an "abuse of discretion" review
standard regarding an alleged denial of the right to be heard and denied the petition as
moot.139 Subsequently, in In re Amy, 140 the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the
traditional mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions. 14 1 After noting the conflict in
the circuits regarding the issue, the District of Columbia Circuit court concluded that the
"best reading" of the CVRA supports the application of the traditional mandamus
standard. 142
In support of its conclusion, the District of Columbia Circuit court cited the Court
interpretive precedent regarding statutory use of a term of art, such as "mandamus"; the
CVRA inclusion of the alternative direct appeal remedy solely for the Government to
assert CVRA-related errors; and the "abbreviated" deadline for resolution of CVRA

Id.
See id.; infra note 343 (discussing this petition); cf In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 608-10 (6th Cir. 2009)
(addressing an appeal and mandamus action regarding the trial court's refusal to disclose the presentence report
to crime victims for use in a civil suit following the conclusion of the criminal proceeding, and finding the
victims' request was outside the scope of the CVRA and that the trial court had not abused its discretion
regarding the appellate action).
131 596 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2010).
132 Id. (citing In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2008)).
133 Id
134 Id.
135 Id. at 373; see infra notes 274-76, 363 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
13' 597 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010).
137 Id. at 349, 352-53; see infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
138 No. 05-7086, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2005).
139 Id. at *2-4; see infra note 406 (discussing this petition).
140 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
141 Id. at 534.
142 Id. at 532-33.
129
30

1
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mandamus petitions that is more consistent with a review for only "clear and indisputable"
errors.143 The Amy court found unpersuasive the petitioner's assertions that CVRA
statutory language that appellate courts "take up and decide" mandamus petitions and
"ensure" a victim's rights, or the statements offered on the Senate floor by Senators
Feinstein and Kyl, supported an appellate-type rather than a traditional CVRA mandamus
review standard. 144 Instead, the appellate court applied the District of Columbia Circuit's
three-part traditional mandamus review standard to the petitioner's restitution-related
claim, requiring her to demonstrate that 1) she has a "clear and indisputable right" to
relief; 2) the trial court has a "clear duty to act"; and 3) no other "adequate remedy" is
available. 145 Applying this traditional standard, the Amy court granted her mandamus
relief, in part, regarding her restitution claim. 146
In reviewing its only CVRA mandamus petition thus far, in In re Vicky, 147 the

Eighth Circuit was the next circuit to adopt the traditional mandamus review standard. In
rejecting the petitioner's request that the direct appeal review standard be applied to her
CVRA mandamus petition, the Eighth Circuit court cited aspects of the rationale utilized
by the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits in adopting the traditional
mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions. 14 The Vicky court noted the Court
interpretive precedent regarding statutory use of a term of art, such as mandamus; the
express provision of the alternative opportunity for direct appeal for the Government
regarding CVRA-related errors; and the short statutory time frame for the resolution of
CVRA mandamus petitions. The appellate court found that the Huff and Kenna decisions
cited by the petitioner regarding alternative review standards lacked "detailed analysis"
and were "unpersuasive" and the cited decisions of the Third and Eleventh Circuits did not
clearly adopt an alternative review standard. 149 The Eighth Circuit therefore adopted the
Court and circuit "traditional standard" for mandamus, requiring a petitioner to
demonstrate 1) the absence of an "adequate alternative means" to attain relief, 2) a "clear
and indisputable" right to the writ, and 3) that the writ is "appropriate under the
circumstances." 1 5 0 Finding that the trial court did not "clearly and indisputably" err in its
determination of restitution, the Vicky court denied the mandamus petition.15 1
The Eleventh Circuit's articulation of its CVRA mandamus review standard has
evolved over time. In In re Stewart,152 the appellate court characterized the CVRA
mandamus proceeding as a "free standing cause of action" and "not an appeal" or an
"interlocutory appeal of an intermediate order." l53 In granting the petitioners' writ
regarding their CVRA victim status, the Stewart court described the question for
resolution as a "mixed question of law and fact," but did not explicitly state the review
standard that it was applying.154 However, the basis for the dissenting opinion was that the
petitioners had failed to demonstrate the "clear and indisputable" right to the writ or the

Id. at 533.
Id. at 533-34.
145 Id. at 532, 534.
146 Id. at 534-44; see infra notes 302-08 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
147 709 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on other groundssub nom. Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct.
1934 (2014) (requiring further proceedings regarding restitution).
143

144

48

1

Id. at 718-719.

Id. at 719.
Id. at 718-20.
...
Id. at 719-23; see infra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
152 552 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2008).
153 Id. at 1288.
154 Id. at 1288-89; see infra notes 234-39, 400 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
149

15o
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"clear abuse of discretion" required for the "drastic and extraordinary remedy" of
mandamus. 155
When the Stewart petitioners filed a subsequent CVRA mandamus petition, in In
re Stewart,15 6 regarding the trial court's denial of restitution to them, the appellate court
noted that it "did not explicitly indicate the standard" used in resolving the initial
mandamus writ.1 '" Regarding the restitution-related petition, the Stewart court stated that
it made "no difference" whether it treated the matter as an appeal of a trial court judgment
or an original mandamus proceeding because the questions for resolution were identical,
i.e., whether the trial court's findings of fact were "clearly erroneous" or whether it had
misapplied the law to the factual findings. 1s Finding the legal principle in the case
undisputed and the trial court's factual findings not clearly erroneous, the Stewart court
denied the mandamus petition. 159
Almost ten years after the enactment of the CVRA, the Eleventh Circuit
explicitly adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard in In re Wellcare Health Plans,
Inc. 16 0 The Eleventh Circuit repeated its previous statements that the CVRA mandamus
proceeding is a "free-standing cause of action" and not an "appeal of a district court
judgment" or an "interlocutory appeal of an intermediate order." 1 6 1 The Wellcare court
noted that, in the Stewart decision, it had previously "left open" whether "traditional"
162
mandamus or "normal appellate" review standards apply to CVRA mandamus petitions.
In Wellcare, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, in accord with the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth,
and District of Columbia Circuits, the traditional mandamus review standard applied to
CVRA petitions.163 The appellate court stated that the "plain text" and other "compelling
textual clues" of the CVRA supported its conclusion: the Court interpretive precedent
regarding statutory use of a term of art, such as mandamus; the express provision of the
alternative opportunity for direct appeal for the Government regarding CVRA-related
errors; and the "compressed" statutory time frame for the resolution of CVRA mandamus
petitions that is consistent with a "highly deferential" review standard.164
Having adopted the traditional mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions,
the appellate court noted that it is an "extraordinary remedy" to be utilized in
circumstances constituting a "judicial usurpation of power" or a "clear abuse of

See Stewart, 552 F.3d at 1290 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367,
380-81 (2004)).
.. 641 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2011).
157 Id. at 1274.
158 Id. at 1274-75.
159 Id.; see infra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (discussing this petition); see also In re Aquino, No. 1213238-B (11th Cir. June 22, 2012) (citing Stewart and reviewing the trial court's determination of CVRA crime
victim status for "clear error"); In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Nos. 11-12707-G, 11-12708-G (11th
Cir. June 17, 2011) (quoting Stewart and stating that in reviewing a CVRA mandamus petition, the appellate
court must determine whether the trial court based its decision on clearly erroneous factual findings or a
misapplication of the law to the findings). In In re Aquino, the appellate court found that the petitioners had not
demonstrated that the trial court made "clearly erroneous" factual findings or misapplied the law to the facts. No.
12-11757-B, slip op. at 1 (11th Cir. Apr. 06, 2012). However, it cited Stewart for the proposition that the
Eleventh Circuit had not decided whether CVRA mandamus petitions are reviewed under the "clear-abuse-ofdiscretion standard generally applicable to mandamus petitions or the less-demanding standard of review applied
to ordinary appeals" and concluded that the petitioners had not demonstrated entitlement to relief under "any
potentially applicable standard of review." Id., slip op. at 2 & n. 1.
1o754
F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1236-37.
Id. at 1237 n.3.
Id. at 1238.
155

164

See id. at 1237-38.
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discretion."1 6 5 The Eleventh Circuit also stated the Court's three-part standard a petitioner
must satisfy for the issuance of a writ, i.e., the demonstration of 1) the absence of an
adequate alternative means to attain relief, 2) a "clear and indisputable" right to the writ,
and 3) that the writ is "appropriate under the circumstances."1 6 6 In the instant case, the
Wellcare court found that the petitioner had not met its burden to demonstrate a "clear and
indisputable" right to the writ and that the trial court had not "clearly abuse[d] its
discretion" in denying the petitioner CVRA victim status or restitution. 167
3.

Remaining Circuits Have Not Yet Adopted a CVRA Mandamus Review
Standard

Over ten years after the enactment of the CVRA, three appellate circuits, i.e., the
First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, have not yet adopted a review standard regarding
CVRA mandamus petitions. Although the Seventh Circuit has denied several CVRA
mandamus petitions, it has not identified a standard of review for its actions. 16 In the sole
CVRA mandamus petition it has considered, the First Circuit simply found that the trial
court "did not err" in determining the petitioner was not a CVRA crime victim and denied
the petition in In re Haas.169 In another case in which crime victims had attempted to file
an appeal rather than a mandamus petition concerning the denial of restitution, the First
Circuit noted the conflict in the circuits regarding the applicable CVRA mandamus review
standard. 170 The appellate court further found that the victims would not be entitled to
CVRA mandamus relief under either the "exacting standard" of traditional mandamus
review or the "more lenient" abuse of discretion standard. 171 As a result, conversion of
their attempted appeal into a mandamus petition would be "futile" and the First Circuit
therefore found it unnecessary to decide the applicable CVRA mandamus review
standard.

172

The Fourth Circuit has also addressed, but not resolved, the standard of review
issue in some of its CVRA mandamus rulings. For example in In re Doe,173 the first of
these decisions, the appellate court described the traditional mandamus review standard;
observed that CVRA mandamus petitions are "not necessarily subject to this stringent"
review standard; and noted that the Second and Ninth Circuits had adopted a "normal
abuse of discretion" standard for CVRA mandamus petitions rather than the higher abuse
of discretion standard associated with mandamus petitions. 17 4 However, the Doe court
concluded that it did not need to decide the review standard issue because the petitioner
was not entitled to mandamus relief regarding her CVRA victim status and restitution
claims "even under the lower standard."1 75

. Id. at 1238 (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004)).
Id. (quoting Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-8 1).
' Id. at 1238-40; see infra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
1 See, e.g., In re Hamilton, No. 12-1059 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 2012); In re Bustos, No. 10-2752 (7th Cir. July 26,
2010); In re Sabbia, No. 10-3316, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27411 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 2010); cf In re Oak Brook
Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12, 2006) (citing Kenna and Huff in connection with general statements
regarding the CVRA).
169 No. 08-2378 (1st Cir. Oct. 30, 2008).
17o United States v. Aguirre-Gonzales, 597 F.3d 46, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2010).
171

Id. at 56.

Id.; see id. at 52-55 (holding that crime victims do not have a right of direct appeal pursuant to the CVRA and
that their sole appellate remedy for asserted CVRA rights violations is through the CVRA mandamus remedy).
173 264 F. App'x 260 (4th Cir. 2007).
174 Id. at 261-62.
175 See id. at 262; id. at 264 (finding no abuse of discretion); infra notes 242-43 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
172
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In In re Brock,17 6 the Fourth Circuit similarly noted the traditional mandamus

standard and the "ordinary abuse of discretion" standard adopted by the Second and Ninth
Circuits for review of CVRA mandamus petitions. 177 As in Doe, the Brock court
concluded that it did not need to decide the review standard issue because "even applying
the more relaxed abuse of discretion standard," the petitioner was not entitled to relief
regarding his claimed violations of his CVRA rights to be heard and treated fairly.178
In ruling on a CVRA mandamus petition almost ten years after the enactment of
the CVRA, in In re Bankruptcy Estate of AGTS, Inc.,1 79 the Fourth Circuit once again

declined to adopt a standard of review for use regarding CVRA mandamus petitions. 8 o
The AGS court noted the traditional mandamus review standard, as well as the conflict that
had developed among the appellate circuits regarding whether the traditional mandamus or
"traditional appeal" standard applies to the CVRA petitions. Once again, the Fourth
Circuit found it unnecessary to decide the applicable review standard, stating, "It is
sufficient simply to note that to issue a writ of mandamus to a district court is not
something to be undertaken lightly.".. The AGS court found that the petitioner was not a
CVRA victim and that the trial court "did not err" in denying restitution to the petitioner,
2
and denied the petition. 18
C.

Conclusion Regarding Appellate Adoption

of CVRA

Mandamus Review

Standards

In the ten years since the enactment of the CVRA, at least eight of the twelve
federal appellate circuits have adopted review standards for the CVRA mandamus
remedy. The initial two appellate circuits to announce CVRA mandamus review standards
interpreted the CVRA to support their selection of a review standard more similar to that
used in direct appellate review than that utilized in traditional mandamus review. The
Second Circuit selected the abuse of discretion standard in Hufl 83 and the Ninth Circuit
selected an abuse of discretion or legal error standard in Kenna.18 4 The Third Circuit has
cited Huff and Kenna as authority for a "different, and less demanding"-but not
explicitly articulated-CVRA mandamus review standard. 185 However, it has also
referenced the implications of Congress's use of a term of art, such as "mandamus," in the
CVRA, in finding it unnecessary to decide the applicable review standard regarding a
CVRA mandamus petition.186 The First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have not yet adopted
CVRA mandamus review standards. 187

262 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir. 2008).
...Id. at 512.
178
179

Id. (finding no abuse of discretion); see infra notes 415-22 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
565 F. App'x 172 (4th Cir. 2014).

Id. at 174.
181 Id.
18o

Id. at 175; see infra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (describing
subsequent Second Circuit discussion of the interrelationship between an abuse of discretion and a clear error
review in CVRA mandamus review).
184 See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text; cf supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (describing
subsequent Ninth Circuit discussion of the interrelationship of the Kenna review standard and traditional
mandamus review).
185 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
182
183

1

See id.

187

See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
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Six appellate circuits have interpreted the CVRA to require a traditional
mandamus review standard regarding CVRA petitions, i.e. the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. "" In this connection, the Fifth, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted the three-part Court standard requiring the unavailability
of an alternative adequate means to attain relief, a clear and indisputable right to the writ,
and the appropriateness of the grant of the writ under the circumstances. 89 The Sixth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits also require a petitioner's showing of a clear and
indisputable right to the writ. The Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits additionally
reference the unavailability of other adequate means to relief. The Sixth and the Tenth
Circuits state that a clear and indisputable right to the writ can be demonstrated by a
showing of a "clear" abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit also includes a showing of the
appropriateness of the requested relief under the circumstances. The District of Columbia
Circuit additionally requires a showing that the trial court has a clear duty to act. 190 Thus,
all of these circuits require a CVRA mandamus petitioner to demonstrate a clear and
indisputable right to relief, plus additional specified factors associated with the traditional
mandamus remedy, in order to obtain CVRA mandamus relief.
A conflict in the circuits has clearly developed between the majority of appellate
circuits (i.e., six circuits) that have adopted some variation of the traditional mandamus
review standard regarding CVRA petitions and the minority of circuits (i.e., two or three
circuits) that have adopted a review standard more like an ordinary appellate review
standard. Additionally, a significant minority of circuits (i.e., three or four circuits) have
not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard. 191 This conflict must await
resolution either by congressional action amending the CVRA to specify the desired
review standard for CVRA mandamus petitions or by Court action interpreting the CVRA
and resolving the existing conflict in the circuits. 1 9 2
In the meantime, however, the federal appellate courts continue to review CVRA
mandamus petitions. The next section of this Article examines the outcomes regarding the
CVRA mandamus petitions reviewed thus far and the actual impact the appellate courts'
differing review standards (or lack of review standards) have had on the outcomes of these
petitions.
THE OUTCOMES OF CVRA MANDAMUS PETITIONS AND THE IMPACT OF THE
REVIEW STANDARD UTILIZED

IV.

A.

The Overall Outcomes of CVRA MandamusPetitions

As described in the CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table below, in the ten years
since the enactment of the CVRA, the federal appellate courts have resolved 73
mandamus petitions filed pursuant to the CVRA. These mandamus petitions have
involved 62 separate petitioners (or petitioner groups). Seven of these 62 petitioners have
been the same (regarding the "Amy" and/or "Vicky" petitions), but they have filed their
petitions regarding separate underlying prosecutions.193
188
189
190
191
192

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 90-167 and accompanying text.
supra notes 112-26, 147-67 and accompanying text.
supra notes 90-111, 128-46 and accompanying text.
supra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
infra notes 468-69 and accompanying text.

See infra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table. The mandamus petitions included in the table were identified
through two sources, i.e., the annual reports prepared for Congress by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts pursuant to the CVRA and a search of the LexisNexis data base. The Administrative Office of the
193
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Overall, the federal appellate courts have denied or dismissed 62 (85%) of the 73
CVRA mandamus petitions. 194 The appellate courts have denied or dismissed 23 of these
petitions (indicated with an "*" in the table), with limited discussion, on the ground that
the petitioners' claims were not properly raised pursuant to the CVRA, e.g., petitioners
attempting to raise claims in connection with civil proceedings, petitioners attempting to
intervene in criminal proceedings unrelated to them, and petitioners attempting to utilize
the CVRA mandamus remedy to pursue relief on other grounds.19 5 In the remaining 39
CVRA mandamus petition denials, the federal appellate courts have more fully addressed
specific claims raised pursuant to the CVRA before ultimately determining to deny the
requested relief. 196 Of the 73 CVRA mandamus petitions reviewed, the federal appellate
courts have granted 11 petitions (15%) to some degree. 19 7

CVRA MANDAMUS OUTCOMES TABLE
FIRST CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Haas, No. 08-2378

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Denied

United States Courts has thus far filed nine annual reports with Congress describing the CVRA mandamus
actions brought and their outcomes, with the most recent report filed on April 30, 2014. See Justice for All Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 104(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2265. A search of the LexisNexis United States Courts of
Appeals data base was also conducted for CVRA mandamus petitions resolved as of October 30, 2014, ten years
after the enactment of the CVRA, using the search terms "Crime Victims' Rights Act" or "Crime Victims Rights
Act" or 3771. Thus, the materials described in this Article are current, as of October 30, 2014.
In addition to these mandamus petitions filed pursuant to the CVRA, in United States v. Burkholder,
590 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2010), the Government raised a crime victim-related issue in its appeal of an offender's
sentence, as authorized by the CVRA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(4) (West Pamp. 2014). The federal appellate
courts that have addressed the issue have generally concluded that the CVRA does not authorize non-parties,
including crime victims, to appeal an offender's sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 715-18
(8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014); In re
Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 755-56 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds
sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014); United States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, SA, 688 F.3d
1301, 1304-07 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540-44 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States
v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 52-55 (1st Cir. 2010); In re Brock, 262 F. App'x 510, 513 (4th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Hunter, 548 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008); Kennav. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th
Cir. 2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2005); compare In re Acker, 596
F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2010), with In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2009).
194 See infra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
195 See id.; see also, e.g., In re Mujaddid, 563 F. App'x 874 (3d Cir. 2014) (attempting to utilize the CVRA
mandamus remedy to obtain other forms of relief); In re Bond, No. 13-2462 (4th Cir. Dec. 6, 2013) (attempting
to intervene in criminal proceedings unrelated to him); In re Nabaya, 481 F. App'x 64 (4th Cir. 2012)
(attempting to assert CVRA claims in connection with a civil proceeding); In re Hamilton, No. 10-3294 (7th Cir.
Oct. 6, 2010) (attempting to intervene in criminal proceedings unrelated to her); In re Ross, 380 F. App'x 356
(4th Cir. 2010) (attempting to use the CVRA mandamus remedy to attack the legality of his confinement);
Williamson v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 06-74584 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2006) (attempting to utilize the CVRA
mandamus remedy to pursue claims against government officials and to seek a wide range of relief, including an
injunction prohibiting the use of "microwaves" on him).
16 See, e.g., In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370 (6th
Cir. 2010); WR. HuffAsset Mgmt Co., 409 F.3d at 555.
197 See, e.g., In re Morning Star Packing Co., 711 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.
2012); In re Amy, 641 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Although the Fifth Circuit initially granted mandamus, in part,
to stay trial court action pending further order of the appellate court, it ultimately denied the petitioners'
mandamus petition in In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2008). See infra notes 352-63 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition). Therefore, this petition is included with the mandamus petition
denials rather than those petitions that have been granted.
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(Oct. 30, 2008).*

Hearing

SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Galvis, 564 F.3d

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

170 (2009).

Restitution

In re W.R. Huff Asset

Confer/Notice/ Fairness/Restitution

Denied

In re Local #46 Metallic

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Denied

Lathers Union, 568 F.3d

Restitution

Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d
555 (2005).

81 (2009).
THIRD CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Dawalibi, 338 F.

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

App'x 112 (2009).*

Fairness/Privacy

In re El, 553 F. App'x

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Hearing

Denied

Petitioner
In re Bankr. Estate of

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

AGS, Inc., 565 F. App'x
172 (2014).

Restitution

In re Bond, 547 F.

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

In re Brock, 262 F.

Hearing/Fairness/Disclosure of

Denied

App'x 510 (2008).

presentence report

113 (2014).*

In re Mujaddid, 563 F.
App'x 874, cert. denied
sub nom. Mujaddid v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 135 S.
Ct. 133 (2014).*

In re Walsh, 229 F.
App'x 58 (2007).*
In re Zackey, No. 103772, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19914 (Sept. 22,
2010).
FOURTH CIRCUIT

App'x 348 (2013).*
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In re Doe, 264 F. App'x

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

260 (2007).

Restitution

Denied

In re Gyamfi, 362 F.

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Dismissed

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Outcome
Granted (for trial

App'x 385 (2010).*

In re Nabaya, 481 F.
App'x 64 (2012).*

In re Rochester, 292 F.
App'x 226 (2008).*

In re Rodriguez, 275 F.
App'x 192 (2008).*

In re Ross, 380 F.
App'x 356 (2010).*

In re Searcy, 202 F.
App'x 625 (2006).*
FIFTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Allen, 701 F.3d
734 (2012).

court to consider
new arguments

raised re victim
In re Allen, 568 F.
App'x 314 (2014).
In re Amy Unknown,
701 F.3d 749 (2012),
vacated and remanded
sub nom. Paroline v.

Restitution
Restitution

United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1710 (2014).
In re Amy Unknown,
No. 13-20485 (Aug. 30,
2013).
In re Butler, No. 0620848 (Nov. 1, 2006).
In re Community
Housing Fund, No. 1111155 (Dec. 9, 2011).
In re Dean, 527 F.3d
391 (2008).

status)
Denied
Granted (re
restitution
determination),
but vacated by

the Court and

Restitution/Abatement

remanded
Granted (re
restitution
determination)
Denied

Restitution

Denied

Notice/Confer

Granted in part
(to temporarily
stay further trial
court action);

Restitution

In re Fisher, 640 F.3d

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

645 (2011).

Restitution

In re Fisher, No. 11-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

10006, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26500 (Oct. 1,
2011).

Restitution

In re May, No. 13-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied
Denied
Denied

Denied

30773 (July 24, 2013).*
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In re Thaler, No. 13-

Delay

40171 (Feb. 15, 2013).

Dismissed as
moot

SIXTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Acker, 596 F.3d

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

370 (2010).

Notice/Restitution

In re McNulty, 597

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

F.3d 344 (2010).

Restitution

In re Siler, 571 F.3d

Disclosure of presentence report

Denied

604 (2009).
In re Simons, 567 F.3d
800 (2009).

Fairness/Dignity

Granted (to
require trial

Denied

court action on
pending motion)
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Bustos, No. 102752 (July 26, 2010).

Intervention in proceedings/Hearing

Denied

In re Hamilton No. 10-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

In re Oak Brook Bank,

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Denied

No. 06-2331 (May 12,
2006).

Hearing/Restitution

In re Sabbia, No. 07-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Vicky, 709 F.3d
712 (2013), vacated and
remandedsub nom.

Restitution

Denied, but
vacated by the
Court and

3294 (Oct. 6, 2010).*

In re Hamilton, No. 121059 (Jan. 12, 2012).*

1368 (Feb. 21, 2007).*

In re Sabbia, No. 103316, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27411 (Oct. 7,
2010).*
EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct.

remanded

1934 (2014).
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NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Amy & Vicky,
710 F.3d 985 (2013).

Restitution

Granted in part
(to determine an
amount of
restitution),

In re Amy & Vicky,
714 F.3d 1165 (2013).
In re Amy & Vicky,
698 F.3d 1151 (2012),
vacated and remanded
sub nom. Amy and

Restitution

Denied

Restitution

Denied, but
vacated by the
Court and
remanded

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Denied in part

Vicky v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 134 S. Ct. 1959
(2014).

In re Andrich, 668 F.3d
1050 (2011).

Kenna v. U.S. Dist.

Hearing

Granted (re right

Court, 435 F.3d 1011
(2006).

to be heard and
to permit motion

In re Kenna, 453 F.3d

Disclosure of presentence report

for re-opening of
sentencing
proceeding)
Denied

1136 (2006).
In re K.K., 756 F.3d
1169 (2014).

Privacy

Denied (but
ordered

preliminary in
camera review of
In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d
1137 (2006).

Exclusion

documents)
Granted in part
(for trial court to

conduct CVRA
exclusion
analysis)
In re Morning Star

Restitution

Packing Co., 711 F.3d

Granted (to

make restitution

1142 (2013).

determination

In re Parker, Nos. 09-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

using correct
standards)
Granted (re

70529, 09-70533, 2009

Exclusion

victim status and

U.S. App. LEXIS

to make

10270 (Feb. 27, 2009).

particularized

finding re
exclusion of
each petitioner)
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In re Stake Ctr.
Locating, Inc., 717 F.3d
1089 (2013).
In re Stake Ctr.
Locating, Inc., 731 F.3d
949 (2013).

Restitution

Denied (as
premature)

Forfeiture

Denied

Williamson v. U.S.

CVRA eligibility

Denied

Privacy

Denied without
prejudice

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Outcome
Denied

In re Antrobus, No. 08-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

4013, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27527 (Feb. 1,
2008).

discovery

In re Antrobus, 563

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

F.3d 1092 (2009).
In re Olesen, 447 F.
App'x 868 (2011).

issue re-opening
Delay/Fairness

Denied

In re Pinson, No. I1-

CVRA filing fee provisions

Dismissed as

Dist. Court, No. 0674584 (Sept. 29,
2006).*
In re Zito, No. 0970554 (Feb. 26, 2009).
TENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Antrobus, 519
F.3d 1123 (2008).

1425 (Oct. 14, 2011).*

moot

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Petitioner
In re Aquino, No. 12-

CVRA Primary Issue(s)
Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Outcome
Denied

11757-B (Apr. 6, 2012).

Hearing

In re Aquino, No. 12-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

13238-B (June 22,
2012)

In re Instituto
Costarricense de
Electricidad, Nos. 1112707-G, 11-12708-G
(June 17, 2011).

In re Miller, No. 0615182 (Sept. 28,
2006).*

In re Searcy, No. 0614951 (Sept. 15,
2006).*

In re Stewart, 552 F.3d

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Granted (re

1285 (2008).
In re Stewart, 641 F.3d
1271 (2011).

Hearing
Restitution

victim status)
Denied
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In re Wellcare Health

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility/

Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d
1234 (2014).

Restitution

Denied

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioner

CVRA Primary Issue(s)

Outcome

In re Amy, 641 F.3d
528 (2011).

Restitution

Granted in part
(to determine
amount of
restitution)

In re Chacin de
Henriquez, No. 10-

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied without
prejudice to

3051, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12129 (June 11,
2010).

In re Jacobsen, No. 05-

renewal

Hearing

Denied as moot

Victim definition/CVRA eligibility

Denied

7086, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13990 (July 8,
2005).

Rodriguez v. Editor in
Chief, Legal Times, No.
07-5234, 2008 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28154
(Apr. 23, 2008).*

Sieverding v. American
Bar Ass'n, No. 07-

Dismissed for
lack of

5126, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13756 (June 8,
2007).*

prosecution

B.

The Issues Addressed in CVRA Mandamus Petitions

As reflected in the CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table, the issues most
frequently addressed in the mandamus petitions filed in the ten years since the CVRA's
enactment have concerned 1) the CVRA crime victim definition and petitioners' eligibility
for CVRA crime victim status; 2) the CVRA right to restitution; and 3) the CVRA
participatory rights to confer with the prosecutor, to notice of proceedings, not to be
excluded from the proceedings, and to be heard in the proceedings. 19" In all, 68 of the 73
CVRA mandamus petitions (93%) involve some aspect of these issues. Of the 50 petitions
in which the federal appellate courts have more fully addressed specific claims raised
pursuant to the CVRA, 45 (90%) address these issues. To illustrate the extent to which the
specific mandamus review standards have had an impact on the outcomes of CVRA
petitions addressing these issues, the following discussion of the outcomes of these 45
petitions is grouped by appellate circuit review standard. These three groups are, as
follows: the traditional mandamus review standard adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits; the more expansive review standards
adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits, and arguably the Third Circuit; and the
"standardless" First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. 99
198

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.

See id.; supra notes 46-192 and accompanying text (discussing the CVRA mandamus review standards); cf
infra note 343 (describing the outcomes regarding the five petitions that have raised other CVRA issues).
199
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CVRA Crime Victim Status

The issue most frequently addressed in the CVRA mandamus petitions resolved
thus far concerns petitioners' attempts to be deemed eligible "crime victims" for purposes
of asserting CVRA rights.20 0 In their mandamus review, the federal appellate courts have
thus considered federal trial courts' application of the CVRA "crime victim" definition,
i.e., whether a petitioner is a "person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia," 201 a definition
incorporating well-known concepts of causation and foreseeability of harm.2 02
a.

More Expansive Review Standard Circuits

Utilizing their more expansive review standards, the Second and Ninth Circuits
have each reviewed two mandamus petitions dealing with a petitioner's eligibility for
CVRA crime victim status.20 3 Applying its abuse of discretion review standard, the
Second Circuit has denied mandamus in both of the cases it has considered.2 04 In In re
Local #46 Metallic Lathers Union,205 in which the defendant was convicted of a money

laundering conspiracy, the trial court determined that the defendant's subsequent use of
the laundered cash to make employee payments that deprived the petitioner union of
related union benefit funds did not make the union a CVRA victim of the defendant's
206
money laundering crime entitled to restitution. The trial court found that the defendant's

200
201

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(e) (West Pamp. 2014); see id. (identifying eligible representatives for minor,

incompetent, incapacitated, and deceased crime victims). During the discussion of the CVRA on the Senate
floor, Senator Jon Kyl, one of the CVRA's primary sponsors, stated that the legislation defined a "crime victim"
as a "person directly and proximately banned as a result of any offense, felony or misdemeanor. This is an
intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or not
they are the victim of the count charged." 150 CONG. REC. S4,270 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Jon Kyl); accord id. (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see 150 CONG. REC. S 10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (indicating the inclusion of victims "whether or not they are the victim of the count
charged"). But see WR. HuffAsset Mgmt Co., 409 F.3d at 564 (stating that the CVRA does not confer rights
against "individuals who have not been convicted of a crime").
202 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2011); In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 349-53 (6th Cir.
2010); cf Aaronson, supra note 8, at 637-42 (discussing the CVRA victim definition); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at
594-95 (stating that the CVRA crime victim definition "invokes" the concept of foreseeability and is not limited
to the crime of conviction). The CVRA requirement of direct and proximate harm is similar to the crime victim
definition used in the primary federal restitution statutes:
[T]he term "victim" means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the
commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an
offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity,
any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663(a)(2), 3663A(a)(2) (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014) (defining victim status in the primary
federal discretionary and mandatory restitution provisions); see Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 594 & n.65 (stating
that the CVRA crime victim definition is "based on" these restitution statutes); cf 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1593(c),
2248(c), 2259(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2014) (defining a "victim" as "the individual hanned as a result of a
commission of' the applicable crime in the mandatory restitution provisions regarding human trafficking, sexual
abuse, and sexual exploitation and abuse of children).
203 The Third Circuit has not reviewed any mandamus petitions regarding this issue. See supra CVRA Mandamus
Outcomes Table.
204 See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text
(describing these petitions).,
205 568 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
206

Id. at 85-88.
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crime of conviction was
complete atMANAMUSMUDDE215
the moment the defendant received the cash.2 07 The
Second Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the union
was not directly and proximately harmed by the defendant's offense.2 08

In In re Galvis,209 the Second Circuit also found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying CVRA victim status to the mother of a decedent who was
murdered in Columbia by members of an organization that the offender led and regarding
which he was convicted in Columbia.2 10 The offender, however, was extradited to the
United States and convicted for drug conspiracy charges. 211 The appellate court found no
clear error in the trial court's factual finding that there was an insufficient causal
connection between the Columbian murder and the drug conspiracy conviction charge to
establish the direct and proximate harm required for CVRA victim status.2 12
Without a discussion of the specific facts in In re Andrich,2 13 the Ninth Circuit
found the trial court did not clearly err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in
concluding that the CVRA rights did not apply to the petitioners.2 14 The appellate court
concluded that the mandamus petition should be denied under either the CVRA or its
traditional mandamus authority.2 15 On the other hand, again without a discussion of the
specific facts in In re Parker,216 the Ninth Circuit granted a CVRA mandamus petition
217
addressing crime victim status2.
The appellate court found that the trial court had erred in
its conclusion that the petitioners in the underlying air pollution prosecution did not satisfy
the CVRA crime victim definition and thus were not eligible for the CVRA-prescribed
218
determination concerning their exclusion from court proceedings.
b.

Traditional Review Standard Circuits

The appellate circuits utilizing the traditional mandamus review standard have
also denied most, but not all, of the petitions regarding CVRA victim status. The Eleventh
Circuit has denied petitions in which the petitioner has actually played a role in the

207

Id. at 86.

208

Id. at 85 & n.2 (applying similar "victim" definition of applicable restitution statute (18 U.S.C.A. §

3663A(a)(2) (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014)) because the petitioner had presented its case under this provision).

Although the defendant planned to use the laundered money to pay employees in cash and thereby avoid taxes
and union obligations, he was only charged with and convicted of the money laundering crime. The appellate
court found the fact that the Government agreed not to charge the defendant for acts related to defrauding union
benefit funds further supported the trial court's determination that this conduct was separate from the money
laundering conviction offense. See id. at 86-87.
209 564 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 174-76.
Id. at 172.
212 See id. at 175-76; cf supranotes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
210
211

213

214

668 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011).

Id. at 1051.
See id.; supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard). The petitioners had
asserted that they were victims of additional unrelated and uncharged federal offenses committed after the
215

defendant entered a plea to mail fraud. The trial court denied their motion to intervene in the criminal case and to
be heard at the defendant's sentencing. See United States v. McMahan, No. 8:07-cr-00249-CJC (C.D. Cal. Nov.
11,2011).
216 Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10270 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009).
217 Id at *1.
218 See id.; infra notes 381-84
and accompanying text (discussing this petition); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §
3771(a)(3) (West Pamp. 2014); cf United Statesv. W.R. Grace, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1159-66(D. Mont. 2009)

(describing the basis of the trial court's findings regarding the petitioners' crime victim status), vacated, CR 0507-M-DWM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124996 (D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2009).
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underlying crime regarding which CVRA crime victim status has been sought. 2 1 9 The
Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an
employee, who refused to participate in his defendant company's antitrust conspiracy and
was subsequently fired and "blackballed" in the related industry, was not a CVRA victim
of the conspiracy and that the petitioner had not demonstrated a clear and indisputable
right to the writ.220 In two related mandamus proceedings, the Fifth Circuit considered a
trial court's denial of CVRA victim status to the petitioners who invested funds to gain
city approval and financing of housing projects that were granted to co-defendants who
engaged in a public corruption-related bribery conspiracy. 2 2 1 The appellate court found
that the trial court's factual findings-that the petitioners' claims that they were directly
and proximately harmed by the defendants' bribery conspiracy were too speculativewere not clearly erroneous, and the petitioners had not clearly and indisputably established
their CVRA victim status.222

In In re Antrobus,223 the Tenth Circuit considered a trial court's denial of CVRA
victim status to the parents of a decedent subsequently murdered (with others) with a gun
the defendant illegally sold to the murderer when he was a juvenile. 224 The appellate court
found that the trial court was not clearly wrong in concluding the defendant's crime of the
gun sale was "too factually and temporally attenuated" from the murder over seven
months later when the murderer was an adult, and that the murderer's acts were an
225
"independent, intervening cause" of the petitioners' daughter's death.
Although
characterizing it as a "difficult case," the Tenth Circuit concluded that the petitioners had
not established a clear and indisputable right to the writ.22 6

See In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding no clear abuse of
discretion in trial court denial of CVRA victim status to un-indicted co-conspirator and no showing of clear and
indisputable right to the writ); In re Aquino, No. 12-13238-B (11th Cir. June 22, 2012) (finding no clear error in
trial court denial of CVRA victim status to persons who sought fraudulent foreign worker visas from the offender
and her co-conspirators); In re Aquino, No. 12-11757-B (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012) (finding no clearly erroneous
factual findings or misapplication of law regarding the above-described victim status determination, actual trial
court affording of right to be heard regarding victim status, and no entitlement to relief under any potential
CVRA review standard); In re Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad, Nos. 11-12707-G, 11-12708-G (11th Cir.
June 17, 2011) (finding that the trial court did not clearly err in denying CVRA victim status to the entity that
functioned as the offenders' co-conspirator); cf 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(1) (prohibiting a person "accused of the
crime" from obtaining relief pursuant to the CVRA).
220 See In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 349-53 (6th Cir. 2010); supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text
(discussing the review standard).
221 In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645 (5th Cir.), reconsiderationdenied, 649 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Fisher, No.
11-10006, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500 (5th Cir. Oct. 1, 2011).
222 Fisher, 640 F.3d at 647-50 (addressing trial court findings regarding speculation as to the role that the bribery
played in the award of city support to the co-defendants rather than the petitioners and the petitioners' decision to
invest funds in their projects); Fisher, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500, at * 1-4 (finding no clear and indisputable
error in the trial court's determination regarding the petitioners' victim status).
223 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008).
224 Id at 1123-24.
225 Id. at 1125-26 (quoting United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 413, at *4-5
(D. Utah Jan. 3, 2008)).
226 See id. at 1125-26, 1130-3 1; supra notes 90-97, 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing the review
standard). A contested fact regarding the causation issue was whether the defendant had heard the murderer say,
at the time of the gun sale, that he intended to commit a bank robbery (i.e., a crime different than the one in
which the petitioners' daughter and others were murdered). The trial judge had stated that his determination of
CVRA victim status would not change even assuming the existence of this fact. SeeAntrobus, 519 F.3d at 1124,
1125 & n.1; United States v. Hunter, No. 2:07CR307DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1323, at *4 (D. Utah Jan. 8,
2008); see also In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1094 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying mandamus based on petitioners'
claim of newly discovered evidence establishing that the defendant heard the murderer say that he planned to rob
a bank with the gun purchased from the defendant); cf In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
27527, at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008) (finding no clear abuse of discretion in trial court's denial of discovery of
219
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The federal appellate circuits utilizing the traditional mandamus review standard
have granted two CVRA mandamus petitions concerning CVRA crime victim status. 2 2 7 In
In re Allen,228 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a petition in which the trial court, finding
insufficient evidence of harm, had initially denied the Government's motion to grant
victim status to identified community members who resided in the area of the defendants'
Clean Air Act violations. 2 2 9 Four years later, and two months before sentencing, the
petitioners, now through their own pro bono counsel, again attempted to be declared
CVRA crime victims. The trial judge denied their request as untimely without addressing
the merits of their claim. 230 In its mandamus review of the trial court's action, the Fifth
Circuit found that the CVRA does not have a time limit for obtaining trial court relief that
would preclude the potential granting of relief under the facts of this case. 2 3 1 The appellate
court found that the circuit's three-part mandamus standard was satisfied, including the
fact that it was clear and indisputable that no time bar prevented the trial court from
considering the new arguments made by the petitioners' counsel in support of their victim
status and the consequent appropriateness of the issuance of the writ.2 3 2 The Fifth Circuit
granted the petitioners' writ to require the trial court to consider the new arguments
presented by their counsel in support of the petitioners' victim status.233
In In re Stewart,234 the Eleventh Circuit considered a mandamus petition brought
by home purchasers seeking CVRA victim status regarding a defendant bank official who
conspired to deprive the bank of honest services by charging the petitioners an additional
mortgage brokerage fee which he and his co-conspirator split. 2 3 5 The trial court found that
the petitioners were not victims of the defendant's conspiracy to deprive the bank of
honest services and denied their request to be heard.2 36 The appellate court rejected the
respondents' claim that the petitioners were not harmed by the conspiracy because their

Environment: The Problem with Extending Victims' Rights to Victims of Environmental Crimes, 67 WASH.

&

Government investigative files and grand jury transcripts in petitioners' attempt to establish CVRA victim
status); supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text (describing this petition).
In denying mandamus in another case, the Sixth Circuit found it unnecessary to resolve the petitioners'
claim that the trial court had refused to recognize them as CVRA crime victims. Regardless whether the
petitioners met the CVRA crime victim definition, the appellate court found that the trial court had allowed the
petitioners a full opportunity for participation in the proceedings, as petitioners themselves acknowledged, and
had actually afforded them the status of CVRA crime victims. See In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 372-73 (6th Cir.
2010); supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
The District of Columbia Circuit denied without prejudice to renewal a mandamus petition seeking a writ
directing the trial court to decide the petitioners' CVRA victim status. Because this matter was already
proceeding toward resolution in the trial court, the appellate court determined that mandamus relief was not
currently warranted. See In re Chacin de Henriquez, No. 10-3051, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12129, at *1-2 (D.C.
Cir. June 11, 2010).
227 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
228 701 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2012).
229 Id. at 735.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.; compare United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d
848, 852-54 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (finding
that it had previously applied an incorrect legal standard to determine the community members' victim status,
reversing its prior ruling, and deeming the community members CVRA victims), with United States v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-563, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37371 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2011), reconsiderationdenied,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82818 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2011) (describing the basis of the trial court's initial ruling
regarding the community members' CVRA victim status). See generally Andrew Atkins, Note, A Complicated
LEE L. REv. 1623 (2010); Ashley Ferguson, Comment, We 're Victims, Too!: The Needfor GreaterProtection of
Environmental Crime Victims Under the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 287 (2011).

552 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1286-87.
236 Id. at
1287.
234
235
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real estate developers had agreed to pay their closing costs, including the inflated
mortgage brokerage fee. 2 3 7 The Eleventh Circuit found that the petitioners remained liable
to the bank for the closing costs, regardless of the developers' agreement to pay the
costs. 2 38 As a result, the petitioners, as well as the bank, were directly and proximately
harmed by the conspiracy and were CVRA victims. The appellate court granted the writ
and ordered the trial court to recognize the petitioners as CVRA victims and afford them
the CVRA rights associated with this status. 2 3 9
c.

"Standardless" Review Circuits

The Fourth Circuit, which has not adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard,
has denied two mandamus petitions regarding a petitioner's crime victim status.24 0 One
petition involved the bankruptcy estate of an entity that the defendant had utilized to carry
out his health care fraud scheme. The appellate court found that neither the entity nor its
creditors were directly and proximately harmed by the defendant's fraud offenses. 2 4 1 The
other petition involved a petitioner who had become addicted to a prescription drug she
used to treat chronic pain, and who sought CVRA victim status in the criminal prosecution
of an entity accused of misbranding the drug with the intent to defraud or mislead. 242
Because the appellate court concluded that the petitioner's addiction-related harm was not
directly and proximately caused by the defendant's misbranding of the drug, she did not
qualify as a victim of the crime charged. 243
2.

Restitution

The CVRA provides crime victims the right to "full and timely restitution as
,,244
provided in law.
Thus, the CVRA does not provide an additional right to restitution for
CVRA crime victims, but ensures the provision of restitution to the degree afforded by

237
238
239

Id. at 1288-89.
Id. at 1289.
Id.; see supra note 152-55, infra note 400 and accompanying text (discussing this petition). But see Stewart,

552 F.3d at 1290 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (finding no clear abuse of discretion or clear and indisputable right to
the writ, as required under the traditional review standard). In finding that the petitioners had established their
CVRA victim status, the appellate court stated that, as long as the requisite harm was established, a CVRA
victim did not have to be named in the charging document or have an identity that constituted an element of the
crime. Id. at 1289.
240 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
241 See In re Bankruptcy Estate of AGS, Inc., 565 F. App'x 172,
174-75 (4th Cir. 2014) (describing the
petitioner's ineligibility for restitution due to its lack of victim status); supra notes 179-82 and accompanying
text (discussing the review standard).
242 In re Doe, 264 F. App'x 260, 261
(4th Cir. Aug. 9, 2007).
243 See id. at 263-64 (describing the petitioner's ineligibility for restitution
due to her lack of victim status). The
appellate court found that the petitioner did not allege that she directly relied on or was even aware of the drug
misbranding. Even assuming that she became aware of "common misperceptions" regarding the drug resulting
from the misbranding, the appellate court found the causation chain between the misbranding and the petitioner's
addiction was "too attenuated" to establish the requisite causation. See id.; cf id. at 264-65 (King, J., concurring)
(finding it unnecessary to resolve the causation issue in order to deny mandamus). The appellate court found it
unnecessary to determine the applicable review standard because it concluded that the petitioner would not be
entitled to relief even under the "lower standard" and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
See id. at 262, 264; supra note 173-75 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
The Seventh Circuit denied a petition that the appellate court found was prematurely filed in that the trial
court had not expressly denied the petitioner CVRA victim status and was actually permitting the petitioner to
participate in the determination of victim status. See In re Oak Brook Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12,
2006).
244 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(6) (West Pamp. 2014).
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other statutes. 2 4 5 The federal statutes include both mandatory and discretionary restitution
provisions,2 4 6 with victim eligibility definitions in the primary restitution statutes similar
to the definition adopted in the CVRA. 2 47 Restitution is mandatory for all federal violent
and property crimes in which an "identifiable" victim has suffered a physical injury or
pecuniary loss. 248 Restitution is discretionary regarding other crimes. 249 Regarding
property crimes, however, restitution is not mandatory if the court determines that the
large number of victims makes restitution "impracticable" or the determination of
complex factual issues regarding a victim's loss would "complicate or prolong" the
sentencing process such that the burden on the sentencing process outweighs the need to
provide restitution.250 The court may also decline discretionary restitution if the
complication and prolongation of sentencing proceedings required to fashion a restitution
251
order outweigh the need for restitution.
The CVRA restitution-related mandamus claims thus far include those described
in the previous section in which the petitioner was not deemed to be an eligible crime
victim either under the CVRA or restitution statutory definition or both, and thus was not
eligible for restitution. 252 They also include petitions, described in this section, by eligible
crime victims who have contested the denial or grant of restitution in their individual
cases. Almost half of these petitions involve the pursuit of restitution by two child
pornography victims in multiple appellate circuits.253
a.

Restitution Petitions Generally
i.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

Applying its abuse of discretion review standard in In re W.R. Huff Asset
Management Co.,254 the Second Circuit denied mandamus petitions brought by two groups
of claimants that had purchased securities from an entity associated with defendants
convicted of securities fraud. 255 The interrelated criminal, civil, and bankruptcy
proceedings involved potentially tens of thousands of victims. The petitioners sought to
vacate a settlement agreement incorporating forfeiture of defendant assets in lieu of
See Doe, 264 F. App'x at 262 n.2; In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 2005); 150
CONG. REC. S4,268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (stating that the CVRA restitution
right, in combination with the rights to be heard and confer with the prosecutor, "means that existing restitution
laws will be more effective"); accordid. (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); see also 150 CONG. REC. S 10,911
(daily ed. Oct.9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (repeating this statement and adding an endorsement of the
"expansive definition" of restitution given in cited decisions); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 610-11 (repeating this
statement and describing the interplay between the CVRA restitution right and the restitution statutes).
246 See infra notes 247-51 and accompanying
text.
247 See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text
(discussing victim definitions).
248 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c) (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014); see also 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1593, 2248, 2259 (West 2000
& Supp. 2014) (describing the mandatory restitution provisions regarding human trafficking, sexual abuse, and
sexual exploitation and abuse of children).
249 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014); see also 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3664 (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014)
(describing restitution procedures including an initial award of restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss).
250 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(3).
251 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).
252 See, e.g., In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2014); In re Bankr. Estate of AGS,
Inc., 565 F. App'x 172, 175 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Fisher, 640 F.3d 645, 650 (5th Cir.), reconsiderationdenied,
649 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2011); In re Fisher, No. 11-10006, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500 (5th Cir. Oct. 1,
2011); In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Local #46 Metallic Lathers Union, 568 F.3d 81,
88 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Doe, 264 F. App'x 260, 264 (4th Cir.
Aug. 9, 2007).
253 See infra notes 254-327 and accompanying text.
254 409 F.3d 555 (2d
Cir. 2005).
255 Id. at 564.
245
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restitution or a fine at sentencing and adopted in connection with a related non-prosecution
agreement that established a $715 million fund to compensate victims of the securities
fraud.25 6 The petitioners contended that the fund provided less than the required full
restitution for the fraud victims and further limited their opportunities for additional
recoveries by including releases and indemnifications for various defendants.25 7
The Second Circuit found that the trial court had not abused its discretion both in
finding that the number of crime victims and the complexity of determining victim losses
satisfied the above-described exceptions to the mandatory restitution provision and by
accepting the settlement agreement as "reasonable substitute restitution." 2 58 The appellate
court further noted that the trial court's acceptance of the settlement in lieu of a complex
restitution determination with an uncertain recovery was consistent with the CVRA's
provision regarding prosecutions with multiple crime victims:259 "In a case where the
court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the
crime victims the rights [identified in the CVRA], the court shall fashion a reasonable
procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the
proceedings." 2 6 0
In In re Morning Star Packing Co.,261 the Ninth Circuit, however, found that the
trial court had committed legal error in denying restitution to petitioners who claimed they
were entitled to mandatory restitution for the full amount of their losses caused by the
defendant's crime. 262 The trial court had based its denial on determinations that it "would
be an unduly complex and time-consuming exercise" to determine restitution, the
defendant could not financially satisfy a restitution award, and the victims could pursue
relief in civil proceedings.2 6 3 The appellate court concluded that the trial court committed
legal error by basing its denial on these factors because the defendant's financial capacity
and the availability of a civil remedy are not proper statutory factors to consider regarding
264
the imposition of mandatory restitution. In addition, the record was unclear whether the
trial court had conducted the required statutory balancing test that the burden on the
sentencing process outweighed the need for restitution in the case.265 The Ninth Circuit
granted the mandamus petition and required the trial court to vacate its judgment denying
restitution and conduct further proceedings using appropriate factors to determine whether
266
to award restitution in the case.

256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Id. at 557-59.
See id. at 560-61.
Id. at 563-64.
See id. at 564; supra notes 48-59; infra notes 344-51 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(2) (West Pamp. 2014).
711 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id, at 1143-44.
id.

See id.
Id. at 1144.
266 See id. (applying provisions in 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A, 3664 (West
2000 & Pamp. 2014)). The Ninth Circuit
denied, as "unripe," a restitution-related petition filed prior to the defendant's sentencing. In re Stake Center
Locating, Inc., 717 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013); cf In re Oak Brook Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12,
2006) (denying the petitioner's restitution claim as premature without reference to a review standard). The Ninth
Circuit subsequently found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error by denying the
petitioner's motion to compel the Government to initiate forfeiture proceedings to obtain property "traceable" to
the defendant's crimes, in addition to the restitution already awarded to the petitioner. The appellate court found
that the CVRA did not provide a victim right to criminal forfeiture or impair the Government's "broad
discretion" regarding seeking such forfeiture. See In re Stake Center Locating, Inc., 731 F.3d 949, 950-51 (9th
Cir. 2013).
264

26 5
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159

TraditionalReview StandardCircuits

Applying traditional mandamus review standards in In re Allen, 267 the Fifth
Circuit denied a CVRA petition regarding which the trial court had denied restitution, in
part, based on a conclusion that the difficulties of determining restitution and resultant
burden on the sentencing process outweighed any need for restitution.26 8 The petition
concerned a Clean Air Act prosecution in which the trial court had determined that all
persons who lived near the refinery that caused the violation during a specified period,
demonstrated specified symptoms, and submitted victim impact statements by a specified
date would be deemed CVRA crime victims. 269 Over 800 individuals submitted victim
impact statements and experts and over 90 victims had offered oral testimony in
connection with the restitution claims. 27 0 The trial court found that the crime victims had
not established the factual basis for their restitution claims based on the presented
evidence and that the difficulties of determining restitution and resultant burden on the
sentencing process outweighed any need for restitution under the discretionary restitution
provisions.271 The Fifth Circuit found that the petitioners had not demonstrated that the
trial court clearly and indisputably erred in invoking this exception to the discretionary
grant of restitution.

272

In In re Acker, 273 the Sixth Circuit denied a restitution-related petition after
adopting the traditional mandamus standard that included a required showing of a "clear
abuse of discretion." 274 The petitioners sought 1) to vacate the plea agreement in this
antitrust prosecution that did not include restitution "in deference to" the related pending
civil litigation, and 2) to participate as parties to its renegotiation to include restitution.2 75
The appellate court found that the trial court had considered all appropriate factors and
had reasonably applied the exception to the grant of restitution for cases in which the
burden on the sentencing process due to a determination of restitution outweighed any
need for restitution. The Sixth Circuit found that the CVRA did not compel restitution in
this case and that the trial court had not abused its discretion in accepting the plea
agreement.27 6
In In re Stewart,277 the Eleventh Circuit denied a restitution-related petition prior

to its formal adoption of the traditional mandamus review standard, but based on its
conclusion that a petitioner showing of a clearly erroneous factual finding by the trial
court in denying restitution was required in the instant case regardless of what review
standard was applied.278 The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the petitioners'
267
268

568 F. App'x 314 (5th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 315-16.

See id.; United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-563, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60172 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
30, 2014); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663 (West 2000 & Pamp. 2014); cf supra note 228-33 and accompanying
text (describing previous grant of mandamus for the trial court to consider additional arguments regarding the
petitioners' CVRA victim status and the trial court's subsequent redetermination of its previous denial of victim
status).
270 Allen, 568 F. App'x at 315.
271 See id. at 315-16.
272 See id. The Fifth Circuit denied two other restitution-related CVRA mandamus petitions. See In re
Community Housing Fund, No. 11-11155 (5th Cir. Dec. 9, 2011) (petition regarding restitution denied to the
petitioner fund controlled by the defendants); In re Butler, No. 06-20848 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2006) (petition denied
concerning an abated prosecution regarding which the petitioner claimed restitution).
273 596 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2010).
274 Id. at 372-73.
269

275

Id. at 373.

See id.; supra notes 131-3 5, infira note 363 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
641 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2011).
278 Id. at 1274-75.
276

277
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claimed loss resulted from their builders' failure to complete their construction projects
and the resulting default on their construction loans rather than the defendant's fraudulent
collection of an additional mortgage brokerage fee. As a result, the petitioners were not
entitled to restitution from the defendant and the appellate court denied their mandamus
petition.279
b.

"Amy" and "Vicky" Petitions

Seven CVRA mandamus petitions thus far have involved trial courts' application
of the specific mandatory restitution provision concerning sexual exploitation and abuse of
children. 28 0 This provision requires mandatory restitution to an individual "harmed as a
result of' an applicable crime in the "full amount" of the victim's loss in specifically
identified areas, such as medical services, therapy, attorney's fees, and lost income, as
well as any other losses suffered as a "proximate result" of the crime. 281 The CVRA
petitions have concerned one or both petitioners, designated by the pseudonyms "Amy"
and "Vicky," who were sexually abused as children and whose abusers filmed and
distributed images of the abuse. The petitions have addressed prosecutions in which Amy
or Vicky, or both, have sought restitution in the full amount of their losses-as much as
approximately $3.4 million for Amy and $1.3 million for Vicky-from defendants
subsequently convicted of possessing, transporting, or distributing child pornography that
included images of Amy and/or Vicky. 2812 In addressing these petitions, the appellate
courts reached different conclusions regarding whether all of a victim's claimed losses
must be proximately caused by a defendant's conduct or only the "catchall" non-specific
category of losses in the restitution statute. The Court ultimately resolved the conflict
among the circuits regarding the proximate causation requirement in Paroline v. United
2 83

States.

i.

TraditionalReview Standard Circuits

Appellate circuits that had adopted traditional mandamus review standards
initially addressed CVRA petitions regarding this issue. The Fifth Circuit was the first to
address a CVRA mandamus petition filed by Amy regarding a child pornography
possession prosecution in which two images of Amy were found among a large number of
images of children on the defendant's computer. 2814 The trial court concluded that the
See id. at 1275 (finding that the petitioners approved the construction draws and were therefore on notice that
the bank would deduct the mortgage-related fee from them); supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text
(discussing the review standard); cf supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (granting mandamus regarding
the petitioners' victim status).
280 See infra notes 281-327 and accompanying text.
281 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 2000).
282 In the years since the sexual abuse images were filmed, they have been widely circulated by and among third
parties. At least 35,000 images of Amy's abuse have been found among the evidence in over 3,200 child
pornography cases since 1998. Amy's restitution claim of approximately $3.4 million is based on the total
amount of her losses from the production, distribution, and possession of the images and primarily consists of
losses for future psychological care and lost income. Restitution has been ordered to Amy in amounts ranging
from $100 to over $3.5 million in at least 174 child pornography cases. See In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749,
752-53 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1710 (2014). Vicky's losses of over $1.3 million primarily include lost income, counseling expenses, and
attorney's fees. She has received restitution to some extent in at least 309 prosecutions. See United States v.
Cantrelle, No. 2:11-cr-00542-GEB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at *18-23 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013).
283 134 S. Ct. at 1718, 1722-30; see infra notes 328-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision).
284 See In re Amy, 591 F.3d 792, 794 (5th Cir. 2009), reh g grantedsub nom. In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d 190
(5th Cir. 2011), reh'g en banc granted, 701 F.3d at 749, vacated andremanded sub nom. Paroline, 134 S. Ct. at
1710
279
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Government had failed to establish that the defendant's conduct proximately caused any
of Amy's approximately $3.4 million loss and denied her any restitution.285 In its
mandamus review of the restitution determination, the initial appellate panel noted that
existing precedent in other circuits required a proximate causation showing for restitution
under this statute and that the Fifth Circuit had not yet construed this aspect of the
statute.286 This panel denied mandamus, finding that Amy had neither clearly nor
indisputably established the correctness of her contention that the statute did not require a
showing of proximate causation between the categories of her claimed losses and the
defendant's conduct. 287
On rehearing, a different appellate panel concluded that the trial court had clearly
and indisputably erred by requiring proximate causation as to all of Amy's losses as
opposed to only the catchall non-specific category of victim loss. The rehearing panel
granted the mandamus writ and remanded the matter for the determination of restitution
owed to Amy.288 The Fifth Circuit reheard Amy's petition en banc.28 The en banc court
recognized that the other circuits that had addressed the issue had concluded that the
sexual exploitation of children restitution statute requires a showing of proximate
causation between a defendant's criminal conduct and all categories of a victim's losses.
However, the en banc court concluded that the language and rationale of the statute
supported a limitation of the proximate causation requirement solely to the catchall
category of restitution losses.290
Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit en banc court's statutory interpretation, in order to
obtain restitution under the statute, a person must first establish victim status by
demonstrating that images possessed, received, or distributed by a defendant include an
image(s) of the individual. 291 Once victim status is established, the individual is entitled to
full restitution for all categories of losses specifically identified in the statute, e.g., medical
services and therapy, and any additional catchall categories of loss that the victim can
establish were proximately caused by the defendant's criminal conduct.292 In awarding
restitution in cases with multiple offenders, such as this, a trial court can use available

Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 794.
287 Id. at 795. But see id. at 795-98 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (finding that Amy was entitled to some amount of
restitution and supporting a remand for a determination of an appropriate amount).
288
Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d at 192-202. In addition to her mandamus petition, Amy attempted to file a direct
appeal from the trial court's restitution ruling that was assigned to this panel. Her request for rehearing of the
mandamus panel ruling was consolidated with her attempted appeal before this second appellate panel. See id. at
193-94; cf id. at 192-93 (determining there was no need to resolve the issue of a CVRA victim right to appeal
because of the grant of mandamus).
289 See Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 752. In addition to the conflict between the initial and rehearing panel
opinions, another Fifth Circuit panel had addressed the same proximate causation issue in a direct appeal by an
offender in a child pornography possession case that included some images of Amy and in which the trial court
had awarded over $500,000 in restitution to Amy. See United States v. Wright, 639 F.3d 679, 681 (5th Cir.
2011), reh'g en banc granted, 701 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2012). Although the Wright panel applied the Amy
rehearing panel's interpretation that proximate causation is only required regarding the catchall loss category, it
concluded that the trial court had not adequately articulated a rationale for its restitution award, vacated the
restitution order, and remanded the case for the trial court to better explain the basis for its restitution award. See
id. at 684-86. Moreover, although they applied the Amy rehearing panel interpretation of the restitution statute
concerning proximate causation, all of the judges on the panel specially concurred to express their disagreement
with this interpretation and to urge the court to rehear both cases en banc. See id. at 686-92 (Davis, J., joined by
King and Southwick, JJ., specially concurring).
290 See Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 759-72.
291 Id. at 773.
292 Id.
285
286
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statutory procedures, such as joint and several liability. 29 3 The en banc court applied its
statutory interpretation to Amy's restitution-based mandamus petition. It concluded that,
as a victim of the defendant's child pornography possession offense, Amy was entitled to
the full amount of her losses and that the trial court had clearly and indisputably erred in
awarding her no restitution.294 Thus, the appellate court granted her mandamus petition,
vacated the underlying trial court judgment, and directed the trial court to enter a
restitution order for the full amount of Amy's losses pursuant to the restitution statute. 295
The Court subsequently vacated and remanded this judgment in Paroline, as described
296
later in this section.
The Fifth Circuit also applied the traditional mandamus standards to grant
mandamus to Amy and Vicky in a child pornography possession prosecution that included
297
images of both of them. In this case, the trial court had awarded $125,000 restitution to
each petitioner (of the over $3 million sought) based on their counseling expenses for ten
years and attorneys' fees, but had not explicitly stated whether the defendant had joint and
several liability for this restitution. 298 Following the affirmance of the restitution award on
the offender's appeal, 299 the trial court granted the offender's motion for a hearing
regarding the restitution award. The trial court stated at the hearing that the previously
imposed restitution obligation was to be joint and several. It then entered an order that the
offender had no obligation to pay any of the awarded amounts of restitution because Amy
and Vicky had each already received more than $125,000 in restitution from defendants in
other cases.

300

&

See id. at 772-73 (including a description of the interplay between 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2259, 3664 (West 2000
Pamp. 2014)).
294 Id. at 773-74.
293

See id. The appellate court also found that Amy satisfied the two other criteria for mandamus, i.e., she had no
other available remedy because mandamus was her only CVRA remedy and the grant of mandamus was
appropriate in light of the court's statutory interpretation. See id. at 773; see also id. at 754-56 & n.5 (finding no
CVRA victim right to appeal); id. at 774 (affinning the award of over $500,000 restitution to Amy in the Wright
case despite the fact that it erroneously did not reflect the full amount of Amy's loss because the Government did
not appeal the sentence and Amy did not seek mandamus regarding it); id. at 774-75 (Dennis, J., concurring in
part in the judgment) (suggesting trial courts can take steps to craft restitution orders in cases with multiple
defendants pursuant to the applicable restitution statutes); cf id. at 775-80 (Davis, J., joined by King, Smith, and
Graves, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding proximate causation is required, but satisfied here;
agreeing with the remand for a determination of restitution; and disagreeing with the majority's analysis
regarding its award in cases with multiple offenders). But see id. at 780-82 (Southwick, J., dissenting) (finding
that proximate causation is required and can be shown through aggregate causation; that additional restitution
proceedings are necessary in the case; and disagreeing with the majority's analysis regarding its award in cases
with multiple offenders).
296 Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1730 (2014) (vacating and remanding the judgment); infra notes
328-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Parolinedecision).
297 See In re Amy Unknown, No. 13-20485, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013).
298 See id.; United States v. Gammon, No. 11-20902, slip op. at 2-3 & n. 1 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2013).
299 On appeal, the offender challenged the restitution order because there was no showing that the victims' losses
were proximately caused by his conduct. The appellate court rejected this challenge on the basis of its en banc
opinion in In re Amy Unknown, described supra notes 289-95 and accompanying text, and found that the
categories of the victims' losses did not require a showing of proximate causation. See Gammon, No. 11-20902,
slip op. at 3-5. The offender also claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to explain the
reasons for the restitution amount and by not stating whether he was jointly and severally liable for the victims'
losses. The appellate court found that the trial court adequately explained the basis for its restitution award (in
the absence of a Government appeal or victim mandamus petition seeking an award of the full amount of claimed
victim loss). The appellate court also found 1) no abuse of discretion based on the trial court's failure to indicate
whether the offender's liability was joint and several; 2) that the offender's liability was limited to the amounts
of restitution awarded; and 3) that, pursuant to the restitution procedural statute, the offender could seek to
suspend restitution payments in the future if the victims were fully compensated for the full amount of their
losses by other offenders. See id., slip op. at 5-8.
300 See Amy Unknown, No. 13-20485, slip op. at 2.
295
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In its mandamus review, the Fifth Circuit found that its previous affirmance of
the restitution award included a determination that the offender's obligation to pay
$125,000 each to Amy and Vicky was not joint and several and that the trial court
intended a restitution award separate from the victims' recovery in other cases. As a result,
the appellate court found that the traditional mandamus criteria were satisfied, including
the petitioners' clear and indisputable right to the writ. It granted the writ and ordered the
reinstatement of the original restitution award of $125,000 to each victim without regard
to any other recovery they might receive. 301
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the
child sexual exploitation restitution statute requires a showing of proximate causation
between an offender's criminal conduct and all of a victim's losses.3 02 However, applying
traditional mandamus standards, the appellate court granted Amy's mandamus petition in
part.30 3 In this case, the offender was convicted of possessing child pornography that
included one image of Amy. The trial court awarded Amy $5,000 that it characterized as
"nominal" restitution regarding the over $3.2 million she sought as her total losses from
the creation and distribution of the pornographic images of her.3 04 The trial court indicated
that the restitution amount was less than the actual harm the offender caused Amy, but that
the Government and Amy had failed to establish the specific amount of loss that was
caused by the offender's possession of the image of Amy. 3 0 5 The trial court also declined
to hold the offender jointly and severally liable for all of Amy's losses based on the
conduct of others.30 6
On mandamus review, the District of Columbia Circuit found that because the
record did not establish that the offender's conduct proximately caused all of Amy's
losses, the trial court did not clearly and indisputably err in declining to impose joint and
several liability on the offender for the full amount of Amy's losses. However, she was
entitled to the loss that the offender did proximately cause and which the trial court
acknowledged was in excess of the $5,000 restitution awarded. By awarding restitution in
an amount less than that the offender proximately caused, the trial court did clearly and
indisputably err, entitling Amy to the grant of mandamus.3 07 On remand, the District of
Columbia Circuit directed the trial court to reconsider the existing evidence presented by
the Government to establish the losses the offender's conduct proximately caused Amy or
to permit the submission of additional evidence or a formula or some "principled method"
for determining the amount of restitution owed to Amy. 308
The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the child sexual exploitation restitution
statute requires a showing of proximate causation between an offender's criminal conduct

See id., slip op. at 2-3. The appellate court noted that the petitioners had already recovered more than
$125,000 each at sentencing which would have rendered the restitution award a nullity if based on joint and
several liability and that the trial court did not indicate a joint and several restitution obligation at sentencing. See
id.
302 See In re Amy, 641 F.3d 528, 534-37 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
303 See id. at 530.
304 Id.
305 See
id.
306
Id. at 530-31; cf United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 540-44 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing Amy's
companion attempted direct appeal after finding no CVRA victim right or other right to appeal the restitution
award).
307 Amy, 641 F.3d
at 539-40.
308 Id. at 540; id. at 540-44 (finding that mandamus was Amy's only
adequate remedy); see supra notes 140-46
and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
301
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and all of a victim's losses. 3 09 The appellate court reached this conclusion in a mandamus
review of a trial court's award of $3,333 in restitution to Vicky as part of the offender's
receipt and distribution of child pornography sentence rather than the full amount of her
losses that included the conduct of other offenders. The amount was calculated based on
Vicky's medical care, therapy, lost income, and attorney's fees expenses after the date of
the offender's crime. 3 10 Applying traditional standards of mandamus review, the appellate
court concluded that the full amount of losses that Vicky sought included losses prior to
the commission of the offender's crime and which he could not have proximately
caused. 311 Thus, the trial court did not clearly and indisputably err in declining to award
Vicky the full amount of her losses that included these pre-crime losses. In addition, the
trial court articulated the basis for the restitution award for Vicky's post-crime losses
which the trial court found represented the full amount of her losses proximately caused
by the conduct of this offender. The Eighth Circuit found that the trial court did not clearly
312
and indisputably err in its restitution determination and denied the mandamus petition.
The Court subsequently vacated and remanded this judgment for further consideration "in
313
light of' Paroline,as described later in this section.
ii.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

Prior to the CVRA, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the child sexual
exploitation restitution statute requires a showing of proximate causation between an
offender's criminal conduct and all of a victim's losses. 3 14 In their mandamus petition,
Amy and Vicky challenged the trial court's denial of any restitution to Amy and the award
of $4,545 to Vicky for the offender's transportation of child pornography including their
images. 3 15 Utilizing its more expansive abuse of discretion or legal error review standard
and applying circuit precedent regarding the requirement of proximate causation regarding

See In re Vicky, 709 F.3d 712, 720-22 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remandedsub nom. Vicky v. Fast, 134 S.
Ct. 1934 (2014). But see id. at 723-28 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that
proximate causation is only required for the catchall category of restitution loss).
310 See id. at 715. Vicky sought from the offender her full losses of over $1.2 million minus the almost $300,000
she had already recovered from other defendants. The trial court awarded restitution of almost $20,000 and found
that proximate causation was only required for the catchall restitution category. On the offender's appeal, the
Government agreed that proximate causation was required regarding all losses. The appellate court remanded the
matter for the reconsideration of restitution. On remand, the trial court calculated an amount of restitution based
on Vicky's medical care, therapy, lost income, and attorney's fees expenses after the date of the offender's
crime. See id.
311 See id. at 718-20; supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard); cf United
States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 715-18 (8th Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Vicky,
134 S. Ct. at 1934 (dismissing Vicky's companion attempted direct appeal after finding no CVRA victim right or
other right to appeal the restitution award).
312 See Vicky, 709 F.3d at 722-23. But see id. at 723-28 (Shepherd, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(finding that proximate causation is only required for the catchall category of restitution loss and supporting the
grant of the petition and remand for entry of restitution in the full amount of Vicky's loss).
313 Vicky, 134 S. Ct. at 1934; see infra note 337 and accompanying text.
314 See United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
315 See In re Amy & Vicky, 698 F.3d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Amy and
Vicky v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 1959 (2014). In the trial court, Amy sought restitution for losses of $3
million and Vicky sought restitution for over $225,000. The trial court had initially awarded restitution to Amy
and Vicky based on $1,000 per image of them that the offender had on his computer, resulting in $17,000 for
Amy and $48,000 for Vicky. On the offender's direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit expanded the discussion of its
prior precedent regarding the required proximate causation for restitution under the statute. It concluded that the
Government had not proven that the offender's crime proximately caused the victims' losses, such proof needed
to support an award of any restitution. The appellate court also questioned whether the formula the trial court
used to determine the amount of restitution was an adequate measure of victim loss. The appellate court vacated
the restitution award and remanded the matter for a redetermination regarding restitution. See United States v.
Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1254-56, 1259-66 (9th Cir. 2011).
309
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victim loss, the Ninth Circuit denied the mandamus petition.3 16 The Court subsequently
vacated and remanded this judgment for further consideration "in light of' Paroline, as
described later in this section.317
In a separate Ninth Circuit-based prosecution, Amy sought over $3.3 million and
Vicky sought over $1.3 million for losses associated with the offender's child
pornography distribution conviction that included Amy and Vicky in at least one of the
images he distributed. 31 8 The presentence report did not recommend restitution based on
the lack of information establishing a causal connection between the offender's conduct
and the victims' losses. In the absence of any additional evidence by the Government or
the victims establishing such a causal connection, the trial court did not order restitution to
Amy and Vicky.31 9

In its mandamus review of the restitution denial, the Ninth Circuit found that the
trial court did not err in requiring a showing of proximate causation in determining
restitution, pursuant to circuit precedent, and denied the petition in this regard.3 20
However, the appellate court found that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying
any restitution to Amy and Vicky.3 2 1 Contrary to the presentence report recommendation

adopted by the trial court, the appellate court found that the petitioners had offered
sufficient record evidence to establish the required causal connection between their losses
and the offender's crime.32 2 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit granted the mandamus petition,
in part, and remanded the matter for the vacation of the restitution aspect of the judgment
and a determination of the amount of restitution owed to Amy and Vicky.32 3
On remand, the trial court reviewed the victims' claimed losses, made some
adjustments, and then deducted from the pool of each victim's remaining total losses any
losses that were specifically traceable to another defendant's conduct and any losses that
predated the defendant's conduct. To determine the offender's share of the victims' losses,
the court then divided the resulting sums by the number of restitution orders in other
prosecutions associated with the victims' images. This formula resulted in a restitution
award of $2,881 for Vicky and $17,307 for Amy.

324

In their mandamus proceeding regarding these restitution awards, Amy and
Vicky contended that the trial court had used an "improper methodology" to determine the
restitution amounts and the court should have imposed joint and several liability on the
defendant for all of their losses. 325 The Ninth Circuit found that 1) the imposition of joint
and several liability was not expressly authorized in the applicable restitution statutes; 2)
the Ninth Circuit had not yet determined the appropriate method for calculating restitution
pursuant to the child sexual exploitation statute; and 3) a conflict in the circuits existed on
See Amy & Vicky, 698 F.3d at 1152-53 (declining the petitioners' request to overrule its proximate causation
precedent and adopt the Fifth Circuit interpretation that proximate causation is only required regarding the
catchall category of statutory losses).
317 See Amy and Vicky, 134 S. Ct. at 1959; infra note 338 and accompanying text.
318 See United States v. Cantrelle, No. 2:11-cr-00542-GEB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 15, 2013).
319 Id. at *3-5.
320 See In re Amy & Vicky, 710 F.3d 985, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2013) (declining the petitioners' request to overrule
its proximate causation precedent and adopt the Fifth Circuit interpretation that proximate causation is only
required regarding the catchall category of statutory losses).
321 Id. at 987.
36

322
323
324
325

See id.
See id.

See Cantrelle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53767, at *10-27.
In re Amy & Vicky, 714 F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2013).
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this issue with the weight of the authority declining to impose joint and several liability.3 26
As a result, the trial court did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion by declining to
impose joint and several liability on the defendant for all of the victims' losses. The Ninth
Circuit therefore denied the mandamus petition.3 27
iii. Court Resolution of the CausationIssue

Almost ten years after the enactment of the CVRA and twenty years after the
enactment of the child sexual exploitation restitution statute, the Court granted certiorari,

in Parolinev. United States,328 the Fifth Circuit en banc case involving Amy's images, to

resolve the conflict that had developed between the circuits regarding the proximate
causation requirement.329 The Paroline Court concluded that the proximate causation
requirement applies to all categories of loss described in the statute and that restitution
under the statute is thus "proper" only to the degree that an offender's crime proximately
caused a victim's loss. 330 The Court, however, recognized the challenges of applying this
proximate causation requirement, and the accompanying actual causation requirement, in
cases like Amy's in which hundreds or thousands of individuals might have participated in
creating her losses and in which attributing specific losses to an individual offender
331
through traditional causal analysis might not be possible.
In this "special context," the Paroline Court concluded that courts applying the
statute should award restitution in an amount that reflects a defendant's "relative role in
the causal process that underlies the victim's general losses."332 Although the Court
entrusted the application of these interpretive principles and the resulting determination of
restitution in these circumstances to the discretion of the trial courts, it suggested possible
factors a trial court might consider in determining a specific offender's relative role in the
overall causal process resulting in a victim's losses. For example, after first determining a
victim's overall losses from the continuing distribution of pornographic images of the
victim, the Court stated that a trial court could consider the estimated number of
prosecuted and not yet prosecuted offenders engaged in related conduct generating the
losses as well as factors concerning the defendant's individual conduct (e.g., possession
vs. distribution of images, the number of images of the victim involved, and any
connection to the images' production).33 3 The Paroline Court stated that a restitution
amount based on a consideration of such types of factors would be deemed the amount of
a victim's overall losses that were the "proximate result" of an offender's crime and the
"full amount" of the losses owed to the victim under the statute. 334
326

Id. at 1167-68; cf id. (declining the petitioners' request to overrule its proximate causation precedent)

327

See id.

134 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (2014).
The Court identified the conflict as one "over the proper causation inquiry for purposes of determining the
entitlement to and amount of restitution" under the child sexual exploitation restitution statute. Id. The Fifth
Circuit's position applying a proximate causation requirement only to the catchall category of loss conflicted
with decisions of the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of
Columbia Circuits that applied a proximate causation requirement to all losses under the statute. See id. at 1719
(citing cases).
328

329

330
331
332

See id. at 1718-22.
See id. at 1722-27.
Id. at 1727.

Id. at 1727-28.
Id. at 1728 (applying 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 2000)). But see id. at 1730-35 (Roberts, C.J., joinedby Scalia
and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (finding that the statute requires actual and proximate causation between a
defendant's conduct and a victim's loss and that no actual causation was shown here that would support a
restitution award); id. at 1735-44 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (supporting an aggregate causation interpretation
that would permit restitution in the full amount of a victim's losses from each defendant).
333
334
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The Paroline Court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
restitution statute's requirements was "incorrect" and that the trial court in the matter had
erred in requiring a "strict showing of but-for causation." 3 3 5 The Court vacated the Fifth
Circuit judgment granting mandamus and remanded the matter for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.33 6 The Court subsequently vacated-and remanded for further
consideration "in light of' Paroline-the judgments related to the Eighth Circuit's denial
of mandamus to Vicky3 37 and the Ninth Circuit's denial of mandamus to Amy and Vicky
in their initial mandamus action there.33 8
3.

Participation Rights

The CVRA includes four crime victim participatory rights regarding notice, an
opportunity to confer with the prosecutor and to be heard, and an exemption from
exclusion from court proceedings for testifying victims. The notice right provides crime
victims the right to "reasonable, accurate, and timely notice" of public court proceedings
and parole proceedings concerning the crime or the defendant's release or escape. 33 9 The
CVRA provides crime victims the "reasonable right to confer" with the prosecutor in the
case. 340 The right of testifying victims not to be excluded from public court proceedings is
granted unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a victim's testimony
would be "materially altered" if the crime victim heard other testimony at the applicable
proceeding. 341 The CVRA right to be "reasonably heard" relates to public proceedings in
the trial court regarding release, plea, and sentencing and parole proceedings. 342The
federal appellate circuits have reviewed mandamus petitions regarding each of these
participatory rights, with the most petitions concerning the right to be reasonably heard.3 43
Id. at 1730.
Id.; see supra notes 284-96 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
337 See Vicky v. Fast, 134 S. Ct. 1934 (2014); supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text (discussing this
petition).
338 See Amy and Vicky v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 1959 (2014); supra notes 314-17 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
3
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (a)(2) (West Pamp. 2014); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3)-(5).
340 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(5).
341 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3771(a)(3), (b)(1); see Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim's Right to
Attend the Trial: The ReascendantNational Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 481 (2005).
342 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(4); see 150 CONG. REC. S4,267-68 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon
Kyl and Dianne Feinstein) (describing the participatory rights); see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,910-12 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); cf Aaronson, supra note 8, at 646-62; Richard A. Bierschbach,
Allocution and the Purposes of Victim ParticipationUnder the CVRA, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 44 (2006); Russell
P. Butler, What Practitioners and Judges Need to Know Regarding Crime Victims' ParticipatoryRights in
Federal Sentencing Proceedings, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 21 (2006); Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rightsfor
Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims'Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 432 (2008); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 597-610; Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims'Rights in an Adversary
System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237 (2008) (describing the participatory rights).
343 See infra notes 344-428 and accompanying text. In addition to the mandamus petitions regarding these
participatory rights, the appellate courts have addressed three petitions relying exclusively on "[t]he right to be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy." See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(8); In re
K.K., 756 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion or legal error by trial court's denial of
motions to quash, but requiring an initial in camera review of documents); In re Zito, No. 09-70554 (9th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2009) (finding the in camera review of subpoenaed documents was not a "cognizable hann" to the
petitioner); In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding a clear and indisputable right to a writ due to the
trial court's three-month delay in ruling on the petitioner's motion to unseal and directing the trial court to make
a ruling within two weeks); see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon
Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4,269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein); Kyl
et al., supranote 8, at 613-14 (describing this right). Petitioners have also asserted this right in connection with
other rights raised. See In re Olesen, 447 F. App'x 868 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Brock, 262 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir.
2008); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005).
335
36
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The Rights to Notice and to Confer with the Prosecutor
i.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

The Second Circuit considered two petitioner groups' claims that their rights to
notice and to confer with the prosecutor had been violated regarding a securities fraud
prosecution in In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co. 3 44 The Government had asserted

that it was impossible to identify and personally notify each of the tens of thousands of
affected victims of the proposed settlement in the case.345 It sought authorization to use
alternative notification procedures pursuant to the CVRA provision concerning
prosecutions with multiple victims, including notification through the related bankruptcy
and civil proceedings, a nationally televised press conference and a press release through
media outlets, and postings on the prosecutor's office web site. The Government engaged
in all of these notifications regarding the proposed settlement. The trial court also ordered
written submissions by persons or entities desiring to be heard regarding the proposed
settlement.3 46 After the due date for these submissions, at the hearing scheduled to rule on
the Government's motion to utilize the alternative notifications, the Government informed
the trial court of the notification actions it had taken. At this proceeding, the petitioners
objected to the proposed settlement agreement, but the trial court accepted the settlement
agreement subject to approval by the judges in the related proceedings.34 7
On mandamus review, the Second Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining that, in light of the time delays and challenges of identifying
victims and calculating related losses, the Government had given "reasonable notice" to
victims of the proposed settlement through the alternative notification methods used.34 8
The appellate court found that no petitioner had requested and been denied an opportunity
to confer with the prosecutor in the case. 349 The Second Circuit stated that "[n]othing in
the CVRA requires the Government to seek approval from crime victims before
negotiating or entering into a settlement agreement." 350 Instead, the CVRA gave the
petitioners an opportunity to be heard regarding the proposed settlement agreement, which
they received. In denying the mandamus petition, the Huff court found that the trial court

The appellate courts have also addressed two petitions raising claims regarding "unreasonable delay"
in the proceedings. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(7); In re Thaler, No. 13-40171 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2013)
(dismissing as moot a mandamus petition challenging the nine-year delay in the resolution of a habeas corpus
petition because the trial court took action and denied the underlying petition); Olesen, 447 F. App'x at 868
(finding no clear and indisputable right to a writ based on delay in resolution of habeas corpus proceeding); see
also 150 CONG. REc. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4,268-69
(daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statements of Sens. Jon Kyl and Dianne Feinstein); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 611-13
(describing this right).
The appellate courts have not yet addressed any petitions asserting the right to be "reasonably
protected" from the defendant. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(1); see also 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4,267 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein); Kyl et al., supra note 8, at 595-97 (describing this right).
344 409 F.3d at 555.
345 Id. at 559.
346 id
347 Id
at 559-60; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(2); supra note 260 and accompanying text (describing options in
cases involving multiple crime victims).
348 WER. HuffAssetMgmt Co.,
409 F.3d at 564.
349 id
350 Id
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had engaged in "extensive successful efforts to provide notice of the proposed settlement
and to solicit and hear objections to it." 3 5 1
ii.

TraditionalReview StandardCircuits

In In re Dean,352 the Fifth Circuit also considered an alternative notification
procedure concerning a plea agreement and its impact on victims' rights to notice and to
confer with the prosecutor.3 5 3 The Government filed an ex parte motion in the trial court
seeking to establish alternative CVRA procedures in light of the large number of crime
victims in the underlying industrial explosion-related prosecution and the potential
accompanying media coverage that could harm the plea negotiation process.3 5 4 The trial
court entered an ex parte order that permitted the Government to enter into a plea
agreement with the defendant without prior notice to the crime victims. Pursuant to this
order, the crime victims were notified of the agreement before the plea's entry in court.3 55
The crime victims had and exercised opportunities to express their opposition to the plea
agreement. The trial court denied their request that it reject the plea agreement based on
asserted violations of their CVRA rights to notice, confer with the prosecutor, and
fairness. 356 The petitioners filed a mandamus petition seeking that the trial court's decision
be reversed and the matter be remanded with instructions that the plea agreement not be
accepted at that time. The Fifth Circuit initially granted the mandamus petition, in part, to
stay further trial court actions to "effect the plea agreement" pending further order of the
appellate court.357
The Fifth Circuit found that "Congress made the policy decision [in the
CVRA]-which we are bound to enforce-that the victims have a right to inform the plea
negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached." 3 58
In this prosecution involving less than 200 victims, the Dean court concluded that it was
not "impracticable" for the Government to notify the victims of the plea discussions and to
permit the crime victims to "communicate meaningfully" with the prosecutor before the
plea agreement was reached. 359 The trial court therefore misapplied the CVRA and the
alternative procedure it approved violated the victims' CVRA rights to notice and to
confer with the prosecutor.3 6 0

351
352
353
354
355

Id.; cf supra notes 48-59, 254-60 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392-93.

Id. at 393; see United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) (describing the trial court proceedings).
357 Dean, 527 F.3d at 392-93.
358 Id. at 395.
356

359

Id.

Id.; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (d)(2) (West Pamp. 2014); supra note 260 and accompanying text (describing
options in cases involving multiple crime victims). The appellate court stated that the Government should have
found a "reasonable way" to inform the victims of the likely criminal charges and find out their views regarding
the potential plea bargain. Dean, 527 F.3d at 394. The appellate court found that the stated reasons for the ex
parte order's alternative notification procedure, i.e., the number of victims and the possible impairment of the
plea negotiations, did not "pass muster." The Government had not claimed that identification and notification of
the victims would be too difficult or expensive and, in fact, suggested a notification procedure to be implemented
36
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However, the Dean court also found that the victims were allowed "substantial
and meaningful participation" at the plea proceeding and thereafter to convey their
opposition to the plea agreement to the trial court.36 1 In ultimately denying the writ under
the traditional mandamus standards, the Fifth Circuit concluded that its issuance would not
be "appropriate under the circumstances" of the case.36 2 Finding that the decision to grant
mandamus is "largely prudential[,] [w]e conclude that the better course is to deny relief,
confident that the district court will take heed that the victims have not been accorded their
full rights under the CVRA and will carefully consider their objections and briefs as this
matter proceeds" in the court's determination whether to accept the plea agreement.3 63
b.

The Rights to be Heard and not to be Excluded from Proceedings
i.

More Expansive Review StandardCircuits

In Kenna v. UnitedStates District Court,3 64 the matter in which the Ninth Circuit
established its abuse of discretion or legal error review standard for CVRA mandamus
petitions, the appellate court reviewed a petitioner's challenge to the trial court's denial of
365
his asserted CVRA right to be orally heard at sentencing. This prosecution involved
father and son co-defendants whose investment fraud resulted in victim losses of almost
after the plea agreement was signed. Id. at 394-95. The appellate court also rejected the stated concern about
impairment of the plea negotiation process as a basis for the alternative notification procedure:
In making that observation [about the impairment of plea negotiations], the court missed the purpose
of the CVRA's right to confer. In passing the Act, Congress made the policy decision-which we
are bound to enforce-that victims have a right to inform the plea negotiation process by conferring
with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached. That is not an infringement, as the district court
believed, on the government's independent prosecutorial discretion; instead, it is only a requirement
that the government confer in some reasonable way with the victims before ultimately exercising
that broad discretion.
Id. at 395 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit stated that it did not matter whether the victims' exercise of their
conferral right "impair[ed]" or facilitated the plea negotiation process-" [t]he Act gives the right to confer." Id.
361 Dean, 527 F.3d at 395-96.
362 Id. at 395.
363 Id. at 396; see supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard); cf United States
v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (accepting the plea agreement).
The Sixth Circuit applied traditional mandamus standards to deny a petition asserting a right to notice prior
to the filing of charges in the case and "direct involvement" in the negotiation of the plea agreement. The
appellate court found the asserted right to notice "uncertain" and not a ground for relief in this case in which the
petitioners were given a "full opportunity" for participation, beginning at the arraignment and continuing
throughout the proceedings. In re Acker, 596 F.3d 370, 372-73 (6th Cir. 2010); see supra notes 131-35, 273-76
and accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf Dean, 527 F.3d at 394; Crime Victims RightsAct of2004:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

111th Cong. 53, 56-57 (2009) (testimony and statement of Susan Howley, Director of Public Policy, National
Center for Victims of Crime); 157 CONG. REC. S7,359-60 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2011) (letter of Assistant Attorney
General Ronald Weich); 157 CONG. REC. S7,060-61 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (letter of Sen. Jon Kyl); 157 CONG.
REc. S3,607-09 (daily ed. June 8, 2011) (letter of Sen. Jon Kyl); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 8, 41-42 (rev. 2012); Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime Victims'
Rights During Criminal Investigations?Applying the Crime Victims' Rights Act Before Criminal Charges are

Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 59 (2014); Elliot Smith, Comment, Is There a Pre-ChargeConferral
Right in the CVRA?, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 407 (discussing applicability of the CVRA prior to the initiation of
formal charges).
364 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006).
365
Id. at 1013.
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$100 million.366 More than 60 victims submitted written victim impact statements and the
petitioner and several other victims orally addressed the trial court at the father's
sentencing. 367 However, the judge did not permit the petitioner or other victims to make
oral presentations at the son's sentencing three months later. In declining their requests to
speak, the judge stated that he had listened to the victims at the first sentencing, rereviewed the impact statements, did not think there was any additional information that
would impact the son's sentencing, and would receive any new victim-related information
through the prosecutor. 3681
In this first mandamus review concerning the CVRA right to be heard, the Ninth
Circuit found that the CVRA statutory text was not dispositive and hence was ambiguous
regarding whether a crime victim's right to be heard included a right to be orally heard or
only a right to make the victim's "position known by whatever means the court reasonably
determines." 3 6 9 To resolve this ambiguity, the Kenna court reviewed the legislative history
of the CVRA and the proposed victim's rights constitutional amendment that used the
same language, and found that it revealed a "clear congressional intent to give crime
victims the right to speak" at the proceedings designated in the CVRA. 3 7 0 The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that this interpretation, i.e., that victims have an "indefeasible right
to speak" at sentencing (like the prosecutor and the defendant), advanced the CVRA's
371
purpose to make crime victims "full participants" in the criminal justice process.
Thus, the Kenna court found that the petitioner's CVRA right to orally address
the court at the co-defendant son's sentencing was not satisfied by the petitioner's oral
address at the father's sentencing.3 72 The appellate court observed that the trial court's
denial of the petitioner's CVRA right to be heard might satisfy its circuit's traditional
mandamus review standard. However, the Ninth Circuit stated that it was not required to
make that determination because the trial court clearly erred and thereby satisfied the
review standard it had adopted for CVRA mandamus review.3 73 The Kenna court thus
granted the petitioner's writ and authorized the petitioner and other victims to pursue a
CVRA motion in the trial court to re-open the sentencing proceeding. 3 74 If granted, the

See id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
369 Id. at 1013-15. The Ninth Circuit not only addressed the differing interpretations of the CVRA right to be
heard presented by the petitioner and the trial court, but also addressed the differing interpretations of the two
other trial courts that had previously addressed the issue. Id.; compare United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp.
2d 1341 (D. Utah 2005), with United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
370 Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1015-16.
371 Id. at 1016. The appellate court noted the petitioner's concession that the CVRA permits a trial court to "place
reasonable constraints on the duration and content of victims' speech, such as avoiding undue delay, repetition or
the use of profanity" and further noted the potential application of the CVRA's provision regarding alternative
procedures in prosecutions with multiple victims. Id. at 1014 & n.1 (referencing 18 U.S.C.A. § 377 1(d)(2) (West
Pamp. 2014)); cf id. at 1018-19 (Friedman, J., dubitante) (agreeing with the application of the CVRA right to
speak in the instant case, but expressing concern about the "broad sweep" of the opinion's language regarding an
"absolute" CVRA right to speak regardless of the circumstances and its application to victims in the instant case
beyond the petitioner).
372 Id. at 1016-17 (finding a CVRA victim right to "confront every defendant who has wronged them" at
potentially multiple sentencings and have the victim's then current impact information considered at the time of
the imposition of punishment).
373 Id. at 1017.
374 Id. at 1017-18 (referencing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(5) regarding re-opening sentencing proceedings).
366

367
368
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trial court was required to conduct a new sentencing hearing at which the petitioner and
other victims would be permitted to speak, as described in the appellate court's opinion.3 75
This petitioner subsequently filed a CVRA mandamus petition with the Ninth
Circuit seeking release of the defendant son's entire presentence report, after the trial court
rejected the petitioner's assertion that the CVRA provides crime victims a "general right"
to obtain disclosure of the report.37 6 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial court's
position after finding that neither the CVRA statute's text nor its legislative history
supported the petitioner's position.3 77 The appellate court additionally noted that the trial
court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his reasons for requesting the
report outweighed its confidentiality and had refused to consider the trial court's offer to
consider disclosing specific parts of the report. 3 78 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error and denied the writ. 3 7 9
The Ninth Circuit granted aspects of two writs regarding the CVRA right not to
be excluded from specified public proceedings by requiring trial court determinations, by
clear and convincing evidence, as to whether individual victims could be excluded
because their testimony would be "materially altered" by their presence in court. 38 0 In In
re Parker,381the trial court had determined that 34 witnesses did not satisfy the CVRA's
crime victim definition and thus could be excluded from court proceedings based on
traditional practices involving witnesses.3 82 The Ninth Circuit found that the trial court had
erred in its determination of victim status and granted the mandamus petition.3 8 3 The
appellate court further instructed the trial court to vacate its order excluding the victimwitnesses and to conduct proceedings to make individualized findings regarding the
presence or exclusion of each of the 34 victim-witnesses pursuant to the CVRA.3 84
The other Ninth Circuit petition, In re Mikhel,38 5 was filed by the Government
regarding a kidnaping and murder prosecution in which the prosecutor had filed an
unopposed motion in limine to permit the murder victims' families to be present during
the entire trial despite the fact that some of them would be testifying.
Citing concerns
about "collusive" witness testimony and "proper" courtroom decorum, the trial court

375

Id; see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard); cf Amy Baron-Evans,

Traps for the Unwary Under the Crime Victims'Rights Act: Lessons the Kenna Case, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 49

(2006); Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act: Judge
Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassellin Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENT'G REP. 36 (2006).
376 In re Kenna, 453 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
377id
378

id

37

Id; see Matthew B. Riley, Note, Victim Participationin the CriminalJustice System: In re Kenna and Victim

Access to PresentenceReports, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 235 (2007).

See infra notes 381-92 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a)(3),
(b)(1) (West Pamp. 2014).
381 Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
10270 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2009).
380

382

Id. at

1.

id
384 See id.; supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (discussing this
petition); see also In re Parker, Nos. 0970529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7158, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2009); United States v. W.R. Grace, CR
05-07-M-DWM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124996, at *1-2 (D. Mont. Feb. 27, 2009) (describing the trial court's
compliance responses).
385 453 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
386
Id. at 1138.
383
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denied the motion and prohibited testifying family members to be present in court prior to
their testimony.38 7

In response to the Government's mandamus petition seeking that the testifying
family members be permitted to observe the entire trial, the Ninth Circuit noted the
traditional rule regarding courtroom exclusion of witnesses incorporated in Rule 615 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 38 8 However, the appellate court stated that Rule 615's
exception regarding persons "authorized by statute to be present" was satisfied by the
CVRA's crime victim right not to be excluded from designated proceedings unless there
was clear and convincing evidence establishing a risk that the victim's testimony would be
"materially altered" and unless "reasonable alternatives" to exclusion were considered.3 89
Moreover, the appellate court stated that there must be a "highly likely" risk of altered
testimony to warrant CVRA victim-witness exclusion.390 The Ninth Circuit therefore
concluded that the CVRA "abrogated" Rule 615 with regard to crime victims and
effectively replaced it with the exclusion procedure prescribed by the CVRA-which the
trial court had not performed before summarily excluding the victim-witnesses from the
proceedings.391 Rather than ordering the trial court to permit the victim-witnesses to be
present, the Ninth Circuit granted the Government's petition, in part, and remanded the
matter for the trial court to conduct the exclusion analysis required by the CVRA and
described in its opinion.39 2
In addressing a CVRA petition asserting a crime victim's right to be heard in In
re Zackey, 9 3 the Third Circuit stated that it did not need to determine the applicable
review standard because the petitioner was not entitled to relief even under the "more
expansive" abuse of discretion standard.3 94 In this fraud prosecution, the trial court denied
the petitioner's motion to permit his lawyer to enter an appearance and represent him at
sentencing. The trial court recognized the petitioner's right to be heard regarding the
defendant's sentence (which he was free to exercise). However, the trial court found that
the CVRA did not require a victim's legal representation when exercising his right to be
heard or require a victim's lawyer to be permitted to speak during sentencing or other
proceedings.3 9 5 The trial court concluded that the prosecutor's assistance would be
"sufficient" to determine an appropriate sentence.39 6
On mandamus review, the Third Circuit observed that the prosecutor had already
requested restitution and attorney's fees on the victim's behalf, had represented he would
seek the upward sentencing guideline departure requested by the victim, and had not
entered into any agreements that would prevent full advocacy at sentencing on behalf of
the defendant's victims. 397 The Zackey court concluded that the petitioner's CVRA rights
387 Id.; see also id.
because the CVRA
18 U.S.C.A. § 3771
388
Id. at 1139.
389 Id.
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 See id. at 1140;

at 1138 n.1 (stating that it was proper for the Government to file the mandamus petition
authorized the prosecutor, as well as the victim, to assert the CVRA rights, and referencing
(d)(1) (West Pamp. 2014)).

id. at 1139 n.4 (expressing no opinion regarding the merits of the exclusion claims in the
absence of record evidence regarding the proposed testimony of the victim-witnesses); FED. R. EvID. 615; cf
United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1056 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (permitting presence of victimwitnesses).
393 No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010).

Id. at *3.
Id. at *2-3.
396 Id. at *2.
394
395

397

Id. at * 2-3.
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were ensured by these measures and would not be "diluted in the absence of individual
counsel." 398 The Third Circuit found that the trial court had properly recognized the
petitioner's sentencing interests; that the prosecutor had "assumed responsibility" for
securing the petitioner's CVRA rights; and that the trial court had properly exercised its
"discretionary powers" in denying the appearance motion of the petitioner's lawyer. It
therefore denied the petition.39 9
ii.

TraditionalReview StandardCircuits

Prior to expressly adopting the traditional mandamus review standard, the
Eleventh Circuit granted a CVRA mandamus petition and ordered the trial court to
recognize the petitioner home buyers as CVRA victims of the defendant's mortgage
brokerage fee-related fraud. The appellate court's grant of mandamus also included an
order to the trial court to afford the petitioners their CVRA rights, including the right to be
heard that the petitioners had sought to exercise in In re Stewart.400
In In re Aquino, 40 1 the Eleventh Circuit denied another petition concerning

CVRA victim status and the right to be heard.40 2 The appellate court found that the
petitioners had not demonstrated that the trial court had made clearly erroneous factual
findings or misapplied the law to the findings regarding the defendant's sentencing
hearing. 403 Assuming arguendo that the petitioners were eligible CVRA crime victims, the
trial court had afforded them the right to be "reasonably heard" by postponing the
sentencing to give them additional time to establish their CVRA victim status and by
permitting them to provide written statements to be considered at sentencing. 404 The
petitioners failed to provide support to establish their victim status or to submit the
permitted statements as of the defendant's sentencing.4 0 5 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the petitioners had not established their entitlement to relief under "any potentially
applicable standard of review" and denied their petition.40 6
In a consolidated appeal and CVRA mandamus petition in In re Siler,407 the Sixth
Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners
access to the presentence reports from a previous prosecution in which they were CVRA
victims. 4 08 The petitioners had sought the presentence reports in connection with a civil
suit filed eighteen months after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.409 The trial
398

Id. at *3.

399 Id. at *2-4; see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (discussing the review standard).
40 552 F.3d 1285, 1286-89 (11th Cir. 2008); see supra notes 152-55, 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing

this petition).
401 No. 12-11757-B (11th Cir.
Apr. 6, 2012).
402 Id., slip op.
at 1-2.
43 Id., slip op. at 1.
44 Id., slip op. at 1-2.
40 Id., slip op. at 2

Id., slip op. at 2 n. 1 (stating that the circuit had not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard); see
supra notes 159, 219 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
In their CVRA petition in the District of Columbia Circuit, the petitioners sought to be heard prior to
the acceptance of the plea and proposed plea agreement in the prosecution. Finding that the trial judge had not
yet accepted the plea or plea agreement and had stated that he would not do so without hearing from the victims,
the appellate court denied the CVRA petition as moot under either the traditional or more expansive review
standard. See In re Jacobsen, No. 05-7086, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2005); supra notes
138-39 and accompanying text (finding the petition should be denied under either review standard).
407 571 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2009).
406

408

409

Id. at 611.

Id. at 607.

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/crimlawrev/vol5/iss1/8

182

Criminal Law Journal: Full Issue
20 15]

MANDAMUS MUDDLE

175

court rejected their claim that the CVRA supported the reports' release to them and
concluded that the CVRA did not provide crime victims a "general right" to obtain
presentence reports.4 10 In addition, the trial court found that these reports are generally not
available to non-parties in the prosecution and the petitioners had not demonstrated any
special need for access to the reports in this matter.4 11
At the outset, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the petitioners' requests for access
to presentence reports in a completed criminal prosecution fell outside the CVRA's "scope
of protection" and the trial court's authority pursuant to the CVRA.4 12 Even if the trial
court retained authority to release the reports, the appellate court found that the CVRA
provides no independent victim right to obtain presentence reports and thus did not require
disclosure in this matter. Even if the CVRA were interpreted to include a right of access to
presentence reports, the petitioners' request of the reports for use in a civil suit subsequent
to the completed criminal proceedings would be outside of the CVRA's scope. The
petitioners presented no evidence of their "special need" or other adequate basis for
obtaining the nonpublic, confidential reports. 41 3 The Sixth Circuit found that the trial court
had appropriately weighed the petitioners' need for the presentence reports against the
need to maintain the reports' confidentiality and had not abused its discretion in denying
the petitioners' request. Concluding that the trial court had "properly" denied the request
for the presentence reports, the Siler court affirmed the trial court's denial order and it
denied the mandamus petition.4 1 4
iii.

"Standardless" Review Circuits
415

In In re Brock, the Fourth Circuit reviewed a mandamus petition asserting
violations of an assault victim's rights to be heard and treated with fairness in connection
with the defendants' sentencing. 416 Although he had materials that summarized the
presentence reports, the petitioner requested disclosure of parts of the presentence reports
themselves regarding restitution, sentencing guideline calculations, and upward
417
departures, two days before the defendants' sentencing.
The reports are confidential,
with access limited to the court and parties to the prosecution. The trial court denied this
request at the sentencing hearing, concluding that the petitioner had sufficient information
to make his victim impact statement without the presentence reports. 418 The trial court
permitted the petitioner to add his oral impact presentation to submitted written impact
and restitution materials, but declined to hear his testimony or arguments regarding the
guidelines calculations. 411
On mandamus review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it did not need to
determine the applicable CVRA review standard because the petitioner was not entitled to
relief even under the "more relaxed" abuse of discretion standard. 4 2 0 The Brock court
Id. at 608.
See id. at 607-08 (reflecting additionally that the petitioners had not conducted discovery in their civil suit
and sought to use the presentence reports as evidence in the civil suit).
412 Id. at 609.
410
411

413

Id. at 609-11.

Id. at 611; cf id. at 608-09 (discussing the petitioners' ability to appeal the trial court order under the facts of
this case).
4
262 F. App'x 510 (4th Cir. 2008).
414

416
417

Id. at 510-11.
Id. at 511.

Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A § 3552(d) (West 2000), FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(2), and a local court rule regarding
access to the presentence reports).
419 See id.
420 Id. at 512; see supra notes 176-78 and accompanying
text (discussing the review standard).
418
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rejected the petitioner's assertion that, without access to the reports, he had insufficient
information to meaningfully exercise his CVRA right to be heard. The appellate court
found that he had "ample" sentencing-related information and found no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's denial of his access to portions of the presentence reports.4 2 1
In light of the petitioner's ability to offer written and oral impact and related information
to the court and the judge's statement that the guideline calculations did not affect the
sentence imposed, the Brock court found that the trial court's refusal to consider the
petitioner's guideline-related arguments did not prevent him from being reasonably heard
or fairly treated. Finally, the appellate court characterized the petitioner's attempt to
challenge the trial court's guideline calculations as a crime victim attempt to appeal the
defendant's sentence, which is not authorized by the CVRA. Concluding that the
petitioner was both reasonably heard and fairly treated, the Fourth Circuit denied the
mandamus petition.4 22

In In re Bustos,423 the Seventh Circuit addressed the trial court's denial of a
motion to intervene in the underlying securities fraud prosecution by the petitioner and
other investors who disagreed with aspects of the court-appointed receiver's proposed
agreements.4 24 The appellate court found that the CVRA does not provide a crime victim
right to intervene in the prosecution, but instead ensures that victims are "heard out":
"Giving victims a voice in the criminal process differs from giving them a veto power,
which often is both the goal and the effect of intervention." 4 25 The appellate court found
that the trial court had not "refused to listen" to the victims, and that the petitioner's and
others' requests had in fact resulted in some modifications of the receiver's proposals.4 26
The appellate court found no "concrete" violations of the CVRA identified in the petition,
but noted that mandamus remained available if the trial court refused to accept victim
comments during future court proceedings4. 427 However, the petitioner's anticipated
opposition to the receiver's final proposal did not constitute a CVRA violation or a basis
for intervention.4 28
C.

The Impact of the MandamusReview Standardon the CVRA Petition Outcomes

Of the 73 mandamus petitions resolved in the ten years since the enactment of the
CVRA, the federal appellate courts have denied or dismissed 62 petitions (85%) and
granted 11 petitions (15%) to some degree. The appellate courts denied or dismissed 23 of
the petitions (indicated with an "*" in the CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table) with
limited discussion on the ground that the petitioners' claims were not properly raised
pursuant to the CVRA, e.g., petitioners attempting to raise claims in connection with civil
proceedings. The appellate circuit's CVRA mandamus review standard consequently did
not affect the outcome of these petitions. Focusing on the remaining 50 petitions in which
the federal appellate courts have more fully addressed specific claims raised pursuant to
the CVRA, the federal appellate courts have denied 39 petitions (78%) and granted 11
Brock, 262 F. App'x at 512.
See id. at 512-13.
423 No. 10-2752 (7th Cir.
July 26, 2010).
424 Id., slip op.
at 1.
425 Id., slip op. at 1-2; see also id., slip op. at 2 (finding it unnecessary
to decide if victim intervention in a
prosecution is ever appropriate and questioning dicta in In re Siler, 571 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2009), regarding
this).
426 Id., slip op.
at 2.
427 id
428 See id. In another petition, the Seventh Circuit found a petitioner
had been allowed to participate in the
proceedings and there had been no violation of the petitioner's right to be heard as of yet in a petition filed "to
preserve [the petitioner's] objections." See In re Oak Brook Bank, No. 06-2331 (7th Cir. May 12, 2006).
421

422
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petitions (22%) to some degree. 4 29 As discussed in this section and assessed in multiple
ways, the appellate circuit's CVRA mandamus review standard has had a limited impact
on the outcomes of these 50 petitions.
Reviewing the denial rate alone, an appellate circuit's adoption of a more
expansive mandamus review standard does not automatically guarantee a lower
mandamus denial rate. The Second Circuit's application of its abuse of discretion standard
in the 3 mandamus petitions it has reviewed has resulted in a denial rate of 100%. Using
its abuse of discretion or legal error review standard, the Ninth Circuit has granted 5 of the
13 mandamus petitions it has reviewed, resulting in a denial rate of 62%. If one includes
the Third Circuit in the category of more expansive mandamus review standards, its denial
rate is 100% based on the sole petition it has reviewed. Collectively, the denial rate for the
appellate circuits that have adopted more expansive CVRA mandamus review standards is
71%.430

The mandamus denial rate in the appellate circuits that have adopted traditional
mandamus review standards is somewhat higher. The Fifth Circuit has denied 7 of the 10
reviewed petitions (70%). The Sixth Circuit has denied 3 of the 4 reviewed petitions
(75%). The Eighth Circuit has denied the sole petition it has reviewed (100%). The Tenth

Circuit has denied all 4 petitions it has reviewed (100%). The Eleventh Circuit has denied
5 of the 6 petitions it has reviewed (83%). The District of Columbia Circuit has denied 2
of the 3 petitions it has reviewed (67%). Collectively, the denial rate for the circuits that
have adopted traditional mandamus review standards is 79%.431
The mandamus denial rate in the appellate circuits that have not yet adopted a
CVRA mandamus review standard is the highest of the review standard categories. The
Fourth Circuit has denied all 3 reviewed petitions (100%). The Seventh Circuit has denied
both of its reviewed petitions (100%). The First Circuit has not yet reviewed any petitions
included in this analysis. Collectively, the denial rate for the appellate circuits that have
not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard is 100%.432
Looking at the mandamus grant and denial outcomes from another perspective,
the traditional mandamus review standard circuits have actually granted more CVRA
mandamus petitions than the appellate circuits with more expansive review standards, i.e.,
6 vs. 5 granted petitions. It is also important to note the disproportionate impact on the
overall petition success ratios that two circuits-the Fifth and Ninth Circuits-have had.
The Ninth Circuit, a more expansive review standard circuit, has both reviewed and
granted the largest number of CVRA mandamus petitions: granting 5 of the 13 reviewed
petitions. The Fifth Circuit, a traditional review standard circuit, has reviewed and granted
the second largest number of CVRA mandamus petitions: granting 3 of 10 reviewed
petitions. Collectively, these two circuits account for 46% of the reviewed petitions and
73% of the petitions that have been granted.43 3 The comparison of these two circuits and
the successful outcomes overall indicates that a traditional CVRA mandamus review
standard does not foreclose the possibility of the grant of a CVRA petition.
429 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 193-428 and accompanying
text (discussing
CVRA petitions and outcomes).
430 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; cf supra notes 48-86 and accompanying
text (discussing the

adoption of more expansive mandamus review standards).

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; cf supra notes 90-167 and accompanying text (discussing the
adoption of traditional mandamus review standards).
432 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; cf supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (discussing the
circuits that have not yet adopted mandamus review standards).
433 See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table.
431
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The above-described data thus reflect that the CVRA mandamus review standard
does not guarantee, or even necessarily predict, a petition's outcome. Circuits that have
adopted more expansive CVRA review standards nevertheless have petition denial rates
ranging between 6 2 -100%. Denial rates for circuits with traditional CVRA mandamus
review standards range from 67 -100%. The denial rate for circuits that have not yet
adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard is 100%.434 These denial rates indicate that
the CVRA mandamus review standard is generally not outcome-determinative.
Another way to assess the impact of the review standard is to examine petitions
that have raised similar issues in circuits with different review standards. For example, the
Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, representing all three review standard categories, have
each denied petitions seeking disclosure of some or all of confidential presentence
reports.43 5 In addition, four circuits have addressed seven petitions brought by one or both
of two petitioners regarding the sexual exploitation of children restitution statute. The
traditional review standard circuits granted 3 of the 4 petitions they reviewed (75%): the
Fifth Circuit granting both of its petitions, the District of Columbia Circuit granting its
petition, and the Eighth Circuit denying its petition. Applying its more expansive review
standard, the Ninth Circuit granted I of the 3 petitions it reviewed (330%).436 Although
there were obviously factual variations in the individual petitions, this review of outcomes
in petitions raising similar issues reflects that the likelihood of CVRA mandamus success
was not enhanced by the availability of a more expansive review standard.
Another measure of the limited impact of the CVRA mandamus review standard
is the fact that, in resolving 10 of the 50 CVRA petitions (20%), appellate courts explicitly
stated that they would have reached the same result regardless whether they applied a
traditional or more expansive mandamus review standard.4 37 In reviewing petitions prior
to adopting their traditional CVRA mandamus review standards, appellate courts in three
circuits took action on four CVRA mandamus petitions based on their determination that
the review standard was not outcome-determinative. The Eleventh Circuit found it
unnecessary to adopt a review standard in denying one petition because it found the issue
for resolution under either review standard was whether the trial court made clearly
erroneous factual findings.43 The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to adopt a review
standard to deny another petition because it concluded that the petitioners had not
established their entitlement to relief under "any potentially applicable standard of
review." 4 3 9 Before denying the petition as moot, the District of Columbia Circuit similarly
found that the petitioner had failed to satisfy either an abuse of discretion or a clear and
indisputable right review standard.44 0 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit found it

434

See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text.

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 376-79, 407-22 and accompanying text
(discussing these petitions).

435

436

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 280-327 and accompanying text (discussing these

petitions).
437

See infra notes 438-45 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Aguirre-Gonzalez, 597 F.3d 46, 52-

56 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding no crime victim right to appeal and finding conversion of attempted appeal into a

mandamus petition would be "futile" because the victim was not entitled to CVRA relief under the traditional or
"more lenient" abuse of discretion standard).
438
See In re Stewart, 641 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2011); supra notes 156-59, 277-79 and accompanying
text (discussing this petition).
439 See In re Aquino, No. 12-11757, slip op. at 2 & n.1 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 2012); supra notes 159, 219, 401-06
and accompanying text (describing this petition).
440 See In re Jacobsen, No. 05-7086, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13990, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2005); supra notes
138-39, 406 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
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unnecessary to adopt a review standard in granting a petition because it found the
petitioners had established a right to the writ even under the "stricter" traditional review
standard.4 4 1 In addition to these circuits, the Fourth Circuit found it unnecessary to adopt a
review standard in denying two petitions because it concluded that the petitioners had not
established a right to the writ even under an abuse of discretion standard.44 2
Three additional circuits denied CVRA mandamus petitions in circumstances in
which they explicitly determined that the review standard was not outcome-determinative.
The Ninth Circuit, a more expansive CVRA review standard circuit, denied a petition in
which the petitioner sought mandamus both pursuant to the CVRA and traditional
mandamus authority. The appellate court denied the petition pursuant to "either the CVRA
or our traditional mandamus authority."4 43 The Third Circuit, arguably a more expansive
CVRA review standard circuit, found it unnecessary to determine the applicable review
standard in denying a CVRA writ because it found the petitioner was not entitled to relief
even under the abuse of discretion standard.44 4 In denying two petitions, the Tenth Circuit,
a traditional CVRA review standard circuit, found that the review standard was not
outcome-determinative. In denying one of these petitions, the Tenth Circuit observed that
the review standard did not impact the petition's outcome because it found that the
disputed trial court ruling would be reviewed for an abuse of discretion under either
review standard. 445 In denying the other petition and rejecting the petitioner's request for a
"more relaxed" review standard, the Tenth Circuit noted that the review standard did not
affect the outcome of the petition because relief "must be denied under any standard of
review."

4 46

Of course, among the 50 CVRA petitions, there are some instances in which the
review standard appears to be outcome-impactful, if not outcome-determinative. For
example, in one matter, the Tenth Circuit characterized the petitioners' claim regarding
the trial court's denial of their victim status as a "difficult case." It, however, denied
mandamus because it did not find that the trial court was clearly wrong in its victim status
determination or that the petitioners had established a clear and indisputable right to the
writ, as required under the traditional mandamus review standard.4 47 In another matter, the
Fifth Circuit actually determined that the trial court had erred in its application of the
CVRA and had violated the petitioners' rights to notice and to confer with the prosecutor.
However, the appellate court also considered the petitioners' "substantial and meaningful
participation" at the contested plea proceeding and their opportunity to express their
opposition to the plea agreement before concluding that the grant of mandamus would not
be "appropriate," a dispositive factor included in the traditional mandamus review
standard.448

In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 2009); supra notes 127-30, 343 and accompanying text (discussing
this petition).
442 See In re Brock, 262 F. App'x 510, 512 (4th Cir. 2008); In re Doe, 264 F. App'x 260, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2007);
supra
notes 173-78, 243, 415-22 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions).
44 3
See In re Andrich, 668 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir. 2011); supra notes 73-78, 213-15 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
444 See In re Zackey, No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914, at *3-4 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010); supra notes
83-86, 393-99 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
445 See In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *3 n.1 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008); supra
notes 98-103, 226 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
446 See In re Antrobus, 563 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); supra note 226 (discussing this petition).
447 See In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (10th Cir. 2008); supra notes 90-97, 104-10, 223-26 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf Antrobus, 519 F.3d at 1126-27 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
448 See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394-96 (5th Cir. 2008); supra notes 112-18, 352-63 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition).
441
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Although the traditional review standard circuits have applied the clear and
indisputable right requirement to both deny and grant mandamus petitions, 449. its impact on
outcomes has also been diminished by the fact that some appellate courts have
intermingled and blurred the distinctions between adopted CVRA traditional mandamus
review standards and the more expansive abuse of discretion (or legal error) standard
adopted by some circuits. This intermingling of standards is perhaps facilitated by Court
mandamus precedent that recognizes a "clear abuse of discretion" as one of the
"exceptional circumstances" that would justify the "extraordinary remedy" of
mandamus. 4 5 0 For example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, if established, a trial
court's clearly erroneous factual finding regarding CVRA crime victim status would
satisfy the abuse of discretion required under traditional mandamus analysis as well as a
direct appellate review standard. 4 5 1 The Second Circuit concluded that such a clearly
erroneous factual finding concerning CVRA victim status would satisfy its adopted CVRA
abuse of discretion review standard.4 52 The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be reviewing
the trial court's action regarding a discovery request related to CVRA victim status for
abuse of discretion under its traditional mandamus review standard and would have also
done so under the rejected "ordinary appellate" review standard.4 53 Perhaps best reflecting
the intermingling of the adopted CVRA review standards, the Sixth Circuit, a traditional
review standard circuit, found that the petitioner had not established a clear and
indisputable right to the writ and thus concluded that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in finding that the petitioner was not a CVRA crime victim. 4 5 4
As a practical matter, this intermingling or blurring of review standards also
results from the nature of the trial court actions that appellate courts review in many
CVRA petitions. In this connection, most CVRA rights have a "reasonableness" limitation
e.g., the right to "reasonable, accurate, and timely notice," the "reasonable right" to confer
with the prosecutor, and the right to be "reasonably heard." The right of victim-witnesses
not to be excluded from the courtroom is conditioned on a trial court determination that
the testimony of the victim-witnesses would not be materially altered by their presence.
The right to restitution is governed by other statutes that permit, in some instances, a trial
court balancing of the burdens of determining restitution in a complex prosecution against
the victim's need for restitution. The CVRA authorizes "reasonable" alternative
procedures in prosecutions in which the large number of victims makes it "impracticable"

Compare In re Fisher, No. 11-10006, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 26500, at *1-4 (5thCir. Oct. 1, 2011) (finding
no clear and indisputable error in the trial court's determination regarding the petitioners' victim status), with In
re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding clear and indisputable error in trial court's determination
that a time bar prevented its consideration of new arguments regarding the petitioners' CVRA victim status).
450 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004); see also supra notes 34-45 and
accompanying text (describing Court mandamus precedent).
451 See In re Stewart, 641 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2011); supra notes 156-59, 278-79 and accompanying
text (discussing this petition).
452 See In re Galvis, 564 F.3d 170, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing precedent finding that clearly erroneous and
abuse of discretion standards are "indistinguishable" in this context); supra notes 60-65, 209-12 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition).
453 See In re Antrobus, No. 08-4013, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 27527, at *3 n.1 (10th Cir. Feb. 1, 2008); supra
notes 98-103, 226 and accompanying text (discussing this petition)
454 See In re McNulty, 597 F.3d 344, 348-53 (6th Cir. 2010); supra notes 136-37, 220 and accompanying text
(discussing this petition); accord In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, 1236-40 (11th Cir. 2014);
supra notes 160-67, 219 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
There is a similar intermingling of review standards regarding the legal error component of the Ninth
Circuit's more expansive CVRA review standard. The Ninth Circuit subsequently stated that its analysis in
previous CVRA petitions had focused on whether the trial court's action was "clearly erroneous as a matter of
law," a "dispositive" factor in its traditional mandamus review. See In re Andrich, 668 F.3d 1050, 1051 (9th Cir.
2011); supra notes 73-78, 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing this petition).
449
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to accord the enumerated rights to all of the victims. 4 5 5 These provisions consequently
entrust the trial court with a significant degree of discretion in implementing the CVRA.4 56
In fact, in In re W.R. HuffAsset Management Co.,457 the Second Circuit identified

the nature of the CVRA rights and their implementation as support for its selection of a
CVRA abuse of discretion mandamus review standard.45 8
[T]he CVRA provides that the determination to "ensure" that the crime
victim is afforded the rights enumerated in the CVRA is entrusted to
the district court to make. Further, the district court is in a better
position than this Court to decide whether or not relief is warranted
under the CVRA ... as it has far more insight into the complexities of a
pending litigation than does a court of appeals. Most of the rights
provided to crime victims under the CVRA require an assessment of
"reasonableness." The district court is far better positioned to make
these assessments and to determine what constitutes "a reasonable
procedure" for effecting these rights than a court of appeals.45 9
These factors that led the Second Circuit to select a CVRA abuse of discretion review
standard-that it has used to deny all of the CVRA petitions it has reviewed-have also
limited the likelihood that a trial court action regarding the CVRA would be deemed a
clear and indisputable error upon mandamus review under the traditional review standard.
They are also the same factors that have likely limited the scope of mandamus
relief when CVRA petitions have been granted under either the traditional or a more
expansive review standard. For example, when the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits concluded
that the trial courts had erred in their victim status determinations, the appellate courts
nevertheless entrusted the trial courts with the responsibility to subsequently provide the
requested rights by performing the CVRA-required determination regarding victimwitness exclusion from proceedings and by hearing from the victims, respectively.4 60
When the Ninth Circuit determined that the trial court had violated the petitioner's right to
be orally heard at sentencing, it nevertheless required the petitioner to follow the CVRAprescribed procedure of filing a motion to re-open the sentencing in the trial court.46 1
Almost half of the petitions granted involved trial court errors concerning restitution.
Regarding two of these petitions, the Fifth Circuit, a traditional review standard circuit,
dictated what the "correct" restitution award should be.4 62 Regarding the other three

18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(a), (d)(2) (West Pamp. 2014); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663, 3663A (West 2000 & Pamp.
2014) (describing restitution provisions).
456 See, e.g., In re Zackey, No. 10-3772, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19914, at *1-4 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2010) (finding
that the trial court's action denying the petitioner a right to be heard through his attorney "fell within the proper
exercise of its discretionary powers").
45 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005).
458 Id. at 562-63.
459 Id. (citations omitted).
460 See In re Parker, Nos. 09-70529, 09-70533, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7158, at *3-7 (9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2009); In
re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1287, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008); supra notes 152-55, 216-18, 234-39, 382-84, 400 and
accompanying text (discussing these petitions); cf supra notes 156-59, 278-79 and accompanying text
(discussing denial of Stewart petitioners' subsequent petition regarding denial of restitution).
461 See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2006); supra notes 66-71, 364-75 and
accompanying text (discussing this petition); cf supra notes 376-79 and accompanying text (discussing denial of
Kenna petitioner's subsequent petition regarding access to the presentence report).
462 See In re Amy Unknown, No. 13-20485, slip op. at 2-3 (5th Cir. Aug. 30, 2013); In re Amy Unknown, 701
F.3d 749, 773-74 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated andremandedsubnom. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1710 (2014); supra notes 120-26, 284-301 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions).
455
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petitions, the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits, representing both traditional and
more expansive review standard circuits, authorized the trial courts to attempt to properly
re-determine the restitution award.463
As assessed across multiple measures, the CVRA mandamus review standard,
i.e., a traditional or more expansive mandamus review standard, has had a limited impact
on the outcomes of CVRA mandamus petitions in the ten years since the statute's
enactment. The appellate circuits have denied the majority (from 62 -100%) of the
mandamus petitions, regardless of the review standard. Appellate circuits with traditional
mandamus review standards have actually granted more CVRA petitions than those with
more expansive review standards. The review standard has not differentially impacted the
outcomes in petitions resolving similar issues. In a significant minority of the petition
opinions, the appellate courts explicitly stated that the same outcome would have been
reached regardless which review standard was utilized. Several other appellate courts have
intermingled or blurred the distinctions between the review standards in resolving their
petitions. Finally, both in granting and denying the presented CVRA petitions, regardless
of the review standard used, appellate courts have shown significant deference to trial
courts' implementation of the CVRA and its required "reasonableness" and other
determinations.464
V.

CONCLUSION

When Congress considered the enactment of the CVRA in 2004, one of its
primary sponsors identified its mandamus enforcement remedy as a feature that made the
legislation "so important, and different from earlier legislation" and a remedy that would
allow an "appellate court to take timely action to ensure that the trial court follows the rule
of laws set out in this statute." 46 5 In the ten years since the CVRA's enactment, federal
appellate courts have considered 73 mandamus petitions asserting violations of the
CVRA. In the course of their review of these petitions, the appellate circuits have
addressed most of the crime victim rights prescribed in the CVRA and other aspects of the
statute, including the definition of crime victim status for purposes of CVRA eligibility.

See In re Morning Star Packing Co., 711 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Amy & Vicky, 710 F.3d 985,
987 (9th Cir. 2013); In re Amy, 641 F.3d 528, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2011); supra notes 140-46, 261-66, 302-08, 31823 and accompanying text (discussing these petitions); cf supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text
(discussing denial of Amy and Vicky's subsequent petition regarding the award of restitution).
The scope of relief ordered upon granting the remaining CVRA mandamus petitions was also limited,
regardless of the review standard utilized. See In re Allen, 701 F.3d 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2012) (requiring the trial
court to hear new arguments regarding the petitioners' victim status); In re Simons, 567 F.3d 800, 801 (6th Cir.
2009) (requiring the trial court to rule on the petitioner's motion within two weeks); In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d 1137,
1139-40 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring the trial court to make the CVRA-prescribed determination regarding victimwitness exclusion from proceedings); supra notes 127-30, 228-33, 343, 385-92 and accompanying text
(discussing these petitions); cf supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text (discussing denial of Allen
petitioners' subsequent petition regarding restitution).
The breadth of the appellate circuit's mandamus review standard also has not predicted which circuits are
most likely to broadly interpret the scope of the CVRA itself For example, the Ninth Circuit, a more expansive
review standard circuit, more broadly interpreted the CVRA rights to be heard and not to be excluded from court
proceedings. See Mikhel, 453 F.3d at 1139; Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1016. However, the Fifth Circuit, a traditional
review standard circuit, more broadly interpreted the CVRA right to confer with the prosecutor and the sexual
exploitation of children restitution statute. See Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 773; In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394-95
(5th Cir. 2008).
464 See supra notes 429-64 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the CVRA review standard).
465 See 150 CONG. REc. S4,261-62 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
463
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The appellate courts have granted 11 of these mandamus petitions and denied 62
petitions.466
In their CVRA mandamus review, a conflict has developed among the circuits
regarding the appropriate review standard to be utilized. The initial appellate circuits to
identify a CVRA mandamus review standard adopted standards that were more expansive
than traditional mandamus review standards: an abuse of discretion standard in the Second
Circuit and an abuse of discretion or legal error standard in the Ninth Circuit. The circuits
that have subsequently adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard have adopted some
version of a traditional mandamus review standard, with all incorporating a requirement of
a petitioner showing of a clear and indisputable right to the writ. These circuits include the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. The Third
Circuit's review standard is ambiguous in that it has referred both to the more expansive
standards adopted by the Second and Ninth Circuits and the traditional standard. The First,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have not yet adopted a CVRA mandamus review standard. 467
This conflict in the circuits regarding the review standard can be resolved by
either congressional or Court action. In this connection, legislation was recently
introduced, but not enacted, in both the Senate and House of Representatives to amend the
CVRA to reflect that appellate courts "shall apply ordinary standards of appellate review"
in deciding CVRA mandamus petitions.468 Alternatively, the Court could grant certiorari
review to resolve the conflict among the circuits, as it did regarding the child sexual
exploitation restitution statute in the Paroline decision, 4 6 9 and determine whether the
CVRA requires a traditional or more expansive mandamus review standard.
The mandamus remedy is an important component of the CVRA. To achieve the
most effective implementation of the CVRA, the circuit conflict regarding the mandamus
review standard should be resolved-regardless of the review standard selected. As a
practical matter, however, this Article has demonstrated that the difference in review
standards has had a limited impact on the outcomes of the CVRA mandamus petitions
reviewed thus far. It is therefore unlikely that a resolution of the circuit conflict regarding

See supra CVRA Mandamus Outcomes Table; supra notes 193-428 and accompanying text (identifying and
discussing these petitions).
467 See supra notes 46-192 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit conflict regarding the CVRA
mandamus review standard).
468 S. 2646, 113th Cong. § 302 (2014); H.R. 4165, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); S. 822, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). This
provision was added, during Judiciary Committee consideration, to proposed Senate legislation reauthorizing the
Justice for All Act and including some amendments to the CVRA. The bill was reported out of the Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. No further action was taken on the CVRA amendments
prior to the expiration of the congressional session. All Actions: S 822
113th Congress (2013-2014),
CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/822/all-actions (last visited Jan. 7,
2015). This provision was also added, during Judiciary Committee review, to proposed Senate legislation
addressing runaway and homeless youth and trafficking prevention. The bill was reported out of the Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Senate legislative calendar. No further action was taken prior to the expiration of
the congressional session. All Actions: S 2646
113th Congress (2013-2014), CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2646/all-actions (last visited Jan. 7, 2015). The
provision was in legislation introduced in the House of Representatives containing proposed amendments to the
CVRA and other crime victim-related legislation. It was referred for subcommittee consideration, but no action
was taken prior to the expiration of the congressional session. All Actions: H.R. 4165 113th Congress (20132014), CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4165/all-actions (last visited
Jan. 7, 2015).
469 See supra notes 328-36 and accompanying text (discussing
the Paroline decision).
466
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the review standard will significantly change the outcomes of CVRA mandamus petitions
in the future.47 0

See supra notes 429-64 and accompanying text (discussing the limited impact of the CVRA mandamus
review standard on petition outcomes).
470
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POSTSCRIPT: OUT OF THE MANDAMUS MUDDLE

After completion of this Article, both the Senate and House of Representatives
approved an amendment to the CVRA to resolve the circuit conflict regarding the CVRA
mandamus review standard.47 1 In separate legislation approved regarding other matters,
both chambers included a provision that explicitly states that the appellate courts "shall
apply ordinary standards of appellate review" in deciding CVRA mandamus petitions.4 72
Prior to the publication of this Article, the House of Representatives adopted the Senate
version of the broader legislation containing the CVRA mandamus review standard
amendment previously approved in both chambers.4 73 President Barack Obama signed the
legislation into law on May 29, 2015.474 This CVRA amendment resolves the circuit
conflict regarding the mandamus review standard that has existed throughout the first ten
years of the CVRA implementation and it will provide appellate courts greater guidance in
considering CVRA mandamus petitions in the future.4 7 5 However, as this Article has
demonstrated, the resolution of the circuit conflict regarding the mandamus review

471 See S. 178, 114th Cong. § 113 (2015); H.R. 181, 114th Cong. § 10 (2015); 161 CONG. REC. S2,338 (daily ed.
Apr. 22, 2015) (reflecting passage of the legislation); 161 CONG. REC. H607 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2015) (reflecting
passage of the legislation); see also All Actions: S. 178
114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.Gov,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 14th-congress/senate-bill/178/all-actions (last visited June 6, 2015); AllActions:
H.R. 181 114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS.Gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/181/all-actions (last visited May 21, 2015); cf supra note 468 and accompanying text (describing previous
legislative proposals to resolve the mandamus review standard issue).
47 2
S. 178, 114th Cong. § 113 (2015); H.R. 181, 114th Cong. § 10 (2015). Both the Senate and House of
Representatives included this CVRA amendment in legislation addressing victims of trafficking. In this
legislation, both chambers also approved additional CVRA amendments, such as 1) the addition of CVRA rights
to timely information about plea bargains and deferred prosecution agreements and to information about the
CVRA rights themselves and 2) a provision to permit the mandamus litigants and the appellate court to agree to a
different time period for mandamus resolution than the 72 hour time period established in the CVRA. S. 178,
114th Cong. § 113 (2015); H.R. 181, 114th Cong. § 10 (2015); AllActions: S 178, supra note 471; AllActions:
H.R. 181, supra note 471.
473 See 161 CONG. REC. H3,329-30 (daily ed. May 19, 2015) (reflecting passage of the legislation); AllActions:
S. 178, supra note 471.
474 See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 113; AllActions: S. 178, supra note
471.
47 Although intended to resolve the circuit conflict regarding the CVRA mandamus review standard, the review
standard Congress has selected may not be entirely clear. The amendment provides for the use of "ordinary
standards of appellate review" in CVRA mandamus proceedings. S. 178, 114th Cong. § 113 (2015). Traditional
appellate review standards include de novo review of questions of law, clear error review of questions of fact,
and abuse of discretion review of matters entrusted to the trial court's discretion. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 558 (1988); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005). The only discussion
of the proposed legislative clarification of the CVRA mandamus review standard appears in the House of
Representatives Committee on the Judiciary report:

This section adopts the approach followed by the Ninth Circuit in Kenna v. U.S. District
Courtfor the CentralDistrictof California,435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006), and the Second
Circuit in In re WR. HuffAsset Management Company, 409 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2005),
namely that, despite the use of a writ of mandamus as a mechanism for victims' rights
enforcement, Congress intended that such writs be reviewed under ordinary appellate
review standards.
H.R. REP. No. 114-7, at 8 (2015). As described in this Article, the Second Circuit adopted an abuse of discretion
mandamus review standard for CVRA petitions in WR. HuffAsset Management Co., 409 F.3d at 562-63, and
the Ninth Circuit adopted an abuse of discretion or legal error mandamus review standard in Kenna, 435 F.3d at
1017. See supra notes 48-59, 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing the CVRA mandamus review standards
established in these decisions). Although similar, these two review standards are not identical and they do not
include all of the traditional appellate review standards. Thus, even after the enactment of this CVRA
amendment, there may be some continuing questions about the applicable CVRA mandamus review standard.
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standard is not likely to significantly change the outcomes of CVRA mandamus
petitions.476

See supra notes 429-64 and accompanying text (discussing the limited impact of the CVRA mandamus
review standard on the petition outcomes).
476
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GIVING AN ACQUITTAL ITS DUE: WHY A
QUARTET OF SIXTH AMENDMENT CASES
MEANS THE END OF UNITED STATES V. WATTS
AND ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING
Lucius T. Outlaw III

Lucius T. Outlaw III is an assistant federal public defender in Maryland. Wesleyan University, B.A., 1993;
George Washington School of Political Management, M.A., 1996; University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D.,
2001. I would like to dedicate this article to my wife, Ami, for her unyielding support, and my parents, Lucius
Jr. and Freida Outlaw, who showed the way with their scholarship.
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In 2007, Mr. Joseph Jones, Mr. Desmond Thurston, and Mr. Antwuan Ball

exercised their Sixth Amendment right to require the government prove to a Washington,
D.C. jury that they were guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of multiple offenses arising
from their alleged involvement with a crack-dealing gang. 1 The three defendants were
charged with conspiracy to distribute crack, distribution of crack (multiple counts), and
various violent crime and racketeering offenses.2 At trial, the government's proof included
recordings of the defendants selling crack, testimony from former defendants turned
cooperators, and testimony from witnesses who had purchased crack from the three
defendants.3 On November 28, 2007, the jury convicted the three men of the distribution
charges, but acquitted them of the conspiracy, racketeering, and violent crime charges.4
Despite the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, the sentencing judge leveraged
the distribution convictions to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendants' "crimes were part of a common scheme to distribute crack." 5 The judge then
determined, again using the preponderance standard, that the scheme involved sales of
over 500 grams of crack for Mr. Jones, and 1.5 kilograms of crack for the other two
defendants.6 Based on these findings, the judge increased the three defendants' sentencing
exposure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from between 27 and 71 months
imprisonment, to 324 to 405 months for Mr. Jones, 262 to 327 months for Mr. Thurston,

and 292 to 365 months for Mr. Ball. The judge varied below the enhanced ranges to
impose prison sentences of 180 months for Mr. Jones, 194 months for Mr. Thurston, and
225 months for Mr. Ball.8

The three defendants appealed their sentences on the basis that "their sentences
violated their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury because they were based, in part, on
[their] supposed involvement in the very conspiracy that the jury acquitted them of
participating in." 9 While the D.C. Circuit "underst[oo]d why appellants find sentencing on
acquitted conduct unfair," the law allowed it, so the appellate court found no fault with
sentences the three defendants received.10
This outcome shocks the conscience of the average layperson whose knowledge
of the criminal justice system likely begins and ends with "innocent until proven guilty."
That is because what allowed this outcome is a dirty secret of the criminal justice system:
United States v.

Watts. Watts allows judges to sentence multi-count defendants for

conduct underlying acquitted counts." It is an allocation of judicial power that (for most)
provokes visceral protestation. Yet, it is a practice that has continued largely unabated
before and after the Supreme Court blessed it in Watts over 17 years ago.
Many commentators and scholars have written how acquitted conduct sentencing
violates the intent and spirit of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. This article takes this

' United Statesv. Jones, 744 F.3d 1362, 1365, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 8 (2014). Only Mr.
Jones and Mr. Ball were charged with the violent crimes. See id at 1365 nl.
2Id.
at 1365 & n.1.
SId. at 1365.
4
Id. at 1365 & n.1.
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1365-66.
7id.

8Id.
9

Id. at 1368.
1369; The Supreme Court denied the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari. Jones v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 8 (2014). The denial, and Justice Scalia's dissent, is discussed later in this article.
" 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997).

1 Id. at
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common analysis one step further, by arguing that a quartet of Supreme Court Sixth
Amendment cases are a Constitutional bar to acquitted conduct sentencing. With Apprendi
v. New Jersey, Blakely v. Washington 3 , United States v. Booker 4 , and more recently,

Alleyne v. United States", the Supreme Court reinforced, clarified, and extended the line
in the sand that separates the power and reach of the bench from the province of the jury.
Taken together, this "max-min quartet" firmly establishes that a judge's sentencing power
begins and ends with the jury and the reasonable doubt standard. 1 6 More importantly, they
provide the means to force the Sixth Amendment confrontation that the Supreme Court
deftly avoided in Watts -- a confrontation that Watts cannot survive.
SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 AND THE BIRTH OF THE GUIDELINES
Before examining Watts and the max-min quartet, it is important to understand

the judicial context and environment that allowed Watts and acquitted conduct sentencing
to emerge and survive, despite contradicting bedrock principles of the American criminal
justice system.
For nearly a century prior to 1984, the federal system employed an indeterminate
sentencing model that approached crime as a moral disease to be cured through
rehabilitation.17 Indeed, the model "was premised on a faith in rehabilitation." 8 Judges,
supported by parole officers, were viewed as experts of the disease, and were therefore
vested with broad discretion to fashion sentences that provided sufficient time to cure
defendants through rehabilitation. 1
During this time, judicial sentencing authority and practice were largely
unregulated and unchecked. The majority of federal criminal statutes had open-ended
punishment ranges or merely set the maximum numbers of years a defendant could be
sentenced to prison.2 0 Judges had unquestioned discretion to sentence a defendant
anywhere within the statutory limits. 2 1 Appellate courts took a hands-off approach and
interjected themselves only when a sentence exceeded the statutory limits or reflected a
gross abuse of discretion.22 This unfettered respect for judicial discretion extended even to

13

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
542 U.S. 296 (2004), reh g denied, 542 U.S. 961 (2004).

14

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

12

133 S. Ct. 2152 (2013).
See cases cited supra notes 12-15.
" See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66 (1989) ("For almost a century, the Federal Government
employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing."); see also Tapia v. United States, 13 1 S. Ct.
2382, 2383, 2386 (2011) (citing and quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Is
Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1186 (1993).
" Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363 ("Both indeterminate sentencing and parole were
based on concepts of the offender's possible, indeed probable rehabilitation. . . .").
19 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-64. Tapia, 131 U.S. at 2386 ("If the judge decided to impose a prison term,
discretionary authority shifted to parole officials: Once the defendant had a spent a third of his term behind bars,
they could order his release.").
20 See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics ofSentencingReform: The Legislative History ofthe Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 225 (1993).
21 Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867, 869-70 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("It is clear beyond peradventure that this court
had and has no control over a sentence which comports with the applicable statute, 'even though it be a death
sentence.' Nor may we reduce or modify a sentence nor require a trial judge to do so.") (quoting Rosenberg v.
United States, 344 U.S. 889, 890 (1952)); United States v. Lowery, 335 F. Supp. 519, 521 (D.D.C. 1971) ("It is
clear that absent a manifest abuse of discretion, and provided the trial judge complies with the applicable statute,
his discretion in sentencing cannot be infringed upon."); Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 225.
22 Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 226, 245; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
1
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death sentences. 2 3 A judge's sentence, for the most part, was final and absolute. 2 4 It was
only with the introduction of federal parole in 1910, did Congress reduce (somewhat)
25
judicial sentencing power.
By the 1970s, "this model of indeterminate sentencing eventually fell into
disfavor."26 The model, and unchecked judicial sentencing discretion, came under
increasing criticism from academics and legislators from both the political left and right.27
To the conservative right, judges were using their unchecked discretion to impose lenient,
disparate, and inconsistent sentences that allowed dangerous, repeat offenders to escape
sufficient terms of imprisonment.28 For the liberal left, the problem was a growing
disparity in the sentences handed to minorities compared to the lighter sentences white
defendants received for comparable crimes. 2 9
After a decade of many fits and starts (and failures) to revamp sentencing policy,
the contrasting concerns of the political left and right converged with the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (hereinafter the "SRA"). 30 The SRA was a near complete
overhaul of federal sentencing policy and practice. 31 Most notably, the SRA was the
abandonment of the indeterminate model in favor of a determinate model that Congress
believed would yield consistent and proportionate sentences, and ease the public's
confusion and concern about sentencing lengths.32 To be the engine of this new model, the
SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter the "Commission"),
See, e.g., Rosenberg, 344 U.S. at 889-90 (1952) ("A sentence imposed by a United States district court, even
though it be a death sentence, is not within the power of the Court to revise.") (discussing congressional action in
1911 abolishing the right to an appeal).
24 Lowery, 335 F. Supp. at 521 ("Initially, it cannot be gainsaid that
in matters relating to sentencing the trial
court has virtually absolute, if not unfettered discretion.").
25 Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 226-27 ("[P]arole authorities were assigned the task of detenninng the actual
release date for most federal prisoners . . . With the advent of federal parole, federal prison sentences became
partially indeterminate.") (explaining that parole reduced judicial sentencing power).
26 Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011); see also Gerald Leonard & Christine Dieter, Punishment
23

Without Conviction: Controllingthe Use of Unconvicted Conduct in FederalSentencing, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM.

L. 260, 271 (2012).
27 See Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26, at 271; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 41 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) ("The
absence of a comprehensive federal sentencing law and of statutory guidance on how to select the appropriate
sentencing option creates inevitable disparity in the sentences which courts impose on similarly situated
defendants."); See also Stith & Koh, supra note 20, at 228. Perhaps the most influential critic was Marvin
Frankel, a well-respected former federal judge and former Columbia law school professor. Id. In 1972, while
serving on the bench, Judge Frankel published Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, which zealously
criticized judicial "wholly unchecked and sweeping" sentencing authority and called for the creation of a
"Commission on Sentencing" responsible for establishing "binding" sentencing guides. Id. Judge Frankel's
views and his book would serve as the model and inspiration for the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Id.
28 See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 44-45; see Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26, at 271; see Frank 0. Bowman, III,
Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has MangledAmerican Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77

U. CHI. L. REv. 367, 374 (2010).
29 See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 65; see also Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2387; see Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26, at 271.
30 See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 65 ("The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in the existing
criminal justice system, and makes it clear that the system is ripe for reform."); see also Tapia, 131 S.Ct. at 2387.
See Stith & Koh, supra note 20, for a discussion of the comprehensive legislative history of the SRA.
31 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132-33 (1991) ("The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 revolutionized the
manner in which district courts sentence persons convicted of federal crimes."); see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
65, ("[The SRA] meets the critical challenge of sentencing reform. The bill's sweeping provisions are designed
to structure judicial sentencing discretion, eliminate indeterminate sentencing, phase out parole release, and make
criminal sentencing fairer and more certain.").
32 See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1474-75 (2012); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?,40
UCLA L. REv. 1179, 1190 (1993); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A.3 (2013) [hereinafter
"U.S.S.G."]. In passing the SRA, Congress sought "honesty in sentencing", "to avoid the confusion and implicit
deception" of indeterminate sentencing, and "reasonable uniformity." Id. [Note: The sentencing guidelines are
referred throughout this Article as the "Guidelines"].
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and charged it with crafting the federal sentencing guidelines
"Guidelines"). 3 3

(hereinafter the

The SRA also shifted the focus of sentencing from rehabilitation to punishment
and deterrence.3 4 More bluntly, the SRA was the legislative rejection of the premise that
prison was for rehabilitation.3 5 Indeed, Congress made its rejection clear by limiting
judicial discretion to the sentencing factors specified by Congress, of which rehabilitation
is one of many, and one that is not highly valued.3 6
MODIFIED REAL OFFENSE SENTENCING UNDER THE GUIDELINES

It took the Commission nearly three years to draft the Guidelines and for
Congress to approve them. At the start, the Commission's critical decision was whether to
base the Guidelines on the charged offense or the "real" offense.37 In a "charge offense"
system, a defendant is sentenced solely on the offense of conviction (and his criminal
record) without considering the particulars of the defendant's criminal conduct. 38 Charge
offense sentencing restrains judicial discretion and promotes sentencing consistency, but
at the expense of particularized sentencing, which recognizes that criminal offenses are
committed with varying degrees of culpability and that not all defendants are the same.
In contrast, under a "real offense" system, a defendant's sentence is based on the
particulars and specifics of his criminal conduct, the context of the conduct, and who was
involved with or injured by the conduct. 39 The advantage of real offense sentencing is that
it allows a judge to tailor a sentence specifically to the circumstances that aggravate or
mitigate a particular criminal act. The downside is that real offense sentencing fosters
sentencing disparity -- a defendant's sentence is largely determined by which judge the
defendant draws and how the judge subjectively views the defendant and the defendant's
conduct.
The Commission initially pursued a real offense system. 4 0 However, this effort
"proved unproductive" as the Commission failed to find a "practical way to combine and
account for the large number of diverse harms arising in different circumstances." 4 1 The
33

.

Mistretta,488 U.S. at 367-68 (1989); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2387; see also S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 63 ("[The
SRA] creates a United States Sentencing Commission whose duty is to promulgate sentencing guidelines and
policy
statements."); Lear, supra note 32, at 1190.
34
Mistretta,488 U.S. at 367 ("[The SRA] rejects imprisonment as a means of promoting rehabilitation. .. and it
states that punishment should serve retributive, educational, deterrent, and incapacitative goals.") (citation
omitted); see also Lear, supra note 32, at 1190-91.
35
See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2010); see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 40 ("The
sentencing provisions of current law were originally based on a rehabilitation model . . .. Recent studies suggest
that this approach has failed, and most sentencing judges as well as the parole commission agree that the
rehabilitation model is not an appropriate bases for sentencing.").
3 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1998 (1984)
(codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3582) ("[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation."); see generally Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (holding that the SRA precluded a sentencing court from
lengthening a defendant's prison term to promote rehabilitation); but see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (West
2010) ("[T]o provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.").
3 See U.S.S.G., supra note 32, § 1AL.4(a) ("One of the most important questions for the Commission to decide
was whether to base sentences upon the actual conduct . . . or upon the conduct that constitutes the elements of
the offense for which the defendant was charged and of which he was convicted . .
38
d
39
d
40 id.
41 id
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Commission was also unable to devise a simple and efficient system that would not result
in the sentencing disparities the SRA was enacted to prevent.4 2
The Commission eventually settled on a modified real offense system that
incorporates elements of charge offense sentencing.43 This hybrid system is employed
today. It consists of base offense levels for every federal offense and pre-set offense level
increases (and a few decreases) based on contextual factors. The base offense level with
the adjustments produce a final offense level that ranges from one to forty-three.44
Separately, to account for the varying criminal records of defendants, the Commission
established a point-based system for measuring a defendant's criminal record and status at
the time of the instant conviction.4 5 A defendant's total number of criminal history points
determines into which of the six criminal history categories he falls. 46 Using the
Guidelines' sentencing table, the intersection point of a defendant's the final offense level
and his criminal history category yield his presumptive sentencing range. 47
RELEVANT CONDUCT

A central tenet of real offense sentencing is that sentencing judges are free to set
a term of imprisonment, within the statutory maximum, based on the specific conduct of
the defendant and all that resulted from the conduct. In real offense sentencing a judge is
not limited by the elements of the offense of conviction. The "modified" approach of the
Guidelines incorporates this tenet by allowing judges to sentence a defendant based on
"relevant conduct." 48 Relevant conduct extends outside and beyond the elements of the
offense of conviction, as well as the offense itself. 4 9 Relevant conduct can consist of facts
related to the criminal conduct underlying the conviction, uncharged conduct, dismissed
charges, the conduct of others done "in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity," or (the focus of this Article) acquitted conduct.50
To encapsulate "relevant conduct" the Guidelines enumerate a number of
"specific offense characteristics" and "applicable general adjustments" consisting of
particular mitigating or aggravating circumstances that increase (or at times decrease) a
defendant's offense level by a prescribed number of levels. 5 1 The number of adjustments

42

id.

Lear, supra note 32, at 1194; Leonard and Dieter, supra note 26, at 273; The Commission characterization of
the system as a charge offense system that "contains a significant number of real offense elements," U.S.S.G.,
43

supra note 37, §lA.4(a), is belied by the real offense adjustments and considerations that are built into or

accompany nearly every factor for determining a defendant's sentencing range, from his base offense level, see,
e.g., U.S.S.G., supra note 37, §4A1.1(d) (requiring the addition of two criminal history points if the defendant

committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence such as probation or parole). On its face
and in practice, the Guidelines are a real offense system that has elements of a charge offense system.
44
45 See generally U.S.S.G., supra note 37, §1B1.1(a); see also id. §2A1.1(a).
1d. § 1B1.(a).
46

id

47id

48

§ 1B1.3.
Id; see also id. § 5K2.21 (allowing a court to "depart upward" for dismissed or uncharged conduct).
5o Id. § 1B 1.3(a)(1). However, the Guidelines do not explicitly provide that acquitted conduct is "relevant
conduct." Indeed, the Guidelines provide only a bland and passive endorsement of acquitted conduct sentencing.
See id. § 6A.3 cmt. background ("In determining relevant facts, sentencing judges are not restricted to
information that would be admissible at trial.") (citing Watts in support of the Guidelines' sentencing policy).
" Id § lB 1.3. The number of enumerated offense adjustments is fixed, and in some ways limited. For the
Commission to account for the nearly unlimited variations and variables of conduct and harm would have
rendered the Guidelines too complex, dense, and unworkable. See id. § 1A.4(a) ("[N]o practical way to
combine and account for the large number of diverse harms arising in different circumstances; nor did [the
Commission] find a practical way to reconcile the need for a fair adjudicatory procedure with the need for a
1 d

49
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is fixed, and in some ways limited, because to account for "every conceivable wrinkle of
each case would quickly become unworkable and seriously compromise the certainty of
punishment and its deterrent effect." 5 2 However, for egregious conduct that falls through
the cracks, the Guidelines encourage judges to increase a defendant's offense level or
sentence a defendant above his presumed guideline range. 53
Relevant conduct sentencing under the Guidelines mirrors the statutory directive
from Congress that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a [court]
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 54
Relevant conduct sentencing, therefore, is essentially without boundaries or limits. One
such absent border is the reasonable doubt standard. The preponderance of evidence
standard reigns for sentencing. 5 It is a standard that is free from the purposefully
burdensome constraints and obligations of the reasonable doubt standard, in favor of a
standard where a splinter over 50% exposes a defendant to an enhanced sentence.5 6 Once
the door of conviction is opened, a defendant is left to answer for his entire life up to that
moment, regardless of how tenuous the link to the offense of conviction, and regardless
that the proof would fail to convince ajury.
UNITED STATES V. WATT

In two cases decided together in 1997 as United States v. Watts,5 7 the Supreme
Court established that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct otherwise proven
under the preponderance standard at sentencing to determine a defendant's sentence. 58
In Watts, police found cocaine base and two loaded firearms in separate parts of
Watts's home. 59 At trial, Watts was convicted of possessing with the intent to distribute
cocaine base, but acquitted of the using a firearm in relation to the drug offense.60 In the
companion case, Putra was captured on videotape selling cocaine to a government
informant on two separate occasions (May 8, 1992 and May 9, 1992). The jury convicted
speedy sentencing process given the potential existence of hosts of adjudicated 'real hann' facts in many typical

cases.").
52Id. §lA.3.
See, e.g., id. §§ 5K2.0-5K2.17.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3661 (West 2014) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 37, § 1B 1.4 (adopting §
3661). It is important to note that § 3661's broad unrestricted scope is not fully embraced by the Guidelines. In
contrast to § 3661, the Guidelines discourage or limit a judge from considering a defendant's education,
vocational skills, drug or alcohol dependence, gambling addiction, employment record, family ties, race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status, disadvantaged upbringing in determining a sentence or
decreasing a defendant's offense level. See Id. § 1B1.4 cmt. background; Id. §§ 5H1.2-5H1.6, 5H1.10, 5H1.12.
See McMillanv. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that using the preponderance standard to
find sentencing factors that enhance a sentence within the statutory maximum is consistent with due process); see
also U.S.S.G., supra note 37, § 6A1.3 cmt. background ("The Commission believes that use of a preponderance
of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving
disputes regarding the application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.").
* See, United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 & n.2 (1997).
* Watts consisted of two cases from the Ninth Circuit: United States v. Watts and UnitedStates v. Putra. Watts
consisted of two cases from the Ninth Circuit: UnitedStates v. Watts and United States v. Putra. Id. at 149.
" In Williams v. New York, the Supreme Court opened the door to acquitted conduct sentencing by affirming a
trial judge's imposition of the death sentence after the jury recommended a life sentence for the defendant's first
degree murder charge. 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949). The Supreme Court held that it is consistent with due process
and proper under New York law, for the trial judge to rely on additional information obtained by the probation
department, but not presented to the jury, to impose a harsher punishment than had been recommended by the
jury. Id. at 242-43.
5
W~atts, 529 U.S. at 149.
6
oId at 149-50.
5

54
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her of the distribution count for the May 8 th transaction, but acquitted her for the May 9 th
transaction. 6 1 During the sentencing phase in both cases, the district court found that Watts
and Putra had engaged in the conduct underlying the acquitted offenses, and used this
"relevant conduct" to increase their respective final offense levels under the Guidelines. 6 2
For Watts, the adjustment consisted of a two-level bump for possession of a gun in
connection with a drug offense.6 3 For Putra, the court aggregated the amount of drugs
from the May 8 th and May 9 th transactions to determine her offense level. 6 4 In both cases,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing, on the ground that
it was improper to punish the defendants for facts and offenses that the jury rejected with
their acquittals. 65
The Ninth Circuit's decisions created a circuit split.6 6 In response, the Supreme
Court took up Watts and Putra. The Court resolved the split by reversing and remanding
both Ninth Circuit decisions by way of a short per curiam opinion that was issued without
full briefing or oral argument. 67
The Supreme Court's starting point was the "longstanding principle" codified by

§ 3661 and pre-dating the Guidelines, that "sentencing courts have broad discretion to
consider various kinds of information," including conduct that may not have resulted in a
conviction.68 The Court noted that the Guidelines expressly adopted and incorporated this
69
principle. In the Court's view, this "longstanding principle" plus the Guidelines' broad
embrace of "relevant conduct," created an expansive pool of sentencing conduct that
includes acquitted conduct.70
Next, with a quick stroke of the pen, the Court dismissed any thought that
acquitted conduct sentencing runs afoul of double jeopardy protections. The Court
explained that it is "erroneous" to confuse punishing a defendant for a crime for which he
was acquitted, with sentencing enhancements that increase a term of imprisonment
because of the manner in which defendant committed the crime.7 1 According to the Court,
sentencing based on acquitted conduct is the latter, and therefore does not implicate
double jeopardy.7 2
The Court ended its short opinion by clarifying what an acquittal means.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's view in Watts and Putra, the Court explained that a "not
guilty" verdict is not a rejection of any facts or a finding that the defendant is actually

"'Id
62

Id. at 150-51.
Id at 150 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1. 1(b)(1) for triggering the bump).
64
Id. at 150-51.
65 Id

66 Id at 149 ("Every other Court of Appeals has held that a sentencing court may [consider acquitted conduct], if
the Government establishes that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.").
6' Id. at 170-71 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("For these reasons the case should have been set for full briefing and
consideration on the oral argument calendar. From the Court's failure to do so, I dissent.").
6' Id at 151 (majority opinion).
69
Id. at 152-53 (citing and discussing U.S.S.G. §1B1.3 and 1B1.4).
70
Id. at 151-53.
' Id. at 154. In making the point, the Court relied solely on Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995). In Witte,
the defendant pled guilty to a marijuana distribution charge, but was sentenced based on a guideline range that
was calculated by including uncharged conduct involving cocaine importation. Id at 389. The defendant was
later indicted for the cocaine importation conduct. The Supreme Court held that the later indictment was not
barred by double jeopardy because the sentencing court's use of the uncharged cocaine conduct in increased
sentence for the marijuana charge did not constitute "punishment" for the cocaine conduct. Id
72 Watts, 519 U.S. at 154.
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innocent. 7 3 To the Court, a "not guilty" verdict is narrow, specific, and "merely proves the
existence of a reasonable doubt as to [a defendant's] guilt" because the government failed
to prove at least one essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 4
Therefore, to the Court, an acquittal provides no barriers to the government "relitigating
an issue when presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof."7 5
Justices Stevens and Kennedy issued separate dissents. Justice Kennedy took
issue with the Court's decision to render an opinion without full briefing and oral
argument. 7 6 Justice Stevens' criticism was more substantive and critical.7 7 Justice Stevens
methodically dismantled the majority's legal reasoning to show why neither the Court's
"prior cases nor the text of [§ 3661] warrants this perverse result."7 " And he ended his
dissent with a strong rebuke of what he saw as the majority's betrayal of the principles of
constitutional criminal jurisprudence.
THE COSTS OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT SENTENCING

Any discussion about the costs of acquitted conduct sentencing must start with
the depreciation of the jury's primacy in our criminal justice system. The right to a jury
trial is "fundamental to our system of justice" 0 whose importance is "hard to
overemphasize."s' Indeed, it is a civil right that the Founding Fathers agreed was
absolutely necessary even though they disagreed about the size and role of the federal
government.8 2 Acquitted conduct sentencing undermines and devalues the role of the jury,
and mocks the jury's historical roots and prominence by "trivializ[ing] 'legal guilt' or
'legal innocence' - which is what a jury decides."8 3 Indeed, the practice "severs the
connection between verdict and sentence," "thwarts the express will of the jury," and
jeopardizes the jury's power to serve as the bulwark between the accused and the
government.

84

The next conspicuous cost is that acquitted conduct provides prosecutors with a
second-bite at the apple of punishment under circumstances that substantially disfavor the
defendant. 5 The forum of sentencing advantages the government - one fact-finder (judge)

73

Id. at 155.
Id (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Fireanns, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)).
Id at 156 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 343 (1990)).
Id. at 170 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 159-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id at 164.
7 Id at 169-70 ("The notion that a charge that cannot be sustained by proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give
rise to the same punishment as if it had been so proved is repugnant to that jurisprudence.").
8o Duncanv. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968).
8United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
82 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The friends and adversaries of the plan of the
convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is
any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter
represent it as the very palladium of free government."); See also Apprendiv. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T] he jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the
Bill of Rights.").
83 United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 152 (D. Mass. 2005).
84 United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 662-64 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("Stated differently, the jury is essentially ignored
when it disagrees with the prosecution."), overruled in partby United States v. Kaminski, 501 F.3d 655, 657 (6th
Cir. 2007). This outcome is not only "nonsensical" but violates the letter and spirit of our country's criminal
jurisprudence. Id.
8See
Barry L. Johnson, Ifat FirstYou Don'tSucceed Abolishing the Use ofAcquitted Conduct in Guidelines
Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REv. 153, 182-83 (1996); see also Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 672; see also United
74
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as opposed to multiple fact-finders who must be unanimous to convict (jury), a lower
standard of proof, looser evidentiary rules, and a finding that the defendant is already
guilty of something.8 6 It is against this backdrop that acquitted conduct sentencing allows
prosecutors to present the same evidence rejected by the jury (or even was deemed
inadmissible at trial) to establish that a defendant deserves an enhanced prison sentence
for conduct the jury did not find supported a guilty verdict. In effect, after failing before a
jury, the prosecution is allowed a "mini-trial" to re-ligate the issue under more favorable
circumstances. 7 And "[w]ith this second chance at success, the Government almost
always wins."
A related cost is that acquitted conduct sentencing empowers and emboldens
prosecutors to charge additional offenses with the intent of establishing "guilt" at
sentencing (under more favorable conditions) rather than at trial. In other words: charge
inflation. Take for instance a prosecutor who believes (or rather desires) that five charges
could apply to a defendant's conduct, but recognizes that only two charges can be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. In this scenario, acquitted conduct sentencing encourages the
prosecutor to pursue all five charges because only one conviction is needed to open the
door at sentencing to any of the charges rejected by the jury." In addition to the costs in
prison years, charge inflation contributes to pleas through cost-benefit coercion. A
defendant facing multiple charges not only has to weigh whether she can emerge
successful at trial, but also the added penalty exposure posed by charges she can beat
under the reasonable doubt standard, but may lose under the preponderance standard at
sentencing. More often than not, the result of this calculation is that the potential years of
imprisonment after trial, even if the defendant is able beat some of the charges, far
outweighs the plea offer provided by the government.
Finally, another cost are the potential sentencing disparities that the Guidelines
are designed to prevent. Not all judges engage in acquitted conduct sentencing, and the
judges that do engage in the practice, do not do so in a uniform manner. Disparities are a
inescapable consequence of defendants who appear before judges who reject acquitted
conduct sentencing and those who embrace it in varying degrees.
MAX-MIN QUARTET

As the central thesis of this Article is based on the "max-min quartet" of
Apprendi, Blakely, Booker, andAlleyne, a brief overview of the four cases is warranted.
90
Apprendi v. New Jersey

Apprendi was arrested for firing several shots into the home of a black family
who recently moved into an all-white neighborhood. During post-arrest questioning,
Apprendi stated that he fired into the house because the occupants were "black in color"
States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 776 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring) ("Government gets the proverbial
,second bite at the apple' during sentencing to essentially retry those counts on which it lost.").
86 Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 672 ("[C]onsideration of acquitted conduct skews the criminal justice system's
power differential much in the prosecution's favor.").
Id. at 672-73.

Canania, 532 F.3d at 776.
United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1501 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[Relevant conduct sentencing] obviously
invite[s] the prosecutor to indict for less serious offenses which are easy to prove and then expand them in the
probation office.") (quoting United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1332 (6th Cir. 1990)) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting).
90 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
89
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and he did not "want them in the neighborhood."" He was subsequently charged by a
New Jersey grand jury with 23 counts for the shootings and unlawful weapon
possession. 92 None of the charged counts referred to New Jersey's hate crime statute.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Apprendi pleaded guilty to two counts of seconddegree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and one count of possession of an
antipersonnel bomb. New Jersey law set a penalty range of five to ten years for the firearm
possession counts, and three to five years for the antipersonnel bomb count. 93 Under the
plea agreement, the state reserved the right to seek an enhanced sentence under New
Jersey's hate crime statute, while Apprendi reserved the right to claim that a hate crime
enhancement violated the Constitution.9 4
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the state's motion in support of the
hate crime enhancement. The judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
enhancement was warranted.9 5 Apprendi was sentenced to 12 years for one of the firearm
possession counts (or two years over the ten-year maximum), and to shorter concurrent
sentences for the remaining two counts.9 6
Apprendi appealed arguing that for the hate crime enhancement to apply, the
Constitution's due process clause required the government to prove the bias motive to a
jury guided by the reasonable doubt standard. The state appellate court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected Apprendi's argument. Both courts of review relied heavily on
McMillan v. Pennsylvania to find that the hate crime enhancement was a sentencing

factor, rather than an element or separate offense requiring the reasonable doubt
standard. 9
The Supreme Court, however, sided with Apprendi. The Court held that New
Jersey's hate crime statute violated due process because it allowed a judge to increase a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on the preponderance of the evidence. 9 " In
reaching this decision, the Court started with the premise that "taken together" the Sixth
Amendment's trial rights and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights
"indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. '"9
The Court then explored the "historic link between verdict and judgment and the
consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the legal
penalties."100 For years since the nation's founding, according to the Court, "[a]ny
possible distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was
unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court ...
"o1 The Court acknowledged that trial practices can "change in the course of centuries
91
92

Id. at 469 (noting that Apprendi later retracted the statement).
id

9

Id. at 469-470.

94 See id. at 468-69. New Jersey's hate crime statute provided for an "extended term" of imprisonment if the trial

judge found under the preponderance standard that a defendant committed the crime to intimidate a person or
group because of the person's or group's race, color, gender, or other protected classes. Id.
95
Id. at 470-71.
96
Id. at 471.
97 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding that using the preponderance standard to find sentencing factors that enhance
a sentence within the statutory maximum is consistent with due process).
98
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491-92, 497.
99
Id at 476-77 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)).
.00 Id. at 482.
1o1

Id. at 478.
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and still remain true to the principles" of the Founding Fathers. 102 But, the Court stressed,
this "practice must at least adhere to the basic principles undergirding the requirements of
trying to ajury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory offense, and proving those facts
beyond a reasonable doubt." 10 3
With these principles in mind, the Court proceeded to reject all three arguments
put forward by New Jersey in support of its statute. The state's first argument was that the
hate crime statute's biased purpose penalty was a "traditional sentencing factor" and not
an "element" of a separate hate crime offense. 10 4 To the Court, characterizing "biased
purpose" as just a sentencing factor regarding motive, greatly undervalued its legal
significance. "By its very terms, this statute mandates an examination of the defendant's
state of mind - a concept known well to the criminal law as the defendant's mens rea."los
And a defendant's intent, or mens rea, "is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a
core criminal offense 'element. '106

-

The state's second argument - McMillan allows a legislature to authorize a judge
to find a traditional sentencing factor on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence
was equally unavailing. The Court read McMillan to frown on a legislature allowing a
judge to significantly increase a defendant's maximum penalty using the preponderance of
the evidence standard.1 0 7 Moreover, it was of no Constitutional consequence to the Court,
that the New Jersey legislature placed the hate crime enhancer within the sentencing
provisions of the state's criminal code. The placement did "not define its character,"
which the Court found resembled an element rather than a sentencing factor.o
The Court used few words to dispatch the state's final argument - that
Almendarez-Torres v. United States extended McMillan's holding to the New Jersey
statute.10 9 To the Court, the two situations were far too different. Almerdarez-Torres

concerned recidivism, which does not relate to the commission of the offense itself. New
Jersey hate crime statute, conversely, "goes precisely to what happened in the
commission of the offense.""' 0
In sum, the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""

0 2

1
103
104
105

Id. at 483.
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 492.
id.

' Id. at 493.

Id. at 494-95. The Court noted that New Jersey's hate crime statute turned a second-degree offense into a
first-degree offense under the state's criminal code, and therefore subjected defendants to significantly
heightened penalties. Id. at 494. In Apprendi's case, the statute potentially doubled Apprendi's maximum
sentence from 10 years to 20 years - a "differential. . .unquestionably of constitutional significance." Id. at 495.
107

108

Id

at 495-96.

Id. at 496; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that it was
constitutional for Congress to define recidivism, particularly illegal re-entry into the United States after being
deported following an aggravated felony conviction, as a sentencing factor, and not an element of the offense).
"o Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 ("There is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a priorjudgment of
conviction [provided beyond a reasonable doubt] and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser
standard of proof.").
109

".Id at 490.
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Blakely v. Washington

Four years later, the Supreme Court used Apprendi to invalidate another state's
use of sentencing factors to enhance a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory
maximum.113 In Blakely, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving
domestic violence and use of a firearm stemming from a violent episode involving his
estranged wife. Under Washington state law at the time, second degree kidnapping was a
class B felony with a 10-year imprisonment limit. 114 Another state law limited the
punishment for second degree kidnapping with a firearm to a range of 49 to 53 months
imprisonment, unless a judge found compelling and exceptional reasons to impose a
115
sentence exceeding the range.
During the sentencing hearing, Blakely's wife recounted the graphic details of
the kidnapping. 116 Having found that Blakely acted with "deliberate cruelty", the judge
rejected the state's recommendation for a sentence within the 49 to 53 month range, and
instead imposed a sentence of 90 months (or 37 months beyond the standard
11 7

maximum).

When the case reached the Supreme Court, Washington state argued that there
was no Apprendi violation because the relevant statutory maximum was not 53 months,

but rather the 10-year maximum for class B felonies under state law."" The Supreme
Court rejected the argument head-on, and set a bright-line rule for what constitutes the
"statutory maximum" under Apprendi:

Our precedents make clear, however, that the "statutory
maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant . . . In other words, the
relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a

judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum
he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge
inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow,
the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential
to the punishment," and the judge exceeds his proper authority. 19
The Court then used this bright line rule to find Blakely's 90-month sentence
constitutionally infirm. It was particularly important to the Court that the judge could not
have imposed the 90-month sentence based on the admitted facts in Blakely's guilty
plea. 120 Because the judge needed to find additional facts, beyond those admitted by
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
Id. at 301 ("This case requires us to apply the rule we expressed inApprendi . .
114 Id. at 298-300; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.40.030 (1975), amendedby Leg. Serv. 57-6151, 2d Spec. Sess., at
356 (Wash. 2001).
" The 49 to 53-month range consisted of, under Washington state law, a "standard range" of 13 to 17 months
for second-degree kidnapping and a 36-month firearm enhancement. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299.
11. Blakely had abducted his wife from their home, bound her with duct tape, forced her at knifepoint into a box
in the bed of his pickup truck, and ordered their 13-year old son to follow the truck in another car under threat of
shooting his wife with a shotgun. Id. at 298. The judge held a three-day bench hearing following Blakely's
objection to the sentence to obtain further testimony about the circumstances of the kidnapping. Id. at 300. The
judge affinned his finding of deliberate cruelty and the 90-month sentence at then end of the hearing. Id. at 301.
117 Id. at 300.
" Id. at 303.
119 Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 304.
113
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Blakely (or found by a jury), to impose the enhanced sentence, the Court held that the 90month sentence ran afoul of the Constitution and Apprendi.

121

After finding the 90-month sentence was invalid, the Court addressed Apprendi's
critics. The Court explained that for "[t]hose who would reject Apprendi," there were two
unsound alternatives. 122 The first alternative "is that the jury need only find whatever facts
the legislature chooses to label elements of the crime, and that those it labels sentencing
factors - no matter how much they may increase punishment - may be found by the
judge."1 23 The Court quickly deemed it "absurd" to follow this path, because the jury
would cease to "function as [the] circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice," and
judges and the State would have unlimited punishment power.124
The second alternative "is that legislatures may establish legally essential
sentencing factors within limits - limits crossed when, perhaps, the sentencing factor is a
'tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense."'l25 The Court's problem with this
alternative was the subjectivity of determining whether a sentencing factor exceeds
constitutional limits and improperly expands the role of the judge.126 This subjectivity, in
the Court's mind, is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's empowerment of the jury
(which reflects the founders' fear of the power of government and judges). 127
The Court then made clear that its decision was not about the constitutionality of
determinate sentencing, but rather "about how it can be implemented in a way that
respects the Sixth Amendment."1 28 In response to critics (such as Justice O'Connor), the
majority felt it was of no consequence that determinate sentencing schemes involve less
judicial fact-finding than indeterminate sentencing schemes. 129 What was important to the
majority was whether determinate sentencing schemes involve more judicialpower than
jury fact-finding, and therefore requiring more diligent protection of Sixth Amendment
trial and jury rights.130
1 31

United States v. Booker

Booker is well known for transforming the Guidelines into a provider of advisory
sentences rather than mandatory ones. What is often lost is that the decision rested on the
Supreme Court extending Apprendi to the Guidelines to find that Booker's enhanced
sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Booker was convicted at trial of possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams
of crack, which triggered a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. 132 Booker's guideline
range was 210 to 262 months imprisonment based on his criminal history and the evidence
Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 306.
id
124 Id
at 306-07; see id at 307 ("This would mean, for example, that a judge could sentence a man for
committing murder even if the jury convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm used to commit it - or
of making an illegal lane change while fleeing the death scene.").
125 Id
(quoting McMillanv. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)).
126 Id. at 307-08 ("With too far as the yardstick, it is always possible to
disagree with such judgments and never
to refute them.").
127 Id. at
308.
121

122
123

128

id

129

Id at 308-09.

130

id

131
132

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Id. at 227.
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at trial that his conduct involved 92.5 grams of crack.133 At sentencing the trial judge
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker's conduct involved an
additional 556 grams of crack.134 Based on this finding, the Guidelines required Booker to
receive a sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment.135 The trial judge
sentenced Booker to the low-end of the range -- 360 months in prison.136
Booker's appeal presented two questions to the Supreme Court. The first was
"Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence
under the [Guidelines] based on the sentencing judge's determination of fact (other than a
prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant[?]1"l 37 If the
answer was "yes," the second question concerned the proper remedy - whether the
Guidelines as whole had to be scrapped as unconstitutional or could parts of the
Guidelines be excised to save the rest. 138
The Court answered "yes" to the first question. In delivering the majority
opinion, Justice Stevens relied heavily on Apprendi and Blakely to hold that "[a]ny fact
(other than a prior conviction) that leads to a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond all reasonable doubt." 1 39 According to Justice
Stevens, those cases (and other similar cases) made clear that a defendant has a "right to
have a jury find the existence of 'any particular fact' that the law makes essential to his
1 40

punishment."

Nonetheless, the Court resisted rendering the entire Guidelines unconstitutional,
primarily because of all the efforts behind the passage of the SRA. In speaking for the
Court on the second question, Justice Breyer announced the Court's remedy for saving the
Guidelines from constitutional purgatory was to surgically remove the provisions that
rendered the Guidelines mandatory. 141 Justice Breyer explained that this approach, above
all other alternatives, would allow the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants to live in
concert with the determinate sentencing scheme Congress desperately wanted. 142
Alleyne v. United StateS143

While Apprendi and Blakely firmly established the limits of judicial fact-finding
to impose a sentence beyond a statutory maximum, questions remained about the
constitutional limits of judicial fact-finding to increase a defendant's minimum sentence.
Two years after Apprendi, the Supreme Court temporarily settled the questions with its
Harris v. United States decision which held that judges remained free to find facts to set
or increase a mandatory minimum faced by a defendant. 144 Harris's lifespan came to a

Id.
Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 245.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 244.
140 Id. at 32 (quoting Blakely,
542 U.S. at 301)
141 Id. at 245-58.
142 Id. at
258.
143 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
144 536 U.S. 545, 568-69 (2002), overruledbyAlleyne, 133 S. Ct. 2151. The Courtblessed the trial court's
finding by preponderance of the evidence that a firearm was brandished during criminal offense for purposes of
imposing enhanced sentence under 18 § 924(c)(1)(A). Id. at 567-68. The Court held that judicial finding of facts
133
134
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screeching halt in 2013 with the Alleyne decision.
Alleyne and an accomplice robbed a store manager on his way to deliver the
store's daily deposits at a local bank. During the robbery, Alleyne's accomplice
approached the manager with a gun. 145 A jury convicted Alleyne of multiple offenses
related to the robbery, including using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of
violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), which carries various mandatory minimum penalties
based on how the firearm was used during the crime. 146
The jury's verdict form did not indicate that Alleyne or his accomplice
"brandished" the firearm during the robbery. 147 Yet based on the presentence report that
recommended the seven-year "brandishing" penalty for Allyene, and evidence presented
at trial, the trial court imposed the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for
brandishing on the § 924(c) count. 148 The court dismissed Allyene's objection to the
sentence on the ground that under Harris, brandishing was a sentencing factor that the
court could find by a preponderance of the evidence without violating the Constitution. 149
The Supreme Court used Alleyne to re-examine whether Harris was consistent

.

and compatible with Apprendi. The Court concluded that it was not.150 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court started with the principle that the "touchstone for determining
whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the fact
constitutes an 'element' or 'ingredient' of the charged offense.,"1 5 To the Court, the
failure of Harris to extend this principle to facts increasing a mandatory minimum
sentence was inconsistent with Apprendi's definition of "elements," which "necessarily
1 52
includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor."
As the Court recognized, a fact that sets or increases a mandatory minimum "aggravates
the punishment" just as it does when it increases a statutory maximum. 153 And therefore,
to pass constitutional muster "[f]acts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence are .
elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." 1 54

After establishing the bright line rule, the Court further explained why Harrishad
to give way to Apprendi. To the Court, Harris violated the principle established by
"common-law and early American practice," and embodied in Apprendi, that facts that
increase the prescribed penalties a defendant faces are elements of the offense. 55 It does
not matter whether the facts increase the floor of the prescribed penalties, as opposed to
the ceiling, because it "is indisputable that a fact triggering a mandatory minimum alters
the prescribed range of sentences to which a criminal defendant is exposed."1 56 What is
key for Sixth Amendment purposes, according to the Court, is that facts that increase or
increase a defendant's mandatory minimum sentence within the statutory range does not violate the Constitution.
Id at 568-69.
145 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.
146 Id. at 2155-56. The statute sets a base minimum sentence of 5 years imprisonment; a minimum of7 years
imprisonment if the firearm was "brandished"; and a minimum of 10 years imprisonment if the firearm was
"discharged." 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1)(A) (West 2006).
147 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2156.
148 id
149id

150 Id. at 2158 ("Harris was wrongly decided and that it cannot be reconciled with our reasoning inApprendi.").
152

id

153id
154id

55

1

Id. at 2160.

156

id
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trigger a mandatory minimum "aggravate" a defendant's punishment because there is a
"heighten[ed] loss of liberty associated with the crime." 57 Therefore the Harris decision's
attempt to limit Apprendi only to facts increasing a statutory maximum was without sound
legal footing, and the "principle applied in Apprendi applies in equal force to facts
15
increasing the mandatory minimum."s
The Court then disparaged the reasoning in Harris that a judge is constitutionally
permitted to impose a enhanced mandatory minimum if the enhanced sentence is within
the statutory range of the offense of conviction found by a jury (or agreed to pursuant to a
plea agreement).1 59 To the Alleyne Court, "[i]t is no answer to say that a defendant could
have received the same sentence with or without the fact." 6 0 The key inquiry, the Court
explained, is always whether a fact "alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to
aggravate it" and is therefore an element of the offense that must be submitted to the
-161

jury.
WHY THE MAX-MIN QUARTET SPELLS THE END FOR WATTS

Inexplicably, what has been largely lost over the years is that in Watts the
Supreme Court did not address whether the Sixth Amendment posed a barrier to acquitted
conduct sentencing. 1 6 2 Since Watts, many circuits have addressed the issue, and
unfortunately have concluded that acquitted conduct sentencing is consistent with the
Sixth Amendment.163 However, a number of these decisions rest on a misunderstanding
that Watts addressed the Sixth Amendment issue in favor of acquitted conduct sentencing,
164 and others were decided before the max-min quartet was complete. 1 6 5
Whatever the
circumstances or reasoning, these decisions must be re-examined in the full light of the
max-min quartet.166

To understand how and why the max-min quartet should put an end to acquitted
conduct sentencing, it is best to start with the circumstances where there can be no

...
Id. at 2161; see id. at 2160 ("It is impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range from the penalty
affixed to a crime.").
...
Id. at 2160.
59
1 Id. at 2160-63.
..
o Id at 2162.
161 Id. The court noted that its decision did not mean that "any fact that influences judicial discretion must be
found by a jury," nor did it upset the "the broad discretion of judges to select a sentence within the range
authorized by law." Id. at 2163.
162 See, e.g., United Statesv. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 n.4 (2005) ("Watts, in particular, presented avery
narrow question regarding the interaction of the Guidelines with the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . .").
163 See, e.g., United Statesv. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366,
369 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Ashworth, 139 Fed. App'x. 525, 527 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Mercer, 242 Fed. App'x. 932
(4th Cir. 2007) (relying on Watts to reject the
defendant-appellants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenge to trial court having used acquitted conduct to
enhance his sentence); United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fletcher, J. dissenting)
("The majority's reliance on Watts as dispositive of Sixth Amendment issues is misplaced. Watts neither
considered nor decided the [Sixth Amendment] issue currently before us."); see also People v. Rose, 776 N.W.2d
888, 888 n.3 (Mich. 2010) ("Although other courts have recognized that Watts is not controlling on the Sixth
Amendment question, they have nevertheless been influenced by the other courts that erroneously presumed the
contrary.").
16'

See infra note 161.

United States v. Coleman, 370 F. Supp. 2d 661, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("The underlying premises of Booker
and its predecessors - Jones, Apprendi . .. andBlakely - detract from Watts' continued validity.").
166
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dispute. 167 First, the max-min quartet, specifically Apprendi, is a complete bar to using
acquitted conduct to extend a sentence beyond the statutory maximum of conviction.
Second, the quartet (specifically Blakely) bars a sentencing judge from using acquitted
conduct to extend a statutory maximum. Finally, the quartet, (specifically Alleyne) bars the
use of acquitted conduct to establish or increase a mandatory minimum sentence.

-

What is unresolved is the grey middle: judges using acquitted conduct to extend a
prison sentence within the statutory maximum of the offense of conviction, without regard
to an applicable mandatory minimum. So why does the max-min quartet put an end to
judges using acquitted conduct in this area? The short answer is that the max-min quartet
firmly reinforces bedrock and interdependent principles underneath the Sixth
Amendment's trial rights, and these principles are irreconcilable with allowing a
sentencing judge to transform offense elements rejected (or not found beyond reasonable
doubt) by a jury into sentencing factors that extend a defendant's term of imprisonment
even if the sentence is within statutory limits. These principles are:
1)

The Constitution demands that a jury find a defendant guilty of all
the elements of the crime with which he/she is charged.

2)

The character of a sentencing enhancer defines whether it is an
offense element or a sentencingfactor.

3)

If a sentencing enhancer is an element then it must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the
defendant.

4)

A judge's sentencing authority is derived from, and limited by a
jury's verdict.

5)

The sentencing rangefaced by a defendant is defined by, and limited
to the facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted
by a defendant.

Together, the principles reflect the Supreme Court's intent through the max-min
quartet to protect and embolden the jury's power to not only resolve the question of guilt
or innocence, but also to find the facts essential to punishment. The max-min quartet puts

to rest the belief and practice that a conviction, without specific findings by a jury,
automatically exposes a defendant to enhanced and extended penalties, mandatory
penalties, and extended statutory maximums.
But these principles reflect a more subtle intent that is important for the argument
presented here. The max-min quartet is part of an ongoing process to dismantle the
practice of prosecutors and judges doing an end-run around the Sixth Amendment's
promise that a conviction on jury-found facts must always precede punishment. 168 Without
a conviction, a judge has no power to impose punishment. The max-min quartet reinforces
not only the premise that a judge's sentencing power is dependent on a conviction, but
also that a conviction does not grant a judge cart-blanche sentencing power. In short, the
'' Id. ("Apprendi and its progeny, including Booker, have elevated the role of the jury verdict by circumscribing

a defendant's sentence to the relevant statutory maximum authorizedby a jury; yet the jury's verdict is not
heeded when it specifically withholds authorization.").
'6' Leonard & Dieter, supra note 26 at 280-281 ("[J]udges can find facts that contextualize an offense and
enhance punishment but thejury must first convict the defendant.") (emphasis added).
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clear implication of the max-min quartet is that a "judge violates a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights by making findings of fact that either ignore or countermand those
made by the jury and then relies on these factual findings to enhance a defendant's
sentence."l 69
To look at it another way, it makes no logical or constitutional sense, that the
max-min quartet prohibits a judge from using a fact rejected by a jury to impose a
mandatory minimum sentence, but permits a judge to use a jury rejected fact to impose a
sentence that is multiple times what the defendant would otherwise receive under the
Guidelines if not for that fact. Take for instance the Jones case discussed in the opening of
this article. Certainly the trial judge could not have sentenced the defendants to a crack
mandatory minimum sentence of 5 or 10 years for the acquitted conspiracy count. Yet, the
judge found no barrier to using "facts" underlying the acquitted conspiracy count to bump
the defendants' sentences from between 27 and 71 months imprisonment to between 180
and 225 months imprisonment - sentences well-above the crack mandatory minimums. It
is a paradox that strains all credulity, and more importantly, renders jury acquittals
meaningless.
This illogical paradox is amply reflected in a decision soon after Booker: United
States v. Magallenez. In that case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiring to
distribute methamphetamine. 17 0 On a special verdict interrogatory, the jury attributed
between 50 and 500 grams of methamphetamine to the defendant. 1 71 At sentencing,
however, the trial judge attributed 1200 grams to the defendant and increased his sentence
accordingly under the Guidelines. 172
Relying on Booker (decided after Magallanez had been sentenced), the Tenth
Circuit held it was error for the trial court "to increase Mr. Magallanez's sentence beyond
the maximum authorized by the jury verdict through mandatory application of the
Guidelines to judge-found facts" using the preponderance standard.173 Yet, the circuit
court rejected the defendant's argument that "under Blakely and Booker, the district court
was required to accept the jury's special verdict of drug quantity for purposes of
sentencing, rather than calculating the amount for itself."1 7 4 According to the appellate
court, because of Watts, a sentencing court "maintained the power to consider the broad
context of a defendant's conduct, even when a court's view of the conduct conflicted with
the jury's verdict." 17 5 Therefore, "[a]pplying the logic of Watts to the Guidelines system as
modified by Booker, we conclude that when a district court makes a determination of
sentencing facts by a preponderance test under the now-advisory Guidelines, it is not
bound by jury determinations reached through application of the more onerous reasonable
1 76

doubt standard."

Although it does not involve acquitted conduct, Magallanez reflects the Kafkaesque world that is criminal sentencing jurisprudence under Watts. On one hand the Tenth
Circuit chided the sentencing court for increasing a sentence beyond facts found by a jury

17

United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 776 (8th Cir. 2008).
408 F.3d 672 (10th Cir. 2005).

171

Id. at 676.

169

Id. at 682-83. The court's finding bumped the defendant's offense level from 26 or 30, to level 32. Id. at 682.
This resulted in a sentencing range of 121-151 months, as opposed to 63-78 months under the offense level that
corresponded with the jury's verdict. The court imposed a 121-month sentence. Id.
173 Id. at 685
74
1 Id. at 683.
172

Id. at 684.
.. Id. at 685.
175
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under the then-mandatory-Guideline scheme, but in the same breath said the trial court
was permitted to do the exact same thing under the "advisory" Guidelines. We are now in
a tail-wags-the-dog situation where the force of a jury verdict under the Sixth Amendment
is dictated and limited by the force of the Guidelines, and not the other way around.
This leads to common rebuttal to Sixth Amendment challenges to acquitted
conduct sentencing: that because Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, the Sixth
Amendment is not implicated when a trial judge relies on facts rejected by a jury to select
a sentence within the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction." The simple
response to this argument is that the max-min quartet does not disturb this premise unless
the judicially discovered "fact" is an element of an offense that was not found (or rejected)
by the jury. An element is not stripped of its character, weight, and significance, once a
jury is released following the verdict. In today's advisory-Guidelines era, "all facts are
not equal . . . especially not facts that amount to separate crimes." 17 What differentiates
acquitted conduct facts, and thereby implicates the Sixth Amendment, is that they "are not
facts enhancing the crime of conviction, like the presence of a gun or the vulnerability of a
victim. Rather, they are facts comprising different crimes." 80
A more probing response is that acquitted conduct sentencing turns Booker onto
itself and strips away the Sixth Amendment protections it was supposed to reinforce. 81
The common understanding is that Booker gave judges back some of the sentencing
discretion that had been taken away by the SRA and the Guidelines. What is often lost is
that Booker also provided increased constitutional protections to federal criminal
defendants facing sentencing. 18 2 Through Booker, the Supreme Court erected a Sixth
Amendment wall between defendants and judicial fact-finding at sentencing. This wall
limits a judge's sentencing authority to the "maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty . . . or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 183 The purpose of
this wall is to protect defendants from fait accompli sentences based on fact-finding at
sentencing under a less demanding standard of proof. In other words, "Just because the
jury has authorized a punishment [with a guilty verdict] does not mean that the jury has
authorized any punishment." 18 4 Booker, therefore, restricts the sentencing power of judges
relative to the defendant, as much as it expands judicial power in relation to the
Guidelines.
Acquitted conduct sentencing betrays the former purpose. It is directly counter to
Booker's intent for judges to use acquitted conduct to extend the sentence range
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 ("For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a
defined range, the defendant has no right to ajury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant."); see
also United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 384-85 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Post-Booker there is no Sixth
Amendment violation when a judge looks at other facts, including acquitted conduct, to select a sentence within
the statutory range).
178 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) ("The dispositive question, we said [inApprendi] 'is one not of
form, but of effect.' If a State makes an increase in an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent
on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by ajury beyond a
reasonable doubt.") (quotingApprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
179 United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 153 (D. Mass. 2005).
177

180

Id.

Id. at 150-51 ("In a nutshell, this position, that one can consider acquitted conduct because the Guidelines are
now advisory, seems to hark back to the period pre-mandatory Guidelines when there was a clear line between
the trial sphere and the sentencing sphere").
182 Id. at 153 ("The Booker remedy decision made the Guidelines advisory ....
But the principal decision in that
case and those that had foreshadowed it reflected the Court's new concern with the formal procedures for
determinig facts essential to sentencing.").
183 Booker, 543 U.S. at 244..
184 Mercado, 474 F.3d
at 663.
181
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authorized by the Guidelines. It is of no constitutional importance to a defendant that the
Guidelines are "advisory" as opposed to "mandatory" if the trial judge enhances the
defendant's guideline range based on jury rejected "facts" that constitute elements of an
acquitted offense, and then impose a sentence within that enhanced range. The outcome
a sentence longer than sanctioned by the jury - is the same. Under the max-min quartet,
this backdoor sentencing not only implicates the Sixth Amendment, it runs afoul of it.
As one court explained, it is nonsensical for Booker, when it comes to acquitted
conduct, to afford defendants less Sixth Amendment protections under an advisory
Guidelines scheme:
If the Guidelines are mandatory, "what the jury verdict authorized"
means a sentence framed by the facts tried - excluding aggravating
enhancements to that offense and surely excluding aggravating
relevant conduct if those facts did not form part of the jury's
verdict. With advisory Guidelines, when the trial judge is not
required to accept a sentence driven by enhancements or relevant
conduct, "what the jury verdict authorized" means a sentence just
within the statutory maximum.
However, when a count considers acquitted conduct it is
expressly considering facts that the jury verdict not only failed to
authorize, it considers facts of which the jury expressly
disapproved. Nor is it enough to hark back to the idea that they
jury "only decides guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, while the
judge decides facts by a fair preponderance of the evidence." The
argument is circular: The fair preponderance standard made sense
in the context of fully indeterminate sentencing. It does not make
sense in this hybrid regime where rules still matter, and certain
facts have important, if not dispositive, consequences.18 5
Moreover, to claim that there is no Sixth Amendment violation because Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory is to ignore the "controlling influence" of the
Guidelines. 18 6 The Guidelines remain the "Federal Government's authoritative view of
appropriate sentences for specific crimes,"18 7 and through a series of post-Booker rulings,
the Supreme Court has ensured that the Guidelines remain so. Accordingly, the Guidelines
are the "starting point and the initial benchmark" for all sentence determinations,188 and
failure to properly calculate a defendant's guideline range constitutes procedural error.8 9
And once a defendant's guidelines are calculated, a within-guideline sentence may be
presumed reasonable, and any departure or variance must be explained. 190 Indeed, a judge

185
18.

187
188
189
190

Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 152-53 (footnote omitted).
Peughv. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084-85 (2013).
Id. at 2085.
Gally. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-49 (2007).
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2080.
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 356-59.
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"varies from a Guidelines sentence at his or her own peril." 191 "And so, in effect, the
Guidelines, with respect to 'acquitted conduct,' remain very much mandatory." 1 92
By slapping an "advisory" sticker on them, Booker did not "deprive the
Guidelines of force as the framework for sentencing." 1 93 Since the Guidelines remain the
dominant sentencing force post-Booker, when ajudge uses facts rejected (or not found) by
a jury to "alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and
do[es] so in a manner that aggravates the punishment," the Sixth Amendment is certainly
implicated. 194 In short, when it comes to the Guidelines, as one court noted, "[w]e cannot
have it both ways: We cannot say that facts found by the judge are only advisory, that as a
result, few procedural protections are necessary and also say that the Guidelines are
critically important."1 95
A related common justification for acquitted conduct sentencing, is that the
practice is consistent with the Sixth Amendment so long as the resulting sentence is within
the statutory maximum of the offense of conviction. In other words, the offense of
conviction is the jury's authorization of a sentence up to or equal to the statutory
maximum based on facts found by the sentencing judge. However, the "jury
authorization" argument rests on the premise that a jury's verdict authorizespunishment.

A not guilty verdict is the most conspicuous expression of a jury's grant (rather
withholding) of sentencing authority. "The fact that a jury has not authorized a particular
punishment is never more clear than when the jury is asked for, and yet specifically
withholds, that authorization." 1 96 Certainly no one would argue that the Sixth Amendment
and other constitutional protections are not barriers to a judge sentencing a defendant who
was acquitted of all charges, just because the judge found the government proved its case
by a preponderance of the evidence. So it is absurd that an acquittal looses the effect of
withholding sentencing authority just because it is in the company of a guilty verdict. 197

The max-min quartet reaffirms the principle that a criminal offense is a collection
of individual elements, and elements are a collection of facts that must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Under the quartet, once an element, always an element.19s A not guilty

United Statesv. Ibanga, 454 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2006), vacated and remanded, 271 Fed. App'x.
298 (4th Cir. 2008); See also United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 777 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring)
("[Flederal district court judges are often acting as automatons-mechanically enhancing sentences with 'acquitted
conduct' pursuant to the now 'advisory' Sentencing Guidelines.").
192 Canania, 532 F.3d at 777 (Bright, J., concurring); Rita, 551 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I am not
blind to the fact that, as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually
mandatory after our decision in Booker.")
.19
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2083.
194 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2156-58 (2013). The protection of a defendant's jury right must
"not [be] motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism, but by the need to preserve Sixth Amendment substance."
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005).
195 Amended Sentencing Memo at 22, United States v. Pimental, 236 F. Supp. 2d 99 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 99103 10-NG), aff'd in partandrev'din part, 380 F.3d 575 (1st Cir. 2004).
16 Mercado, 474 F.3d at 664. See also Id. ("In the case of acquitted conduct, the jury has been given the
opportunity to authorize punishment and specifically withheld it.").
197 See id. at 663 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("It makes absolutely no sense to conclude that the Sixth Amendment
is violated whenever facts essential to sentencing have been determined by a judge rather than a jury, and also
conclude that the fruits of the jury's efforts can be ignored with impunity by the judge in sentencing.") (quoting
United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 150 (D. Mass. 2005).
198 Cf Oregonv. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 173 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that when ajudge's fact-finding is
essential to the imposed punishment, "[t]hat 'should be the end of the matter."') (quoting Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
191
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verdict does not, and cannot, recast an offense element into something less substantial,
which can be found by a sentencing judge, using a lesser standard of proof, to extend a
prison sentence. 199 Such re-labeling, as the Supreme Court forcefully asserted in Booker,
is "irrelevant for constitutional purposes." 2 0 0 And under the quartet, it is of no import
whether the sentence imposed using acquitted conduct facts falls within the range allowed
by statute. All that matters is the jury has not provided authority for such a sentence, and
the acquitted conduct facts expose a defendant to an aggravated prison sentence that he
would otherwise not face.20 1
TURNING THE TIDE - JUSTICE SCALIA THE KEY?

The key to ending acquitted conduct may lie with an unlikely source - Justice
Antonin Scalia. Through his dissent in Jones, Justice Scalia forcefully called on the
Supreme Court to reach a definitive decision on judicial fact-finding during sentencings,
and chided the Court for passing on the opportunity Jones permitted to do so:
We have held that a substantively unreasonable penalty is illegal and
must be set aside. It unavoidably follows that any fact necessary to
prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable - thereby
exposing the defendant to the longer sentence - is an element that
must be either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. It may
not be found by a judge.
For years, however, we have refrained from saying so. . . . the
Courts of Appeal have uniformly taken our continuing silence to
suggest that the Constitution does permit otherwise unreasonable
sentences supported by judicial factfinding, so long as they are within
the statutory range. This has gone on long enough.20 2
While the tone is suggestive, Justice Scalia's dissent does not explicitly say
which way he would vote if the issue were properly before the Court. One must remember
203
that Justice Scalia concurred with the majority decision in Watts.
However, a Scalia
dissent a few years prior to the Jones case suggests that the Justice's comfort with
acquitted conduct sentencing has dissipated over time.
In Oregon v. Ice, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment allowed
states, such as Oregon in this instance, to assign to judges, rather than juries, the role of
finding facts needed to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences for multiple
offenses. 204 In dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that Apprendi was an uncompromising
barrier to a sentencing scheme where judge-found facts were "'essential to' the
punishment ... imposed." 20 5
No one would ever dispute that a judge's power to punish a defendant facing a one count indictment rests on
the jury returning a guilty verdict. If the jury returns a not guilty verdict, the trial judge would have no authority
to punish the defendant using judge-found facts under a preponderance of evidence standard. It simply defies
logic to believe this power vacuum is filed just because a defendant faces multiple counts.
200 Booker, 543 U.S. at 231. See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605 (2002) ("[T]he characterization of a fact
or circumstance as an 'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the question 'who decides,' judge
or jury.").
199

201

See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158.

Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 8-9 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
See 519 U.S. 148, 158 (1997).
555 U.S. 160 163-64 (2009).
205 Id. at 173 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 223).
202

203
204
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Justice Scalia took aim at the majority's effort to limit Apprendi to "only to the
length of a sentence for an individual crime and not to the total sentence for a
defendant." 206 The majority's faulty logic, according to Justice Scalia, was a betrayal to
the "pains" the Supreme Court had taken "to reject artificial limitations upon the facts
subject to the jury-trial guarantee."2 0 7 These efforts "made clear that the guarantee turns
upon the penal consequences attached to the fact, and not to its formal definition as an
element of the crime." 20 8
Together, Justice Scalia's dissents in Oregon and Jones provide cautious
optimism that the Justice is ready to embrace an unambiguous and unyielding rule that the
jury (and only the jury) is permitted to find facts necessary to extend a prison sentence
regardless of the statutory limit. Or, he at least wants the Supreme Court to resolve the
issue once and for all.
If the acquitted conduct sentencing does come before the Supreme Court again,
who would side with Justice Scalia (assuming he is ready to end acquitted conduct
sentencing)? Among the current ranks, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas joined Scalia's
Jones dissent, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined his Oregon dissent. 209
Assuming they all continued to follow Justice Scalia's lead, there would be at least four
votes for ending acquitted conduct sentencing.
One could speculate about which justice could provide the crucial fifth vote.
However, that speculation must be tempered by the reality of the vote to deny review of
the Jones case. Although the denial order did not reveal how the justices voted, since it
takes just four justices to grant review, it seems clear that the six justices that did not join
Scalia's dissent voted for denial. This is not a good sign for those, including this author,
eager to see the Supreme Court put an end to acquitted conduct sentencing.
CONCLUSION

"The Founders were keenly aware, though, that 'the jury right could be lost not
only by gross denial, but by erosion."' 210 Watts was a monumental breach of the Sixth
Amendment, and its erosive effect on defendants' jury rights continues unabated.
Acquitted conduct sentencing devalues to worthlessness the jury's role in measuring
whether the government has met its burden at trial, and empowers and encourages
prosecutors to over-charge knowing that one guilty verdict will supersede any not guilty
verdicts a jury renders. It is practice that indeed is a "jagged scar on our constitutional
complexion."

2 11

For too long, courts have rested on Watts to justify this invidious practice. In
Watts, however, the Supreme Court side-stepped the Sixth Amendment and the barrier it
poses to acquitted conduct sentencing. It is a maneuver that is no longer available now that
the max-min quartet has fortified the line between judge and jury, and re-invigorated the
206 Id
("I cannot understand why we would make such a strange exception to the treasured right of trial by
jury.").
207 id
208 id
209 See Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 8; Ice,
555 U.S. at 173.
210 United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt,
J., dissenting) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S.
at 248 (1999)).
211 United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 550 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (Wald, J., concurring).
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role of the Sixth Amendment in sentencing. Armed with the max-min quartet, now is the
time for a direct Sixth Amendment assault on acquitted conduct sentencing "in order to
again ensure that the 'right of jury trial [will] be preserved, in a meaningful way
guaranteeing that the jury [will] still stand between the individual and the power of the
government."' 212

Brief of Law Professor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Jones, 135 S. Ct. 8 (No. 13-10026)
(quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005)).
212
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INTRODUCTION

-

Peremptory challenges to potential jury members are supported by an
overwhelming majority of practicing lawyers. Criminal litigators of both stripes
prosecutors and defense attorneys - are nearly unanimous in their view that peremptory
challenges should be retained, despite criticism of such challenges from judges and
academics. Interestingly, both prosecutors and defense attorneys believe that one of the
main advantages of peremptory strikes is that they provide an advantage over the trial
opponent.
But as a matter of elementary logic, preemptory strikes cannot simultaneously
provide both the prosecution and defense an advantage over the other. Rather, only three
scenarios for systemic advantage exist: the prosecution is advantaged over the defense, the
defense is advantaged over the prosecution, or neither party is systematically advantaged
over another.1
In Part I, I will discuss voir dire as a whole and give an explanation of
peremptory strikes. In Part II, I will discuss the positives and negatives of preemptory
strikes and the effects of eliminating preemptory strikes. In Part III, I will discuss which
party to a criminal case benefits from preemptory strikes, the paradox that preemptory
strikes cannot simultaneously provide an advantage over the other side to both the
prosecution and the defense, and factors that could influence which side peremptory
strikes benefit.
PART I
A. Right to a Jury

Throughout history, the right to a trial by jury has held strong as a principle
rooted in constitutional values. Thomas Jefferson stated, "I consider trial by jury as the
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of [its] constitution." 2 Trial by jury represents the ideals that framers brought to
the constitution in forming this great nation. The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
prevents oppression by the government. Trial by jury embodies the concept of a restrained
government, in that disinterested and uninvolved persons must make objective decisions
regarding fact before the government can convict an individual and as a result restrict the
rights of that individual.
Article III of the United States constitution provides that unless otherwise
waived, criminal prosecutions should be tried by a jury.3 In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. 4 The
Honorable Judge Herbert J. Hutton characterized the right to a trial by jury of one's peers
as "one of the cornerstones of the American judicial system" and "a birthright cherished

' The third option - neither party is systematically advantaged over the other - is consistent with peremptory
strikes advantaging one party over the other in a particular case. A particular, rather than systemic, advantage
might result from a particularly skilled attorney, the particular crime or defendant, or the members of the
particular venire.
2Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to A Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1005, 1009 (1992) (citing 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 267 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) (letter to
Thomas Paine dated Paris, July 11, 1789)).
3U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
4U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
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by generations of American citizens." 5 The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
outlined guidelines for juries, requiring that they be "selected at random from a fair cross
section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes." 6
B. Voir Dire

'

In order to ensure the constitutional guarantees surrounding trial by jury, litigants
are permitted to voir dire the venire, which allows for exclusion from the venire those
members that present a potential cause for disqualification so that the remaining members
are capable of analyzing the facts without influence from extraneous considerations.7 In
Hill v. State, the court stated "Undergirding the voir dire procedure and, hence, informing
the trial court's exercise of discretion regarding the conduct of the voir dire, is a single,
primary, and overriding principle or purpose: 'to ascertain the existence of cause for
disqualification.
Voir dire is a French term meaning "to speak the truth."9 Put simply, voir dire is
the examination of a potential juror to see if he or she is fit to serve.10 Colorado Rule of
Criminal Procedure 24(a) provides: "An orientation and examination shall be conducted to
inform prospective jurors about their duties and service and to obtain information about
prospective jurors to facilitate an intelligent exercise of challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges."" Trial courts are vested with discretion in conducting voir dire,
which is not disturbed unless there is a clear showing of abuse. 12 Generally, both the
prosecution and defense are permitted a certain amount of time to voir dire the venire;
however, there is no constitutional right to voir dire, "so long as the court's examination
allowed counsel to determine whether any potential jurors possessed any beliefs that
would bias them such as to prevent [the defendant] from receiving a fair trial."l3 Jurors
may be examined for multiple purposes, including to elicit grounds of challenge for cause
and to ascertain the jurors' state of mind with reference to the matter at hand in order to
keep parties fully advised in the exercise of their right to peremptory challengeS.14
C. Types of Challenges
During the voir dire, litigants are permitted to strike jurors from the venire, or
challenge them. There are two main types of challenges: challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges.
i. Challengefor Cause

A challenge for cause is "a request that a prospective juror be dismissed because
there is a specific and forceful reason to believe the person cannot be fair, unbiased or

In re Green, No. 96-0002, 1996 WL 660949, at*I (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 1996).
§ 1861 (2014).
Williams v. State, 904 A.2d 534, 539 (Md. 2006).
661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Md. 1995) (quoting McGee v. State, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (Md. 1959)).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1710 (9th ed. 2009).
0
Id.
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
12 Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562, 563-64 (10th Cir. 1947).
People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 255 (Colo. 1996) (quoting People v. O'Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo.
1990)).
14 Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 40 P. 891, 892 (Colo. 1895).
6Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.
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capable of serving as a juror." 15 The judge makes the determination regarding whether the
juror should be struck or dismissed. Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) provides
that the court shall sustain challenges for cause for reasons including, but not limited to:
incompetence in the absence of qualification prescribed by statute; relationship within the
third degree to participants in the case, including attorneys; criminal complaint against the
accused; service on grand jury, coroner's jury, or investigatory body in relation to the
case; previous jury service for trial arising out of same factual situation or involving same
defendant; involvement in civil action against defendant arising out of the act charged as a
crime; witness to any matter related to crime or its prosecution; fiduciary relationship to
the defendant, person alleged to be injured by crime, or person whose complaint instituted
the prosecution; bias for or against the defendant or prosecution. 16
While courts are required to dismiss a juror for cause if the juror has a state of
mind "manifesting bias for or against the defendant, or for or against the prosecution," the
test applied for a challenge for cause is not whether a potential juror merely expressed
concern about some aspect of the case or jury service, but whether the juror "would render
a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented at trial and the instructions
given by the court." 17 This is because jurors' concerns are often an effort to express
"feelings and convictions about such matters of importance in an emotionally charged
setting," and the court "may give 'considerable weight' to a potential juror's assertion that
he or she can perform jury service fairly and impartially in the case." 18 In contrast, a
peremptory challenge allows litigants to challenge or dismiss a juror without stating a
reason. 19
ii. Peremptory Challenge

Peremptory challenges have existed for nearly as long as juries have existed.20 In
Roman criminal cases, the accuser and accused each proposed one hundred judices, each
rejected fifty from the other's list, and the remaining one hundred would try to alleged
crime.21 Peremptory challenges date back to the early days of the jury trial in England,2 2
and are rooted in tradition of the jury trial in America.2 3
Gerald
Hill
& Kathleen
Hill,
challenge for cause,
PEOPLE'S
LAW
DICTIONARY,
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=169 (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
COLO. R. CRM4. P. 24(b).
1 People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Colo. 1986) (citing People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Colo.
1984); People v. Wright, 672 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1982)); People v. Garrison, 303 P.3d 117, 127 (Colo. App. 2012).
" Garrison, 303 P.3d at 127-28 (quoting People v. Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1987)).
19
Gerald
Hill
& Kathleen
Hill, peremptory challenge, PEOPLE'S
LAW
DICTIONARY,
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1501 (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
20 Batsonv. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986).
21 id.
22 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965) (White, J.)
("Thus The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw.
1, Stat. 4 (1305), provided that if 'they that sue for the King will challenge any . . . Jurors, they shall assign . .. a
Cause certain.' So persistent was the view that a proper jury trial required peremptories on both sides, however,
that the statute was construed to allow the prosecution to direct any juror after examination to 'stand aside' until
the entire panel was gone over and the defendant had exercised his challenges; only if there was a deficiency of
jurors in the box at that point did the Crown have to show cause in respect to jurors recalled to make up the
required number. Peremptories on both sides became the settled law of England, continuing in the above form
until after the separation of the Colonies." (footnotes omitted)) (tracing the development of preemptory
challenges), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
23 See id. at 214-16 ("In the federal system, Congress early took a part of the subject in hand in establishing that
the defendant was entitled to 35 peremptories in trials for treason and 20 in trials for other felonies specified in
the 1790 Act as punishable by death, 1 Stat. 119 (1790). In regard to trials for other offenses without the 1790
statute, both the defendant and the Government were thought to have a right of peremptory challenge, although
the source of this right was not wholly clear. . . . The course in the States apparently paralleled that in the federal
system. The defendant's right of challenge was early conferred by statute, the number often corresponding to the
15
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The right to peremptory challenges has been described as one of the most
important rights of the accused,24 despite the United States Constitution containing no
language giving the right to peremptory challenges.25 In a criminal proceeding, the
function of a peremptory challenge is "to secure a more fair and impartial jury by
enabling" litigants "to remove jurors whom they perceive as biased, even if the jurors are
not subject to a challenge for cause." 26 As Justice Byron White stated in Swain v.
Alabama, "The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on
both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." 2 7
Traditionally, litigants could exercise peremptory challenges "for any reason at
,,28"
all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of that case,
and
the decision to exercise a peremptory challenge was "left wholly within the discretion of
the litigant."29 However, the Supreme Court has limited this discretion throughout time.
Constitutional limits are imposed on peremptory challenges through the equal
protection clause. These limits have formed over time.
.

In 1879, the Supreme Court held excluding jurors "because of their color . .
amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws." 30 The Court then went on to hold
that "[a]lthough a Negro defendant is not entitled to ajury containing members of his race,
a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as
jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause."31 The
prosecutor's "use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time" was
,,32
described as "systematic discrimination on the part of the State.
The Court outlined
what a defendant must show in order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges: (1) the defendant "is
a member of a cognizable racial group;" (2) "the prosecutor has exercised peremptory
challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race;" and (3) a
showing that "these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race." 33
In 1986, the Court held that once the defendant establishes a prima facie showing
of purposeful discrimination in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges, "the
burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black
English practice, the prosecution was thought to have retained the Crown's common-law right to stand aside, and
by 1870, most, if not all, States had enacted statutes conferring on the prosecution a substantial number of
peremptory challenges, the number generally being at least half, but often equal to, the number had by the
defendant." (footnotes omitted)) (tracing the development of peremptory challenges).
24 See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("The right to challenge a given number of jurors
without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.").
25 See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the Constitution of the United
States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an
impartial jury is all that is secured.").
26 People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 303 (Colo. 2000), overruledby People v. Novotny, 320 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2014).
27380 U.S. at 219.
28 United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Conn. 1976).
29 Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991).
30 Strauderv. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), abrogated by Taylorv. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, (1975).
31 Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04.
32 Id. at 227.
3 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986), holding modified by Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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jurors."3 4 In 1991 the Court extended the Batson protection to defendants of all races, 3 5
and in 1994 the Court extended the Batson protection to gender discrimination.3 6 In
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., the Court extended Batson to civil juries
because "the race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the challenged
jurors."37 In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court extended Batson even further and held "that
the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful
discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges." 38
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 24, which governs peremptory challenges
in criminal cases in Colorado, provides:
In capital cases the state and the defendant, when there is one defendant,
shall each be entitled to ten peremptory challenges. In all other cases
where there is one defendant and the punishment may be by
imprisonment in a correctional facility, the state and the defendant shall
each be entitled to five peremptory challenges, and in all other cases, to
three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, each
side shall be entitled to an additional three peremptory challenges for
every defendant after the first in capital cases, but not exceeding twenty
peremptory challenges to each side; in all other cases, where the
punishment may be by imprisonment in a correctional facility, to two
additional peremptory challenges for every defendant after the first, not
exceeding fifteen peremptory challenges to each side; and in all other
cases to one additional peremptory challenge for every defendant after
the first, not exceeding ten peremptory challenges to each side. In any
case where there are multiple defendants, every peremptory challenge
shall be made and considered as the joint peremptory challenge of all
defendants. In case of the consolidation of any indictments,
informations, complaints, or summons and complaints for trial, such
consolidated cases shall be considered, for all purposes concerning
peremptory challenges, as though the defendants had been joined in the
same indictment, information, complaint, or summons and complaint.
When trial is held on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the
number of peremptory challenges shall be the same as if trial were on
the issue of substantive guilt.3 9
D. Methods of Voir Dire
There are two main methods of jury selection: the "strike and replace" method
and the "struck" method.40 In both of these methods, parties are permitted to voir dire the
venire before being required to exercise challenges. This practice is rooted in history and
supports the due administration ofjustice.41
Id. at 97.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991).
3 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994).
3 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
38 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
Colo. R. Crim. P. 24(d)(2).
40 Jury Selection, ARIZ. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/jury/jurylj.htm#N_3_
(last visited
May 16, 2014).
41 See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1894) ("Any system for the impaneling of a jury that
prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right must be condemned; and
therefore he cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge until he has been brought face to face, in the
3
3
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i. "Strike and Replace"Method

In the "strike and replace" method, otherwise known as the "jury box" system,
the jury box is filled with randomly selected venire members.4 2 After examining the
venire, counsel for each side may exercise their challenges. 43 Litigants "exercise
challenges for cause and their allotted number of peremptory challenges in some
prescribed pattern of alternation." 44 As members of the venire are struck from the box,
other venire persons are drawn to replace the empty seats.4 5 When all challenges have
been used or waived, the remaining individuals in the jury box become the jury. 46
ii. "Struck" Method

In the "struck" method, venire members are examined, and then challenged and
excused for cause.47 A panel is then created with the number of jurors who will hear the
case, the number of alternates, and the combined number of peremptory challenges
allotted to each side. 48 Litigants exercise their peremptory challenges on an alternating
basis against the panel until they have used their allotted challenges and only the number
49
of jurors and alternates needed remain.
PART II

Research indicates that many scholars and academic commentators favor the
abolishment of peremptory challenges. 0 Moreover, a growing number of judges have
presence of the court, with each proposed juror, and an opportunity given for such inspection and examination of
him as is required for the due administration of justice.").
42 United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 796 (2d Cir. 1981).
43
id
44id
45

id
46id
47

id.

Id at 796-97.
Id at 797.
5o See generally 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *346 (stating that the peremptory
challenge is "an
arbitrary
and
capricious
species
of
challenge")
available
at
http://presspubs.ucicago.edu/founders/documents/amendV-VIcriminal processsl4.html; Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir
Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L. REv. 545, 545 (1975) (note 2 omitted) ("[T]he voir dire
procedure is being attacked as a cumbersome, time-consuming, meaningless part of the jury trial."); Brent J.
Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227,
230 (1986) ("A more equitable legal system would eliminate peremptory challenges and would rely exclusively
on cause challenges and on expanded voir dire to root out only those jurors unable to follow the judge's
instructions."); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire Peremptory Challenges, and
the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 209 (1989) (highlighting the gains of eliminating
peremptory challenges) ("[S]ubstantial economic savings, the effective control of racial and other widely
condemned forms of group discrimination, and the control of countless other, less frequently employed, less
generalized classifications that insult and diminish human beings."); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory
Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 420-23 (1992) (arguing for abolition of peremptory
challenges); Professor Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses
ofPeremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1148-49 (1994) (proposing that peremptory challenges
should be abolished for all litigants except criminal defendants, and that the peremptory challenges for all
litigants except criminal defendants be replaced with an expanded for-cause system); Mark Cammack, In Search
of the Post-PositivistJury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 486 (1995) ("[T]he simplest way to eliminate discrimination . . is
to eliminate the peremptory challenge .... ); Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call for
Change Through ComparativeAnalysis, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 363, 363-64 (2009) (arguing that
peremptory challenges should be abolished in the United States); Melynda J. Price, PerformingDiscretion or
48

49

Performing Discrimination:Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J.

RACE & L. 57, 97 (2009) (arguing that the best course of action to remove race and racism as factors in
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expressed their disapproval of peremptory challenges, 51 including a few Supreme Court
justices.

52

Conversely, litigators are overwhelmingly in favor of peremptory challenges.53
There are both positive and negative aspects of the peremptory challenge. Moreover, there
would be both positive and negative effects of eliminating peremptory challenges.
A. Benefits of the Peremptory Challenge
The Court has stated that peremptory challenges are "one of the most important
of the rights secured to the accused."5 4
i. Rooted in Tradition

Peremptory challenges have a long history in the American legal system. The
concept of an impartial jury has been aided by the peremptory challenge throughout time.
While there are disadvantages associated with the use of peremptories, as discussed
below, they have long been utilized as a valuable tool in the creation of impartial juries.
ii. Provides Discretion to Litigants

The peremptory challenge gives litigants discretion in arbitrary selecting
potential jurors, in that "its exercise is left wholly within the discretion of the litigant," 56
and litigants have the discretion to act upon prejudices conceived from "the bare looks and

discretionary challenges is to abandon peremptory challenges altogether); Maisa Jean Frank, Challenging
Peremptories: Suggested Reforms to the Jury Selection Process Using MinnesotaAsA Case Study, 94 MINN. L.
REv. 2075, 2077 (2010) (arguing that reform should include the elimination of the peremptory challenge in most
cases, since the for-cause challenge provides an adequate avenue for party participation in jury selection); Roger
Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 377, 422 (2010) ("[C]ourts and legislatures should consider limiting or eliminating peremptory
challenges").
"See Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683,
1713 (2006) ("The chorus of judges calling for the elimination of the peremptory, while still small, is nonetheless
growing."); see also Alen v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (arguing to abolish the
peremptory challenge as inherently discriminatory); Com. v. Rodriguez 931 N.E.2d 20, 44 (2010) (Marshall,
C.J., concurring) ("[I]t is either time to abolish them entirely, or to restrict their use substantially."); State v.
Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 347 (Minn. 1998) (Page, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is time for this court to consider seriously
Justice Marshall's admonition in his concurrence in Batson that the goal of ending 'the racial discrimination that
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely."'); Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007) ("[W]e would be well within our
authority in abolishing the peremptory challenge system as a means to ensure the integrity of our criminal
trials.").
52
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (J Marshall, concurring) (stating that the only way to end
the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process is to eliminate peremptory
challenges entirely); John Paul Stevens, Foreword, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 907 (2003) (arguing that peremptory
challenges create significant costs and require the expenditure of valuable court time while producing "minimal
benefits at best"); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266-67 (2005) (J Breyer, concurring) (stating the case
"reinforces Justice Marshall's concerns" regarding peremptories and racial discrimination); Rice v. Collins, 546
U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (J Breyer, concurring) ("I continue to believe that we should reconsider Batson's test and
the peremptory challenge system as a whole.").
5 See infra Part III.A.
5 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1965)),
overruledby Batsonv. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
* See infra pp 6-8.
* Edmonsonv. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 633 (1991).
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gestures of another."57 The discretion surrounding peremptories "is a mechanism for the
exercise of private choice in the pursuit of fairness. . . . an enclave of private action in a
government-managed proceeding." 58
iii. Fosters a "Middle Ground" Jury

Peremptory challenges enable participants to exclude those jurors they believe
will be most favorable to the other side, which provides a means of eliminating "extremes
of partiality on both sides." 5 9 Peremptory challenges allow participants to eliminate
individuals who don't meet the standard for challenge for cause but still propose a
potential bias, even if minimal, which helps to assure "the selection of a qualified and
unbiasedjury." 60 Essentially, peremptories can be seen as a supplement to the challenge
for cause. In theory, the resulting jurors form a middle ground jury, capable of hearing
both sides to come to a fair decision.6 1
iv. PerceptionofFairness

Peremptory challenges provide a perception of fairness in criminal trials. They
have "always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury."6 2 By allowing litigants to
participate in the selection of jury members through peremptory challenges, a perception
of fairness is created because "the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity
of the legal system."63 Litigant involvement and a jury created to decide the case based on
the evidence placed before them foster a perception of fairness among both the parties and
the public. 64
v. Protectionof Voir Dire

While litigants are permitted to voir dire the venire before raising a challenge for
cause, this voir dire may be more extensive in regards to peremptory challenges. If a
litigant were to examine a venire person to the level of discomfort in the pursuit of a
challenge for cause and subsequently lose that challenge for cause, the litigant can fall
back on a peremptory challenge to remedy the potential for a damaged relationship
between the litigant and venire person. Without the peremptory challenge to fall back on,
litigants may be hesitant to pursue the elicitation of deeper biases on behalf of the venire
person and a subsequent challenge for cause in fear of having to proceed with a juror who
may develop negative feelings towards the litigant during that process. Moreover, the
peremptory challenge requires a voir dire in order for litigants to make decisions regarding
peremptory challenges. The peremptory challenge allows litigants to use voir dire to
identify predisposed jurors and unreceptive jurors.65
" Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 633-34.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (quoting Batsonv. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)).
6o See id. (emphasis added).
6 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ("The
function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties
that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not
otherwise.").
62 Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376.
63 Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987).
64
See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
5

5

6'

See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-BatsonPeremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaireand the

"Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1010 (1996). Survey respondents in favor of retaining
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B. Detriments of the Peremptory Challenge
i. Requires Many Resources

The use of peremptory challenges requires many resources. First, enough jurors
must be called to make up a jury pool large enough to allow litigants to exercise
peremptory challenges. Second, litigants sometimes hire jury consultants to opine on the
potential biases of venire persons. Lastly, the constitutional limits placed on peremptory
challenges sometimes require that a separate hearing be held,6 6 which requires significant
judicial resources.
ii. Inhibits the Cross Section of Community Concept

By using peremptory challenges "to eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides," 67 the concept of having a jury of one's peers or a jury representing a cross section
of the community is inhibited. Justice White stated that "the Court has unambiguously
declared that the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair
cross section of the community."68 Eliminating venire persons because of their
personalities, experiences, background, beliefs, tendencies, or any other reasons decreases
the probability that the jury will truly be a fair cross section of the community.
Moreover, because individuals with different backgrounds and experiences may
bring a different perspective to the deliberations, the quality of verdicts is limited by
peremptory challenges. Excluding certain groups of individuals makes it less likely that
the verdicts are truly representative of the values of the community as a whole.
iii. PrejudicialElement

In the pursuit of equal protection, constitutional limits have been imposed on how
participants may exercise their peremptory challenges.69 However, the peremptory
challenge is still an "arbitrary and capricious species of challenge"7 0 that allows litigants
to act upon prejudices conceived from "the bare looks and gestures of another." 7 1
Peremptory challenges require some sort of prejudice, in that litigants make a decision to
remove venire persons based on an impression or short interaction. While this may be
non-race based discrimination, there is still a level of discrimination involved, be it
discrimination based on facial expression, area of origin, expressed preference towards a
particular litigant, or any other reason that does not rise to a level of challenge for cause.

peremptory challenges stated the challenges were valuable to them because "peremptory challenges allowed
them to assemble a fair jury because they could eliminate predisposed jurors and weed out unreceptive jurors."
Id.
6 See, e.g, David H. Stacy & Brenda M. Sauro, Edmonson: Dramatic Change in the Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 21 COLO. LAW. 687, 689-90 (1992) (discussing required hearings for Batson challenges).
67 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (1965).
68 Taylorv. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
6 See supra Part I.C.ii.

70

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3 46.

'

Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
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C. Effects of Eliminating Peremptory Challenges
i. Effects on JudicialEfficiency

Eliminating peremptory challenges would likely result in a flood of challenges
for cause. Litigants will have to use challenges for cause to eliminate any bias. Because
there is no peremptory challenge to fall back on for a semi-biased juror, litigants will be
required to make challenges for cause for any perceivably biased juror. These effects will
require additional use of judicial resources.
On the other hand, eliminating peremptory challenges could potentially require
less time for voir dire. Because litigants are only seeking to identify partial or biased
jurors on which to exercise a challenge for cause, no additional voir dire will be required
other than to identify those partial or biased jurors. Litigants will have no reason to further
probe the venire.
ii. Effects on the Fair andImpartialJury

Demonstrably partial or biased jurors are eliminated through challenges for
cause. 72 Jurors survive a challenge for cause if "the juror would render a fair and impartial
verdict based on the evidence presented at trial and the instructions given by the court." 73
Therefore, if challenges for cause work perfectly, abolishing peremptory challenges
should not have an effect on the fair and impartial jury.
However, challenges for cause might not completely accomplish the goal of
providing impartial and unbiased jurors. All venire persons will come through the door
with some type of experiences and background that lend to biases. The challenge for cause
sets a bar in which jurors who are demonstrably unable to separate their preconceived
notions from the case at hand will be struck from the jury. The peremptory challenge
allows litigants to strike jurors that fall below that line, but still present a concerning level
of partiality or extremity. 74 Without the peremptory challenge, litigants will be required to
rely solely on challenges for cause to secure a fair and impartial jury.
iii. Effects on the Defendant

Although the right to peremptory challenges "is one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused," 75 there is no Constitutionally guaranteed right to
peremptory challenges. 7 6 In contrast, "individual jurors themselves have a right to
nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures." 7 7 Individual jurors also have a right to equal
protection under the laws, 8 which extends to discrimination surrounding peremptory
E.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Skilling v. United States, 561
U.S. 358, 442 n.8 (2010).
73
People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Colo. 1986) (quoting People v. Wright, 672 P.2d 518, 520 (Colo.
1982)).
7 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) ("The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
* Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
E.g., Stilsonv. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). See also Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S.148, 149 (2009).
SJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140-41 (1994).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72
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strikes. 79 Eliminating peremptory challenges would deprive defendants of this important
right to remove perceivably biased jurors who were not subject to a challenge for cause.o
iv. Effects on Deliberations

One of the functions of peremptory challenges is to "eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides." 1 Abolishing the peremptory challenge would prevent these
"extremes" from being excluded from the jury. A jury room that includes these
"extremes" would undoubtedly increase the amount of opinions offered in deliberations,
thereby resulting in increased deliberation times and increased number of hung juries.
v. Effects on Prejudiceand Discrimination

-

Abolishing peremptory challenges and instead seating the first twelve jurors who
survive challenges for cause is the simplest and most effective manner to eliminate
prejudice and discrimination involved in peremptory challenges. Completely removing
race and racism as factors in peremptory challenges could be accomplished at the source
by abandoning peremptory challenges altogether.8 2
PART III
A. Practitioner Opinions Regarding Peremptory Challenges
Although peremptory challenges are not popular among judges8 3 or academic
commentators,8 4 litigators are in favor of keeping them. In a survey conducted by Jean
Montoya, "practitioners overwhelmingly described peremptory challenges as valuable."
81% of lawyers who answered a question regarding the value or peremptory challenges
"described peremptory challenges as having great value," ".18% described peremptory
challenges as have some value," and "[f]ewer than 1% described peremptory challenges as
having no value." 86
A question regarding the value of peremptory challenges revealed that 83% of
the responding prosecutors, 80% of the responding defense attorneys, 82% of the
responding state court practitioners, and 83% of the responding lawyers who had practiced
in both federal and state courts believe peremptory challenges are of "great value."87
Conversely, only 56% of the responding federal court practitioners indicated that they

7 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 ("[T]he component of the jury selection process at issue here, the State's
privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
o See People v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 303 (Colo. 2000) ("The function of peremptory challenges in a criminal
proceeding is to allow both the prosecution and the defense to secure a more fair and impartial jury by enabling
them to remove jurors whom they perceive as biased, even if the jurors are not subject to a challenge for
cause."), overruledby People v. Novotny, 320 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2014).
8 Swainv. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruledby Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
82 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to
distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to
ban them entirely from the criminal justice system.").
83 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
8 Montoya, supra note 66, at 1000.
8 Id.

Id at 1026 n. 102.
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believed peremptory challenges had great value." However, the exclusively federal court
practitioners made up a small sample of respondents. The main reasons lawyers cited in
indicating why peremptory challenges are valuable are that "peremptory challenges allow
litigants to exclude jurors with whom the attorney has "bad chemistry" or to exclude
jurors on the basis of "gut feeling." "9o
While respondents "felt that peremptory challenges had depreciated in value
following Batson and Wheeler," they indicated that an additional value peremptory
challenges hold is a level of control on behalf of litigants over the composition of the jury
because peremptories "allow litigants to exclude jurors on the basis of unprotected group
membership (e.g., occupation), to skew the panel in the client's favor by excluding
panelists in the opponent's favor, and to exclude the "screwballs" (the quirky,

unpredictable jurors)."" Respondents who felt peremptory challenges were only of some
value commented that their ability to discover biases was limited due to time and other
limits on voir dire.9 2 Both prosecutors and defense attorneys felt that peremptories have
diminished usefulness due to inadequate voir dire; specifically, "they noted inadequate
questioning of the jury panelists before the lawyers are called upon to exercise their
peremptory challenges as a problem." 93
Prosecutors in particular found "peremptory challenges valuable to shape a
working group of jurors" in the pursuit of obtaining a unanimous verdict.94 The
overwhelming weight of respondents support retaining peremptory challenges; "98% of
attorneys who answered the questions said that peremptory challenges should not be
eliminated.95 Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike shared the sentiment that peremptory
challenges should not be eliminated: 99% of responding prosecutors and 99% of
96
responding defense attorneys thought peremptory challenges should not be eliminated.
B. Effectiveness of Peremptory Challenges
While there is little evidence on the effectiveness of peremptory challenges, a
study by Hans Zeisel and Shari Seidman Diamond examines the effect of peremptory
challenges on the jury and verdict.9 7 Zeisel and Diamond conducted the study to discover
whether trial lawyers' use of peremptory challenges affect the outcome of the case.9 " In
this study, peremptorily excused jurors stayed in the courtroom as shadow jurors.99 At the
end of the trial, shadow jurors revealed how they would have voted in the case. 100 By
combining that knowledge with posttrial interviews of the real jurors, Zeisel and Diamond
were able to reconstruct the vote as it would have been had there been no peremptory
strikes.101 The reconstructed vote is what the result would have been if the first 12 jurors
88
89
90

9'
92

Id.
Id.

Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
id.

93

Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1009-10.
96 Id. at 1026 n. 139.
97 Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in A FederalDistrictCourt, 30 STAN. L. REv. 491, 491-92 (1978).
94

95

98
99

Id.

Id. at 492.

'~Id.

101

Id.
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in the venire had formed the jury - if only challenges for cause were made and not
peremptory challenges. Zeisel and Diamond then compared the result of the reconstructed
jury with the real jury, enabling them to "gauge the effect, if any, of the peremptory
2
challenges on the composition of the jury and its verdict." 10
The experiment was conducted with 12 criminal cases.103 Each case had three
juries: the real jury, the jury composed of peremptorily challenged jurors, and a jury
selected randomly from the remaining venire.10 4 Five out of the twelve cases produced
notable shifts in the probability of a guilty verdict. 105 In the remaining 7, however, "the
combined effect of challenges was minimal and did not produce the expectation that the
verdict of the "jury without challenges" would have differed from that of the real jury." 106
The full results were as follows: 10 7

COMPARISON OF THE RECONSTRUCTED "JURIES WITHOUT CHALLENGES" AND THE
REAL JURIES AFTER CHALLENGES
Percentage

Votes

On

Guilty

First

Ballot

Corresponding
Percentage
Probability That the
Verdict
Will
Be
Guiltyal

(1)

(2)

(3)

Case

"Jury

Real

No.

Without

Jury

"Jury Without
Challenges"

(5)
Real Actual
Jury Verdict

42
83
42
33
83
50
83
100
50
92
17
33

41
96
22
42
91
55
89
100
42
89
17
84

23
94
23
11
94
42
94
100
42
97
2
12

(4)

Challenges"
1 aal
2
3aaal

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

49
88
41
50
77
53
72
100
50
72
38
67

NG
G
NG
NG
G
NG
G
G
Hung
G
NG
NG

(4)

-

(3)

Percentage Shift in
Probability of Guilty
Verdict as a Result
of Challenges
- 18
-2
+ 1
-30
+3
- 13
+5
0
0
+8
-15
-72

alPercentages are interpolated from Graph 1. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
aalAssuming an initial vote of 5 to 7. See note 20 supra. If an initial vote of 6 to 6 is assumed, (1)
becomes 54% and (2) becomes 50%; if 4 to 8 is assumed, (1) becomes 44% and (2) becomes 33%.
aaaAssuming an initial vote of 5 to 7. If an initial vote of 6 to 6 is assumed, (1) becomes 46% and (2)
becomes 50%; if an initial vote of 4 to 8 is assumed, (1) becomes 36% and (2) becomes 33%.

102
103

id
I

105

Id at 499.
Id. at 507.

106

Id.

107

id.

104
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The data was then used to obtain an idea of how well the litigants used their
allotted peremptory challenges to excuse jurors who would have voted against their side if
on the jury.os Zeisel and Diamond formulated a performance index for the attorneys, with
+100 representing optimal challenge performance and -100 representing worst challenge
performance.109 The results were as follows: 10
ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE INDEX

Case No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Prosecutor
+23
-59
+44
-20
+31
-61
+9
-32

Defense
+46
+6
+30
+44
+48
-11
-10
-62

9

01

+12

10
11
12
Average (Mean)
Average Fluctuation Around the Mean

+58
+62
-61
-0.5
±38

+46
+36
+19
+17.0
±25

at The prosecutor exercised only one challenge, and the challenged juror did not participate in the
study.
The collective scores do not indicate a particularly positive performance of the
attorneys in their use of peremptory strikes." The averages indicate that the prosecution
made about as many good challenges as bad ones, and the defense did not score much
better. 112 The averages are misleading however because the surrounding deviations from
the average are so large. 113 While the average scores hover around zero, in some cases the
attorneys performed very well, and in others they performed very poorly. 1 14
C. The Peremptory Paradox
As previously mentioned, one of the main reasons attorneys value peremptory
strikes is that excluding jurors allows the attorney to "skew the panel," which is done "by
excluding panelists in the opponent's favor."' 1 5 However, both sides get to exercise
peremptory challenges. Therefore, both sides have an opportunity to "skew the panel" or
exclude "panelists in the opponent's favor." The panel cannot be skewed in favor of both
the prosecution and the defense at the same time. This paradox could potentially cancel
out the benefits peremptory challenges afford each side.

.sId. at 513-14.
0 9
1 Id. at 514.
.oId. at 516.

."Id. at 517.
Id.
Id.
114 Id.
112
113

"

Montoya, supra note 66, at 1001.
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While it is possible for peremptory challenges to hold value for both sides simultaneously,
it is not possible for both sides to be simultaneously advantaged by peremptory strikes.
Peremptory challenges could be favored simultaneously by both the prosecution and
defense, for, say, resulting in more accurate jury decisions, or a fairer decision making
process. But peremptories cannot provide the prosecution a systemic advantage over the
defense and the defense a systemic advantage over the prosecution at the same time.
Therefore, there are only three possibilities for advantage with regards to peremptory
strikes: (1) the prosecution is advantaged, (2) the defense is advantaged, or (3) neither side
is advantaged.
As shown through the deviations in Jean Montoya's study, there is no clear
answer regarding which side benefits from the use of peremptory challenges. There are,
however, a multitude of reasons why the use of peremptory challenges would benefit one
side over the other.
D. Reasons The Defendant or Prosecution Would be Advantaged Over the Other
i. Location

The location of a criminal jury trial will likely affect which party will be
advantaged by peremptory challenges. In a county that has a large group of a certain
demographic, it may behoove one side to peremptorily challenge members of that
demographic if that demographic is perceivably biased towards a party. While such use of
peremptory strikes is potentially rooted in stereotypes, the strategy may be advantageous.
For example, if a criminal case was being tried in a jurisdiction that contains a large
majority of older, conservative individuals, a defendant charged with a drug crime relating
to marijuana may benefit from peremptorily challenging individuals from that
demographic. On the other hand, if the case was being tried in a jurisdiction that contains
a large majority of younger, liberal individuals who have been exposed to a more tolerant
view of marijuana use, the prosecution may benefit from peremptorily challenging
individuals from that demographic.
However, both the prosecution and defense could take advantage of this
jurisdictional situation. For example, in the conservative jurisdiction mentioned above, it
seems as though the defendant would benefit most from peremptory challenges because he
has the opportunity to strike members from the majority. But it only takes one juror to
hang a jury - so the prosecution might benefit from using a peremptory to strike the one
minority juror that could have hung the jury. On the same token, a defendant might benefit
in the liberal jurisdiction mentioned above by using a preemptory to strike the one
minority juror that would keep a jury from acquitting.
These fictitious jurisdictions highlight the peremptory paradox in that peremptory
challenges hold value for both sides simultaneously, but cannot simultaneously advantage
one side over the other.
ii. Attorney Skill

The attorneys' abilities will likely influence which side will be advantaged by the
use of peremptory strikes. If an attorney is not able to effectively conduct voir dire and
exercise meaningful peremptory challenges, the challenges will likely not be
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advantageous. If an attorney is able to effectively conduct voir dire and exercise
meaningful peremptory challenges, the results of such could be extremely advantageous.
The skill with which the attorney conducts voir dire will dictate whether the attorney
chooses the "right" venireman to excuse.
iii. PresidingJudge

The judge presiding over the criminal case will potentially play a role in what
side is advantaged by peremptory challenges. If the presiding judge tends to grant one
side's challenges for cause more often than another's, then the peremptory challenges will
likely be more useful to the side that was less successful with the challenges for cause.
The litigant for this side who was unsuccessful with the challenges for cause will then
have to decide whether to use the peremtories on those who survived the challenges for
cause. Conversely, the litigant who prevailed with challenges for cause will then have the
autonomy to use the peremptories on other venire persons.
CONCLUSION

Peremptory challenges have a long history, rooted in tradition and constitutional
values. While there are many benefits to the use of peremptory challenges in criminal jury
trials, these benefits are potentially overstated because the challenges cannot
simultaneously advantage both the prosecution and the defense. There are however, many
factors that will influence which side is advantaged. Despite of the potential for the
opposing side to be advantaged, peremptory challenges are overwhelmingly favored by
practitioners and will likely continue to be in the future. A look at the potential
advantageous possibilities of peremptory challenges will provide practitioners insight into
how to most effectively use their challenges.
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